EU Member States' Energy Relations with Russia: Conflicting Approaches to Securing Natural Gas Supplies
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14650045.2011.520864
ISSN1557-3028
Autores Tópico(s)Russia and Soviet political economy
ResumoAbstract European Union (EU) member states' 'failure' to cooperate on energy policy towards Russia has been much criticised in the media and by policy analysts since the mid-2000s. This article analyses member states' choices to ensure domestic supply security by either increasing gas supplies from Russia or by reducing gas imports from Russia. The article seeks to explain why the member states pursue energy supply objectives towards Russia that are opposed by other member countries, despite the official commitment to acting 'in a spirit of solidarity'. It argues that the member states' choices are informed by their assessment of the geopolitical reality and its expected impact on their national energy supply security. This is, in turn, informed by their perceived vulnerability that stems from their geographic location, historical experience and bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia. The analysis shows that calls in the EU for 'solidarity' regarding the security of natural gas supply serve primarily as a cover for the pursuit of individual and not collective EU interests. The rhetoric of 'solidarity' and the need for cooperation in the EU also serves the European Commission's interest in acquiring a more important role in external energy policy. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am very grateful to the three anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions on how to improve this article. Notes 1. A. Correljé and C. van der Linde, 'Energy Supply Security And Geopolitics: A European Perspective', Energy Policy 34 (2006) pp. 532–543; A. Mañé-Estrada, 'European Energy Security: Towards the Creation of the Geo-Energy Space', Energy Policy 34 (2006) pp. 3773–3786; D. Finon and C. Locatelli, 'Russian and European Gas Interdependence: Could Contractual Trade Channel Geopolitics?', Energy Policy 36 (2008) pp. 423–442; R. Youngs, Energy Security. Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge (London: Routledge 2009). 2. British Petroleum, 'BP Statistical Review of World Energy' (June 2009). 3. Europa, 'Commissioner Piebalgs Calls for a Rapid Resolution of the Russia-Belarus Gas Conflict', RAPID Press Release IP/06/1906 (28 Dec. 2006); Europa, 'Statement of Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs after the Interruption of Oil Supplies from Belarus to the European Union', RAPID Press Release IP/07/15 (8 Jan. 2007); Europa, 'Commission Convenes the Oil Supply Group to Address Oil Supply Disruptions to the EU', RAPID Press Release IP/07/24 (9 Jan. 2007); Europa, 'The EU Agrees on a Joint Action to Tackle Disruptions in Oil Supplies from Russia', RAPID Press Release, IP/07/34 (11 Jan. 2007); Europa, 'The Commission Urges to Resolve the Open Gas Payment Issue', RAPID Press Release IP/07/1430 (2 Oct. 2007); Europa, 'Statement of Commissioner Piebalgs and Minister Vizjak on Resolving Russian-Ukrainian Gas Dispute', RAPID Press Release IP/08/383 (4 March 2008); R. Goldirova, 'EU on Alert Over Russian Oil Supplies', EU Observer, 29 Dec. 2009. 4. For an analysis of the 'special' bilateral relations of Germany, France and Italy with Russia see G. Timmins, 'EU–Russian Relations – a Member-State Perspective: Germany and Russia – a Special Partnership in the New Europe?', in D. Johnson and P. Robinson (eds.), Perspectives on EU–Russia Relations (London: Routledge 2005) pp. 55–70; G. Timmins, 'German Ostpolitik Under the Red-Green Coalition and EU-Russia Relations', Debatte – Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 14/3 (2006) pp. 301–314; G. Timmins, 'German-Russian Bilateral Relations and EU Policy On Russia: Reconciling the Two-Level Game?', in J. Gower and G. Timmins (eds.), Russia and Europe: An Uneasy Partnership (London: Anthem Press 2007) pp. 169–184; C. Collina, 'A Bridge in Times of Confrontation: Italy and Russia in the Context of EU and NATO Enlargements', Journal of Modern Italian Studies 13/1 (2008) pp. 25–40; J. Newton, 'Shortcut to Great Power: France and Russia in Pursuit of Multipolarity', in J. Gower and G. Timmins (eds.), Russia and Europe: An Uneasy Partnership (London: Anthem Press 2007) pp. 185–205. 