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Is Merit in the Milk Powder? PursuingPuññain contemporary Sri Lanka

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14639940802312741

1476-7953

Jeffrey Samuels,

Indian and Buddhist Studies

Abstract This article examines merit making in contemporary Sri Lankan practice. Exploring the role of emotions, most generally defined as "happiness in the heart/mind," in this important Buddhist activity, this article seeks not only to move beyond a more mechanical view of merit making as generalized exchange, but also to introduce an affective quality to the notion of intention (cetanā). Finally, this article questions the tendency to judge Buddhist behavior and appearance solely against the norms set forth in the Buddhist monastic code by investigating how people's histories, experiences, and backgrounds shape their own understandings of who constitutes an ideal monastic. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this article was presented at the South Asia Seminar Series, University of Texas, Austin. The author would like to thank those who attended for encouraging me to think in new directions. The author would particularly like to thank Oliver Freiberger, Janice Leoshko, Lester Kurtz, and Patrick Olivelle for their suggestions and valuable insights. The author would also like to express appreciation toward Kate Crosby and Jonathan Walters for their remarks as well as Benedicte Bossut for her comments—both substantive and editorial. Notes 1. The 10 wholesome actions that are said to accrue merit are: (1) giving (dāna), (2) being morally upright (sīla), (3) meditating (bhāvanā), (4) giving/transferring merit (patti ), (5) rejoicing in the merit of others (pattānumodanā), (6) rendering service (to others) (veyyāvacca), (7) honoring others (apacāya), (8) preaching (desanā), (9) listening (to the teachings) (suti), and (10) having correct views (di hiju). 2. Similar discussions of the pre-eminence of giving in making merit is found in Tambiah (1970 Tambiah, S. J. 1970. Buddhism and the spirit cults in North-East Thailand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar], 148), Keyes (1983 Keyes, C. F. 1983. "Merit-transference in the Kammic theory of popular Theravada Buddhism". In Karma: An anthropological inquiry, Edited by: Keyes, C. F. and Daniels, E. V. 261–86. Berkeley: University of California Press. [Google Scholar], 274), and Spiro (1982 Spiro, M. E. 1982. Buddhism and society: A great tradition and its Burmese vicissitudes, 2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published 1970) [Google Scholar], 103). 3. See note 18 below for an interesting interpretation of this commonly held view. 4. Although some scholarship on giving has made reference to the emotions, those discussions have centered primarily on the wholesome activity of rejoicing in the merit of others (pattānumodanā). 5. As in several other Asian contexts (Brown 2001 Brown, S. 2001. The journey of one Buddhist nun: Even against the wind, Albany: State University of New York Press. [Google Scholar], 9), the term hita is most appropriately translated as heart/mind. While this term, which is quite pervasive in the daily conversations of monks and lay people, may be translated as mind, I was told by most of my informants that the English term mind is too limited. When I began asking lay people and monks to show me their hita, many of them, after first pointing to their heart, pointed to their head, indicating both its emotional and cognitive function. While the term hita—which refers to something quite different from the Sinhala terms for mind (manasa, mana, or mana ) and heart (hada, hadavata, or hr aya)—sometimes appears in phrases that would warrant 'mind' as a more appropriate translation (such as to cultivate or develop the hita [hita vä enewa] or to think (hitanavā/sitanavā), in other contexts (e.g. feeling hurt [hita ridenavā]; feeling broken, as in a broken heart [hita binduna]; feeling happy or glad [hitē satu a]; or falling for something attractive, such as falling in love [hita vetuna]), the term hita may be more appropriately translated as 'heart'. This dual function of hita may point back to Indian conceptions of the mind as being located in the heart. I would like to thank Patrick Olivelle for bringing this to my attention. 