Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The G20, the Crisis, and the Rise of Global Developmental Liberalism

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 33; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01436597.2012.628110

1360-2241

Paul Cammack,

International Development and Aid

Abstract Abstract The emergence of the G20 leaders' meeting during the recent global financial crisis as the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation' reflects a significant shift of hegemony over global governance towards the emerging economies but does not challenge the authority or objectives of the international financial institutions. On the contrary, successive G20 initiatives, culminating in the adoption of the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth in November 2010, reveal both a further strengthening of the already close institutional relationship between the G20 and the Bretton Woods institutions and a strong shared commitment to a developmental form of global liberalism. This article charts the ascendancy of emerging economy perspectives through the lens of the G20, maps their ties to the imf and other international organisations, sets out the content of the new global developmental liberalism, and assesses the implications of emerging economy hegemony for the advanced and the emerging economies, respectively. Notes 1 Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 25 September 2009, p 3, para 19; and The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration June 26–27, 2010, p 1, para 1. All official G20 statements are taken from http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx. 2 The episode, which took place on 27 April 1999 in Summers' office in the US Treasury, is recounted J Ibbitson & T Perkins, 'How Canada made the G20 happen', Globe and Mail (Toronto), 19 June 2010, at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/g8-g20/news/how-canada-made-the-g20-happen/article1609690/, accessed 3 June 2011. 3 See, for example, A Payne, 'How many Gs are there in "global governance" after the crisis? The perspectives of the "marginal majority" of the world's states', International Affairs, 86(3), 2010, pp 729–740; J Vestergaard, 'The G20 and beyond: towards effective global economic governance', diis Report, 4, 2011, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; AF Cooper, 'The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested "steering committee" for the world', International Affairs, 86(3), 2010, pp 741–757; and S Soederberg, 'The politics of representation and financial fetishism: the case of the G20 summits', Third World Quarterly, 31(4), 2010, pp 523–540. 4 M Beeson & S Bell, 'The G-20 and international economic governance: hegemony, collectivism, or both?', Global Governance, 15(1), 2009, pp 68–69. Contrast BK Gills, 'Going South: capitalist crisis, systemic crisis, civilisational crisis', Third World Quarterly, 31(2), 2010, who concludes that, despite 'shared hegemony' (p 170), 'the USA and the West, together as an ensemble, remain globally hegemonic' (p 181). 5 P Martin, 'Time for the G20 to take the mantle from the G8', in J Kirton & M Koch (eds), G20—Growth, Innovation, Inclusion: The G20 at Ten, London: Newsdesk Communications/G20 Research Group, November 2008, p 22. 6 The phrase quoted is from LH Summers, 'Reflections on managing global integration', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(2), 1999, p 4. For an equally pompous exercise in hubristic pontification, see his 'International financial crises: causes, prevention, and cures', American Economic Review, 90(2), 2000, in which we learn 'what it means to have an efficient financial system' and the best ways to design one (p 2). Footnote 1 on the same page marks this as a moment at which Summers was most confident of 'the benefits that liquid markets provide'. 7 'The image of Hu Jintao, the president of China, and Manmohan Singh, the prime minister of India—leaders of the two most populous countries on earth, quite possibly destined to be the largest economies on earth within our lifetimes—waiting outside while we held our G8 meetings, coming in for lunch, and then being ushered from the room so that we could resume our discussions among ourselves, is one that stayed with me'. P Martin, Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics, p 358, quoted in GS Smith, G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance, cigi G20 Papers, No 6, May 2011, p 5. 