5. P. Noël, 'Beyond Dependence. How to Deal with Russian Gas', Policy Brief (European Council on Foreign Relations 2008); Youngs (note 1). 6. All data discussed here is from Commission of the European Communities, 'Europe's Current and Future Energy Position. Demand – Resources – Investment. Part B – Statistical Annex, Current National Energy Position', Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Second Strategic Energy Review. An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, COM 2008 744 (13 Nov. 2008). The data is for the year 2006, and covers the EU of 27 member states. The percentage shares were calculated by the author by adding import volumes to indigenous production for each energy carrier, calculating the share of Russian origin in the total and then its share in the gross national energy consumption for each energy carrier. As the country data sheets list some gas figures in terajoule (TJ) while others are given in million tonnes (Mtoe), the gas figures had to be converted into tonnes of oil equivalent. This method is imperfect, but the figures regarding shares of Russian energy in total consumption and electricity generation yield insights into supply dependencies that the data on import volumes and the share of Russian gas in total imports cannot provide. 7. Russian oil accounts for around 10 percent of EU energy consumption and around 1 percent of EU electricity generation, coal from Russia accounts for around 2.5 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 8. British Petroleum, 'BP Statistical Review of World Energy' (June 2008). 9. Commission of the European Communities, 'A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy', Green Paper COM 2006 105 (8 March 2006) p. 6. 10. For a detailed analysis of the supply relations of the CMEA states and Russia under the Soviet regime, see R. Maddock, 'Energy and Integration: The Logic of Interdependence in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe', Journal of Common Market Studies XIX/1 (Sep. 1980) pp. 21–34. 11. B. Söderbergh, K. Jakobsson, and K. Aleklett, 'European Energy Security: The Future of Norwegian Natural Gas Production', Energy Policy 37 (2009) p. 5037. 12. Norway's gas production, the closest alternative source of supplies for Sweden, Denmark and the UK is expected to peak in 2015–2020, and the volumes available for exports to EU member states will not substantially increase from the present level until it peaks. See Söderbergh, Jakobsson, and Aleklett (note 11) pp. 5037–5055. 13. Russian gas continued to flow through the pipeline that transits Belarus but carries only around 20 percent of Russian gas exports to the EU. 14. Commission of the European Communities, 'The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the EU: An Assessment', SEC 2009 977, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC (16 July 2009) p. 8; A. Willis, 'EU Not Getting 'One Drop' of Russian Gas', EUObserver, 13 Jan. 2009. 15. Noël (note 5) p. 2. 16. Ibid., p. 13. 17. Commission of the European Communities, 'Assessment Report of Directive 2004/67/EC on Security of Gas Supply, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply and Repealing Directive 2004/67/EC, Commission Staff Working Document SEC 2009 978 (16 July 2009) p. 35. 18. Commission of the European Communities, 'An Energy Policy for Europe', Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament COM 2007 1 (10 Jan. 2007), Annex 3, p. 26. 19. The share of natural gas in Lithuania's electricity generation increased substantially with the decommissioning of its nuclear reactors (Ignalina) by 31 December 2009. This will have increased the share of alternative fuels, including Russian natural gas in Lithuania's national energy consumption by more than a quarter. 