Attitudes and Contents
1988; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 98; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/292968
ISSN1539-297X
Autores Tópico(s)Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessAttitudes and ContentsSimon BlackburnSimon BlackburnPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 98, Number 3Apr., 1988 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292968 Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 65Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1988 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:John Eriksson Disagreement and inconsistency: a problem for orthodox expressivism, Synthese 200, no.55 (Sep 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03867-9James L. D. Brown Interpretative expressivism: A theory of normative belief, Philosophical Studies 179, no.11 (May 2021): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01648-7Víctor M. Verdejo, Javier González de Prado Interlocking content and attitude: a reply to the anti-normativist, Inquiry 62 (Oct 2021): 1–22.https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1985603Malte Willer, Christopher Kennedy Assertion, expression, experience, Inquiry 34 (Dec 2020): 1–37.https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850338Chi-Ho Hung, Chiu Yui Plato Tse The Frege-Geach Problem and Blackburn's Expressivism, Philosophia 48, no.55 (Mar 2020): 2021–2031.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00194-6Carlo Dalla Pozza, Claudio Garola, Antonio Negro, Davide Sergio A Pragmatic Logic for Expressivism, Theoria 86, no.33 (May 2020): 309–340.https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12240Benjamin Lennertz Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 156 (Sep 2019).https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12639Andrés Soria Ruiz A Non-factualist Semantics for Attributions of Comparative Value, (Jul 2019): 275–296.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59565-7_14Neil Sinclair The Naturalistic Fallacy, 14 (Nov 2018).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316717578CAROLINE T. ARRUDA Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics, Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4, no.44 (Jan 2019): 471–490.https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.15Derek Shiller The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no.3-43-4 (Jan 2020): 425–446.https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1413843Max Kölbel Perspectival representation and fallacies in metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no.3-43-4 (Jan 2020): 379–404.https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1432398John Eriksson Noncognitivism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day, (Dec 2017): 591–606.https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139519267.046Malte Willer Advice for Noncognitivists, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (Jul 2016): 174–207.https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12160Victor M. Verdejo Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will, Metaphilosophy 48, no.33 (Apr 2017): 355–369.https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12243Bob Hale Realism and its Oppositions, (Feb 2017): 491–531.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118972090.ch20Lenny Clapp A Non-Alethic Approach to Faultless Disagreement, Dialectica 69, no.44 (Dec 2015): 517–550.https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12104Jeremy Schwartz, Christopher Hom Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism, Noûs 49, no.44 (Jun 2014): 824–845.https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12068Patrick Clipsham Developing a Post-Prior Taxonomy of Ethical Sentences, Philosophia 43, no.33 (May 2015): 801–820.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9602-xAndrew Alwood NON-DESCRIPTIVE NEGATION FOR NORMATIVE SENTENCES, The Philosophical Quarterly (Aug 2015): pqv067.https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv067John Cantwell An Expressivist Bilateral Meaning-is-Use Analysis of Classical Propositional Logic, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24, no.11 (Oct 2014): 27–51.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-014-9209-9Derek Baker and Jack Woods How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency, Ethics 125, no.22 (Jun 2015): 391–424.https://doi.org/10.1086/678371Mark Douglas Warren , Philosophical Studies 172, no.1111 ( 2015): 2859.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0447-8Kim Frost On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit, The Philosophical Review 123, no.44 (Oct 2014): 429–484.https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2749720John Cantwell Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic, Dialectica 68, no.33 (Sep 2014): 443–457.https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12072Nicholas Smyth Resolute Expressivism, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no.44 (Feb 2014): 607–618.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9495-yHenrik Rydenfelt Realism Without Mirrors, (Apr 2014): 675–692.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_47Peter Ludlow Recursion, Legibility, Use, (Apr 2014): 89–112.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05086-7_5Nur Zafifa Kamarunzaman, Azlyn Ahmad Zawawi, Zaliha Hj. Hussin Reporting Misdeeds: An Evaluation on Intention to Blowing the Whistle, International Journal of Social Science and Humanity 4, no.44 (Jan 2014): 269–274.https://doi.org/10.7763/IJSSH.2014.V4.361Mark Schroeder Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?, Noûs 47, no.33 (Oct 2011): 409–430.