8 Brazil, China, India, Mexico and Korea were invited to deliberate upon 'promoting and protecting innovation; enhancing freedom of investment by means of an open investment climate including strengthening the principles of corporate social responsibility; defining joint responsibilities for development focusing specifically on Africa; and joint access to know-how to improve energy efficiency and technology cooperation with the aim of contributing to reducing CO2 emissions'. Ibid, p 5, note 7. 9 imf, World Economic Outlook April 2008, Washington, DC: imf, 2008, p xii. See also R Wade, 'The First-World debt crisis of 2007–2010 in global perspective', Challenge, 51(4), 2008, pp 24–25. 10 imf, World Economic Outlook April 2011, Washington, DC: imf, 2011, p 181, Table A1; and imf,World Economic Outlook September 2011, Washington, DC: imf, 2011, p 2, Table 1.1. 11 B Eichengreen & R Baldwin, 'Introduction', in Eichengreen & Baldwin (eds), What G20 Leaders Must Do to Stabilise our Economy and Fix the Financial System, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2008, p 1. 12 G20, Communiqué—Kleinmond, Cape Town, South Africa, 17–18 November 2007, p 1, para 2. 13 Beeson & Bell, 'The G-20 and international economic governance', p 77. They did presciently suggest, however, that a 'major systemic crisis' would allow the G20 to take up issues central to perceived US interests ( p 81). 14 imf, Transcript of a Press Briefing by Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil and Chairman of the G-20, Washington, DC, 11 October 2008, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2008/tr081011.htm, webcast at http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=79160994001, accessed 13 June 2011. 15 See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Dana Perino, 22 October 2008, at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081022-2.html, accessed 13 June 2011. See also 'PM Kevin Rudd's role in international crisis summit', The Australian, 25 October 2008, which reports a lengthy conversation between Rudd and Bush on 10 October in which Rudd urged the calling together of the G20 leaders, at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/pms-role-in-crisis-summit/story-e6frg6no-1111117850306, accessed 3 July 2011. The claim that Bush asked Rudd 'What's the G20?' was subsequently denied. 16 G20, Communiqué— São Paulo, Brazil, 8–9 November 2008, p 1, para 3. 17 Declaration—Washington, US, 15 November 2008, p 1, para 3. 18 G Chin, 'The emerging countries and China in the G20: reshaping global economic governance', Studia Diplomatica, LXIII(2), 2010, pp 105–123. 19 See the trenchant (and far from diplomatically expressed) case for emerging power recognition put forward by Brazilian diplomat Marcel Biato in MF Biato, 'Shaping global governance: a Brazilian perspective', Artigos cebri, 3(1), 2008, which notes Brazilian outreach to Africa and India, and the South in general, and derides the G5 and Heiligendamm processes. Note also the more recent characterisation of Brazilian foreign policy in P da Motta Veiga & S Polónia Rios, 'A política externa brasileira sob Lula: o fim do "Consenso de Brasília"?', Artigos cebri, 5(3), 2010, p 13: 'it is important to note that issues of global governance are essentially perceived in Brasilia through the lens of North–South opposition. From this perspective, the central policy issue, as regards global governance, is the redistribution of power between developed and developing countries in international forums. Measures to deal with global challenges should be compatible with this objective, which is to say that they should not only increase the voice of developing countries, but also make the developed countries foot the bill for the measures concerned'. 20 See, for example, M Kawai, 'G-20 Financial Reforms and Emerging Asia's Challenges', in K Dervis, M Kawai & D Lombardi (eds), Asia and Policymaking for the Global Economy, Manila/Washington, DC: Asian Development Bank Institute/Brookings, 2011, pp 105–106, 116–22. 21 See J Pisani-Ferry, 'International governance: is the G20 the right forum?', Bruegel Policy Contribution, March 2009, pp 3–4. 22 Cooper, 'The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested 'steering committee' for the world', p 744. 23 G20, The Group of Twenty—A History, Study Group Report presented to Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Kleinmond, South Africa: November 2007, pp 18–19, emphasis added. 