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Repression and Rebellion: Britain's Response to the Arab Revolt in Palestine of 1936–39

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/03086530801889350

1743-9329

Jacob Norris,

Military History and Strategy

Abstract In April 1936 growing unrest among the Arab community of Palestine led to the outbreak of a sustained revolt that would pose the most serious threat to British rule thus far experienced by the mandate government. Initially manifesting itself as an urban-led campaign of civil disobedience directed against the Zionist presence in Palestine, the second phase of the rebellion developed into a far more violent and peasant-led resistance movement that increasingly targeted British forces. Britain's response to this unrest has been the focus of much historical research, but few studies have examined the realities of the counterinsurgency at ground level or the relevance of this to the internal fracturing and collapse of the rebel movement in 1939. This article investigates the interplay between the colonial forces and the rural Arab population, highlighting Britain's resort to more heavy-handed military violence during the second phase of the Revolt, and situating these tactics in the wider issue of British abuses perpetrated during states of emergency. Notes [1] Among the historians that have documented the trend towards a hardening of the British response in 1937 and 1938 are Kolinksy, 'The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security', 158–64, and Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security. [2] See, for example, Cohen, 'British Strategy and the Palestine Question, 1936–39', 182–83. [3] Townshend, 'The Defence of Palestine', 921–36. [4] Examples of scholars who place more emphasis on the revolt's internal weaknesses include: Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 269; Arnon-Ohanna, 'The Bands in the Palestinian Arab Revolt', 229–47; Bowden, 'The Politics of Arab Rebellion', 147–74. [5] For the approach of the Palestine police force, see Kroizer, 'From Dowbiggin to Tegart', 122–23. [6] For the focus on diplomacy in order to end the rebellion of 1936, see Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, 26–31. [7] 'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' (167), The National Archives, London (TNA), War Office (WO) 191/70. [8] See Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, 12–14. For Colonial Office reluctance to impose martial law, see colonial secretary Ormsby-Gore's comments in 'Palestine: Defence Orders in Council, 1931 and 1936', memorandum from colonial secretary, 4 March 1937, TNA WO 32/9618. [9] 'Military Lessons', TNA WO 191/70, 34. [10] See Colonial Office, Palestine Royal Commission Report, 368; League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 32nd Session, 6th Meeting, 3 Aug. 1937. Available from http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF (5 Aug. 2006). [11] See Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, 53. [12] The difference between the emergency regulations imposed by Britain in 1937–38 and a full declaration of martial law is discussed by Townshend in 'The Defence of Palestine', 927. [13] See Telegram no.453, Battershill to Ormsby-Gore, 6 Oct. 1937, TNA, Colonial Office (CO) 733/332/75156/1–64. [14] For rural hegemony during the second phase of the revolt, see Abboushi, 'The Road to Rebellion', 42–44. For the decentralisation of British military activity in early 1938, see 'Operations from 1 April 1938 to 18 May 1938' (5–6), TNA WO 32/9496. [15] See Kroizer, 'From Dowbiggin to Tegart', 118. [16] Report of meeting held on 31 Dec 1937 involving Charles Tegart and high-ranking police officials, in Wauchope's dispatch of 24 Jan. 1938, TNA CO 733/383/1. See also Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, 191. [17] 'Disturbances and Martial Law Policy', TNA WO 32/9618. [18] General Haining, 'Report on Military Control in Palestine' (18–23), TNA WO 191/89. [19] 'GOC's report on emergency regulations of 1938/39' (21–22), TNA WO 191/89. [20] 'Disturbances and Martial Law Policy', TNA WO 32/9618. [21] JAG's Office to DPS, 3 May 1937, TNA WO 32/9618. [22] Haining, 'Report on Operations in Palestine from 1 Aug. 1938 to 31 Oct 1938' (2–3), TNA WO 32/9498. For the resurgence of rebel activity in the summer of 1938, see Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 237. [23] SSC to HC, 1 Sep 1938, TNA CO 733/367. [24] Minutes from 'Palestine Discussions', first and second meetings, 7 Oct 1938, TNA, Foreign Office (FO) 371/21864. [25] The extra division consisted of five battalions of infantry, a battery of Royal Horse Artillery, the 11th Hussars and ancillary troops. 