20. The government of Vaclav Klaus decided to restructure the energy supply system and invested in the construction of nuclear power stations, access to alternative supply sources and the connection to its Western neighbours' gas and electricity grids. For a discussion of Czech and Polish energy supply policies during the 1990s until the mid-2000s, see V. Weichsel, 'Atom, Monopol und Diversifikation. Elemente tschechischer Energiepolitik', OSTEUROPA 54/9-10 (2004) pp. 180–202; K.-O. Lang, 'Zwischen Sicherheitspolitik und Ökonomie. Polens Energiewirtschaft im Spannungsfeld', OSTEUROPA 54/9-10 (2004) pp. 203–222. 21. E. Karm, 'Environment and Energy: The Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline', Journal of Baltic Studies 39/2 (June 2008) p. 112. 22. Commission of the European Communities, 'Assessment Report of Directive 2004/67/EC on Security of Gas Supply, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply and Repealing Directive 2004/67/EC, Commission Staff Working Document SEC 2009 978 (16 July 2009) p. 18. 23. See, e.g., J. Solana 'The External Energy Policy of the European Union', Speech at the Annual Conference of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) S042/08, 1 Feb. 2008; A. Piebalgs, 'European Energy Security Policy', Speech at the European Business Summit, 21 Feb. 2008, SPEECH/08/96 (22 Feb. 2008); A. Vondra, 'Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference', 7 Feb. 2009. 24. Council Directive 2004/67/EC Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Natural Gas Supply (26 April 2004), Official Journal of the European Union L 127, 29 April 2004, p. 93, para. 13; Commission of the European Communities, 'A European Strategy' (note 9); Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and Repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJL 211/94, 14 Aug. 2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, para. (55) and Art. 6.1; Commission of the European Communities, 'Second Strategic Energy Review. An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan', Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM 2008 744 (13 Nov. 2008) p. 3; Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9 May 2008, Official Journal of the European Union C 115/1, Title XXI Energy, Art. 194, para. b; see also Art. 122, para. 1; Europa, 'The Gas Coordination Group Evaluates the Recent Russian-Belarus Gas Dispute', RAPID Press Release IP/07/3 (4 Jan. 2007). 25. K. Niklewicz and J. Pawlicki, 'Mr Tusk's Energy Pact', Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 Oct. 2008. For a detailed discussion see M. Roth, 'Poland as a Policy Entrepreneur in Europe's External Energy Policy: Towards Greater Energy Solidarity vis-à-vis Russia?', Geopolitics 16 (2011). 26. Commission of the European Communities, 'EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan' (note 24); Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Natural Gas Supply' (13 Nov. 2008) p. 6. 27. Europa 'Gas Coordination Group Evaluates the Recent Dispute between Russia and Ukraine', RAPID Press Release IP/08/432 (11 March 2008). 28. Commission of the European Communities, 'An Energy Policy for Europe' (note 18) p. 10, section 3.2; p. 10, section 4.2. 29. Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication on the Directive 2004/67/EC' (note 26) p. 6, section 3.5; p. 10, section 4.4; p. 9, section 4.2.1. 30. Ibid., p. 11, section 5. Such an agreement exists already between companies in Hungary and France. In case of reduced supplies from Russia the French company will leave behind in Hungary its share of supplies. See ibid., p. 10, section 4.4b. 31. A Regulation to replace the Gas Security of Supply Directive of 2004 does not, in contrast to a Directive, require transposition into national law, but is directly applicable to EU member states. 32. Commission of the European Communities, 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply and Repealing Directive 2004/67/EC', COM 2009 363 (16 July 2009), Preamble (23). 