6. This point is raised in Philip Almond's Almond, P. C. 1988. The British discovery of Buddhism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] The British Discovery of Buddhism (1988 Almond, P. C. 1988. The British discovery of Buddhism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 37; see also Collins 1998 Collins, S. 1998. Nirvana and other Buddhist felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 56) where he writes that: 'Buddhism had become by the middle of the nineteenth century a textual object based in Western institutions. Buddhism as it came to be ideally spoken of through the editing, translating, and studying of its ancient texts could then be compared with its contemporary appearance in the Orient. And Buddhism, as it could be seen in the East, compared unfavorably with its ideal textual exemplifications contained in the libraries, universities, colonial offices, and missionary societies of the West. It was possible then, as a result of this, to combine a positive evaluation of a Buddhism textually located in the West with a negative evaluation of its Eastern instances.' 7. Steven Kemper (1978 Kemper, S. 1978. "Buddhism without Bhikkhus: The Sri Lanka Vinaya Vardena society". In Religion and legitimation of power in Sri Lanka, Edited by: Smith, Bardwell L. 212–35. Chambersburg: Anima Books. [Google Scholar], 213) raises this point in his article on the Vinaya Vardhana Society, where he writes: 'In the end Gombrich's stance is an "outside" one. What finally interests him is an Indological question: can current precepts be judged to be consistent with commentatorial Buddhism and thus be called orthodox … [which] he appraises … not in terms of his informants' sense of the religion but in terms of his own acute knowledge of the Pāli texts.' In another of his articles (1971a), Gombrich is equally concerned with deducing the degree to which Buddhist practices, in this case merit transference, correspond to canonical Buddhism. For a different stance regarding how best to make sense of this important Buddhist ritual, see Keyes (1983 Keyes, C. F. 1983. "Merit-transference in the Kammic theory of popular Theravada Buddhism". In Karma: An anthropological inquiry, Edited by: Keyes, C. F. and Daniels, E. V. 261–86. Berkeley: University of California Press. [Google Scholar]). 8. Although I will in the remainder of this article complicate somewhat Gombrich's understanding of cetanā as intentionality, it is important to note that his view of the role that intention plays in merit-making is consonant with many sections of the Pāli canonical texts. In the Sa yutta Nikāya (I.32), for instance, we read that when a person gives with faith and with a purified mind, then food accrues to that one [who gives], both in this world and the next (ye na dadanti saddhāya vippasannena cetasā, tameva anna bhajati asmi loke parambhi ca). Although this passage points to the need for acts of giving to be accompanied by a pure mind and thoughts of faith, other passages in the canon point to a much wider range of factors that affect merit. In the Dīgha Nikāya (II.357), for example, we read not only that giving without a sense of respect bears little fruit, but also that one should give with proper care, with one's hands, with proper respect, and with attention ('sakkacca dāna detha, sahatthā dāna detha, cittikata dāna detha, anapaviddha dāna detha'). In the A guttara Nikāya (III.415), for example, not only do we find a statement that intention is karma (literally: I call intention, oh monks, karma [cetanāha bhikkhave kamma vadāmi]) but also (III.172) that a good person should give with faith (saddhāya dānam deti), carefully (sakkaccam dānam deti), at the proper time (kālena dānam deti), with an unconstrained mind (anuggahitacitto dānam deti), and without hurting oneself or others (attānañ ca parañ ca anupahacca dānam deti). Finally, in the Majjhima Nikāya (III.24) we find a passage about how a good person gives gifts carefully, with his hands, with respect, with purity (of mind), and with a view that something will come (of it) ('sappuriso sakkacca dāna deti, sahatthā dāna deti, cittīkatvā dāna deti, parisuddha dāna deti, āgamanadi hiko dāna deti. Eva kho bhikkhave, sappuriso sappurisadāna deti'). All translations of Pāli and Sinhala phrases are mine unless otherwise noted. 9. In the following chapter, Gombrich (1971b Gombrich, R. 1971b. Precept and practice: Traditional Buddhism in the rural highlands of Ceylon, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Google Scholar], 46) similarly writes: 'Buddhist doctrine agrees with Kant that what counts is intention, not effect … Karma is nothing more or less than intention (cētanāva)'. 10. The same two factors—the size of the gift and the spiritual recipient—are also discussed in Melford Spiro's (1982 Spiro, M. E. 1982. Buddhism and society: A great tradition and its Burmese vicissitudes, 2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published 1970) [Google Scholar], 106f. and 112) study of Burmese Buddhism. 