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LEVIATHAN LEASHED: THE INCOHERENCE OF ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN POWER

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 25; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/08913811.2013.823759

1933-8007

Paul R. DeHart,

War, Ethics, and Justification

Abstract Early modern theorists linked the idea of sovereign power to a conception of absolute power developed during the medieval period. Ockham had reframed the already extant distinction between God's absolute and ordained powers in order to argue that God was free of moral constraint in ordaining natural law for human beings. Thus, the natural law could command the opposite of what God had ordained if He wished to make it so. Bodin extended Ockham's argument to earthly sovereigns, who do not (he argued) have to obey civil law. However, Bodin undermined his absolutism by maintaining that civil law has to be consistent with natural and divine law. Hobbes more consistently argued that while mortal sovereigns are accountable to God, the power of sovereigns to command is not subject to moral constraints. Underlying Ockham's view of God's sovereignty, and Bodin's and Hobbes's view of earthly sovereigns, is a notion of the will's unconstrained power. But this notion is self-referentially incoherent. This incoherence, in turn, infects the very notion of sovereignty. Acknowledgments thanks the National Endowment for the Humanities for the Summer Stipend that funded a good portion of the research for this paper, and acknowledges helpful comments from Jeffrey Friedman and two anonymous reviewers. Notes 1. On Creon's position, as depicted in Sophocles’ Antigone, see DeHart Citation2006. 2. According to Sophocles' Creon, “The man the city sets up in authority must be obeyed in small things and in just but also in their opposites.… There is nothing worse than disobedience to authority. It destroys cities, it demolishes homes; it breaks and routs one's allies. Of successful lives the most of them are saved by discipline. So we must stand on the side of what is orderly” (Antigone, 720–30). 3. The English word power is profoundly equivocal. Medieval Latin employed two different words, denoting distinct phenomena. Potentia denotes the capacity or ability to do something. Potestas denominates the right or authority to perform some act. The original phrase that the English translates as “absolute power,” so far as I can tell, is potentia absoluta. This refers to God's ability to actualize any of several (perhaps infinitely many) logically and metaphysically possible worlds. De potentia dei absoluta is contrasted with de potentia dei ordinata—God's decision to actualize some possible world. I suggest that in this original sense de potentia absoluta carried no connotation of any absolute moral right or authority. That is, God's possession of de potentia absoluta did not imply a concomitant possession of a potestas absoluta. William of Ockham, however, construed de potentia dei absolutain such a way as to entail that God possessed potestas absoluta—a morally unlimited right to command. In technical terms, what follows is an argument against potestas absoluta and construals of potentia absoluta that entail potestas absoluta. What follows is therefore not an argument against de potentia absoluta in every signification. 4. I take each of these arguments against absolute sovereignty (the moral and the logical incoherency argument) to provide sufficient grounds for rejecting it. But as not everyone will accept the moral argument—moral antirealists by virtue of their position cannot—I offer the logical incoherency argument to show that there is additional reason to reject the doctrine of absolute, sovereign power. 5. Friedman (Citation1994) holds that MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, and Walzer are communitarians of this sort. Friedman's characterization of communitarians as voluntarists does apply, I think, to those who are also conventionalists. As I read them, however, MacIntyre, Sandel, and (probably) Taylor are moral realists and are therefore neither conventionalists nor ethical voluntarists. Historically, Stephen Douglas and Oliver Wendell Holmes advance positions akin to the sort of communitarianism Friedman rightly rejects. 6. Other thinkers, such as Duns Scotus (who was probably not a thoroughgoing voluntarist), must of course be included in a full account of the potentia dei absoluta, especially as construed in voluntarist terms (see Oakley Citation2005, 66). 7. William E. Connolly (Citation1988, 16–20) also makes this connection. 8. In the ensuing argument, I generally follow Francis Oakley's (Citation1984, Citation2005) interpretation of Ockham's ethical theory and of the divine powers. 9. In fact, the distinction between God's ordained and absolute power (potentia dei absoluta et ordinata) was employed by theologians and philosophers operating within the via antiqua, such as Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, as well as by those now designated as belonging to the via moderna (Oakley Citation2005, 54–60; Oakley Citation1984, ch. 2, esp. 47–52). 10. Boehner (Citation1990, xix) notes that, for Ockham, “God can do (or make or create) everything which does not involve a contradiction; that which includes a contradiction is absolute non-entity.” See also Oberman (Citation1963, 37). 11. On this point, I agree with Connolly (Citation1988, 19), who captures succinctly the complaint of Ockham's medieval, modern, and contemporary critics: God's omnipotence, for nominalists such as Ockham, “requires the radical contingency of the world.” 