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Neo Oasis: The Xinjiang Bingtuan in the Twenty-first Century

2009; Routledge; Volume: 33; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10357820802714807

1467-8403

Thomas Cliff,

Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The organisation's full title is the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps [, Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan]– a military-agricultural colony founded in 1954 with the responsibility to "open up wasteland and defend the frontier" (O'Neill, 2004 O'Neill, Mark. 2004. Corps values endure on the mainland's wild west frontier [Internet] Hong Kong, South China Morning Post. Available from: , accessed 10 December 2004 [Google Scholar]). 2. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 3. The bingtuan has since its inception been responsible for a land-area and for governing the people within that land-area. In 2008 the organisation had its own courts, universities, police and so on, and reported an annual GDP. 4. Philip Kuhn defines "militia" as "those institutions in which the civil and military roles of the participants are in a substantial degree interconnected". This interconnection extends to every aspect of their legal, psychological and economic existence (1970, pp. 13–14). 5. Seymour (2000 Seymour, D. James. 2000. Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan. Inner Asia, 2(2): 171–93. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) and Becquelin (2000 Becquelin, Nicolas. 2000. Xinjiang in the nineties. The China Journal, 44: 65–90. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Becquelin broadened his scope in an article published in 2004, which contributes substantially to the current article. However, Becquelin's 2004 article concentrates on the campaign to Open Up the West rather than on the bingtuan per se. 6. The initial observations and interviews for this article were carried out during 9 months in Xinjiang over 2002–03. I visited – as an English teacher, a tourist, or a personal guest of a resident – a number of bingtuan farm centres [] and villages [] in both North and South Xinjiang and talked in an informal manner with my hosts and other residents. I also interviewed "ex-bingtuan" residents now living in Urumqi, Shihezi or Korla. The new textual sources are primarily Chinese-language articles published by Party and/or bingtuan research and teaching institutes in Xinjiang – see bibliography for full details. I conducted further interviews, did additional fieldwork, and made the final revisions to this article whilst in Korla, Xinjiang, in 2007–08. 7. Peasant farmers, "sent down" urban youth, prostitutes and other minor criminals were coercively or forcibly relocated from Eastern China in order to populate the bingtuan. 8. The PLA ran the bingtuan's immediate progenitor, the Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army, until the bingtuan was itself officially formed in October 1954. For the next 15 years, the PLA controlled only the (still significant) military affairs of the bingtuan (McMillen, 1981 McMillen, H. Donald. 1981. Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han organisation in a non-Han region. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, : 65–96. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 71). However, in 1969, growing Sino-Soviet tensions and the decimation of the bingtuan leadership during the early Cultural Revolution caused the central authorities to restore military control over the entire organisation. PLA troops took over leadership positions throughout the hierarchy, fitting directly into the bingtuan's existing military structure. The PLA, however, was taking over a dysfunctional organisation that continued to exist only because of its security role. In 1975 the economic imperative prevailed: the bingtuan farms were dispersed into Xinjiang's state farm system and the army officers acting as bingtuan cadres made civilian (Seymour, 2000 Seymour, D. James. 2000. Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan. Inner Asia, 2(2): 171–93. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 179). These civilianised cadres carried their personal and economic links to the PLA into the Reform era, but their passing marks the passing of their military mindset: aspiring new bingtuan officials are now required to pass a competitive exam before taking up positions in the hierarchy (Neo Oasis, 2007 Neo, Oasis. 2007. xin lu zhou. [Internet] zhongguo jingji xinxi wang xinjiang bingtuan zhongxin Updated 2007. Available from: , accessed 22 October 2007 [Google Scholar]). 9. Bingtuan companies were grouped together in a corporate structure [], rather than being dispersed entities belonging to units within the military structure of the organisation. Both the new name – Xinjiang Construction Corporation [; XCC]– and the new structure operate in parallel with those that previously existed. Unification also means that all of these smaller companies ultimately answer to the General Manager of the XCC – who is simultaneously the bingtuan Commander. 10. That is, the PLA divestment order, the Incorporation of the bingtuan and the granting of legal status to its courts and prosecution offices, and the campaign to Open Up the West itself. 11. For example, making a profit and continuing to support settlements in marginal border regions. 12. This concurs with Nicolas Becquelin's claim that central control in Xinjiang is now advanced enough to meet any separatist threat (2004, p. 374). 13. Although this rural-urban link has been strengthening for some time, an ever-increasing dependence on non-labour agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, pesticides and machinery, the demise of subsistence or semi-subsistence farming as a mode of existence, and the need for markets for cash crops are all factors that have come to bear most strongly in the post-Mao era. 14. The next major infrastructure project in North Xinjiang is a railway line linking the important bingtuan urban areas of Kuytun, the biggest transportation hub West of Urumqi, and Beitun, a recently promoted town [] within the administrative area of Altay city. 15. James Seymour points out that the authors of a 1994 article that read in part "…the border areas are the frontiers of the motherland … the construction there should have the whole nation's support…" were in fact issuing a sort of ultimatum to Beijing: "If you want us to defend China against the forces of central Asian nationalism, you should be willing to pay for the service"(2000, p. 185). 16. Nicolas Becquelin notes that "Beijing has by-passed the provincial and local administrations by giving the Corps greater autonomy" (2000, p. 80). 17. Along with primary and middle-school students from the region (both urban and rural schools, grades two to nine), teachers conscripted from Eastern China to "support the border areas" must participate in the harvest of bingtuan crops – including sugar beet, cotton, tomatoes and chilli peppers. They must fulfil a quota each day (eg. 10 year-old grade 4 children must take in 50 kilograms of tomatoes), and are fined according to the amount that they fall short. If they go over quota, their school gets paid extra by the crop owner. If they refuse to attend, they or their families must pay the fine for the full quota. 18. The title of this article, Neo Oasis, is adopted from an informational and promotional website, www.neooasis.com, which aims to promote the bingtuan to prospective investors and in-migrants, as well as to provide a portal for those inside the organisation who are able to access it. In the brief term, Neo Oasis, is reflected the self-image of the bingtuan– of a proud past and bright future. 19. This image is held by both Western and Chinese people, scholars and non-scholars. 20. If there is any deity (or "town god") for Shihezi, and the bingtuan in general, it is Wang Zhen. His inscription reads "Han Warrior". 21. The traditional Chinese conception was that the earth was square, and heaven was round. Perhaps, then, the existence of a crescent-shaped road around the offices of the Party Committee – the only road in Shihezi with any curvature whatsoever – is somehow significant. 22. It is important to note that, like elsewhere in the Chinese polity, there is structural resistance to full market reform – not least among members of the established patronage networks at the lower levels of the bingtuan hierarchy, who rely on their power to plan and allocate "public" resources to build their personal wealth (Interviews at farm centre 2, 2007 Interviews at farm centre 2. 2007. Bingtuan farmers, Conducted by Tom Cliff [Google Scholar]). Market rhetoric, although empty at this level, is a valuable instrument of control. 23. It must be noted that replicating Shihezi over and over throughout Xinjiang is not possible, not least because many other Divisions occupy far less favourable environmental and economic positions than that of Shihezi.