THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THAILAND'S BUDDHIST ORDER
2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 44; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14672715.2012.738544
ISSN1472-6033
Autores Tópico(s)Cambodian History and Society
ResumoAbstract Thailand's monastic politics are in turmoil. No longer can the sangha be written off as a political force and viewed simply as a fount of legitimacy for the nation and the monarchy. The role played by a few hundred pro-Thaksin "redshirt" monks in the March to May 2010 mass demonstrations testified to growing unease within the rank-and-file monkhood, which is drawn from the same regions and segments of society as the redshirt movement more generally. But beyond these overt displays of dissatisfaction, the sangha faces a range of serious challenges. While long-standing tensions between the rival Thammayut and Mahanikai orders have apparently declined, a dearth of moral and administrative leadership has paralyzed the Thai monkhood and rendered it seemingly incapable of reforming itself. Competing power groups linked to secular politics are vying for influence within the Supreme Sangha Council, while there is no widely supported successor ready to replace the current supreme patriarch, himself nearly a hundred years old. In many respects, the political paralysis of the monkhood mirrors the wider crisis confronting the body politic of the Thai nation itself. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many thanks are due to the guiding hand of Sombat Chantornvong, for whose Thailand Research Fund project the original version of this article was written. I am also very grateful to all those who granted me interviews; to Pete Tanruangporn for his research assistance; to Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Michael Connors, Tyrell Haberkorn, Michael Montesano, and Naris Charaschanyawong for their invaluable critical comments; to Nick Nostitz for his fine photographs; and to Tom Fenton for his wonderful editing. Notes 1 The terms "red" and "redshirt," which signify those broadly supportive of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, are used hereafter without quotation marks. 2 Sombat Citation2010, 3. 3 For a discussion see McCargo Citation2012, 190–98; and Graham Citation1993. 4. See Sombat 2010, 18. Source here is Bellah Citation1967. 5. Sombat Citation2010, 22. Source is Patterson n.d. 6. Various Thai educational institutions have adopted slogans using the term "wisdom," such as NIDA's "Wisdom for Change" and Mahidol University's "Wisdom in the Land." 7. On the concept of network monarchy, see McCargo Citation2005. 8. For analyses of the politics surrounding the 2006 military coup, see Connors and Hewison Citation2008. 9. King Prachadipok's Institute Citation2012, 133. 10. Somboon Citation1982, 7. 11. The history of this suppression is explored in Kamala Citation1997. 12. Elsewhere (McCargo Citation2009) I have contrasted the universalist stance of Buddhadasa with the more particularistic perspective of Prayudh Payutto, who has in effect replaced him as Thailand's leading monk-scholar. Prayudh does not accept my views and recently published a book in which he strongly articulates his disagreements with me. See Prayudh Citation2011. Confusingly, Prayudh has published his work under different monastic titles, as he has been regularly promoted through the sangha hierarchy. His current title is Phra Bhrama Khunabarana; his previous titles were Phra Rajavaramuni, Phra Dhebvedhi, and Phra Dhammapitaka. 13. For a detailed analysis of the 2010 protests, see Montesano, Pavin, and Aekopol, eds. 2012. 14. For a list of the eleven senior monks blacklisted, see Thai Rath, 3 March 2010. 15. Interview with Phra Metthathamajan, vice-rector, Mahachulalongkorn University, 10 September 2012. 16. Jim Taylor argues that some 400 to 500 monks took part in or offered support for the 2010 redshirt protests. Many followed monastic regulations and attire, though others even sported red flags and headbands themselves. At least five monks were arrested; some of these were forced to disrobe. See Taylor Citation2012, 290–92. 17. For a discussion of the concept of "urbanized villagers" as a central explanation for the social origins of the redshirts, see Naruemon and McCargo Citation2011. 18. Sulak Sivaraksa interview, 26 July 2012; Phra Metthathamajan interview, 10 September 2012. 19. Thanks are due to Nidhi Aeusrivongse for this observation, 30 August 2012. 20. See Suraphot Citation2011 (Khwamkhit) and the detailed discussion in Suraphot 2011 (Phra). 21. Suraphot Citation2011 (Khwamkhit), 53. He also argues that such prohibitions have no basis in Buddhist scriptures. 22. Suraphot's discussion of yellow monks is much weaker than his analysis of redshirt monks, partly because he takes Samana Photirak, the leader of the breakaway Santi Asoke movement, as the main representative of yellowshirt monks. This is a misleading view, given that Santi Asoke had not been part of the mainstream sangha for the past twenty-five years. 23. For a critical discussion of Vajiramedhi's controversial 2010 statement that "Killing time is more of a sin than killing people," see blogazine.in.th/blogs/buddhistcitizen/post/3465. For a spoof Facebook page full of Photo-shopped images of the monk, apparently created by his critics, see www.facebook.com/luangjae (accessed 4 October 2012). 24. Quoted in Suraphot Citation2011 (Khwamkhit), 69–70. 25. Interview with two academics specializing on Thai Buddhism, 27 July 2012. 26. Sulak interview, 26 July 2012. 27. Phra Methithammajarn interview, 10 September 2012. 28. Ibid.; Suraphot Thaveesak interview, 14 June 2012. 29. Interview with two academics, 27 July 2012. 30. Informant interview, 11 June 2012. 31. A recent such contribution appeared in the cremation volume for the abbot of Wat Chanasongkram, whose funeral took place in February 2012. 32. Significantly, members of the royal family have not patronized Wat Saket. Sulak interview, 26 July 2012. 33. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn was also ordained at Wat Bowornnives in 1978. 34. For a discussion of the five anantariya kamma, the fifth of which is sanghabheda, "causing schism in the order," see Prayudh Payutto Citation2012, 179, sect. 245. 35. For a history of this fascinating temple, see Koompong n.d. 36. Interview with former disciple of Phra Phimonlatham, 31 July 2012. 37. Jatuporn Prompan, personal conversation, 10 July 2012. Jatuporn also spoke about the Phimonlatham case during a parliamentary no-confidence debate in 2011. 38. Thammayut monks view their Mahanikai counterparts as "incompletely ordained" and so believe themselves to be the only "real" monks in Thailand. 39. Suraphot Thaveesak interview, 14 June 2012. 40. For a recent discussion of Wat Phra Thammakai, see Cook Citation2009. 41. Prayudh Payutto Citation2007, 52–53. 42. Paisal Visalo Citation2012. 43. The most outspoken critic of Wat Phra Thammakai in recent years has been one of the temple's former leading monks, Mano Mettanando Laohavanich. See, for example, Mano Citation2012. The author claims that he was prevented from giving this paper at a conference at Mahachulalongkorn University in Bangkok owing to the influence of the movement—a claim rejected by the university. 44. See MacKenzie 2008. 45. See the program in question at www.dmc.tv/pages/en/Where-is-Steve-Jobs/20120822-TheHereafter-News:Steve-Jobs-where-is-he-now-Part-1.html (accessed 4 October 2012). 46. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=PtjD10y6Hn4 (accessed 4 October 2012) and the following media commentaries: www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/308543/dhammakaya-boasts-stevejobs-afterlife and www.manager.co.th/qol/viewnews.aspx?NewsID=9550000102986 (accessed 4 October 2012). 47. Mano writes, "Under the first female prime minister of Thailand, Wat Phra Dhammakâya has, for the first time, several hard-core disciples sitting in the parliament." Mano Citation2012, 510.
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