12. The passage referenced here is from Ockham's Quodlibeta, III, Q. xiii. In his Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententarium (Reportatio), Ockham holds (1) that actions presently evil, such as robbery, adultery, and hatred of God, may be meritoriously performed “if they were to agree with the divine precept just as now de facto their opposites agree with the divine precept”; (2) the ground for (1) is that “evil is nothing other than the doing of something opposite to that which one is obliged to do”; and (3) God is “obliged to the causing of no act.” These passages seem necessarily to entail that the content of morality is radically contingent and solely dependent upon the free will of God (Ockham Citation1981, II, qu. 15; Oakley Citation2005, 75–76). 13. As a number of analytic philosophers have noted, Ockham's understanding of divine omnipotence is certainly not the only plausible understanding of it. Indeed, Ockham's understanding of divine omnipotence may not even be a plausible understanding of it. See Alvin Plantinga Citation1979. 14. Thus, contrary to Connolly (Citation1988, 18), Ockham is not the sort of divine command theorist who believes “human morality” is “simply a response to the commands of God revealed Scripture.” As I see it, Connolly wrongly depicts Ockham's ethical theory as an instance of divine command theory in which divine commands are promulgated (and ethical knowledge is available) only through special revelation. This eventuates in an incorrect portrayal of Hobbes as trying to correct the nominalist account to include natural reason (ibid., 21–26). As Oakley (Citation1961; Citation1984, 81–2; Citation2005, 75–80) makes clear, Ockham's ethical theory already included natural reason as the vehicle through which basic moral obligations are promulged. 15. For some interesting recent accounts of Ockham's ethical theory that pose challenges to the standard, voluntaristic account see works by Peter King (Citation1999), Marilyn McCord Adams (Citation1999), A. S. McGrade (Citation1999) in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (Spade Citation1999), as well as by John Kilcullen (Citation1993 and Citation2011). Kilcullen argues that Ockhamist natural law is not a species of ethical voluntarism. Rather, Ockham holds that certain “absolute” requirements of natural law (such as refraining from murder, hatred, theft, or adultery) may be overridden by the most fundamental requirement natural law—namely, that we obey the commands of God. This makes other basic requirements of natural law (refraining from murder, hatred, theft, and adultery) a kind of rational, non-positive morality (i.e., a morality not wholly depedent on omnipotent will) that holds ceteris paribus. That is, the “absolute” prohibitions of the natural law are default moral norms (and even natural, moral norms) that can be overridden in precisesly one instance—when God commands otherwise. I find Kilcullen's account of Ockham very interesting but ultimately unpersuasive. In addition to the arguments in the text (which I think are decisive), I find it puzzling that he uses “absolute” to denote commands that hold ceterus paribus but that may be overridden by the command of God. It's hard to see how override-able commands can be absolute in any sense of the term. 16. Letting o stand for obligation, n for nominalism, and v for voluntarism, we can formalize my argument as follows: (n•o)→v. Ockham is a nominalist (he affirms n) who advances a natural law account of moral obligation (so he affirms o as well). Consequently, he affirms the antecedent of the conditional (he affirms (n•o)). Per modus ponens, he must affirm the consequent as well (i.e., he must affirm v). 17. More formally, if Ockham is not a voluntarist (~v), then per modus tollens, he would have to deny the antecedent of our conditional: ~(n•o). Now ~(n•o) is logically equivalent to ~n v ~o (~n or ~o). Thus, if Ockham rejects ethical voluntarism, then, by implication of our conditional, he affirms either ~n (not nominalism) or ~o (i.e., he rejects obligation). Since he affirms ethical obligations, he affirms o, which is logically equivalent to ~~o. Per the disjunctive syllogism and given the disjunct ~n v ~o, Ockham must affirm ~n. Thus, if ~v, then (given modus tollens, the disjunctive syllogism, and his affirmation of ethical obligations), ~n. But Ockham is a nominalist. He therefore affirms n. Consequently, if Ockham is a nominalist and he rejects voluntarism, then he affirms n and ~n. Moreover, if he is a nominalist with a theory of obligation, he must by implication affirm v. If Kilcullen is right and Ockham rejects voluntarism, then he also affirms ~v. Consequently, his thought would be doubly self-contradictory (DeHart Citation2012b). Elsewhere (ibid.) I argue that such a double self-contradiction obtains in the relation of Locke's metaphysics to his ethics. But I am strongly inclined to think that Ockham was consistent on this count (the incoherency of ethical voluntarism notwithstanding). 18. Anthony J. Lisska (Citation2012), Thomas M. Osborne, Jr. (Citation2005), J. B. Schneewind (1998, ch. 2.iii), and Michael Allen Gillespie (Citation1999, 7 and Citation2008, 23) also argue (compellingly) that Ockham is best construed as a voluntarist. By way of contrast, Elshtain (Citation2008, 25–26, 38 and 109–110) notes that the portrayal of Ockham as affirming a strong version of the contingency of the potentia dei ordinata (one advanced by Gillespie and Etienne Gilson) is controversial. Such depictions more accurately describe a version of “Ockhamism” than the views of Ockham himself. Ockham represents more a “shift” towards voluntarism than the sort of “voluntarism all the way down” that we see in Hobbes. But even if Ockham is not an Ockhamist and even if he advances only a weak account of the contingency of the ordained power of God, I submit that his position is sufficiently voluntaristic to fall prey to my critique. 