'Report on Operations in Palestine from 1 Aug. 1938 to 31 Oct 1938' (6), TNA WO 32/9498. For details of the RAF deployment see Harris to Nicholl, 5 Sep 1938, TNA, Air Force (AIR) 23/765. [26] See, for example, Cohen, 'British Strategy and the Palestine Question', 182–83. Other historians who make this point include Bethell, The Palestine Triangle, 42–49; Sheffer, 'Appeasement and the Problems of Palestine', 395. [27] Kolinksy, 'The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security', 160. [28] 'Palestine Discussions', first meeting, 7 October 1938, TNA FO 371/21864. [29] 'Military Operations in Palestine', telegram from officer administering the government of Palestine to secretary of state for the colonies, 12 Oct 1938 (83), TNA FO 371/21864. [30] The 1939 White Paper reversed the recommendations of the 1937 Peel Commission Report by calling for an independent and unified Palestinian state to be created within ten years, while Jewish immigration would be halted after five years unless approved by the Arab majority. See Colonial Office, Palestine: Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government. For assessments of Britain's success in containing and suppressing the Revolt by May 1939, see Haining, 'Operations from 1 April 1939 to 30 July 1939' (2), TNA WO 32/9500. [31] SSC to HC, 24 Oct 1938, TNA WO 32/9618. For the more subservient approach of high commissioner MacMichael, see Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 238. [32] The four districts were Samaria, Haifa and Galilee, the Southern District and the Jordan Valley. See Haining, 'Report on Operations from 1 Aug. 1938 to 31 Oct 1938' (6), TNA WO 32/9498. [33] Bowden, 'The Politics of Arab Rebellion', 162–68. [34] For examples, see Kolinsky, 'The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security', 160–62; Bowden, 'The Politics of Arab Rebellion', 162–68. [35] For a detailed discussion of perceptions of Palestine in English culture, see Bar-Yosef, The Holy Land in English Culture, 247–95. [36] Interview with Patrick Norman, Imperial War Museum London (IWM), Sound Archive (SA) 4629/1. See also interview with Reubin Kitson, IWM SA, 10688/6/1. [37] Interview with Richard Catling, IWM SA, 10392/9/3. [38] See letter dated 3 June 1936, TNA WO 32/9401. [39] See, for example, Norman, IWM SA, 4629/1. [40] Interview with Samuel Wentworth, IWM SA, 4767/5/4. [41] Interview with Napier Crookenden, IWM SA, 16395/7/1 and James Bellows, IWM SA, 12913/17/2. For historiography dealing with Arab weaponry, see Bowden, 'The Politics of Arab Rebellion', 158. [42] See Norman, IWM SA, 4629/1. [43] This is typified by Crookenden, IWM SA, 16395/7/1. [44] Catling, IWM SA 10392/9/3. [45] See, for example, A. Morrison, 'On the Road to Anywhere!', IWM, Department of Documents (DD), 75/75/1, 19–20. [46] See Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 235–38. [47] Norman, IWM SA, 4629/1–2. [48] For example, see interview with Arthur Lane, IWM SA, 10295/11/3. [49] For the decentralisation of British military activity in early 1938, see 'Operations from 1 April 1938 to 18 May 1938' (5–6), TNA WO 32/9496. The head of Britain's security forces in Palestine, Charles Tegart, was repeatedly warned in 1937 that the traditional point of contact with villages, the mukhtars, were now largely inactive. See Tegart's diary, 22 Dec 1937, 2 and 5 Jan. 1938, Middle East Centre Archives (MEC), St. Anthony's College, Oxford. [50] Haining, 'Report on Operations from 1 April 1939 to 30 July 1939' (7), TNA WO 32/9500. [51] For the testimonies of Palestinian Arabs who deliberately misinformed the British on the whereabouts of rebel groups, see Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, 166. [52] Haining, 'Report on Operations, 1 April 1938 to 18 May 1938' (5), TNA WO 32/9496. [53] See Haining, 'Report on Operations, 20 May 1938 to 31 July 1938' (2), TNA WO 32/9497. [54] Ibid., 4. [55] Ibid., 3. [56] See Kitson (IWM SA, 10688/6/1) and S. Burr (IWM DD, 88/8/1, letter dated 24 Feb. 1938). [57] Haining, 'Report on Operations from 1 Aug. 1938 to 31 Oct 1938' (2), TNA WO 32/9498. [58] JAG's Office to DPS, 3 May 1937, TNA WO 32/9618. [59] Carr papers, 277, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHC), Kings College London, letter dated 17 Oct 1937. [60] Hoffman, The Failure of British Strategy, 81. [61] Burr, IWM DD, 88/8/1, letter dated 9 Sep 1938. [62] Letter by Aubrey Lees, TNA CO 733/371/4. [63] Kolinksy, 'The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security', 157. [64] See Kroizer, 'From Dowbiggin to Tegart', 