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All that Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 26; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/02684527.2011.580603

1743-9019

Andreas Etges,

International Relations and Foreign Policy

Abstract The coup against Mossadegh has often been described as the beginning of the 'Golden Age' of the CIA. The article argues that, while the coup was successful in getting rid of Mossadegh, its negative short-term and long-term consequences in Iran but also for the United States weigh heavily. Without thorough analysis why it nearly failed, the coup became a fatal catalyst for other interventions of the CIA that led to the Bay of Pigs disaster. If intelligence activities lose their moral dimension and if success is exclusively measured by 'mission accomplished', in the end more will be lost than gained. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Alice Orth and Christoph Heilmeier for their research assistance and comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Notes 1Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on American–Iranian Relations, 17 March 2000, (accessed 11 November 2010). 2John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster 1986) pp.259, 486. Cf. Richard Helms and William Hood, A Look Over my Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House 2003) pp.107, 117; Anne Karalekas, 'History of the Central Intelligence Agency' in W.M. Leary (ed.) The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press 1984) pp.54–57. This history was written for the Church Committee. See also Christopher M. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins 1995) and John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee 2006). 3Helms and Hood, A Look Over my Shoulder, p.106. 5Henry R. Luce, 'The American Century', Life Magazine, 17 February 1941. 4Based on Clifford Geertz, Alastair Iain Johnston defined strategic culture as 'an integrated "system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious".' Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', International Security 19/4 (1995) pp.32–64, 46. Cf. Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', Review of International Studies 25/1 (1999) pp.49–69; Colin S. Gray, Out of the Wilderness: Prime-time for Strategic Culture (no place: Defense Threat Reduction Agency 2006); Jeffrey S. Lantis, 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy', International Studies Review 4/3 (2002) pp.87–113; Rashed Uz Zaman, 'Strategic Culture: A "Cultural" Understanding of War', Comparative Strategy 28/1 (2009) pp.68–88. 6Richard C. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798–2008, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC) 2009, (accessed 11 November 2010). 7James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press 1988) p.63; Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991) p.62. 8Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.61. 9Francis J. Gavin, 'Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950–1953', Journal of Cold War Studies 1/1 (1999) pp.56–89, 70. 10W. Roger Louis, 'Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq Government' in M. Byrne and M.J. Gasiorowski (eds.) Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press 2004) p.128. 11Quoted in Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.63. 12'U.S. Position on Iranian Oil Situation', 18 May 1951, in: Department of State Bulletin, 28 May 1951, p.851, (accessed 11 November 2010). 13Sir Sam Falle, 'The Mussadiq Era in Iran, 1951–1953: A Contemporary Diplomat's View' in D.W. Lesch (ed.) The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1999) pp.78–86, 85. 14'C.I.A. Records Destroyed', New York Times, 29 May 1977. 15Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979); C.M. Woodhouse: Something Ventured (London: Granada 1982); Donald N. Wilber, Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952–August 1953 (Nottingham: Spokesman Books 2006). Scott A. Koch, '"Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953', June 1998, (accessed 11 November 2010). 16Cf. M.J. Gasiorowski 'The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran', Middle East Report 216 (2000), pp.4–5; N.E. Gallagher and D.S. Wilson, 'Suppression of Information or Publisher's Error?: Kermit Roosevelt's Memoir of the 1953 Iranian Countercoup', Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 15/1 (July 1981), plus Addendum by Nikki K. Keddie. 17Malcolm Byrne, 'Introduction' in Byrne and Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp.xiii–xxi, xiv. 18Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, pp.72–77; Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy, pp.55f., 64, 67; M.J. Gasiorowski, 'Security Relations between the United States and Iran, 1953–1978' in M.J. Gasiorowski and N.R. Keddie (eds.) Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1990) pp.145–65, 146f.; Malcolm Byrne, 'The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945–1953' in Byrne and Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp.201–26, 223. 19Quoted in Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.75. 20The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Development of U.S. Policy toward Iran, 1946–1978, 31 March 1980, pp.18–33, (accessed 11 November 2010). 21Woodhouse, Something Ventured, p.117; similar, p.110. 22Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.85. 23Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy, p.74. Wilber, Regime Change, p.13f. 24Wilber, Regime Change, p.22f. 25Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.66f. 26Fakhreddin Azimi, 'Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces' in Byrne and Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp.27–101, 69–73; Maziar Behrooz, 'The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh' in Byrne and Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp.102–25. 27Cf. Byrne and Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup. 28Kennett Love, 'Iran's Mossadegh Riding Tudeh Communist Tiger; Premier, Now Virtually a Dictator, Gives Rein to Suppressed Party', New York Times, 26 July 1953; 'Mossadegh Plays With Fire' (Editorial), New York Times, 15 August 1953; 'Upheaval in Iran', New York Times, 17 August 1953. 29Roosevelt, Countercoup, p.199. 30Cf. Gasiorowski, 'Security Relations'; Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy, p.85ff. 31Cf. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, pp.79, 81; NSC 136/1: The Present Situation in Iraq, 20 November 1952 (accessed 11 November 2010); The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Development of U.S. Policy toward Iran, 1946–1978, 31 March 1980, pp.24–25. 32Gavin, 'Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran'. 33NSC 136/1: The Present Situation in Iraq, 20 November 1952. 34Under Secretary of State, Walter B. Smith, First Progress Report on Paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1: 'U.S. policy regarding the present situation in Iran', 20 March 1953 (accessed 10 November 2010). 35Roosevelt, Countercoup, p.107. Under Secretary of State, Walter B. Smith, First Progress Report on Paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1: 'U.S. policy regarding the present situation in Iran', 20 March 1953. 36Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp.2–3. 37Ibid., pp.11, 18. 38Ibid., pp.2–3; Wilber, Regime Change, p.13; Woodhouse, Something Ventured, p.125. 39Oral History Interview with Loy W. Henderson, Washington, DC, 14 June 1973, 5 July 1973 by Richard D. McKinzie, (accessed 30 July 2008). 40Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.83. 41'Mossadegh Plays With Fire' (Editorial), New York Times, 15 August 1953. See also the telling title of an earlier article: Love, 'Iran's Mossadegh Riding Tudeh Communist Tiger'. Cf. Behrooz, 'The 1953 Coup in Iran', p.104. 42Vladislav M. Zubok, Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The 'Small' Committee of Information, 1952–1953 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center 1992) p.21f.; Richard Herrmann, 'The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946–1988' in Keddie and Gasiorowski (eds.) Neither East nor West, pp.63–98, 69. 43Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy, p.80. Cf. '"Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, August 1953', June 1998. Cf. Homa Katouzian, 'Mosaddeq's Government in Iranian History: Arbitrary Rule, Democracy, and the 1953 Coup' in Byrne and Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp.1–26, 16–17; Azimi, 'Unseating Mossadeq', pp.27–101, 28–29. 44Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.97. 45Ibid., p.425; cf. pp.86, 94. 46Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy. Cf. Gasiorowski, 'Security Relations'. 47Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup d'Ètat against Mosaddeq' in Gasiorowski and Byrne, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp.227–60, 231; Louis, 'Britain', p.161. 48'Measures which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mossadeq', State Department, March 1953, 1, (accessed 11 November 2010). 49Kennett Love, 'Statues of Shahs Torn Down in Iran', New York Times, 18 August 1953; 'Moscow Says U.S. Aided Shah's Coup', New York Times, 20 August 1953; 'Mossadegh Smashes Attempted Overthrow', Washington Post, 17 August 1953. 50Richard Harkness and Gladys Harkness, 'The Mysterious Doings of CIA', Saturday Evening Post, 6 November 1954, pp.34–35, 64–68, here 34, 66. 51Oral History Interview with Loy W. Henderson, Washington, DC, 14 June 1973. 52 Foreign Relations of the United States, [hereafter FRUS] 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran 1951–1954, Washington, DC, 1989. 53Introduction to the series by the State Department's 'Office of the Historian', (13 March 2009). 54 FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran 1951–1954, pp.759–60. 55Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, 1 January–31 December 2006, published 19 June 2007, (accessed 11 November 2010). 56Wilber, Regime Change, pp.65–66. 57Reuel Marc Gerecht, 'Blundering Through History With the C.I.A.', New York Times, 23 April 2000. 58'London' Draft of the TPAJAX Operational Plans, in Wilber, Regime Change, pp.73–88, here p.86. 59David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum 1977) p.111. Cf. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.94. 60Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp.208–10, 210. Cf. Helms and Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder, p.117. 61In this instance the CIA deliberately lied to Eisenhower and others about the things that went wrong, as Nicholas Cullather has shown in a CIA history of the events which was released in parts in 1997. 'Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952– 1954', CIA History Staff document by Nicholas Cullather, 1994. The text can be found here: (accessed 10 November 2010). 62'Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency', 30 September 1954, p.6, (accessed 11 November 2010).