19. What they ascribed to human sovereigns was not merely potentia absoluta but potestas absoluta—a kind of unconstrained right to command. 20. One might say that Bodin is constructing a doctrine of human, political authority precisely contrary to the doctrine articulated by Plato in his Laws (360 BC), in that section where he discusses how authority should function in the proposed colony of Magnesia. 21. Classical Austinian positivism came under withering attack during the latter part of the twentieth century. More recent arguments render it implausible that the more sophisticated positivism of the latter twentieth century remains tenable. 22. Indeed, having said that “sovereignty given to a prince subject to obligations and conditions is properly not sovereignty or absolute power,” Bodin (Citation1576, 8) immediately qualifies his remark, stating: “This does not apply if the condition attached at the creation of the prince are the law of God or nature (la loy de Dieu ou de nature).” 23. I have here mentioned but a few of the elements that form the background for Hobbes's political theorizing. A full account would have to include such elements as his relation to Selden's work and to the Tew Circle (see Tuck Citation1979, ch. 6) as well as his hostility to the Roman republican tradition (Skinner Citation2008). See also Gillespie Citation2008, ch. 7, and Martinich Citation1999. 24. Hobbes (Citation1651, 123) makes a similar argument in Chapter XIX of Leviathan when speaking of elective monarchy: “That king whose power is limited is not superior to him or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superior is not supreme, that is to say not sovereign.” 25. For rules of inference and terminology, I am following Patrick J. Hurley's A Concise Introduction to Logic (Citation1997). According to DeMorgan's rule, ~(p•q) is equivalent to (~p v ~q) and ~(p v q) is equivalent to (~p•~q). According to Modus tollens, if p, then q; not q; therefore not p. The argument in this paragraph can be symbolized as follows: (1) L v ~L; (2) L → (L o v L i ); (3) ~L o ; (4) ~L i ; (5) Given (3) and (4), (~L o •~L i ), which, according to DeMorgan's Rule, is equivalent to ~(L o v L i ); (6) Given (2) and (5) and modus tollens, we must reject L; (7) Given (1) and the disjunctive syllogism we must affirm ~L. 26. Though I will later argue for the incoherence of absolute sovereign power so construed. 27. The following section draws upon arguments I develop in DeHart Citation2007 (184–86 and 219–21). 28. Hobbes's understanding of the right of nature seems to evolve over the course of his writing. In the Elements of Law the right of nature is the right to do everything without qualification. In later work (De cive and Leviathan) we have a right to do everything in order to survive. On this evolution see Tuck Citation1979, 119–32. Even so, Hobbes says that right and wrong have no place in the state of nature, which is the only state of affairs in which the right of nature can be exercised. This seems clearly to entail that the exercise of the right of nature is morally unconstrained. Consequently, it is not easy to see how the later Hobbes can qualify the exercise of the right in the state of nature (though, as I suggest below, it is also difficult to see how Hobbes can avoid holding that the law of nature obtains in the state of nature—a position he also clearly seems to hold). 29. My interpretation of Hobbes as holding that the right of nature cannot, in fact, be laid aside by mere renunciation but only by transfer, is an inference from (as I see it, a necessary entailment of) the following passages: “If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion it is void; but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and judges of the justness of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore, he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the right (he can never abandon) of defending his life and means of living.” In contrast, “in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so to do” (Leviathan, XIV.18–19). Likewise, a few chapters later, Hobbes writes, “For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and (in sum) doing to others as we would be done to) of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men” (ibid., XVII.2). In The Two Gods of Leviathan, A. P. Martinich (Citation1992, 151–52) makes a different argument for the same interpretation: “In other words, to transfer a right is to transfer the power to exercise that right. Sovereigns acquire irresistible power through transfers of power, not renunciations. When each citizen transfers his rights to the sovereign, the sovereign acquires tremendous power to fulfill his office. This would not be possible if each citizen merely renounced his right to things. For renunciations of rights do not increase the sovereign's power to do the things he is appointed to do, such as build roads and bridges and protect all the citizens from marauding invaders. Indeed, if each citizen merely renounced his rights, the sovereign's power would be dissipated among all the citizens, each of whom he is supposed to protect, and he would be more vulnerable than any other person. The secret to the sovereign's irresistible power is that each citizen transfers his right to the sovereign. That is, each person uses his power to enable the sovereign to do his duty. With everyone working together to do the sovereign's bidding, the sovereign has a good chance of getting the roads and bridges built and defending against invaders. This is Hobbes's point when he says that the ‘only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them [citizens] from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, … is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will’” (quoting Leviathan, XVII.13). 