11. Besides mentioning the often-recited 'iti pi so' formula that describes the sa gha as an unsurpassable field of merit of this world, Gombrich does not discuss with any great detail the passages where the need to locate a virtuous recipient is discussed. Suffice it to say, however, that there are a number of passages in which the need to locate a virtuous recipient is raised. In a conversation ensuing between the Buddha and King Pasenadi, for instance, the king asks the Buddha 'Verily, where, oh venerable one, does giving result in great fruit (kattha pana bhante dinna mahapphalam'ti)?' The Buddha is purported to have responded to this questions by saying 'Giving to a person who is virtuous, oh king, bears great fruit, not to someone who lacks virtue (sīlvato kho mahārāja dinna mahapphala no tathā dussīle)'. The same sutta (Sa yutta Nikāya I.99f.) goes on by describing a worthy recipient as one who has gone forth from household life (agārasmā anagāriyam pabbajito) and who has abolished the five hindrances (nīvara ā): desire, ill-will, sloth, restlessness, and doubt. 12. These block quotes are in the original text. Although the focus of this article is Sinhalese Theravāda, it may be worthwhile to point out that Melford Spiro perceives a similar tension in regards to how Burmese Buddhists understand merit and meritorious giving. He writes, for instance, 'Monks, who frequently preach on dāna, often remind their audience that the merit derived from giving depends on this pure intention, i.e., the spiritual quality of the benefactor. For the most part, however, the Burmese have reversed this relationship between donor and recipient. For them the merit deriving from dāna is proportional to the spiritual quality of the recipient rather than that of the donor' (Spiro 1982 Spiro, M. E. 1982. Buddhism and society: A great tradition and its Burmese vicissitudes, 2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published 1970) [Google Scholar], 106f.). Whereas Gombrich finds the latter view pervasive among monastics and lay people, Spiro argues that that same view is more widespread among the Burmese laity. 13. I use the expression 'particular reading of the canonical and commentarial texts' because, as Freiberger (2004) notes, the Pāli canon is not oftentimes consistent and one-dimensional but represents a multiplicity of views and understandings. Some of those views will be presented below. 14. Martin Southwold (1983 Southwold, M. 1983. Buddhism in life: The anthropological study of religion and the Sinhalese practice of Buddhism, Dover, N.H.: Manchester University Press. [Google Scholar], 182) levels a similar critique against Gombrich's study of Sinhalese Buddhism when he, in making reference to Gombrich's tendency to view beliefs as primary and practices as derivatives, writes: 'The last chapter of Gombrich's book, "Conclusion", is an admirably sensitive and insightful discussion of two main tendencies in contemporary and historical Buddhism, framed largely in terms of his contrast between cognitive and affective religion. It may be that his reliance on this too easy and superficial distinction cocooned Gombrich from facing up to the real challange that the evidence, his evidence, presents, so that he states the conclusion it points to, that the voice of the people is the voice of the Buddha, not definitely, but as an extremely tentative query. Whether or not this is a case in point, the real objection to giving primacy to belief in the analysis of religion is not so much that it is ill-warranted by fact and by logic, as that it diverts us from the kind of analysis which produces better understanding' (emphasis added). 15. The role of emotions, such as joy or happiness, in Buddhist rituals or in the making merit process is discussed in Jon Walters' forthcoming publication where he compares Buddhist and theistic rituals in contemporary Sri Lanka. Despite suggesting that Buddhist-layer rituals oriented toward the Buddha are almost devoid of a type of playfulness (sellam) that characterizes rituals that focus on or deal with the gods, Walters Walters, J. S. Forthcoming. "Gods' play and the Buddha's way: Varieties of levity in contemporary Sinhala practice". In Ritual levity and Ritual play in South Asian, Edited by: Raj, Selva and Dempsey, Corinne. Albany: State University of New York. [Google Scholar] nonetheless points out that 'Sinhala literature provides a wonderfully rich vocabulary for the rarefied "happiness" (satu a) which ideally is experienced in Buddhist-layer rituals'. In an earlier publication (1997 Walters, J. S. 1997. "Stupa, story, and empire: Constructions of the Buddha biography in early post-Asokan India". In Sacred biography in the Buddhist traditions of South and Southeast Asia, Edited by: Schober, Juliana. 