Closing the Deal with Iran
2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 54; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00396338.2012.709386
ISSN1468-2699
Autores Tópico(s)Economic Sanctions and International Relations
ResumoAbstract Iran must understand that the benefits of engagement, including sanctions relief, outweigh the benefits of a nuclear weapon. That message may not be getting through as clearly as it could or should. Acknowledgements The author thanks Mark Fitzpatrick, Kenneth Katzman, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Becca Wasser for their comments on an earlier draft of this commentary, and Alexa Bruer for her research assistance. Notes James R. Clapper, ‘Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’, 2 February 2012, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=699574. On Fordow, see IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/23, 6 June 2012. The Baghdad proposal is a modified version of the 2009 fuel swap. See Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), esp. pp. 356–70; and Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel Swap Plan’, Survival, vol. 52, no. 3, June–July 2010, pp. 67–94. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on 21 September 2011: ‘If they give us the 20% enriched uranium this very week, we will cease the domestic enrichment of uranium of up to 20% this very week. We only want the 20% enrichment for our domestic consumption. If they give it to us according to international law, according to IAEA laws, without preconditions, we will cease domestic enrichment. This is not something we wish to produce and sell on the open market. 20% enriched uranium, as you know, is not useful for much of anything other than the production of cancer treatment medication. It is not useful for a power plant.’ Nicholas Kristof, ‘An Interview with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’, New York Times, 21 September 2011, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/an-interview-with-mahmoud-ahmadinejad/. ‘Iran Will Never Seek Nuclear Weapons: Leader’, PressTV, 22 February 2012, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/228014.html. See also Iran's statement at the IAEA emergency meeting regarding the fatwa on 10 August 2005, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/mehr080905.html. Interview with Iranian official, 22 May 2012. The text of the treaty is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement. For example, US President Barack Obama said on 9 June 2010 that ‘we respect Iran's right, like all countries, to access peaceful nuclear energy. That is a right embedded in the NPT’, adding that ‘time and again, the Iranian government has failed to meet [its] responsibilities’. ‘Remarks by the President on United Nations Security Council Resolution on Iran Sanctions’, 9 June 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-united-nations-security-council-resolution-iran-sanctions. ‘Assessing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities amidst Economic Challenges: The Foreign Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2013’, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 29 February 2012, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/73119.pdf. For Iran's positions on UNSCR 1696 and 1737, see ‘Letter Dated 31 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council’, United Nations Security Council S/2006/603; and ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Security Council’, 23 December 2006, available at http://www.un.int/iran/statements/securitycouncil/articles/ Dr. Zarif Statement before the Security Council. Dec. 23.2006.pdf. The president can offer selected exemptions in the trade and investment ban on Iran by allowing exports of goods, services or technologies that he determines are in ‘the national interest of the United States’. See Section 103/b/2/vi of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr2194enr/pdf/BILLS111hr2194enr.pdf. US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf. For the best sources on sanctions see Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran Sanctions’, RS20871 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 28 March 2012); and U.S.–Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws and Regulations (Washington DC: The Atlantic Council, February 2011). Fox News Poll conducted by Anderson Robbins Research and Shaw & Company Research, 24–26 June 2012, http://www.pollingreport.com/wh12.htm. ABC News/Washington Post, 7–10 March 2012, http://www.pollingreport.com/iran.htm. Additional informationNotes on contributorsAndrew Parasiliti Andrew Parasiliti is Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies–US, and Corresponding Director, IISS–Middle East.
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