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Haram or Halal? Islamists' Use of Suicide Attacks as “Jihad”

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 23; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09546553.2011.578185

1556-1836

Shireen Khan Burki,

Islamic Studies and History

Abstract Suicide attacks are an important, and effective, terror tactic in Al Qaeda and other Islamist Movements' (AQOIM) tool kit as they wage jihad al saghir (lesser jihad) against the kuffar (infidels). The successful 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil would not have been possible without the willingness of 19 young Arab men to commit intihar (suicide). AQOIM's "marketing" of suicide attacks in their propaganda campaigns as "martyrdom operations," leads one to ask: Is the use of suicide as a military tactic in war against the kuffar sanctioned in Islam both scripturally and/or by the interpretations/opinions of Muslim scholars and religious figures, as well as by the Muslim public? This article explores the ongoing jihad (struggle) within Islam on what does and does not constitute "martyrdom operations." It does so by exploring the legality of such acts through the lens of Islamic doctrine (Quran and Hadith), as well as studying the interpretations of respected ulema (scholars) on whether or not suicide attacks are indeed "martyrdom operations" to be praised as "halal," or to be condemned as "haram" (forbidden). Keywords: Al QaedaHizballah ijtihad Islamists jihad jihad al saghir martyrdom operationssuicide attacksterrorism Acknowledgments The author would like to thank the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) for the opportunity to present her initial draft of this paper at their third annual conference. Notes In addition to Al Qaeda, the various Islamist groups and movements who have leveraged suicide attacks as a vital tool in their operational toolkit have included Hizballah, Al Dawa, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Egyptian Al Jihad, Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda in Iraq (now called the Islamist State of Iraq), Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al Ansar Mujahedin of Chechnya, etc. It must be emphasized that these groups are not monolithic, nor are they necessarily affiliates or even share identical goals. Rather, the common thread is their operational reliance on "suicide" as a key weapon or instrument of "jihad." It serves to highlight the fact that, to date, "suicide as a tactic of jihad" has been leveraged by a variety of Muslim terrorist organizations belonging to both the Shia and Sunni sects. David Cook and Olivia Allison, Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007); Musa Khan Jalalzai, Dying to Kill Us: Suicide Bombers, Terrorism and Violence in Pakistan (Lahore: Al Abbas International, 2005); Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," The American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343–361; Asaf Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks," International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2009): 46–78; Ami and Arie Pedahzur, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective," Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987–2008. For an excellent account of events leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (Vintage Books, 2007); The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). On April 18, 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon was struck by an explosives-laden truck in a suicide bombing that killed over 60 people. A shadowy Iranian-financed (Shia) group that was loosely affiliated with Hizballah led by a former Fatah member, Imad Mughniyah, called the Islamic Jihad Organization, took responsibility. On December 12, 1983, the Iranian-financed (Shia) Islamic Dawa Party's 90-minute coordinated attacks on six foreign and Kuwaiti targets included a suicide truck bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. On October 23, 1983, suicide bombers attacked the Beirut barracks of U.S. and French military forces, which were part of the Multinational Force in Lebanon, killing 299 American and French servicemen. The Iranian-financed Islamic Jihad Organization, an affiliate—or perhaps by then the military arm—of Hizballah, claimed responsibility. On September 20, 1984, a suicide truck bomb attack by Hizballah detonated outside the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 24 people. On March 17, 1992, in an uncharacteristic move, and far afield from its home base, Hizballah's affiliate/proxy, the Islamic Jihad Organization, conducted a suicide attack in Argentina with a pickup truck laden with explosives