Democratic Kampuchea: An Updated View
1977; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Volume: 1977; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1355/seaa77g
ISSN0377-5437
Autores Tópico(s)Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography
ResumoIntroduction The precipitous departure from Phnom Penh on 13 April 1975 of the U.S. Ambassador signalled the end of one of the most costly and devastating chapters, in human and material terms, in the history of the Khmers. Five days later, the victorious Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea marched triumphantly into Phnom Penh without encountering any armed resistance from the disintegrating Khmer Republic's Army. For the inhabitants of Phnom Penh the relief was obvious as the war had caused considerable hardship to almost every Kampuchean family with the exception of those who benefited from the war looting. Press reports {Le Monde, 9 May 1975) described the enthusiasm with which the inhabitants of Phnom Penh greeted the liberating People's Army of Kampuchea. But this excitement was to be short-lived. Within hours of its arrival, the liberating army ordered the evacuation of Phnom Penh and other major cities in Kampuchea. Orders were earned out swiftly as witnessed by those foreigners who were left behind at the French Embassy in Phnom Penh. Within forty-eight hours the capital :ity was practically empty. Even patients in the hospitals were forced to leave with the exception of those who could not be moved without endangenng their lives. Apparently those who remained were mostly soldiers of the People's Army who were wounded during the final days of the battle for Phnom Penh. At first there were contradictory theories for the reasons behind these dramatic measures of emptying the cities. One such theory analyzed this act as the reflection of the Kampuchean tradition in history that new leaders would build new capitals after they came to power, in order to sanctify their new reign. Another well-known theory was that the new r?gime wanted to erase the consumer society, the very image of a decadent people influenced by Western civilization. And, of course, there was the usual bloodbath theme which equated communism with revenge md brutality. Indeed, these theories are very difficult to prove or disprove. One way to assess the situation with a minimum of subjectivity is to note the explanation given by the present r?gime's leaders. In a speech in New York City on 6 September 1975, Ieng Sary the Deputy Premier of the Gouvernement Royal de l'Union Nationale du Kampuchea (GRUNK) gave three main reasons which compelled the new government to empty the cities, Phnom Penh in particular. One factor was the swollen population of Phnom Penh which had increased from 600,000 before the war to nearly 3,000,000 at the time of the defeat of the Lon Nol r?gime. With the majority of the population of Phnom Penh refugees from the countryside, it was physically impossible for the new r?gime to feed this enormously inflated population. International food relief assistance
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