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Revisiting the Concept of the Failed State: bringing the state back in

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01436597.2013.831596

1360-2241

Natasha Ezrow, Erica Frantz,

Political Conflict and Governance

Abstract Abstract The policy and donor communities have placed great importance on fixing 'failed states'. World leaders have cited failed states as one of the greatest threats to the global community. Nevertheless the concept of the failed state is currently subject to a backlash from the academic community. Scholars have criticised the failed states literature on theoretical, normative, empirical and practical grounds. We provide a brief overview of these main concerns and offer a more systematic method for measuring 'state failure'. Coming up with better ways of assessing how states underperform will enhance our understanding of how institutional decay affects stability and development and, most importantly, will provide an improved system of early warning for practitioners. Notes 1 The particular term that should be used to reference state failure is also controversial. We do not discuss the positives and negatives of the terms used to capture the concept here, but instead focus on the utility of the concept itself. 2 T Hagmann & M Hoehne, 'Failures of the state failure debate: evidence from the Somali territories', Journal of International Development, 21, 2009, p 44. 3 C Call, 'Fallacy of the "failed state"', Third World Quarterly, 29(8), 2008, p 1492. 4 These groupings are fairly similar to Hagmann & Hoehne's identification of the 'empirical, analytical, normative and practical shortcomings' of the state failure literature. Hagmann & Hoehne, 'Failures of the state failure debate', p 44. 5 W Easterly & L Freschi, 'Top five reasons the "failed state" is a failed concept', Aidwatch, 13 January 2010, at aidwatchers.com/2010/01/top-5-reasons-why-"failed-state"-is-a-failed-concept/#n8, accessed 13 August 2012. 6 S Hameiri, 'Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of institutionalism', Journal of International Relations and Development, 10, 2007, p 123. 7 S Woodward, 'Fragile states: exploring the concept', Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (fride) 2004, pp 1–9. 8 R Rotberg, 'The new nature of nation-state failure', Washington Quarterly, Summer 2002, p 87. 9 For more on this, see P Evans & J Rauch, 1999; G Hydén, J Court & K Mease, Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp 121–142 and E Buscaglia, 'Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector', In Forum on Crime and Society 3, 2003, pp 3–34. 10 The patrimonial bureaucracy is often referred to as a type of administration where civil servants are responsible and loyal to a particular leader, and not to the state. Corruption levels tend to be high, as government jobs are treated as income-producing assets rather than positions of public service. We use the term 'patrimonialism' synonymously with 'neo-patrimonialism'. 11 M Weber, quoted in PD Hutchcroft, 'Oligarchs and cronies in the Philippine state: the politics of patrimonial plunder', World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations, 43(3), 1991, p 415. 12 Ibid. 13 M Weber, Economy and Society, Vol 1, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978, pp 128–129. 14 M Bøås, 'Liberia and Sierra Leone—dead ringers? The logic of neo-patrimonial rule', Third World Quarterly, 22(5), 2001, p 700. 15 Weber, Economy and Society, pp 343–347, 351–352. 16 S Decalo, 'African personalist dictatorships', Journal of Modern African Studies, 23(2), 1985, p 216. 17 Hydén et al, The Bureaucracy and Governance in 16 Developing Countries, p 8. 18 P Evans, 'The state as problem and solution: predation, embedded autonomy and structural change', in S Haggard & R Kaufman (eds), Politics of Economic Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, p 167. 19 PB Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 20 M Bratton & N van de Walle, 'Neo-patrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa', World Politics, 44(4), 1994, p 463. 21 Taken from a 1987 survey of 281 Brazilian bureaucrats in Evans, 'The state as problem and solution', p 167. 22 D North, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: WW Norton, 1981, p 22; and MA Kocher, 'State capacity as a conceptual variable', Yale Journal of International Affairs, 5, 2010, pp 141–142. 23 Evans, Embedded Autonomy, p 45. 