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00833.xNur Zafifa Kamarunzaman, Azlyn Ahmad Zawawi, Zaliha Hj. Hussin, James K. Campbell Whistle blowing intention in relation to perceived organizational support, attitude to whistle blow, channel of communication among public servant, (Sep 2012): 285–289.https://doi.org/10.1109/ISBEIA.2012.6422888NEIL SINCLAIR MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS, Analytic Philosophy 53, no.22 (Jun 2012): 158–179.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-960X.2012.00558.xRuth Weintraub Logic For Expressivists, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89, no.44 (Dec 2011): 601–616.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2010.525517Charlie Kurth Logic for morals, morals from logic, Philosophical Studies 155, no.22 (May 2010): 161–180.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9559-3Carl Baker Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14, no.44 (Dec 2010): 445–455.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9255-6Neil Sinclair Moral expressivism and sentential negation, Philosophical Studies 152, no.33 (Nov 2009): 385–411.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9484-5Ebenezer Paintsil Towards Legal Privacy Risk Assessment and Specification, (Jan 2011): 174–185.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22890-2_15Derek Baker Ambivalent desires and the problem with reduction, Philosophical Studies 150, no.11 (Mar 2009): 37–47.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9396-4Michael Blome-Tillmann XIV-Moral Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 109, no.1pt31pt3 (Oct 2009): 279–309.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00268.xPatricia Marino ON ESSENTIALLY CONFLICTING DESIRES, The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no.235235 (Apr 2009): 274–291.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.570.xN. Sinclair Recent Work in Expressivism, Analysis 69, no.11 (Jan 2009): 136–147.https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ann020Mark Schroeder How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation, Noûs 42, no.44 (Nov 2008): 573–599.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00693.xNeil Sinclair Free Thinking for Expressivists, Philosophical Papers 37, no.22 (Jul 2008): 263–287.https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640809485222Mark Schroeder What is the Frege-Geach Problem?, Philosophy Compass 3, no.44 (Jul 2008): 703–720.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00155.xDANIEL R. BOISVERT EXPRESSIVE-ASSERTIVISM, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89, no.22 (Jun 2008): 169–203.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00315.x Bibliography, (Jan 2008): 411–440.https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470757031.biblioPatricia Marino Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties, Dialogue 47, no.11 (Apr 2009): 81–102.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300002390Neil Sinclair PROPOSITIONAL CLOTHING AND BELIEF, The Philosophical Quarterly 57, no.228228 (Jul 2007): 342–362.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.488.xDAVID ALM Non-Cognitivism and Validity, Theoria 73, no.22 (Oct 2008): 121–147.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01194.xPatricia Marino Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, no.55 (Nov 2006): 517–533.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9034-6C. S. Jenkins Lewis and Blackburn on quasi-realism and fictionalism, Analysis 66, no.44 (Oct 2006): 315–319.https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/66.4.315C. S. Jenkins Lewis and Blackburn on quasi-realism and fictionalism, Analysis 66, no.292292 (Oct 2006): 315–319.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00634.xJamie DREIER Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, no.33 (May 2006): 714–721.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00598.xJames Gordon Finlayson Habermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge, European Journal of Philosophy 13, no.33 (Dec 2005): 319–344.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2005.00232.xMark van Roojen EXPRESSIVISM, SUPERVENIENCE AND LOGIC, Ratio 18, no.22 (Jun 2005): 190–205.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00283.xJorn Sonderholm WHY AN EXPRESSIVIST SHOULD NOT COMMIT TO COMMITMENT-SEMANTICS1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105, no.33 (May 2005): 403–409.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00183.xMax Kolbel III-Faultless Disagreement, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104, no.11 (Sep 2003): 53–73.https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.t01-1-00003Barry Ward Sometimes The World is Not Enough: The Pursuit of Explanatory Laws in a Humean World, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84, no.22 (Jun 2003): 175–197.https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00169Mary Gore Forrester Metaethical Background, (Jan 2002): 1–35.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9994-8_1David Alm Moral Conditionals, Noncognitivism, and Meaning, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, no.33 (Sep 2000): 355–377.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00905.x David O. Brink Moral Motivation, Ethics 108, no.11 (Oct 2015): 4–32.https://doi.org/10.1086/233786Michael Smith INTERNALISM'S WHEEL, Ratio 8, no.33 (Dec 1995): 277–302.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00088.xStefan Sencerz Moral facts and the problem of justification in ethics, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, no.33 (Sep 1995): 368–388.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409512346711Nick Zangwill Moral mind-independence, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, no.22 (Jun 1994): 205–219.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409412346011Allan Gibbard Reply to Sinnott-Armstrong, Philosophical Studies 69, no.2-32-3 (Mar 1993): 315–327.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00990092
Referência(s)