The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value
2004; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 114; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/381694
ISSN1539-297X
AutoresWłodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen,
Tópico(s)Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessArticlesThe Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value*Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow‐RasmussenWlodek Rabinowicz Search for more articles by this author and Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 114, Number 3April 2004 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/381694 Views: 557Total views on this site Citations: 218Citations are reported from Crossref © 2004 by The University of Chicago. 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