The Activities of Special Operations Executive in Turkey
2004; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 40; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00263200410001700365
ISSN1743-7881
Autores Tópico(s)Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes SOE was created immediately after the fall of France in July 1940 in order to undermine the enemy war effort by means of subversive activities against the enemy overseas and also the formation and encouragement of secret armies in the occupied territories. During this time SOE evolved from a centralized London-based organization to a decentralized service with operational units responsible to the Allied theatre commanders in different parts of the world. The organization was kept as secret as possible. It had a ministerial head, whose role was nominally to take responsibility for the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW). SOE and the ministry were kept wholly separate, although MEW cover proved a useful shield for SOE agents, and each was able to supply the other with information regarding economic policies abroad and possible strategies for economic warfare. SOE was initially divided into three sections: SO1, which dealt with propaganda; SO2, which was concerned with operations; and SO3, which dealt with planning. SO1 was eventually split off to form the Political Warfare Executive in 1941, and SO3 disappeared into oblivion. In effect SO2 became SOE. A Section D – the sabotage section of the Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6 – co-ordinating centre had been established in Istanbul in August 1940, with duties also in the Balkans. Its activities were gradually brought within the remit of the Middle East mission. By 1943 SOE Cairo had organized operations into Yugoslavia and Greece, and other countries of the Middle East. See SOE Operations in Africa and the Middle East: a Guide to the Records in the Public Record Office (Kew: PRO Publications, 1998), p.2. PRO FO 371/30097, R 81169/240/44, Bowker minute, 29 Aug. 1941. PRO FO 371/30097, R8169/240/44, JP(41)689(S), Report by Joint Planning Staff, 28 Aug. 1941. PRO FO 371/30097, R 8309/240/44, C-in-C, Middle East, to Chiefs of Staff, No.GR/00425, 7 Sept. 1941. Eden abandoned his earlier idea that the existence of a plan should be concealed from Knatchbull-Hugessen since it would create further difficulties when the time arrived for the Taurus scheme. Knatchbull-Hugessen agreed, in another connection, to the maintenance of SOE's existing contacts in Turkey as well as the establishment of dumps of explosives and their employment for such purposes. He knew nothing about the Taurus scheme and therefore the dumps to the establishment of which he had agreed could only be used in connection with the schemes he knew about and were in no circumstances to be connected with the Taurus project. Otherwise, if the plans came to the knowledge of the Ambassador he might demand the immediate removal, bag and baggage, of all SOE personnel in Turkey. PRO FO 371/30097, R 8584/310G, Howard to Mallay, 5 Oct. 1941. PRO FO 371/30097/8309/240/44, Commander-in-Chiefs, Middle East to Chiefs of Staff, No.00491, 6 Sept. 1941. PRO FO 371/30097, R 8387/240/44, Dixon minute, 11 Sept. 1941. Knatchbull-Hugessen telegraphed to the Foreign Office stating that such discontented elements could be Armenians and Kurds. The Ambassador reminded him that they were already being worked by the Germans, and the Turkish Government was aware of this. ‘If we started similar activities we should lose our whole influence with the Turkish Government who would immediately become aware of what we were doing.’ PRO FO 371/30095, R 7445/240/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, No.1865, 1 Aug. 1941. PRO FO 371/30095, R 7445/240/44, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Foreign Office, No.1865, 1 Aug. 1941. PRO FO 371/30095, R 7275/240/22, Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 22 July 1941. According to the information given to him, this agent was occupied in transporting certain material from Istanbul to a foreign country. The same agent, after police examination, was found to be carrying a magnetic mine with which the German steamship Arcadia was to be blown up. When Hugessen intervened to obtain the release of the agent referred to, he created more than a suspicion in the minds of Turkish officials that he was connected with the affair and that his connection with it had the object of compromising Turkey with Germany. PRO FO 371/30096, R 4936/240/44, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Foreign Office, No.1043, 3 May 1941. For instance, George Dimitroff was the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party and the sole organizer of the only mutinous opposition to the Government before the German occupation. As the SOE were busy preparing in case of invasion they were anxious to have him in Turkey. The Foreign Office, realizing that Hugessen was unlikely to agree to any cover post for him, thought