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The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 98; Issue: 402 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00358530902895428

1474-029X

Danielle Beswick,

International Development and Aid

Abstract Abstract Using evidence from the case of Congo, focusing in particular on the eastern Kivu provinces, this article argues that the enduring presence of warlords, and the influence of their international supporters, remains inadequately addressed by current practices of post-conflict state-building. The dominant contemporary model of state-building currently focuses on the promotion of liberal democracy as a way of avoiding future conflict, highlighting in particular the key role of elections. Simultaneously, it emphasises the importance of security and developing a state monopoly on violence. However, in the pursuit of both these ends in Congo, warlord politics and interference from regional powers continue to pose significant challenges. Exploring key aspects of the rebel movement led by Laurent Nkunda in east Congo (2004–2009), this article will illustrate some of the challenges warlordism poses in Congo, focusing particularly on the shortcomings of a ‘single sovereign’ approach to state-building. In conclusion, the experience of the Kivus indicates that an approach recognising multiple sovereignties or emphasising significant decentralisation may be more appropriate. Without such a shift in emphasis the notion that Congo is, or will soon become, an empirically functional state is perhaps wishful thinking. Key Words: Congogovernancestate-buildingwarlordsLaurent KabilaLaurent NkundaKivuTutsiHutugenocideRwanda Notes 1. Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by Laurent Kabila in 1997. In this article, the country will be referred to as Zaire when discussing the Mobutu era and Congo thereafter, not to be confused with the neighbouring state Congo-Brazzaville. 2. By the end of the second war in central Africa (1998–2003), Congo was seen by many as a failed state. As Bøås and Jennings point out, liberal approaches to state-building have a tendency to view failed states “through the dominant lens of Western security interests” whereby differences in the state targeted for reconstruction are inevitably overlooked or disregarded and “policy interventions thus assume a standardised form on the basis of what has worked in other places before” (2005, p. 388). 3. UK Department for International Development, ‘Statement from Hilary Benn and Lord Triesman on announcement of provisional results in the DRC presidential elections,’ 17 November 2006. 4. Trade ties across the Rwanda-DRC border are also significant, particularly in goods such as oil and potatoes. 5. Banyamulenge are a largely Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi population, based primarily in the South Kivu region of DRC around the hills of Mulenge. They are primarily descendants of economic migrants who left Ruanda-Urundi in the late 19th century, supplemented by Rwandans fleeing persecution after Rwandan independence. Since Congo's independence the East, which is also home to a Hutu population in North Kivu, has experienced successive conflicts over access to land and the question of who is actually ‘Congolese’. 6. Not least in 1996, when the state supported a decree which “stripped Zairian citizenship from people of Rwandan-Tutsi ancestry and directed them to give up their property” (Reno, 1998 Reno, W. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States, London: Lynne Reiner. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 161). 7. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo. 8. For example a Rwandan, James Kabarebe, had become the DRC Army Chief of Staff. Kabarebe currently holds this same position in Rwanda. 9. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. 10. Once again, Rwanda's leaders felt that their interests in tackling the refugee issue could be best served by direct military intervention. This demonstrated a lack of confidence not only in the Kabila regime after its cooperation with the genocidaires, but also in the ability of others such as the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) to provide the degree of security on the DR Congo-Rwanda border that the Rwandan government demanded. This lack of confidence in MONUC is also reflected in articles by Rwanda's pro-government media. See ‘Strange UN force in the DRC,’The New Times (Kigali), 4–6 November 2005, p. 9. 11. Coltan is an abbreviation of Columbite-Tantalite, an ore found in abundance in Congo, which is used in electronic equipment including mobile phones and computer systems. Similar accusations were also made against Uganda (Points 135–142). 12. See for example Vinci (2005 Vinci, A. 2005. The strategic use of fear by the Lords Resistance Army. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 16(3): 360–381. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) on the manifestation of this phenomena with regard to the insurgency in northern Uganda. 13. By 1999, the RCD had split into two factions, one backed by Rwanda (the RCD-Goma) and the other by Uganda (RCD-Bunia.) The two clashed in 2004, reportedly over access to mineral wealth in east Congo, and by 2003 the RCD-Goma controlled over a third of Congo's territory (Tull, 2003 Tull, D. 2003. A reconfiguration of political order? The state of the state in North Kivu (DR Congo). African Affairs, 102(408): 429–446. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 434). 14. These reports are based on a confidential UN report, which claimed that the FARDC had been cooperating with Hutu militias to fight Nkunda in 2008, whilst Rwanda had supplied aid and child soldiers to Nkunda to back his campaign. See ‘DR Congo rebels “stalling talks,”’ BBC News Online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/africa/7776990.stm, accessed 11 December 2008. 15. See also the CNDP Programme which calls for ‘Adoption of federalism as an innovative and performing form of political governance of the country’ in CNDP Seven Point Programme, http://www.cndp-congo.org/minimumprog.php, point 4, accessed 20 January 2009. 16. The elections did succeed in bringing together some of Congo's key warlords and militia leaders, though there is ample evidence of corruption and inefficiency which suggests that their commitment to liberal democracy remains lip-service (de Goede, 2006 de Goede, M. J. 2006. “Elections in the Congo: ending the war and legitimising warlords”. In Outside the Ballot Box: Preconditions for Elections in Southern Africa 2005/6, Edited by: J. Minnie. 91–96. Windhoek: Media Institute of Southern Africa. [Google Scholar], p. 94). As de Goede also points out, the international efforts to incorporate warlords into the peace process and later to secure their participation in elections may encourage warlord behaviour in the future, “reproducing conflict instead of ending it” (2006, p. 92). 17. The possibility of Rwanda re-intervening in Congo was raised even as early as 2005, as reflected in local newspaper reports in Kigali which commented: “History should whisper into Kabila's ears that this dilly-dallying with a plethora of rebel groups is not bound to profit him in any way, other than putting his country in another round of ‘African world war.’” See ‘DRC-a failed state,’The New Times (Rwanda), 30 September–10 October 2005, p. 9. 18. Ostensibly invited by Rwanda to Kigali to discuss operations against the Hutu militias in Eastern Congo, Nkunda was arrested by his erstwhile backers in January 2009. Rwanda's actions in arresting Nkunda may seem surprising. However, they must be viewed from the perspective of the Rwandan regime, which has economic interests in the Kivus. Until recently these interests, as well as Rwanda's border with Congo, were believed to be protected by Nkunda and his forces, but a shift in focus from regional power to national destabilisation is no longer in Rwanda's interests (International Crisis Group, 2003 International Crisis Group. The Kivus: the forgotten crucible of the Congo conflict, International Crisis Group. Africa Report, No. 56. [Google Scholar]). It is likely that Kigali will now seek a new proxy in the region and attempt to consolidate their networks of influence in Kivu during their joint-operations with the FARDC.