160–92. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. [Google Scholar], 179f.), Walters also discusses the roles that some of these same and related emotions—laughter, delight, pleasure, satisfaction, being overjoyed, and being thrilled—have in large-scale Buddhist festivals in the early-post-Aśokan era. 16. Although the terms satu a and santō a are most commonly translated as happiness, the words encompass a range of emotions that include gladness, pleasure, contentment, and satisfaction. 17. This crass-calculus model is possibly best exemplified in Spiro's ethnographic study (1982, 112; see also 412), where he writes: 'Poor or wealthy, whether he recites from memory or from an account book, almost any villager can say to the last penny how much (and for what) he has expended on giving … It is as if each unit of dāna—however it be calculated—produces a commensurate unit of merit, so that in order to calculate one's store of merit and hence predict one's future existence, it is merely necessary to keep a cumulative account of one's giving'. 18. Even though the head monk did not make any references to specific passages 'in the teachings' where a connection between making merit and happiness is made, a cursory examination of a number of texts in the Sutta Pi aka reveals such a relationship. In one section of the A guttara Nikāya (III,336f.), for instance, we read that the three characteristics of a gift given by a donor that bears the best results are being happy (sumano) before giving, pleased (pasādeti) while giving, and delighted (attamano) after giving a gift (dāyako pubbeva dānā sumano hoti, dada citta pasādeti, datvā attamano hoti). In the conversation between the Buddha and King Pasenadi found in the Kosala Sa yutta of the Sa yutta Nikāya (I.98) mentioned above, a similar point is also raised. In response to the King's question 'where should dāna be given (kattha nu kho bhante dāna dātabban'ti)?', the Buddha is purported to have said: 'dāna should be given where the mind is happy or pleased (yattha kho mahārāja citta pasīdatī'ti)'. 19. The term muñcana is related to Sinhala verb midenevā, which (similar to the Pāli verb and word muñcati and muñcana) means 'released' or 'delivered' (Sorata Thera 1998 Thera, Sorata Nayaka, ed. 1998. Śrī Sumagala Śabdakoaya [The blessed and auspicious (Sinhala–Sinhala) dictionary], 3rd ed., Colombo: S. Godage and Brothers. [Google Scholar], 780). 20. For instance, in his article 'The Buddhist Canon and the Canon of Buddhist Studies', Freiberger (2004 Freiberger, O. 2004. The Buddhist canon and the canon of Buddhist studies. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 27(2): 261–84. [Google Scholar], 262) convincingly argues through a discussion of the multifarious images of the laity in the Pāli canon that 'canonical texts are, in contrast to the common view, a rich source for current scholarship interests (such as the issues of religious practice and diversity) … [and that] the image of the canon as being consistent, one-dimensional, and purely normative … is to a large extent the product of a "canonization" carried out by early generations of scholars'. In terms of making merit, Freiberger points out that canonical texts contain much more sophisticated and complex images of the laity than those suggested by earlier scholarship: 'as self-confident persons who have the ability to assess the ethical and 'spiritual' status of the recipients of their gifts. They do not trust the promise that the best recipient is, by way of ordination, the Buddhist monk or nun; they reject the concept of the sa gha as a field of merit that is, by definition, unsurpassable' (2004, 273). 21. Gombrich also points out that the relationship drawn between the recipient's piousness, by which is commonly understood their asceticism and high level of moral purity, and the amount of merit accrued from a donative act is something that is also borne out in the canonical texts. In the Sa yutta Nikāya (I.175), for instance, we read how gifts given to a sage who knows his former lives, who has seen heaven and hell, who has attained nibbāna or the destruction of birth (atho jātikkhayam patto), and who has acquired certain supernatural powers (abhiññāvosito muni) bears great fruit (mahapphalam). In the Dhammapada (vs. 356ff.) as well, we read that gifts offered to a person free from greed, hatred, and ignorance bears great fruit. 