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Hollowing Out the State: Public Choice Theory and the Critique of Keynesian Social Democracy

2008; Routledge; Volume: 22; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13619460701731913

1743-7997

Noel Thompson,

Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract This article considers public choice theory as a component of the New Right critique of Keynesian social democracy in the 1960s and early 1970s. More specifically, it details the nature of the challenge it posed to the conception of public bureaucrats, public bureaucracies and the ethos of public service that informed the Keynesian social democratic agenda and discusses its dissemination through think-tanks and other media. It also assesses its consequent impact and legacy, arguing that public choice theory struck at the heart of Keynesian social democracy and left a legacy more profoundly destructive in this regard than either monetarism or Austrian economics. Keywords: Keynesian Social DemocracyPublic Choice TheoryNew Right Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and criticisms of three anonymous referees who reviewed an earlier draft of this piece and also the comments of Alan Finlayson of the Department of Politics and International Relations, Swansea University, for a helpful interchange of views on the social democratic response to public choice theory. Notes [1] Though the critical response of Enoch Powell, Geoffery Rippon, Angus Maude, John Jewkes and, at a more profound philosophical level, Michael Oakeshott should not be forgotten. It should also be noted that not all historians accept that such a consensus existed. See, for example, Zweiniger-Bargielowska Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I. 2002. Austerity in Britain, Controls and Consumption, 1939–55, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], Austerity in Britain, Controls and Consumption, 1939–55. 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