30. My interpretation of Hobbes here involves two claims: (1) The sovereign possesses the right of nature (and, in particular, possesses this right relative to his, or to their, subjects), and (2) The sovereign possesses this right because he (or they) received it on transfer from those covenanting together to enter civil society. Now this seems to me the best interpretation of the passages I have been discussing (see Williams Citation2009, 96 and Martinich Citation1992, 151–52). There is, however, an enigmatic passage in which Hobbes affirms (1) but not on the basis of (2). Indeed, in that passage he appears emphatically to reject (2): “But I have also showed formerly [xiv] that before the institution of commonwealth, every man had a right to everything, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation, subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right, but only (in laying down theirs) strengthened him to use his own as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all; so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only, and (excepting the limits set him by natural law) as entire as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one against his neighbor” (Leviathan, XXVIII.2). It's unclear whether Hobbes's main point is simply about the right of punishing or about the right of nature more generally. If Hobbes main point is about the right of nature, then this seems to contradict his claim that subjects lay down the right of nature by transferring it to the sovereign. Even so, his argument in this passage redounds to the same conclusion—namely, that the sovereign possesses the right of nature vis-à-vis his subjects and that his subjects do not posses it because they have laid it down. As he elsewhere says, the sovereign person (or persons) is not a party to the social contract (Leviathan, XVIII.4). Consequently, the sovereign does not surrender his (or their) right to all things. My argument depends only upon the claim that the sovereign possesses the (morally unrestricted) right of nature (vis-à-vis his subjects), and not upon any particular account of how or why the sovereign has it. Thus, construing Hobbes to hold that the sovereign did not receive the right of nature on transfer from his subjects but rather had it all along will not save him from the ensuing critique. 31. Connolly (Citation1988, 32) takes Hobbes to affirm (1) but not (2) as stated. The laws of nature really are laws, and they obligate human sovereigns. But on Connolly's reading of Hobbes, the laws of nature are “inoperative” in the state of nature. Call this (2)′: The laws of nature obligate sovereigns and subjects in civil society but do not hold in the state of nature. The objection to my account of Hobbes might then be recast to say that (3) follows from (1) and (2)′. But does Hobbes affirm (2) or (2)′? I believe that the textual and logical evidence favor (2) (see below). My reply to the objection, however, does not depend on settling this question. 32. I am not suggesting that Martinich infers (3) from (1) and (2) or that he qualifies absolute power along these lines. 33. At the end of Chapter XV Hobbes says, “These dictates of reason [i.e., the laws of nature] men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves, whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others.” He immediately adds, “But yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then they are properly called laws” (Leviathan, XV.41). However, this qualification is dropped in a later passage: “The law of nature and the civil law contain each other, and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature … are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before, as being then the commands of the commonwealth, and therefore also civil laws; for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them” (ibid., XXVI.8). 34. For instance, Hobbes's third law of nature is “that men perform their covenants made” (Leviathan, XV.1). He also holds that “covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory” (ibid., XIV.27). Taken together, these passages suggest that the third law of nature obtains in the condition of mere nature. As well, Hobbes holds that the sovereign is obligated by the law of nature. He says that a monarch elected for life “is obliged by the law of nature to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the government from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war” (ibid., XIX.11). Speaking more generally he writes, “The office of the sovereign (be it a monarch or an assembly) consisteth in the end for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely, the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author of that law, and to none but him” (ibid., XXX.1; see also Martinich Citation1992, 91). But how can Hobbes intelligibly hold that sovereigns are accountable to the laws of nature unless they constitute real laws? Finally, as Martinich (Citation1992, 82–83) notes, the intelligibility of Hobbes's social contract theory requires positing that