22. Although the focus of this article is on Sinhalese Buddhism, it is worth pointing out a similar conclusion that Spiro draws based upon discussions with his Burmese informants. He writes that, for instance, for the majority of Burmese donors, 'the merit deriving from dāna is proportional to the spiritual quality of the recipient rather than that of the donor. It is for this reason primarily that they insist, as we shall see, upon the piety of their monks' (Spiro 1982 Spiro, M. E. 1982. Buddhism and society: A great tradition and its Burmese vicissitudes, 2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published 1970) [Google Scholar], 107). In a later chapter, Spiro (1982 Spiro, M. E. 1982. Buddhism and society: A great tradition and its Burmese vicissitudes, 2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published 1970) [Google Scholar], 412) discusses what he means by piety: 'As they view it, the amount of merit acquired from alms-giving is proportional to the piety of the recipient. Indeed, some Burmese … go so far as to say that, despite the fact that he wears a yellow robe, no merit is acquired by giving alms to an impious monk. This is a minority view, but everyone agrees that the greater the purity of the monk, i.e., the stricter his observance of the Rule [Vinaya], the greater the merit accruing to the donor'. 23. At the same time, however, Seneviratne (1999 Seneviratne, H. L. 1999. The work of kings: The new Buddhism in Sri Lanka, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Google Scholar], 278) also qualifies the above-mentioned phenomenon by noting how lay people, in their greed to acquire a storehouse of merit, often care little about the quality of the recipient: 'The laity wants merit, by hook or crook. Merit is the greater if the monk is virtuous. Often lay devotees rush to provide the needs of "ascetic" monks because of this. However, for purposes of merit-making, any traditionally ordained monk will suffice; having access to a virtuous monk is just a bonus in the merit-making investment. The only requirement is that the monk is properly ordained, his inner state being immaterial. It thus follows that, however useful the monk is for satisfying the lay greed for merit, or perhaps because the monk does that, the laity's true interest in the monk is narrowly defined. Hence the space within which the monk is accorded respect is delimited. Outside that space, the monk can be the butt of ridicule, or at least an irrelevance. Overt respect is accorded to the monk at all times, but covert critique is never far away.' 24. I might qualify my statement by noting that all of the lay people interviewed were patrons of village temples and, thus, represent only one segment of a large spectrum of Buddhist devotees. 25. I should note in passing that my own view drawn from my conversations with over a dozen donors of village temples is that the popularity of the forest-dwellers of Sri Lanka is by no means shared by the whole population. This layman, for instance, concerned as he is about having his religious needs fulfilled by a group of willing and able monastics, was much more ambivalent about more ascetically inclined monastics. For instance, when I asked him which type of temple—a village or forest temple—would he be a patron of if he had to choose, he (after diplomatically saying 'both') provided a very telling response: 'If one goes to an arañña (forest), then one can become enlightened. That is done for oneself. One receives food, goes to a ku i, and meditates. That's it. However, in this [village] temple, they don't do that. These monks teach worldly people (lokayā a) about their faults, protect the temple, and perform social service by telling the people "Don't drink. Don't steal. Don't behave in a bad manner." They perform funeral (pa sukula) rituals and preach (ba a) … By doing these things, the sāsana progresses. As a result, the sāsana will be long-lasting. In the places like that (i.e., an arañña), the monks don't act incorrectly. However, it is for oneself only.' For further study of ambivalent attitudes toward the ascetic-leaning forest monastics, see Silber (1981 Silber, I. F. 1981. Dissent through Holiness: The case of the radical renouncer in Theravada Buddhist countries. Numen, 28(2): 164–93. [Google Scholar], 1995 Silber, I. F. 1995. Virtuosity, charisma, and social order: A comparative sociological study of monasticism in Theravada Buddhism and medieval Catholicism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]), Malalgoda (1976 Malalgoda, K. 1976. Buddhism in Sinhalese Society 1750–1900, Berkeley: University of California Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 19, 60), and Geiger (1960 Geiger, W. 1960. Culture of Ceylon in medieval times, Edited by: Bechert, Heinz. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. [Google Scholar], 202); for cases outside Sri Lanka, see Bunnag (1973 Bunnag, J. 1973. Buddhist monk, Buddhist layman: A study of urban monastic organization in central Thailand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 54ff.) and Mulder (1968 Mulder, J. A. N. 1968. Monks, merit and motivation, Dekalb: Norther Illinois University Press. [Google Scholar], 41). 