117. [65] Kitson, IWM SA, 10688/6/1. [66] Forster Papers, MEC. The eight deaths are confirmed in the Colonial Office archives, as is the compensation payment of £2,065 made to the families of the deceased. See HC to SSC, 24 March 1939, TNA CO 733/398/1. [67] Bellows, IWM SA, 12913/17/2. [68] See Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, 196. [69] Lane, IWM SA, 10295/11/2. [70] For the early activities of the Special Night Squads, see Orde Wingate, Secret Memorandum, 5 June 1938, LHC, 15/5/300. Testimonies of Jewish soldiers who speak of the brutality employed by the Night Squads are found in the Central Zionist Archive, and cited in Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 430–31. For the influence of these tactics on official army operations, see Haining, 'Report on Operations from 20 May 1938 to 31 July 1938' (6), TNA WO 32/9497. [71] Haining, 'Operations from 1 Aug. 1938 to 31 Oct 1938' (6), TNA WO 32/9498. [72] B. A. Pond typescript memoirs, IWM DD, 78/27/1. [73] Lane, IWM SA, 10295/11/2–3. [74] Burr, IWM DD, 88/8/1, letter written from Acre Police Station (Burr's time at Acre spanned from Jan. 1939 to Feb. 1940; as the revolt was still in progress at the time of this letter, it must have been written in early 1939). [75] Eric Bishop, enclosure 5 May 1939, National Archives in Washington DC, NA 867 N 4016/86, cited in Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 214. [76] Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, 194. [77] MacMichael to Graham-Brown, 8 Aug. 1938, MEC, Jerusalem and the East Mission Papers, Box LXVI, file 2. [78] MacMichael to MacDonald, 10 Aug. 1938, TNA CO 733/371/3. [79] See, for example, Lane, IWM SA, 10295/11/3. [80] Burr, IWM DD, 88/8/1, letter dated 8 March 1939. For further stories of looting see Kitson, IWM SA, 10688/6/1. [81] Kitson, IWM SA, 10688/6/1. [82] See, in particular, Lane, IWM SA, 10295/11/2–3. [83] Battershill to Shuckburgh, 21 Nov. 1937, Rhodes House Library (RHL), Oxford, Battershill Papers, 10:3. [84] Lane, IWM SA, 10295/11/2. [85] Ibid., 10295/11/3. [86] See, for example, Battershill to Ormsby-Gore, 18 Dec 1937, TNA CO 733/333/7. For the hundreds of Arab complaints arriving at the high commissioner's office, see TNA WO 32/4562, CO 733/333/7, CO 733/371/2, CO 733/398/15 and CO 733/368/9. [87] Colonial Office memo, 6 Feb. 1939, TNA CO/733/371/2. [88] Haining, 'Palestine, 1938 – Allegations Against British troops' (preface), 12 Jan. 1939, and 'Hostile propaganda in Palestine. Its origin and progress in 1938' (12), WO 32/4562. [89] Ibid., 11. [90] MacMichael to MacDonald, 'Draft Commentary on Husseini letter' (6), 22 Sep 1939, TNA WO 32/4562. [91] HC to SSC, 21 Jan. 1939, TNA CO 733/398/2. [92] MacMichael to Graham-Brown, 8 Aug. 1938, MEC, Jerusalem and the East Mission Papers, Box LXVI, file 2. [93] See Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 74. [94] See Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 322–24. [95] Ibid. 325–27. [96] See, for example, Elkins, Britain's Gulag; Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency. [97] See Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 164–68; Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 150–57. [98] For Arthur Harris and his role in the counterinsurgency in Palestine see Townshend, 'The Defence of Palestine', 934; for other cases of British airpower used against dissident villages, see Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control; for the use of aerial bombardment for 'pinpoint and harassing tactics' during the counterinsurgency in Malaya, see Postgate, Operation Firedog, esp. 39–42. [99] See Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 165–66. [100] Haining, 'Operations in Palestine from 20 May 1938 to 31 July 1938' (2), TNA WO 32/9497; Bowden, 'The Politics of Arab Rebellion', 167. [101] Haining, 'Operations from 1 Nov 1938 to 31 March 1939' (6), TNA WO 32/9499. [102] Ibid., 7, 10. [103] Hoffman, The Failure of British Strategy, 80. [104] Great Britain, Colonial Office, A Survey of Palestine, vo. 1, 46–48. [105] Crookenden, IWM SA, 16395/7/1. [106] Exponents of this view include: Abboushi, 'The Road to Rebellion', 42; Stein 'The Intifada and the 1936–39 Uprising', 71. [107] See Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 269. Other exponents of this view include: Bowden, 'The Politics of Arab Rebellion', 147–74; Kayyali, Palestine: A Modern History, 231. [108] Swedenburg, 'The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry', 496. [109] For examples of this type of Palestinian historiography, see Yasin, Al-thawra al-'Arabiyya; al-Azhari, 'Thawra 1936 wa Intifada 1987'.