covenants can be made in the state of nature—otherwise individuals in the state of nature could never make that covenant by which the state of nature is left; they could never enter the civil state or establish a sovereign power. But covenants could not be made in the state of nature unless the laws of nature obtain in the state of nature. Moreover, these laws must obtain as laws in the proper sense (i.e., as commands) and not merely as theorems or counsels of prudence. For if the laws of nature obtain in the state of nature merely as theorems or counsels of prudence, then they are not obligatory, and if they are not obligatory, then they cannot obligate individuals to keep their covenants made. 35. In Chapter XLIII Hobbes says, “All that is NECESSARY to salvation is contained in two virtues: faith in Christ, and obedience to laws” (Leviathan, XLIII.3). Near the conclusion of the chapter he writes, “And when the civil sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him sinneth against the laws of God (for such are the laws of nature) and rejecteth the counsel of the apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their princes” (ibid., XLIII.23). 36. There is an additional reason to think that (3) does not follow from (1) and (2), or from (1) and (2)′. As I see it, Hobbes holds (a) that sovereigns are unlimited or morally unconstrained vis-à-vis their subjects, such that no treatment of the subject by the sovereign can be considered wrong or an abuse of authority; and (b) that sovereigns are accountable to God (and to the law of nature) for how they treat their subjects, such that violating the laws of nature in relation to their subjects wrongs God; and, finally, (c) that there is no contradiction in holding both (a) and (b). If Hobbes holds (a)-(c), then (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) or from (1) and (2)′ for him. My critique of Hobbes (below) presumes that Hobbes may in fact hold (a)-(c). 37. In Chapter XXX, he asks, “But what is a good law? By a good law I mean not a just law, for no law can be unjust …. A good law is that which is needful for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous.” Consequently, “a law that is not needful, having not the true end of law, is not good” (Leviathan, XXX.20–21). But such a law is, for Hobbes, still a law. 38. He adds, “To those, therefore, whose power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth to God Almighty, not as Creator and gracious, but as omnipotent” (Leviathan, XXXI.5). 39. According to Martinich (Citation1992, 158), “Scholars have not taken as seriously as he intended it Hobbes's remark that Leviathan is the ‘mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence’” (quoting Leviathan, XVII.13). 40. “Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service, for my life, to an enemy, I am bound by it” (Leviathan, XIV.27). 41. Psalm 74: 12–14, as translated in the New American Standard Bible. 42. In ancient Hebrew theology, Leviathan is one of the two most frequently mentioned monsters or serpents of the Old Testament. In contemporaneous Canaanite mythology, the Leviathan was a fierce serpent that encircled the earth (Boyd Citation1997, chs. 2 and 3). Isaiah 27:1 describes the divine victory over evil as a day on which “the Lord will punish Leviathan the fleeing serpent with His fierce and great and might sword, even Leviathan the twisted serpent; and He will kill the dragon who lives in the sea.” The days of flourishing and peace follow the crushing of the Leviathan. 43. We might also note how the absolute power of the Hobbesian sovereign places the subject in what can only be described as a state of nature relation to the sovereign. It would seem, then, that the absolute power of the sovereign defeats the very purpose of absolute sovereignty—namely, the preservation of those who have covenanted together to create the sovereign. 44. The point I am making is not merely linguistic. Sovereignty in the Hobbesian sense gives us a signifier without a referent—in which case the signifier actually signifies nothing. The problem is therefore metaphysical as well. 45. Althusius (Citation1614, 121–22) writes: “By absolute power justice is destroyed,” and “Finally, absolute power is wicked and prohibited. For we cannot do what can only be done injuriously. Thus even almighty God is said to be unable to do what is evil and contrary to his nature.” 46. The argument could be recast to say that (4)–(6) are incoherent, resulting in the unsoundness of the argument just the same. 47. Moreover, if there is no objective right normative for ruled and ruler alike, then there is no ground for preferring the sovereignty of the state to the autonomy of the self. Neither could be justified against the other. 48. To reiterate, the concept of absolute power had an essentially different meaning in the medieval period prior to Ockham. For Thomas and Albert, the absolute power of God simply referred to the possible worlds the deity might have but did not choose to actualize. But those possible worlds that admitted of actualization were, for those theorists, delimited by divine goodness, which was also taken to be ontologically necessary. 49. This paragraph and the next three draw upon and rework an argument I first advanced in DeHart Citation2012a, 170; but whereas DeHart Citation2012a applies the argument against conventional social contract theory, here I extend the argument to apply it against modern sovereignty and the underlying idea of absolute power. I have drawn upon the argument developed in DeHart Citation2012a with the permission of Perspectives on Political Science.