33. J. H. Matláry, 'Energy Policy: From a National to a European Framework?', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996) pp. 257–277; J. H. Matláry, Energy Policy in the European Union (Macmillan Press 1997); S. Mayer, 'Path Dependence and Commission Activism in the Evolution of the European Union's External Energy Policy', Journal of International Relations and Development 11/3 (2008) pp. 251–278; J. F. Braun, 'Multiple Sources of Pressure for Change: The Barroso Commission and Energy Policy for an Enlarged EU', Journal of Contemporary European Research 5/3 (2009) pp. 428–451. 34. F. McGowan, 'Can the European Union's Market Liberalism Ensure Energy Security in a Time of 'Economic Nationalism'?', Journal of Contemporary European Research 4/2 (2008) pp. 90–106; E. Wäktare, 'Territorial Restrictions and Profit Sharing Mechanisms in the Gas Sector: The Algerian Case', Competition Policy Newsletter 3 (2007) pp. 19–21, available at . 35. Europa, RAPID Press Release IP/07/3 (note 24); A. Piebalgs, Energy Commissioner, 'Oil and Gas Geopolitics', Speech at the Lisbon Energy Forum 2007 SPEECH/07/586, 2 Oct. 2007; A. Piebalgs, 'Consequences of the Recent Gas Crisis – Second Strategic Energy Review – Challenge of Energy Efficiency through Information and Communication Technologies', Debate (European Parliament, Strasbourg, 2 Feb. 2009); J. M. Durão Barroso, 'Statement of President Barroso on the Resolution of the Ukraine-Russia Gas Dispute. Press Points', RAPID Press Release SPEECH/09/12 (20 Jan. 2009); Europa, 'The Gas Coordination Group Evaluates the Current Gas Crisis and Confirms Measures to Assist Countries in Need', RAPID Press Release IP/09/30 (9 Jan. 2009); D. F. Tusk, 'Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference', 7 Feb. 2009. 36. Commission of the European Communities, 'Proposal for a Regulation' (note 32) Preamble (4). The Regulation was adopted in a considerably altered form in October 2010 as Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC. 37. Ibid. 38. T. H. Ilves, 'Speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference', 10 Feb. 2007; and T. H. Ilves, 'Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference', 7 Feb. 2009. N. Sarkozy, 'Speech at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy', 7 Feb. 2009; A. Heinrich, 'Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas: Potential for Conflict', KICES Working Papers 9–10 (Sept. 2007); R. Tarnogórski, 'North European Gas Pipeline. Legal Aspects', The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 15/1 (2006) p. 117. 39. A. Merkel, 'Speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference', 10 Feb. 2007; S. Handke and J. J. de Jong, 'Energy as a Bond: Relations with Russia in the European and Dutch Context', Clingendael Energy Paper CIEP 02/2007 (The Hague: Clingendael International Energy Programme). 40. European Parliament, 'Report on towards a Common European Foreign Policy on Energy (2007/2000(INI)', Committee on Foreign Affairs A6-0312/2007 (11 Sep. 2007) section B, para. 27, p. 9. 41. Europa, 'European Commission to Launch EU Network of Energy Security Correspondents 10th May', RAPID Press Release IP/07/629 (9 May 2007); Europa, 'Gas Dispute between Russia and Belarus: Commission Activates EU Energy Networks', RAPID Press Release MEMO/07/318 (2 Aug. 2007). 42. M. Leonard and N. Popescu, 'A Five-Point Strategy for EU-Russia Relations', Europe's World 8 (Spring 2008) pp. 20–30. 43. See Commission of the European Communities, 'An Energy Policy for Europe' (note 18) p. 10, section 3.2; Ilves, '45th Security Conference' (note 38). 44. See Vondra (note 23). 45. Ibid.; Mayer (note 33) p. 252. 46. Ilves, '43rd Security Conference' (note 38); Ilves, '45th Security Conference' (note 38). 47. Noël (note 5) pp. 1, 3, 16, 17. 