26. Usually, after offering the food to the temple, the monk-recipients take a portion of the dāna and offer it to the Buddha (Buddhapūjā). The people bringing alms-food to the temple take part in that offering, during which they are administered, by one of the monks, the triple refuge and the five precepts. The monk commonly gives a short sermon, oftentimes about the merit associated with giving. 27. This particular ritual, which has grown in popularity over the past three decades, is discussed in length in Seneviratne and Wickremeratne (1980 Seneviratne, H. L. and Wickremeratne, Swarna. 1980. Bodhipuja: Collective representations of Sri Lankan youth. American Ethnologist, 7(4): 734–43. [Google Scholar]), Gombrich (1981 Gombrich, R. 1981. A new Theravadin liturgy. Journal of the Pali Text Society, 9: 47–73. [Google Scholar]), and Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988 Gombrich, R. and Obeyesekere, G. 1988. Buddhism transformed: Religious change in Sri Lanka, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]). 28. Like the previous layman, this dāyaka did not answer my question of which temple—a village or forest temple—he would be a patron of were he forced to choose only one. However, like the previous layman, this dāyaka's response indicated an overall preference for the village temple and monks: 'From my perspective, arañña monks protect morality (sil) one hundred to one hundred and fifty percent. However, their attitude is "me only." They think: "Me only. Me only. Only I can attain nibbāna." They have the idea: "Only I can be shaped (hadanavā)." That is what I believe. They are unable to take other people along with them. It is only about them. That is what shows.' 29. In one of my discussions with the three female devotees mentioned above, the topic of faith also arose. According to the second upāsikā, acts of generosity should not only be accompanied by feelings of happiness in the heart, but also with feelings of faith (śraddhāva). While I found the connection she drew between happiness in the heart and faith to be quite interesting, I was surprised to find that in the commentary to the Puggalapaññati, happiness (Pāli: pasāda) is used as a synonym for faith (Pāli: saddhā): 'pasādo saddhā pasādo va' and that, in the Culla Niddesa, being joyful (pasīdati) also means having faith (saddahati). The references to these two texts are highlighted in Endo's study (1987, 39). 30. This is quite different from what Andy Rotman found in his study of the Divyāvadāna where certain objects—buddhas, images of buddhas, arhats, and stūpas—are said to be agents of prasāda or feelings of faith and serene joy and that feelings of prasāda in the mind are said to arise irrespective 'of one's thoughts, feelings, or intentions' (Rotman 2003 Rotman, A. 2003. The erotics of practice: Objects and agency in Buddhist Avadana Literature. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 71(3): 555–78. [Google Scholar], 561). Rotman (2003 Rotman, A. 2003. The erotics of practice: Objects and agency in Buddhist Avadana Literature. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 71(3): 555–78. [Google Scholar], 561f.) further writes that 'Individual tastes and habits are elided, as are, apparently, differences in gender, age, race, and class'. What the conversations with lay Buddhists and monastics indicates, however, is that notions of what results in happiness and faith are largely dependent upon one's particular circumstances: one's history, social class, and cultural milieu. 31. Oftentimes, it is through the dynamic relationship that exists between a group of monastics and their lay patrons that ideas about what constitutes a pleasant or unpleasant experience is discussed and worked out. One example of this concerns the sixth precept: refraining from eating after midday. Even though this is one of the 10 fundamental rules imposed on all monks and novices, novices from one temple where I conducted research often ate in the evenings. Even though I understood this to be a common practice in Sri Lanka, I was surprised to find that when I spoke to lay donors of this temple about it, many of them found no problem with novices eating after midday; in fact, several of the key donors to the temple even provided evening meals to the young monastics there. In my conversations with them, no dāyaka expressed feeling disgust toward the novices eating after midday. Why was this so? It was, I later found out, because the head monk had discussed with the laity how important it is for young children to eat in the evening. Commenting on how the head monk shaped the laity's views about what constitutes acceptable behavior and, hence, a pleasing experience of Buddhism, a head monk from a neighboring temple—who after mentioning how his own donors openly objected to monastics (young or old) taking evening meals—said: 'Unlike here, the head monk there made people understand that it is all right for the novices to eat in the evening'. 