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Nationalism and Democratization in Contemporary China

2009; Routledge; Volume: 18; Issue: 62 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10670560903174663

1469-9400

Cong Ri-yun,

China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance

Abstract The crippled economic and political reform in China has come with two schools of thought: the new-left and nationalism. The new-left focuses on domestic issues, while nationalism tackles more international relationships. This paper explores the effects of radical nationalism on China's democratization process. It argues that if nationalism takes the dominant position in China's political process, Chinese reform will go astray. Notes *Cong Riyun is a professor at the Institute of Political Science, China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing. The author would like to thank Dr Zheng Hong and Dr Lu Chunlong for translating the Chinese version into English. 1. These two trends are to a great extent crossed. In most cases, new-leftists in domestic affairs are nationalists in international ones, while the nationalists easily see eye to eye with the new-leftists in domestic politics. 2. In China, the absolute majority of the population is mass in root. They, peasants in particular, have almost no consciousness of or identification with the state. This consciousness and identification lodge in intellectual and political elites. The populous Han have little sense of ethnic belonging, while the minorities have a clear mind about ethnic belonging. The development of education produces more intellectual elites. With the enlargement of Chinese university enrollment from the end of the 1990s, more youth are going to college. There are 5.7 million students who went to university in 2007. Now the number of college students has reached 23 million, the largest in the world. The young intellectuals total about 50 million in number. With the influence of the media, the national consciousness of ordinary workers and peasants has increased. 3. Suisheng Zhao divided Chinese nationalism according to its carriers as three levels: 'in the state apparatus, in intellectual discourse, and within popular society', and then according to its political identification and value, Zhao divided it into three types: 'liberal nationalism, ethnic nationalism, state nationalism'. Please see Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 8 and 20. 4. The large amount of historical bias in the mind of the nationalist was formed in the 1950s–1970s. Some of them occurred in the Yan'an Period. After reform and opening, this bias has been presented as the orthodox doctrine to students and the masses. The stale reports about the Western world by the media at that time still work as the base in the nationalists' recognition toward current Western society. 5. Shaoguang Wang, 'Nationalism and democracy', Review of Public Administration 2, (2004). See also Phoenix Weekly, (October 2005). 6. A best-selling book in the 1990s says, if someone believes in one person one vote, 'he is either an idiot or used by Americans'. See Xiguan Li, Lei Xiong et al., The Back of Evilized China (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publishing House, 1996). 7. Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China, Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 44. 8. Pan Wei, Rule of Law and 'Superstition of Democracy' (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Social Science Publishing Ltd, 2003), pp. 3–60. Please also see, Pan Wei, 'Toward a consultative rule of law regime in China', Journal of Contemporary China 12(34), (2003), pp. 3–43. 9. For the discussion of Pan Wei's points, please see Randall Peerenboom, 'A government of laws: democracy, rule of law and administrative law reform in the PRC', Journal of Contemporary China 12(34), (2003), pp. 47–67; Edward Friedman, 'A comparative politics of democratization in China', Journal of Contemporary China 12(34), (2003), pp. 103–123; Larry Diamond, 'The rule of law as transition to democracy in China', Journal of Contemporary China 12(35), (2003), pp. 319–331; Suisheng Zhao, 'Political liberalization without democratization: Pan Wei's proposal for political reform', Journal of Contemporary China 12(35), (2003), pp. 333–355. 10. Yongnian Zheng, 'Chinese new wave of nationalism—source, process and future', in Jialong Lin and Yongnian Zheng, eds, Nationalism and Relationship between Mainland and Taiwan—the Dialog of Western and Eastern Scholars in Harvard University (Taiwan: New Naturalism Ltd, 2001), p. 25. 11. Suisheng Zhao emphasizes the ideas of public participation and calls it 'liberal nationalism': Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, pp. 23–26. Please also see his article, Suisheng Zhao, 'China's pragmatic nationalism: is it manageable?', Washington Quarterly 29, (Winter 2005–2006), p. 138. I, however, would like to call it 'populist nationalism'. 