48. The consortium is composed of Gazprom (51 percent of shares), German energy companies E.ON Ruhrgas (15.5 percent) and BASF/Wintershall Holding (15.5 percent) and Dutch company Gasunie (9 percent) which joined them in June 2008 and French company Gaz de France (GDF, 9 percent) which joined them in June 2010. See RIA Novosti, 'Gazprom rachète à GDF Suez 5,26% de l'allemand Verbundnetz Gas', RIA Novosti, 27 Nov. 2009; RIAN, 'France's GDF Suez to Join Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project', RIA Novosti, 1 March 2010. See Nord Stream, 'Company News. GDF Suez Acquires 9 Percent Stake in Nord Stream' (21 June 2010), available at , accessed 25 June 2011. A memorandum on the participation of the UK was signed between Putin and Blair already in June 2003. According to Russian sources, the UK has reserved the equivalent to 4 percent of the UK's total gas demand from Nord Stream. See Ria Novosti, 'Gran Bretaña se reserva en el gasoducto Nord Stream 4.000 millones de metros cúbicos de gas al año', RIA Novosti, 28 Nov. 2009; Gazprom, 'About/Major Projects/Nord Stream', available at , accessed 20 Jan. 2009; V. Pop, 'Russian Baltic Sea Pipeline Gets Final Approval', EU Observer, 12 Feb. 2010. For more details on the envisaged gas importers, see Nord Stream, 'Partners and Contractors' (n.d.) available at , accessed 25 June 2011. 49. French oil firm Total holds a 25 percent share in the consortium to develop the Shtokman gas fields which are to be operational by 2013. See Shtokman, 'About Company', Shtokman Development Company, available at , accessed 14 Jan. 2009. Almost a quarter of Yuzhno-Russkoye's reserves are owned by E.ON. See E.ON Ruhrgas, 'Yuzhno Russkoye Gas Field: Participation Agreement Signed' (n.d.), available at ; P. Runner, 'Nord Stream to Pump EU Gas by 2011, Russia Says', EUObserver, 21 Jan. 2009. 50. 'Rysk-tyska gasledningen. Tyskland har godkänt gasledning', Dagens Nyheter, 28 Dec. 2009. 51. The role of Nord Stream as an alternative to transit through Ukraine was underscored by the Czech EU Presidency in 2009. See Vondra (note 23). 52. B. S. Whist, 'Nord Stream: A Litmus Test for Intra-EU Solidarity', in Andreas Kasekamp (ed.), Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2009 (Tallinn: Eesti Välispoliitika Instituut 2009) pp. 88–89. As Danish and British production is gradually declining, both Ireland and Sweden can also be expected to benefit from Russian gas imports since their gas supplies have thus far originated exclusively from the UK and Denmark, respectively. 53. Ibid., p. 76. 54. See 'Rysk-tyska gasledningen. Danmark godkänner gasledning', Dagens Nyheter, 20 Dec. 2009; 'Rysk-tyska gasledningen. Regeringen säger ja till gasledningen', Dagens Nyheter, 5 Nov. 2009. 55. Whist (note 52) p. 76. 56. S. Bouzarovski and M. Konieczny, 'Landscapes of Paradox: Public Discourses and Policies in Poland's Relationship with the Nord Stream Pipeline', Geopolitics 15/1 (2010) p. 9. 57. There remain however questions about its cost-efficiency. See ibid., p. 12. 58. Ibid. 59. V. Pop, 'Putin Questions Baltic Pipeline, as Oil and Gas Prices Drop', EUObserver, 13 Nov. 2008; and G. Baczynska, 'Poland's Tusk Says Baltic Gas Pipeline Uncertain', Reuters (Warsaw), 6 Nov. 2007. 60. Yamal-Europe does not carry, as originally envisaged and indicated by its name, gas from the fields on the Yamal peninsula. 61. Bouzarovski and Konieczny (note 56) pp. 1–21. 62. Ilves, '45th Security Conference' (note 38). 63. P. Runner, 'Nord Stream to Pump EU Gas by 2011, Russia Says', EU Observer, 21 Jan. 2009; Whist (note 52) pp. 96, 105. 64. Whist (note 52) p. 105. 65. Ria Novosti, 'Estonian Parliament Speaks against Nord Stream Project', Ria Novosti, 27 Oct. 2009; 'Regeringen säger ja' (note 54); 'Tyskland har godkänt' (note 50). For a detailed analysis of the environmental impact of Nord Stream, see Karm (note 21) pp. 99–121 and Whist (note 52) pp. 98,105. 66. Whist (note 52) pp. 97–98. 