that arrangements should be made through its secret organizations for the Turkish police to be squared in regard to Dimitroff's sojourn in Istanbul. As so often happened in these cases, SOE sent Dimitroff to Istanbul as a fait accompli and took it on themselves to arrange cover for him as assistant translator at the British Consulate General without informing Knatchbull-Hugessen. No doubt Dimitroff was a safe bet in that both the Germans and Bulgarians had a price on his head. In these circumstances, while Turkey was full of the fear of Germany, that the Turkish authorities might wink either at his activities in Turkey or his attachment to the staff of the British Embassy seemed to betray on the part of SOE a complete misunderstanding of the Turkish policy and outlook at the time. In this connection the Ambassador once again outlined that ‘the Turkish Government were most anxious to avoid participation in the war and that consequently they would do all they could to avoid action which the enemy considered provocative’. Moreover, cover of this description had already been given to far too many persons of doubtful antecedents and behaviour, over whose mysterious activities the Ambassador did not seek control. After all there was no alternative but to remove Dimitroff from Turkey. PRO FO 371/30096, R 7688/240/44, Bowker minute, 5 Aug. 1941; PRO FO 371/30095, R 7396/240/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, No.1854, 30 July 1941. PRO FO 371/30095, RR 4936/240/44, Cadogan to Hugessen, No.1276, 6 June 1941. PRO FO 371/30095, R 7445/240/44, Hugessen to FO, No.1865, 1 Aug. 1941. PRO HS 3/217, de Chastelain to AD, No.68/13/18, 10 Aug. 1941. Ibid. PRO HS/3/217, A.G. de Chastelain to AD., No.68/13/18, 10 Aug. 1941. The responsibility of the Middle East Mission included also Palestine, Arabia, Iraq, Persia, the Balkans and Hungary and North Africa; Egypt, Italian East Africa, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Libya and Tunisia. Field Commander Harris Burland (code name: D/H44) exercised supervision over all activities directed from Turkey in the following countries: Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary. PRO HS 3/ 219, the SOE report on their Staff and their duties in Turkey. For instance Bekir Kara (A/H140) was very good friend of Recep Peker, Minister of the Interior. Such a contact among high ranking officials enabled SOE to gain control of material for their activities. It also helped the SOE agents to be freed when they got into trouble. PRO HS 3/221 Harrop to SOE, Middle East, 573/60/18, 21 May 1943.) He worked first in Istanbul for SOE in 1941. While Adnan and his wife, Emine, were working for SOE in Istanbul, Adnan was arrested and exiled for a while. After their terms of exile had been relaxed, the SOE in Istanbul sent them to İzmir. PRO HS 3/221 Harrop to SOE, Middle East, 573/60/18, 21 May 1943. PRO HS 3/ 219, the SOE report on their Staff and their duties in Turkey. Ibid. There have been various estimates of the number of his followers, but all were probably exaggerated, especially as the bonds of loyalty within the Kurdish tribes of Turkey had become noticeably weaker during the previous 20 years. PRO HS 3/221, de Chastelain to Directorate of SOE Middle East, no.1784/13/18, 8 Feb. 1943. SOE asked MEW in this connection to persuade the Shell Company to instruct their representative to co-operate with its representative in the town. The Shell Company did not raise any objections. PRO FO 371/30095, Brook (MEW) to Foreign Office, 10 July 1941; Petroleum Department to Dixon, 29 July 1941. PRO HS 3/217, D/HO to de Chastelain, No. 641, 25 June 1941. PRO HS 3/243, W. Harris Burland (D/H44 to Chastelaine, 51/44/18, 18 Feb.1942. PRO FO 371/30095, R 7245/1310/G, Sargent to Jebb, 30 July 1941. He had a post in the Foreign Office, but acted as Chief Executive Officer of the SOE. PRO FO 371/30095, R 7245, Jebb to Cadogan, No.SC/2634/83, 5 Aug. 1941 PRO FO 371/30095, R 9731/240/44, Jebb to Sargent, SC/2928/83/1, 5 Nov. 1941. Ibid. Sargent to Jebb, 13 Nov. 1941. One of the leading agitators in Istanbul was the future Gauleiter of Lebanon, Emir Adel Arslan. The Park Hotel, and some cafés in Istanbul were regular meeting places of the conspirators. The brother of Arslan, Shekib Arslan, in Berlin, was the principal adviser on propaganda in the Arab countries to the Grand Mufti, who directed Arab broadcasts. Emir Arslan was formerly a great anti-Turkish propagandist and furiously opposed Turkey's recovery of Alexandrette (Hatay). In Antakia agents for this propaganda had been established, including people from Baghdad, Teheran and Kabul, all specialists. The remaining refugees were organized into cells, headed by a number of Gauleiters. Morcos, a Lebanese Christian who took the Mufti to Bari and Berlin, was another clever agent in Istanbul. He was a brilliant linguist and spoke perfect Arabic, Hebrew and Kurdish as well as English. He had an Italian diplomatic passport. HS 3/218, DHO to Directorate of Special Operations, No.183/198/inf., 