12. Suisheng Zhao calls him 'a leading liberal nationalist': Suisheng Zhao, 'China's pragmatic nationalism', p. 138. 13. In my opinion, 'human rights' here refers to democratic participation rather than general individual rights. 14. As Edward Friedman said, 'China, in contrast, is a strong, secure and rising power. No one is going to invade China or challenge its sovereign existence. Fears to the contrary are worrisome paranoid fantasies'. Please see, Friedman, 'A comparative politics of democratization in China', p. 109. 15. Wang Xiaodong, 'Nationalism and democratism', in Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong, Song Qiang et al., Chinese Road in the Shade of Globalization (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publishing House, 1999), p. 31. 16. Zhiyuan Cui, Mao Zedong's Idea of Cultural Revolution and the Restructuring of Chinese Modernity (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Journal of Social Science, 1996), pp. 49–74. 17. Ziyuan Cui, 'A new way of Chinese political reform—competitive election without competitive parties', available at: http://guancha.gmw.cn/show.aspx?id = 7. 18. Shaoguang Wang, 'Warning against the decoration of democracy', Dushu [Reading Books], (April 2003), pp. 9–18. 19. Qing Jiang, Political Confucianism: Contemporary Confucian Turning, Feature and Development (Beijing: San Lian Bookstore, 2003), pp. 202–210, 369. 20. Kang Xiaoguang, 'Statement of Chinese peculiarities—reflections on 25-year reform experience in Chinese mainland', Strategy and Administration, (April 2003), pp. 60–61. 21. Kang Xiaoguang, 'Exploring the political development strategy in the ten years future', Strategy and Administration, (January 2003), p. 78. 23. Kang Xiaoguang, 'Statement of Chinese peculiarities', p. 61. 22. In 2008, there was a rising debate on 'universal values'. In this debate, radical nationalists, together with traditional leftists, denied the existence of 'universal values'. Radical nationalists argued that freedom, democracy and human rights are Western values, but not universal values. For reference, please see Zhou Xincheng, 'Lun pushi jiazhi shifou cunzai ji pushi jiazhi de guchuizhemen de zhengzhi mudi' ['On the existence of universal values and the political purpose of those who advocate for universal values'], Zhengzhixue Yanjiu [Political Science Research] no. 10, (2008); Feng Yuzhang, 'Zenyang renshi suowei pushi jiazhi' ['How to understand the so-called universal values'], Makesi Zhuyi Yanjiu [Marxism Research] no. 7, (2008); Hou Huiqin, 'Pushi jiazhi de lilun wuqu he shijian xianjing' ['Theoretical error and practical pitfall of universal values'], Makesi Zhuyi Yanjiu [Marxism Research] no. 9, (2008). 24. Pan Wei, Rule of Law and 'Superstition of Democracy', p. 56. 25. Suisheng Zhao pointed out that, 'among the most important outcomes of the patriotic education campaign was that many people, including some liberal intellectuals, changed their minds. Many Chinese intellectuals emphasized that they were patriots first and democrats second'. Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, p. 242. 26. Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2000), pp. 25–40. Yongnian Zheng also believes that this patriotism is equal to love of a 'socialist country'. Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China, p. 93. 27. When SARS was prevailing in 2003, cultural nationalist Xiaoguang Kong still gave the government a full mark. Only a tame Confucian subject can do this. 28. Wu Guoguang, 'The historical flux of Chinese nationalism', in Jialong Lin and Yongnian Zheng, eds, Nationalism and Relationship between Mainland and Taiwan, p. 322. 29. One nationalist reminds us that we should not ignore the connotation and character of the Chinese civilization, China's incomparable and deep-rooted nationalism complex, animosity resulting from the humiliation and disgrace experienced during early modern history combined with superiority and strong-esteem, and dreams of empire that have been hidden in the nation's heart for thousands of years. He says if someday China realizes democratic politics, that means a politically soft landing, China will become an empire eager to enlarge its territory. He conceives a concrete strategy of the Chinese empire: 'push eastwardly' and 'extend northwardly'. The Chinese political future will be what he has said if nationalists take the leadership. See Zhiping Qiu, 'Democratic China must finally run to imperialism', available at: http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/sino.us/pages4/sino us forum171103a.html. 30. For the impacts of patriotism education and historical education upon the rise of radical nationalism in China, please see Cong Riyun, 'Minzu zhuyi heyi jijin—dui jijin minzu zhuyi xingqi yuanyin de tantao' ['Why nationalism is so radical—to explore the causes of the rise of radical nationalism'], in Zhaoji Xingye and Liu Xiaolin, eds, Shijie Zhengzhi Zonglun [On World Politics] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publishing House, 2008), pp. 156–166. 