67. For a detailed discussion of said events, see K. Brüggemann and A. Kasekamp, 'Identity Politics and Contested Histories in Divided Societies: The Case of Estonian War Monuments', in E. Berg and P. Ehin (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration (Aldershot: Ashgate 2009) pp. 51–63; K. Brüggemann and A. Kasekamp, 'The Politics of History and the "War of Monuments" in Estonia', Nationalities Papers 36/3 (July 2008) pp. 425–448; M. Mälksoo, 'Liminality and Contested Europeanness: Conflicting Memory Politics in the Baltic Space', pp. 65–83, in E. Berg and P. Ehin (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration (Aldershot: Ashgate 2009) pp. 65–83. See also P. Ehin and E. Berg, 'Incompatible Identities? Baltic-Russian Relations and the EU as an Arena for Identity Conflict', in E. Berg and P. Ehin (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration. (Aldershot: Ashgate 2009) pp. 1–14. 68. S. Sillanpää, 'Piping Down over Nord Stream', Helsingin Sanomat, 6 Sep. 2009. 69. A. Rettman, 'France and Russia Forge Alliance with Gas, Warship Deals', EU Observer, 2 March 2010. 70. 'Danmark godkänner' (note 54); 'Regeringen säger' (note 54). 71. Whist (note 52) pp. 80–81. 72. The pipeline's primary function would have been to deliver natural gas from offshore platforms to eastern Norway, with trunks supplying Sweden and Denmark, allowing also for a possible connection to Poland via Denmark. See Gassco, 'Skanled Project Terminated' (n.d.), available at . See also Bouzarovski and Konieczny (note 56) p. 14. 73. Whist (note 52) pp. 92–93. 74. See also ibid., p. 99. 75. The transit pipelines will be jointly owned by Gazprom and a national energy company of the respective state. 'Grönt ljus för rysk gasledning', Dagens Nyheter, 14 Nov. 2009. 76. Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, 'Markets for Nabucco – Sources for an increased demand', available at , accessed 31 Jan. 2009. 77. Shareholders are Romanian Transgaz S.A., German RWE, Austrian OMV, Hungarian MOL, Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD and Turkish Botas AS, each with a 16.67 percent share. See Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, 'Shareholders Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH', available at , accessed 10 Feb. 2009. 78. M. Mora, 'Cumbre privada Berlusconi-Putin para hablar de energía. La oposición califica la visita del Cavaliere a la dacha de Valdai como "indigna de un país democrático"', El País, 21 Oct. 2009. For an analysis of the new 'great game' taking place between Russia and the EU in this region in competition for the Central Asian countries' resources, see V. Feklyunina, 'The 'Great Diversification Game': Russia's Vision of the European Union's Energy Projects in the Shared Neighbourhood', Journal of Contemporary European Research 4/2 (June 2008). 79. 'Interview. Mandil: Energy Solidarity 'Still Just Words'', Euroactiv.com, 9 Feb. 2009. 80. For more detail on these issues, see A. Goldthau, 'Rhetoric Versus Reality: Russian Threats to European Energy Supply', Energy Policy 36 (2008) pp. 686–692; J. P. Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Oxford Institute for Energy 2005); S. L. Tkachenko, 'Actors in Russia's Energy Policy towards the EU', in P. Aalto (ed.), The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Securing Europe's Future Energy Supply (Aldershot: Ashgate 2008) pp. 163–192; A. Wasilewski, 'Natural Gas in Russia's Foreign Policy', The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 13/10 (Winter 2004) pp. 89–113; K. Westphal, 'Germany and the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue', in P. Aalto (ed.), The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Securing Europe's Future Energy Supply (Aldershot: Ashgate 2008) pp. 93–118. 81. Mora (note 78). 82. The Austrian and Hungarian national energy champions are however in competition with one another to act as Central European gas hub. For a detailed discussion see E. Butler, 'The Geopolitics of Merger and Acquisition in the Central European Energy Market', Geopolitics (forthcoming). 83. V. Pop, 'Romania Opens Door to Gazprom Pipeline', EU Observer, 24 Oct. 2008. 84. Vondra (note 23). 85. 'Europe Split Over Energy Security. Merkel Calls on EU to Support Baltic Gas Pipeline', Spiegel Online International, 29 Jan. 2009. 86. Centre for Eastern Studies, 'Bulgaria: The Dispute between the Government and the President over Energy Policy', CE Weekly, 16 Sept. 2009, available at http://www.osw.waw.pl.
Referência(s)