against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. It claimed responsibility for this attack that killed 29 and wounded 242. Most of the victims were Argentineans, and many were children. Their stated motive for the attack was Israel's assassination of Hizballah's Secretary General Sayed Abbas al-Musawi in February, which in turn was in retaliation for the kidnapping and death of missing Israeli servicemen in 1986, and for the abduction of U.S. Marine and UN Peace Keeping officer, William R. Higgins in 1988. Technically, the Khobar Tower (Saudi Arabia) truck bombing by Hizballah al Hijaz (Party of God in the Hijaz) was not a suicide attack because the driver of the truck was denied access to the military compound by U.S. military guards. Unable to get onto the base, the assailants improvised and parked their explosives-laden truck up against a chain link fence close to the Khobar Tower and made their escape minutes before the bomb exploded. On August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda along with Egyptian Islamic Jihad members carried out simultaneous suicide truck bomb explosions at the U.S. Kenyan Embassy in Nairobi and the U.S. Tanzanian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. On October 12, 2000, the United States Navy destroyer USS Cole, while it was harbored and refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden, was struck by an explosives-laden speedboat maneuvered by two al Qaeda operatives in a suicide attack that killed 17 American sailors and injured 39. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for this suicide attack which was the deadliest attack against a United States Naval vessel since an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter fired two Exocet missiles at the USS Stark, which killed 37 American sailors and injured 21 on May 17, 1987 in the Persian Gulf. The July 7, 2005 London bombings (often referred to as 7/7) were a series of coordinated suicide attacks upon London's public transport system during the morning rush hour by 4 Britons loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda of Pakistani origin. Between October 2000 and October 2006 there were 167 clearly identified suicide bomber attacks, with 51 other types of suicide attacks in Israel as quoted in Y. Schweitzer, "Palestinian Istishhadia: A Developing Instrument," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 8 (2007): 699. For more details on suicide attacks in Israel since they began in 1994 to early 2006, see Cook and Allison (see note 2 above), 34–36; Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 19–44. Chechen suicide attacks began on June 9, 2000 when a Chechen woman, Hawa Barayev, drove a truck filled with explosives into a building occupied by Russian Special Forces, killing 27. It was this suicide attack conducted by a woman which led al Qaeda operative Shaykh Yusuf ibn Salih Al-Uyayri to pen The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Self Sacrificial Operations: Suicide or Martyrdom? (2003) as a legal opinion on whether her actions were halal. Although the Chechen suicide attacks were mostly carried out by locals, the tactics employed mirrored those leveraged by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic jihad in Israel. There are however some key distinctions between the two: most Palestinian suicide bombers' families received large financial "rewards" for such acts of "martyrdom" from Saddam Hussein's regime until his overthrow and from Hamas; compensation has not been the motivational factor for the Chechens. Second, unlike the Palestinians, a majority of the Chechen bombers have been female, called shahidka by Chechens or "Black Widows" by Russians (as they have often lost their husbands in the war or been victims of rape by Russian soldiers). Third, while the Chechens are also Sunni Muslims like the Palestinians, they have emphasized their strikes as being motivated primarily by "nationalistic" aspirations; the Palestinian groups like Hamas have emphasized a religious component as in jihad, leading one scholar, Meir Litvak, to identify Hamas as a "religious-nationalist movement." In the Chechen case, there seems to be a correlation between the influx of Wahhabi elements in the 1990s in an area that was traditionally a stronghold of Sufism, as well as the use of suicide attacks as jihad. In Arabic "halal" means "lawful or legally permitted." It is a term used to designate any object or action which is permissible according to Islamic scripture and traditions. The opposite of halal is that which is "haram." As Litvak explains in his seminal work (Meir Litvak, "'Martyrdom is Life': Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 8 (2010): 716–734) on