14 Dec. 1941. HS 3/218, DHO to Directorate of Special Operations, No.183/198/inf., 14 Dec. 1941 PRO FO 371/30095, R 4789/240/44, Hugessen to Cadogan, No.1016, 30 April 1941. PRO HS 3/217, Edmond to de Chastelain, No.A.903, 18 Aug. 1941. PRO HS 3/218, SOE in Istanbul to Directorate of Special Operations, No 4888, 31 October 1941. In their assessment, the Kurds tended to bear Britain a grudge for not implementing the promises – real or imagined – of autonomy made to them after the First World War, and though they may be described as being anti-government rather than anti-Turkish, they might be persuaded to seize an auspicious moment to create considerable difficulties. PRO HS 3/ 217, L/DI.1 to D/H.V, No.M.I.3 (6)/296/41, 27 Aug. 1941. PRO HS 3/221, Chastelain to the Directorate of the SOE (SOE Middle East), 1734/13/18, 8 Feb. 1943. HS 3/221, Harrop to SOE, 152/60/18, 28 April 1942. In the end, the SOE made contact with Adnan through his wife. The couple found a small apartment in a house containing one other apartment. It was suitable for a W/T station. Adnan got a job as a cashier and accountant in a small hat factory owned by his nephew. Harrop arranged that his name should be shown on the official pay list of the factory, and that the amount of SOE's subsidy to him, TL 200, was paid by the factory as his salary, and reimbursed to his nephew privately. This was a cover for him to avoid comment. Adnan found Suat Erol, a radio operator who had been employed part-time on Turkish ships but had a small water-transporting business which kept him ashore most of the time. SOE offered him a retaining fee of TL 100 per month, in return for which he would stay on shore permanently. His code name was A/H58. Their code names were A/54 and A/55. HS 3/221 Harrop D/H60 to SOE, 146/60/SMY, 20 April 1942. PRO HS 3/221, Harrop to Directorate of SOE, No.236/60/18, 20 July 1942. PRO HS 3/221, Harrop to SOE in Cairo, No.189/60/18, 3 June 1942. Adnan's cover job was that of carpet dealer in this town as this would give him an excuse to travel about the country, and SOE gave him TL2,000 to set up this business as cover. PRO HS 3/221, Harrop to SOE, No.278/60/18, 2 Sept. 1942. The town to which Adnan moved was particularly favourable for the work of SOE. There was little police control and also the population was mixed and primitive. There was a great number of discontented people because of government inability to maintain supplies. There had already been serious riots in the town caused by the government's policy towards the peasants. Adnan met some of the local leaders and was convinced that they would co-operate. These men had dumps and ammunition. However, Harrop warned him that it was not their policy at the moment to enter into relations with elements hostile to the regime and he should therefore make no approach to these men. But there should be no danger in remaining on friendly terms with them, trying to gain their confidence. These men would take action in any event as soon as there was trouble in the country and it should be possible, if it were worked skilfully, to arrange that their actions were directed against the Germans. PRO HS 3/233, Harris Burland report on Commercial Shipping activities. PRO HS 3/229, file No.T6/6, SOE interview with Alexander Cadogan on 24 June 1943. PRO HS 3/233, Harris Burland's report on Commercial Shipping activities, 30 Nov. 1942. PRO HS 3/232, Burland to SOE in Cairo, No.86/44/18, 27 April 1942. PRO HS 3/232, Burland to Bridgeman, 12 April 1942. PRO HS 3/232, Burland to Minister of Economic Warfare, 12 April 1942. The exports were carried almost exclusively in Turkish caiques plying between Istanbul and Burgas. There were estimated to be about 250 vessels engaged in the trade, the average capacity being about 60 tons. As a matter of fact the same project had been proposed by United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in Istanbul, but it had been turned down by their London headquarters on the grounds that no guarantee could be obtained that the vessels, when constructed, would be allowed to pass under a foreign flag. London's worry was that if retained under a Turkish flag, they would form part of the general shipping pool and would not necessarily operate to the benefit of British interests. However, Dr Schucht of the Siemens Halske Co. Berlin, who was well known in Istanbul, succeeded in overcoming such difficulties. It was owing to his help that the Turkish government solved the difficulties which arose in the erection of a frequency telephone installation. W.S. Morgan to SOE London, No.111/22/18, 20 Sept. 1942. PRO HS 3/232, Harris Burland to R. Jordan (British Commercial Counsellor in Ankara), No.278/44/18, 5 Oct. 1942. PRO HS 3/229, file No.T6/6 PRO HS 3/231, A.D.S. to Head of SOE, No.6/T1/401, 14 May 1941. PRO HS 3/219, Burland to Directorate of Special Operations, No.1295/44/18, 27 Nov. 1943. PRO HS 3/231, A.D.S. to Head of SOE, No.6/T1/401, 14 May 1941. PRO HS 3/227, Report on Turkey, No.456, 25 Nov. 1942.
Referência(s)