24 Martin, 'Time for the G20 to take the mantle from the G8', p 25. 25 P Cammack, 'What the World Bank means by poverty reduction and why it matters', New Political Economy, 9(2), 2004, pp 189–211. 26 G20, Communiqué, 1999, p 1, paras 2–5. 27 G20, Communiqué, 2007, p 2, para 4. 28 G20, Communiqué, 2008, p 5, para 14. 29 G20, Leaders' Statement, the Pittsburgh Summit, 25 September 2009, p 6, para 6, emphasis added. 30 P Cammack, 'Poverty reduction and universal competitiveness', Labour, Capital and Society, 42(1–2), 2009, p 45. 31 T Kalinowski, 'Can Korea be a bridge between developing and developed countries in the G20 and beyond?', in T Fues & P Wolff (eds), G20 and Global Development: How can the New Summit Architecture promote Pro-poor Growth and Sustainability?, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2010, pp 86–87. 32 G20, The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, 26–27 June 2010, p 25, para 14. 33 See P Cammack, 'All power to global capital!', Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness, No 10, Institute for Global Studies, Manchester Metropolitan University, e-space Open Access Repository, 2009. 34 Seoul Action Plan, pp 4–5, para 16. 35 imf, Factsheet: The G20 Mutual Assessment Process (map), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm, accessed 16 June 2011. 36 Cammack, 'What the World Bank means by poverty reduction and why it matters', p 190. 37 LA Winters & S Yusuf (eds), Dancing with Giants: China, India and the Global Economy, Singapore/Washington, DC: Institute of Policy Studies/World Bank, 2007; H Broadman, with G Isik, S Plaza, Xiao Ye, and Y Yoshino, Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007; and World Bank, World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography (two vols), Washington DC: World Bank, 2008. 38 oecd, Perspectives on Global Development 2010: Shifting Wealth, Paris: oecd, pp 23–25. 39 P Cammack, 'The shape of capitalism to come', Antipode, 41(S1), 2010, pp 266–269. 40 Asian Development Bank, Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia, Manila: adb, 2009, p iv. 41 World Bank, Africa's Future and the World Bank's Support to It (sic), Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011, p 1, see also pp 29–30; African Development Bank Group, adb Regional Integration Strategy, 2009–2012, Tunis: afdb, 2009; and UK Department for International Development (dfid), Joining Up Africa: Regional Economic Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Kilbride: dfid, 2010. See also unctad, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa's Development, New York: unctad, 2009. 42 imf, Shifting Wealth, ch 3; unctad, Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: South–South Cooperation—Africa and New Forms of Development Partnership, New York: unctad, 2010; unctad,South–South Integration is Key to Rebalancing the Global Economy, Policy Brief No 22, February 2011; Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2011: South–South-Economic Links, Manila: adb, 2011; and oecd, Scaling up South–South Knowledge Sharing: A G20 Mandate for tt–ssc and undp, Paris: Task Team on South–South Cooperation, oecd, at http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_43385523_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 18 June 2011. 43 Beeson & Bell, 'The G20 and international economic governance', pp 73, 77. 44 JY Lin, 'From Flying Geese to Leading Dragons: new opportunities and strategies for structural transformation in developing countries', wider Lecture, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 2011. 45 World Bank, Global Development Horizons 2011—Multipolarity: The New Global Economy, Washington, DC: World Bank, p 46. 46 N Okonjo-Iweala, 'Promoting sustained growth in the Caribbean: challenges and opportunities', 12th William G Demas Memorial Lecture, Caribbean Development Bank, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 24 May 2011, at http://go.worldbank.org/PD8PWIJKF0, accessed 8 June 2011. 47 N Okonjo-Iweala, 'Restoring Europe's luster', address at the eds19 Meeting, Cyprus, 27–29 May 2011, emphasis added, at http://go.worldbank.org/1TMLN7F5R0, accessed 18 June 2011. 48 'Statement by Mr Guido Mantega, Minister of Finance of Brazil', Development Committee, DC/S/2011-0061, 24 September 2011, p 1, emphasis added. 49 'World economy seen at tipping point in bbc debate', imf Survey Online, 23 September 2011, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/POL092311A.htm, accessed 25 September 2011.