p. 725: Hamas goes to great pains to emphasize the distinction between martyrdom (istishhad) for the sake of Islam and ordinary suicide (intihar), which is prohibited in Islamic warfare. In the Quran, Sura Al-Ahzab (ayat 57) it warns of the consequences of offending Allah through evil acts, etc.: "Verily, those who offend Allah and his messenger are cursed by Allah in this world and the next, and He has prepared for them a humiliating torment." The Qur'an (literally "the recitation") is the main religious text of Islam, also sometimes transliterated as Quran, Kuran, or Koran. Some Quranic ayats (verses) on Allah's will and one's "destiny": No self can die except with Allah's permission, at a predetermined time. If anyone desires the reward of the dunya, We will give him some of it. If anyone desires the reward of the akhira, We will give him some of it. We will recompense the thankful. Sura Al-Imran (ayat 145) It is He who created you from clay and then decreed a fixed term, and another fixed term is specified with Him. Yet you still have doubts! Sura Al-An'am (ayat 2) Every nation has an appointed time. When their time comes, they cannot delay it a single hour or bring it forward. Sura Al-A'raf (ayat 34)Your Lord creates and chooses whatever He wills. The choice is not theirs. Glory be to Allah! He is exalted above anything they associate with Him. Sura Al-Qasas (ayat 68). Although certain Muslim Imams and Ulema have sporadically expressed dismay and even condemned suicide attacks as constituting a haram act, there have been no references by these same figures to the well established belief amongst Muslims (irrespective of sect) that "life is pre-determined by Allah" (as often enunciated in the concept of inshallah, or Allah willing) when addressing the question of whether self inflicted death in jihad is a justifiable tactic of war. It is particularly noteworthy that the act of suicide through self immolation by Tariq (a.k.a. Muhammad) Bouazizi on December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia—which literally was the spark that lit the Jasmine Revolution followed by turmoil which quickly enveloped the entire Middle East—has been depicted as an act of "martyrdom"—notwithstanding the historical realities and Islamic doctrine and traditions that prohibit suicide as haram. The fact that nowhere in the Muslim world has anyone publicly expressed repugnance nor condemned the desperate acts of this poor man as haram might suggest that pragmatic considerations take precedence over religious ones when it comes to "interests." Currently, the primary targets for "martyrdom operations" are fellow Muslims in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These are being justified as halal acts against the mushriqun (polytheists) such as the Sufi and Shia (according to the Islamiyun) and the munafiqun (hypocrites) like the secular or non-practicing Muslims. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 69–70. For more on Jihad through history see Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Reuven Firestone, The Origins of Holy War in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Gilles Kepel, The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). Bonner (see note 21 above), 2. "Jihad" as a rallying cry has been invoked in call to battle by Muslim rulers since the inception of Islam. The Arabic word jihad means to strive, to exert oneself, to struggle. Throughout history, there has been much disagreement amongst Muslims over the meaning/intent of the term "jihad." See Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 2005), 1; Bonner (see note 21 above), 13; John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville, KY, 1993), 34; Richard L. Rubenstein, Jihad and Genocide (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 11–16. "War and Peace in Islamic Law," in Harfiyah Abdel Haleem, Oliver Ramsbotham, Saba Risaluddin, and Brian Wicker, (eds.), The Crescent and the Cross: Muslim and Christian Approaches to War and Peace (New York: Palgrave, 1998), 67. 25:52 (Furqan), Arberry translation as quoted in Bonner (see note 21 above), 22. Ibid. Paul Heck, "Jihad Revisited," Journal of Religious Ethics 32, no. 1 (2004): 96–98. Paul Fregosi, Jihad in the West (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), 20–21; Andrew Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 307–308. In Arabic, "Muhharibun" is "terrorists.". Jihad al kabir (the greater jihad)—also called jihad bil nafs (the struggle of the conscience/ego)—has been a focal point of the widespread, mystical realm of Islam known as Sufism. Such an inner, mystical examination is anathema to the Muwahhidun/Wahhabi/Salafi, who interpret many of the ascetic mores/customs of the Sufi as being bida (innovations) and thus haram (forbidden). For more on the "jihad" of Arab conquest and conversion during the early days of Islam see Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquest: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007). In Islam, da'wa means a "call" or "invitation." The term has been used to refer to a person being "called" to follow Islam. However, over time its meaning has evolved to mean a "mission" or "propaganda" in either a political or religious sense. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005): 215. Quranic Sura Al-Hajj (the pilgrimage), ayat 39. "Murtadd" in Arabic is "apostate." There are two types of apostates in Islam: Murtadd fitri and Murtadd milli. The first is one who is born into Islam but abandons his/her faith; the second is one who converts to Islam and then leaves the faith. A fatwa is a legal pronouncement in Islam that can only be issued by a religious law scholar on a specific issue. In Sunni Islam, fatwas are non-binding. However, those issued by the Khalifa (Caliph) and/or a widely respected Sunni alim (scholar) carried/carry greater weight. According to Shia doctrine, a fatwa could be binding, depending on the status of the alim or imam who issues it. Thus, when Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani issues a fatwa, it is generally considered "binding" in the eyes of most Shia. For the purposes of this article, "Islamiyyun" are those Muslims who actively seek to conduct jihad al saghir in the non-Muslim regions (Europe/North America) and currently involve those Muslim "activists" who subscribe to the same specific ideology as Qaeda and Affiliate Movements (AQAM). David Bukay, "The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings: Islamist Ideology," Middle East Quarterly (February 2006): 27–36; Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," Science 299, no. 5612 (March 7, 2003): 1534–1539. The AQOIM narrative is a latest propaganda/recruitment/intimidation tactic that ridicules the kuffar's desire/love of life as being cowardly and that their "jihadis" are to be admired/glorified for desiring/preferring death. Amelie Bloom, Laetitia Bucaille, and Luis Martinez (eds.), The Enigma of Islamist Violence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 5–6. For more on suicide in Islam written prior to the current trend in the Muslim world of revising jihad's rules of engagement, see Franz Rosenthal, "On Suicide in Islam," Journal of the American Oriental Society 66, no. 3 (July–Sep. 1946): 239–259. Hadith - Bukhari 2:445, Narrated by Thabit bin Ad-Dahhak. Accessed at http://muttaqun.com/suicide.html Hadith - Bukhari 7:670, Narrated by Abu Huraira. Accessed at http://muttaqun.com/suicide.html While some have argued that "suicide attacks" by Muslims began in the 11th century at the hands of the Nizari Ismailis, this would be an inaccurate reading of historical events. The Ismailis did not rely on gunpowder or self immolation to terrorize a target audience. Thus, their suicidal acts cannot be classified as haram because they were killed at the hands of their enemies. The first use of suicide as "jihad" against the infidel was the U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon in April of 1983 at the hands of the Iranian funded (Shia) Hizballah's military arm or affiliate: the Islamic Jihad Organization. Al Qaeda's leading theorist (in U.S. captivity since 2005), Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Musab al-Suri, a former Syrian Muslim Brotherhood member who fled Syria in 1982 after Hafiz Assad's regime confronted the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Hama, and settled in Peshawar, Pakistan) wrote a 1600-page tract titled The Call to Global Islamic Resistance. Al Suri briefly discusses suicide in a section titled "The Ruling on Martyrdom (Suicide) Operations," in which he distinguishes "suicide" (haram) from "self sacrifice" (halal). For al Suri, blowing oneself up in attack against infidels (even unarmed non-combatants) is permitted because it is protecting Allah's religion. For al Suri's translated work see Jim Lacey (ed.), A Terrorist Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab Al-Suri's Islamic Jihad Manifesto (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 179; see also Haim Malka, "Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks," Middle East Quarterly 10, no. 2, (2003): 19–28. Sheikh Yusuf al-Uyayri (alternatively known as Yusuf al-Ayyiri) was a Saudi-born senior al-Qaeda strategist who was killed by Saudi security forces in 2003. He is best known in jihadi circles for his penned work on "martyrdom operations" which was released the year of his death (2003): Shaykh Yusuf ibn Salih Al-Uyayri, The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Self Sacrificial Operations: Suicide or Martyrdom? (Translated into English by At-Tibyan, 2003); For Uyayri's role in fund raising, etc., see Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125–126. Uyayri (see note 46 above), 8. Ibid., 39. For more on the Assassin see Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967); Jefferson Gray, "Holy Terror: The Rise of the Order of the Assassins," The Quarterly Journal of Military History (February 2010): 16–25. Accessed at: http://www.historynet.com/holy-terror-the-rise-of-the-order-of-assassins.htm/1 Although today the majority of global terrorist attacks are conducted by Sunni Muslims in the name of Islam and are legitimized by being called acts of istishhad (martyrdom), the first use of suicide bombings in contemporary times was at the hands of the Iranian funded Lebanese Shia terrorist organization, Hizballah (party of God) in the early 1980s in Beirut. Hizballah's suicide attacks against foreign forces were widely perceived in the Muslim world to have been the catalyst event that forced the "crusaders" from the shores of Lebanon. Thus, the "lesson learned" by Islamists of all stripes was not only did "terrorism pay," but specifically, "suicide operations" were especially cost effective as a key tool in their asymmetric warfare against a stronger foe. Benjamin Acosta, "The Suicide Bomber as Sunni-Shi'i Hybrid," Middle Eastern Quarterly 17, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 13. The contemporary arguments, in certain Muslim circles, that defend/justify acts of self immolation/detonation to be a result of innovations in the tools of warfare (bombs, grenades, etc.) ring hollow. Gunpowder, a Chinese invention, has been around since the 800 s. The Ottoman Turks embraced gunpowder with enthusiasm, using it with spectacular effect during their assault on Constantinople in 1453. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), the Afghan mujahidin forces not once authorized, or resorted to, the use of suicide attacks against the Soviet troops on their soil in their jihad, despite being cognizant of the suicide bombings in Lebanon that lead to the hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1984. In fact, suicide as a tactic against "foreign" forces was introduced in Afghanistan by Arabs affiliated with Al Qaeda with the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001. This reality has led some observers, to include respected scholars like Kepel (Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds and the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 22) to opine that if the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is resolved the genie (terrorist/suicide attacks) will be put back in the bottle. In light of history and the current climate in the Muslim world, not to mention the fact that in the minds of most Muslims, Israel lies within the boundaries of Dar al Islam, such an optimistic assessment appears to overlook the historical record. Uyayri (see note 46 above), 39. Ibid., 32. Uyayri fails to mention a single Muslim scholar by name. In citing this ayat (verse) from Sura Tawbah, Uyayri is literally grasping at straws. His "interpretation" is rather flimsy in that this ayat does not specify committing suicide as a halal (legitimate) act. It merely states that Allah "owns" his creations' lives and wealth, thus making Uyayri's "interpretation" a far cry from the actual intent of this verse. Cited in article no longer accessible at original source (Las Vegas Sun) titled: "Muslim Scholars Debate Suicide Tact," Las Vegas Sun (September 16, 2001). Accessed at: http://www.apologeticsindex.org/news1/an010918-10.html. More recently the same Grand Mufti al Sheikh was quoted in "Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia: No to Suicide Bombings," Al Hayat (November 27, 2009), condemning such attacks as haram. He has also done so in the past (2003) and has made no distinctions as to who may be the target stating that all such attacks go against Islam. Accessed at FatwaOnline.com website on February 10, 2010 at http://www.fatwa-online.com/fataawa/worship/jihaad/jih004/0001027_2.htm For more on Tantawi's views on terrorism and the use of suicide tactics see Egypt Today, accessed at: http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1727. What is noteworthy is Sheikh Tantawi's contradictory statements on the subject of suicide in "martyrdom operations." See also Zvi Bar'el and Yair Sheleg, "Tantawi Validates Suicide Attacks," Haaretz (March 22, 2003). Accessed at: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/tantawi-validates-suicide-attacks-1.49758 