24 Evans, 'The state as problem and solution', p 151. 25 M Lundahl, 'Inside the predatory state: the rationale, methods, and economic consequences of kleptocratic regimes', Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 24, 1997, p 33. 26 DW Brinkerhoff & A Goldsmith, 'Clientelism, patrimonialism and democratic governance: an overview and framework for assessment and programming', US Agency for International Development, Office of Democracy and Governance under Strategic Policy and Institutional Reform, Washington, DC, December 2002, p 17. 27 C Young, 'Reflections on state decline and societal change in Zaire', mimeo, January 1997, p 2. 28 D Gould & JA Amaro-Reves, 'The effects of corruption on administrative performance: illustrations from developing countries', World Bank Staff Working Papers, 580(7), 1983, p 10. 29 Ibid. 30 NG Quimpo, 'The Philippines: predatory regime, growing authoritarian features', Pacific Review, 22(3), 2009, p 339. 31 Ibid. 32 W Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p 6. 33 JV Hastings, 'Geographies of state failure and sophistication in maritime piracy hijackings', Political Geography, 28, 2009. 34 Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 'Clientelism, patrimonialism and democratic governance', pp 1–50. 35 C Young, 'Zaire: the shattered illusion of the integral state', Journal of Modern African Studies, 32, 1994, pp 247–263. 36 D Compagnon, 'Political decay in Somalia: from personal rule to warlordism', Refugee, 12(5), 1992, p 9. 37 LT Dung, 'Judicial independence in transitional countries', United Nations Development Programme Oslo Governance Centre, January 2003, p 8. 38 Dung, 'Judicial independence in transitional countries'. 39 PH Solomon, 'Assessing the courts in Russia: parameters of progress under Putin', Demokratizatsiya 16(1), 2008, pp 1–7. 40 S Sondhi, 'Combating corruption in India: the role of civil society', paper prepared for the 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Quebec City, 1–5 August 2000, p 12. 41 MM Khan, Political and Administrative Corruption: Concepts, Comparative Experiences and Bangladesh Case, Berlin: Transparency International, 1998, p 11. 42 E Buscaglia, M Dakolias & WE Ratliff, Judicial Reform in Latin America: A Framework for National Development, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1995, p 12. 43 P Domingo, 'Judicial independence and judicial reform in Latin America', in A Schedler (ed), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999, p 168. 44 Buscaglia et al, Judicial Reform in Latin America, p 14. 45 Domingo, 'Judicial independence and judicial reform in Latin America', p 165. 46 Ibid, p 168. 47 N Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p 1. 48 Ibid, p 192. 49 More delays are caused by those who refuse to accept judgments involving payment. Egyptian judicial institutions have been lenient on those who delay making payments in civil cases and there is little enforcement. Ibid, p 193. 50 C Mallat, 'The Lebanese legal system', Lebanon Report, 2, 1997, p 34. 51 J Staats, JLS Bowler & JT Hiskey, 'Measuring judicial performance in Latin America', Latin American Politics and Society, 47(4), 2005, p 79; and W Prillaman, The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin American: Declining Confidence in the Rule of Law, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2000, p 18. 52 E Buscaglia, 'Obstacles to judicial reform in Latin America', in E Jarquin & F Carrillo (eds), Justice Delayed: Judicial Reform in Latin America, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998. 53 Some researchers refer to low-quality security institutions as praetorian. We do not use this term here because of the wide-ranging ways in which it is defined. See A Perlmutter, Egypt, The Praetorian State, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974; T Lee 'Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia', Armed Forces & Society, 32(1), October 2005, pp 80–104; and B MacDonald, Military Spending in Developing Countries, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1997. 54 JT Quinlivan, 'Coup proofing: its practice and consequences in the Middle East', International Security, 24(2), 1999, p 139. 55 D Compagnon, 'Political decay in Somalia', p 9. 56 UB Ikbe, 'Patrimonialism and military regimes in Nigeria', African Journal of Political Science, 5(1), 2000, p 156. 57 Decalo, 'African personalist dictatorships', p 227. 