32. The Niga has are a group of people who are said to be a follower of the teacher Niga ha Nāt(h)aputta, described as a heretic in the Pali canonical texts (see Majjhima Nikāya II.214ff.). A detailed account of Nātaputta is given in Malalasekera (1960 Malalasekera, G. P. 1960. Dictionary of Pali proper names, London: Luzac and Company. [Google Scholar], Vol. II, 61ff.). 33. Commenting on the connection between happiness in the heart and a monastic's appearance, the anunāyaka said: 'People think "The monk who is our monk (apē hāmuduruwo) should live to please the people, with a beautifully shaven head and beard." They are not that concerned with his mental state (mānasika). That [appearance/demeanor] is what people consider to be good. That is their expectations. When it is not fulfilled, a wrong picture (väradi citrayak) emerges in their hita.' While the anunāyaka remarked how the novices' mental states were immaterial to pleasing the hearts of donors and, thus, enabling the donors to earn merit, some novices disagreed. Several novices, for example, suggested that the recipients of dāna need to cultivate proper mental states and attitudes when and after they receive offerings. Speaking about how the thoughts of the recipients affect the donors' merit, one 19-year-old novice who entered the sa gha at the age of eight said: 'People give us food after having undergone a lot of difficulties. Some may even give us alms while their own children go hungry. Some may give us delicious food while they themselves eat only plain food (nika käma). So, it is bad for us think "this food is delicious, this food is not delicious" when we receive alms. We should not categorize the meal or food as good or bad. If we categorize the food like that, we would receive demerit (pau). Such types of thoughts would mean that our minds are not clean and would, in turn, affect the person who is offering the food to us. Also, if we just sit around in the temple and do nothing or commit any forms of misconduct after eating the food of the donors, we will receive demerit. As a result, the donor who gave us the alms food will receive less merit.' 34. In fact, according to the Vinaya, monastics are allowed to grow their hair to a length of two inches or finger-widths, a length that most Buddhists living in contemporary Sri Lanka would find quite unsuitable. 35. Related to this, is the view that religious emotions and attitudes of devotion had no place in early Buddhism. This point is well illustrated in Kevin Trainor's (2003 Trainor, K. 2003. Seeing, feeling, doing: Ethics and emotions in South Asian Buddhism. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 71(3): 523–30. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 525) remark where he notes: 'A further factor contributing to the neglect of emotion in South Asian Buddhist studies is the tendency to associate religious emotion with feelings of devotion and to regard such devotional attitudes as inconsistent with early Buddhism … According to this perspective, which is increasingly subject to serious challenge …, devotion to the Buddha and ritualized veneration developed later as concessions to lay Buddhists who could not or would not adhere to the ideal of emotional detachment that characterized the Buddha's original teaching.' This view that attitudes of devotion is not part of early Buddhism is exemplified in Richard Gombrich's Gombrich, R. 1988. Theravada Buddhism: A social history from ancient Benares to modern Colombo, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] book Theravāda Buddhism (1988 Gombrich, R. 1988. Theravada Buddhism: A social history from ancient Benares to modern Colombo, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 119f.) where he, in discussing the development that Buddhism underwent in the years following the Buddha's death, writes '[T]he stark contradiction between "having no refuge other than yourselves" and "taking refuge" in the Three Jewels is striking. It seems hard to argue that Buddhist lay religiosity as we know it was just what he [i.e., the Buddha] intended. However, excellent a consequence of his teaching, I submit that it was not the Buddha's idea.' 36. I would like to thank Jonathan Walters again for helping me formulate this idea more clearly.