31. Two influential books are representative: Song Qiang et al., China Can Say No (Beijing: Chinese Business Association Press, 1996); and Li Xiguan, Xiong Lei et al., The Back of Evilized China. 32. In the time of Mao Zedong, the leaders had charismatic personality. The value of the individual was submerged and absorbed by the glorious leaders. After that period, the consciousness of individuality came out, but in the Chinese education system, individualism has no proper place. So it cannot be promoted normally, but can only be expressed in a devious and metamorphic way. 33. One of the features of Chinese nationalism is the confusion of state nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Someone bluntly proposes that statism can take the place of nationalism and be used as a fundamental backbone to support the development of a national state. Guoguang Wu, 'The historical flux of Chinese nationalism', p. 326. 34. Fromm believes that abusing and being abused coexist: Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (Beijing: International Culture Publishing House, 2003), pp. 209, 217. 35. Yingshi Yu is the pioneer of this idea. See Yingshi Yu, 'Election under missile: between democracy and nationalism', China Times, (29 March 1996). 36. For example, when China was applying to enter into the WTO, the central government even ordered local ones to check official documents and abolish those which were contrary to the rule of the WTO. 37. Pan Wei, 'Ganyu xifang zhankai zhengzhi guannian jingzheng' ['We shall compete with Western political ideas'], Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], (30 January 2008). 38. Please see, Wang Zaibang, 'The historical reflection on the alternation of world leadership', Strategy and Administration, (June 1995), pp. 1–5. World leadership has become one of the main concerns of Chinese nationalism since the 1990s; please see Guoguang Wu, 'The historical flux of Chinese nationalism', p. 321. 39. Chinese radical nationalism opposes the warlike Right in Japan and America, but in fact, they are brothers and fuel each other. 40. The reality of China is different from that of Russia, so China will not make the same decision. 41. Recently a play series called General Lang Shi has been on CCTV. Nationalists argue whether Lang Shi is a traitor or a patriot. This reveals that nationalism is in an embarrassing situation in national identification. 42. Alastair Iain Johnston believes that traditional Chinese culture is not prone to be peaceful as many people think. Realism underlies a hard Realpolitik strategic culture: the best way of dealing with security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force. So compared with other huge countries, China is more likely to use force to resolve a diplomatic crisis. See Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China, p. 6. 43. Feiling Wang, 'Chinese tragedy—the coming clash on both sides of the Straits', in Jialong Lin and Yongnian Zheng, eds, Nationalism and Relationship between Mainland and Taiwan, pp. 412 and 426. 44. Feiling Wang, 'Chinese tragedy—the coming clash on both sides of the Straits', in Jialong Lin and Yongnian Zheng, eds, Nationalism and Relationship between Mainland and Taiwan, p. 427. As for the clash of national unification and democratization, see Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China, ch. 7. 45. In the end of 2008, there was a video clip titled '2009, Go China' on the website of You Tube, which astonished many intellectuals. For reference, please see: http://www.youtube.com/results?search_type = &search_query. The main points of this video clip are as follows: '2009, Go China! Lead: Snowstorm, freely falling down to earth, like Western values. Lead: Despair fills the sky, ice covers the earth. Lead: Did China retreat? All: No. The Olympics were a success! We are victorious! … Lead: Earthquakes, shifting back and forth like the positions of Sarkozy, with his dirty tricks, trying to shake the great China. Lead: Did China retreat? All: No. The Shenzhou-7 launched. We are victorious! Lead: Pathetic Europe will never stop the insurmountable force of our great dynasty. All: Just the aftershocks from the earthquake would destroy France! … Lead: Do not waver, do not slow down, do not make big changes. Lead: Do not change the flag. Do not turn back. All: Step ruthlessly over all anti-China forces. … Lead: 2009, All: Go China. Lead: 2009, All: China the Greatest'. As Islamic extremists were trained in the Mosque, Chinese radical nationalists were educated in the classrooms of elementary and middle school.