58 JP Moran, 'Praetorians or professionals? Democratization and military intervention in communist and post-communist Russia', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 15(2), 1999, pp 41–68. The decline in professionalism is also a result of lower levels of training and expertise. The military was starved of the funding necessary to take on technological development and innovation. This lack of funding affected military readiness. In May 2003 it was reported that Russian pilots only received six to eight hours of combat training per year, far below the 150 hours or more required by nato pilots. Senior military officers in Russia have also complained about the weapons systems and equipment that they have to work with. D Herspring, 'Vladimir Putin and military reform in Russia', European Security, 14(1), 2005, p 138. 59 Moran, 'Praetorians or professionals?', p 82. 60 Herspring, 'Vladimir Putin and military reform in Russia', p 130. 61 Ibid, p 139. President Putin claims he is tackling these problems by increasing funding for the military and upgrading its status in society. 62 C Black, 'Deterring Libya: the strategic culture of Muammar Qaddafi', The Counter-proliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No 8, US Air Force Counter-proliferation Center, Air War College, Maxwell, AL, 2000, p 10. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Quinlivan, 'Coup proofing'. 66 Ibid, p 146. 67 A Musah, 'Privatization of security and arms proliferation in Africa', Development and Change, 33(5), 2002, p 922. 68 W Reno, Warlord Politics in African States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998. 69 R Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003, p 12. 70 MacDonald, Military Spending in Developing Countries. 71 Perlmutter, Egypt, The Praetorian State. 72 A Kposowa & JC Jenkins, 'The structural sources of military coups in post-colonial Africa, 1957–1984', American Journal of Sociology, 99(1), 1993, p 126. 73 P McGowan & TH Johnson, 'Sixty coups in thirty years—further evidence regarding African military coups d'état', Journal of Modern African Studies, 24(3), 1986, p 546. 74 B Agyeman-Duah, 'Military coups, regime change, and interstate conflicts in West Africa', Armed Forces & Society, 16(4), 1990, pp 547–570. 75 Zartman, Collapsed States. 76 D Acemoglu, T Verdier & J Robinson, 'Kleptocracy and divide and rule: a model of personal rule', Journal of European Economic Association, 2(2–3), 2004, pp 162–192. 77 A Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords: The Challenge of State Building in Post Taleban Afghanistan, Crisis Research Center Working Paper 33, London, UK, September 2003, p 4. 78 B Riedel, 'Pakistan and terror: the eye of the storm', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618(1), 2008, pp 31-45. 79 MS Fish, 'Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies', Journal of Democracy, 17(1), 2006, pp 5–20. 80 SF Starr, Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia, Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program Paper, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, June 2006, p 1. 81 P Kubicek, 'Authoritarianism in Central Asia: curse or cure?', Third World Quarterly, 19(1), 1998, p 32. 82 D Koh, 'Leadership changes at the 10th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party', Asian Survey, 68(4), 2008, p 672. 83 Quimpo, 'The Philippines'. 84 G O'Toole, Politics in Latin America, Harlow: Pearson, 2007, p 154. 85 Starr, Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia, p 1. 86 N Tan, 'Institutionalized leadership: resilient hegemonic party autocracy in Singapore', paper prepared for presentation at cpsa Conference, Ottawa, 28 May 2009. 87 L Diamond & MF Plattner (eds), Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. 88 V Wang, The Accountability Function of Parliament in New Democracies: Tanzanian Perspectives, Bergen: Chr Michelsen Institute, 2005, p 10. 89 Diamond & Plattner, Democratization in Africa, p 38. 90 Ibid, p 39. 91 Ibid, p 41. Salaries may also pay a role in curbing corruption. Better pay is a step in professionalising the legislature. Well paid legislators are more likely to be impervious to the allure of executive patronage and more able to perform their duties. Higher salaries may attract better qualified candidates who desire to strengthen institutions. 92 K Mani, 'Militaries in business: state-making and entrepreneurship in the developing world', Armed Forces and Society, 33(4), 2007, pp 591–611.