Hadia Mostafa, "Anatomy of a Flip Flop: Sheikh Tantawi's conflicting statements on suicide bombing since 9/11," Egypt Today (June 2004). Accessed at: http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1727. See also "Jihad Against the U.S.: Al Azhar's Conflicting Fatwas," MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, No. 480 (March 16, 2003). David A. Graham, "No Great Sheiks," Newsweek (March 12, 2010). Accessed at: http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/11/no-great-sheiks.html "Jihad is Not Just Armed Struggle," The Washington Post (July 28, 2007). Accessed at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/27/AR2007072701863.html "Egypt's top Muslim leader responds to suicide bombing," Washington Post (January 2, 2011). Accessed at: http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2011/01/egypts_top_muslim_leader_responds_to_suicide_bombing.html What is striking about this caveated public statement from ulema in Pakistan after continued suicide bombings within their country, is that they do not carte blanche condemn suicide bombings as "haram" in Islam. "Praying behind imams who endorse terror declared haram," Daily Times (December 15, 2009). Accessed at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\12\16\story_16-12-2009_pg7_2 "Ayatollah Sistani condemns attack on church in Baghdad," ShiiteNews (November 2, 2010). Accessed at: http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1927:ayatollah-sistani-condemns-attack-on-church-in-baghdad-&catid = 59:iraq&Itemid = 2 "Shia cleric for 'fatwa' against suicide attacks," Thaindian News (March 24, 2008). Accessed at: http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/shia-cleric-for-fatwa-against-suicide-attacks_10030746.html The Islamist movement, Ikhwan al Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), based out of Cairo, Egypt, which was founded in 1928 by Hasan al Banna, has worked hard to present itself as a peaceful political movement in its public relations campaign. However, one of its most prominent leaders is the recently repatriated (from exile) Sheikh Yousef Qaradawi who, as one of Sunni Islam's most influential alim, has advocated violence against the kuffar, and justified the use of suicide attacks as halal in "jihad." Furthermore, some of the Muslim Brotherhood offshoots (such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Takfir wal Hijra (TwH), Al Qaeda, and Hamas) have all relied on violence, and especially, in more recent times, on suicide attacks as an important tactical tool in their terror toolbox. Sheikh Qaradawi's popularity is due to the widely held perception in the Muslim world that he is "independent" of the present rulers in the Middle East unlike Sheikhs Gomaa or Al Sheikh or the deceased Tantawi who are viewed by many to be toadies of corrupt rulers. Thus, many of their "opinions" on controversial topics are ignored by some of the populace who now have easy access on the internet to the "opinions" of ulema who are not affiliated with any state institutions. For more on the uneasy relationship between the ulema of Al-Azhar and the Egyptian state and on the relationship between the Saudi ulema and the ruling Saud regime see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 144–151 (Egypt); 152–160 (Saudi Arabia). Kepel (see note 53 above), 19. For more insight on Qaradawi's views on subjects such as "female martyrdom," see "The Qaradawi Fatwas," Middle East Quarterly 11, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 78–80. Accessed at: http://www.meforum.org/646/the-qaradawi-fatwas Accessed at: http://m.memri.org/14499/show/bae13fb07b62fffbaa0d290804f4ff6d&t=0e3daa2990ed9c241a738ba33d0e1a4c Quotations of Qaradawi, Sabri, and Mufti Abdul Aziz, accessed at: http://www.apologeticsindex.org/news1/an010918-10.html Yaniv Berman, "Top Palestinian Muslim Cleric Okays Suicide Bombings," The Media Line (October 17, 2006). Accessed at: http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=1280 Ibid. For more on the "jihad against Israel" led by Hamas, see Litvak (see note 15 above): 721–723; Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and their Dispatchers (London: Praeger Security International, 2007). For more on the use of suicide in the Second Intifada see Robert J. Brym and Bader Araj, "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada," Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1969–1986. Con Coughlin, "Sheikh Fadlallah was the terrorist mastermind behind the Lebanon hostage crisis," The Telegraph (July 5, 2010). Accessed at: http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100046096/sheikh-falallah-was-the-terrorist-mastermind-behind-the-lebanon-hostage-crisis/ For more on the Ash'arites whose literalist approach informs Sunni schools of jurisprudence (fiqh) today, see Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1111), The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Translated by Michael Marmara (Provo: Brigham Young University, 1998). Ibn Rushd, a Mu'tazilite, famously responded that "to say that philosophers are incoherent is itself to make an incoherent statement." But his response could not refute Al Ghazali's view, which was very broadly based and eventually came to dominate Sunni theology. For more on the Mu'tazilite philosophy (which flourished in Baghdad and Basra during the 8th to 10th CE) see Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, with S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam (Oxford: One World Publications, 1997); Sophia Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their Deserts: The Character of Mu'tazilite Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). Muslim scholars, like Wael Hallaq, who argue that in Sunni Islam the gates of ijtihad were never really closed, could be labeled "neo-Mu'tazilites." For Islamiyyun militants, such "Western Conventions" are both "man, not Allah, made"; and second, reflect the kuffar's ideology and thus are haram (forbidden) and illegal for Muslims to adhere to. Three of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (fiqh), the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi argue that the gates of ijtihad were closed by the 10th century. The fourth, Hanbali, madhab (the most austere school) has stressed that ijtihad is necessary to re-examine/re-assess Islamic precepts in order to better replicate the time of the Salaf-i-Saliheen (pious predecessors) of the 7th and 8th centuries. The Shia also believe in ijtihad since they never recognized any closing of the so-called "gates" of independent reasoning. While prominent scholars of Islamic jurisprudence such as Joseph Schacht (1902–1969) recognized that the "gates of ijtihad" were "closed" within Sunni schools of jurisprudence (fiqh) around the 10th century which signified that all necessary examination, and interpretation, of the Quran and Hadith had been accomplished by Muslim (Sunni) scholars, thus further inquiry was unnecessary; more recent scholars of Islamic law (see Wael Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" International Journal of Middle East Studies 16, no. 1 (1984): 3–41) have challenged this assessment, arguing that ijtihad remains an essential component (farz) of the Sunni Muslim tradition, despite the emphasis on blind obedience (taqlid). Although it can be argued that due to a breakdown of consensus (ijma) amongst Sunni clerics and scholars on the subject of ijtihad, it appears that the Hanbali school (madhab), and the literalists of the other three schools of jurisprudence, have won out. The reality, however, is not so clear cut. Unlike the Salafists, Sunni scholars like Hallaq and others seek to practice ijtihad in order to interpret Islamic works and teachings in order to make them applicable to issues unique to contemporary times. See also Wael Be Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Kepel (see note 21 above)), 190–191. Peters (see note 24 above), 178–179. "Support for Suicide Bombing: Is Suicide Bombings Justifiable?" Pew Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center, 2010. Accessed at: http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=19 The Pew poll in Lebanon found that suicide attacks on civilians were primarily favored by the Shia, with 46% of Shia polled expressing their support of varied degrees; while 33% of the Sunnis polled expressed complete or partial support. The list of kuffar targets continues to grow in the eyes of the jihadis. The term "anarchical jihad" was coined by this writer to describe the current state of affairs in the Sunni Muslim world that no longer has a spiritual or temporal Caliph (Khalifa). Thus, every Tom, Dick or Abdullah can now issue his/her own fatwa and declare jihad al saghir and determine how to proceed irrespective of any moral or ethical constraints. Additional informationNotes on contributorsShireen Khan BurkiShireen K. Burki is currently completing a book on state-society relations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. She has worked as an assistant professor (contractor) at the National Defense University in Washington, DC (2009–2010); with the USMC as a subject manner expert on South Asia and Southwest Asia (2006–2008); and as a contractor with USAID based out of Peshawar, Pakistan on the Tribal Areas Development Sub-Project (1987–1989). She completed her PhD in political science from the University of Utah in 2007.