Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The end of oppositional history?

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13642529.2011.616408

1470-1154

Kalle Pihlainen,

Australian History and Society

Abstract Narrative constructivism – the narrative theory of history following Hayden White – has focused intensely on the search for alternative forms for history writing. At the same time, since the late 1960s, many oppositional efforts within historical research proper have been coopted into mainstream history writing and their political edge has been blunted. Microhistory and feminism, for example, have become fairly standard ways of 'doing history' in many history departments. The article proposes that, despite its radical intentions, constructivist theorizing has played a role in the institutionalization and consequent watering down of oppositional approaches. On the most basic level, this claim may be seen simply to reiterate arguments against a postmodernist universalization of difference: if 'anything goes', nothing can be used to question the status quo. The article goes beyond such a discussion of epistemological scepticism, however, investigating particular ways in which the constructivist demand for new forms of history writing has redefined the task of historians so that even opposition is considered more a representational than a political strategy. Keywords: critical historiographyconstructivismpost-structuralismradical historymicrohistoryfeminist history Acknowledgements Many thanks to Alun Munslow, Keith Jenkins and Richard Vann for their comments, and to the Academy of Finland for funding. Notes 1. The coinage of the term 'narrative constructivism' by Alun Munslow (2007, 17) helps to distinguish this strand of the debate from the constructivisms of Giambattista Vico, John Dewey, R.G. Collingwood, or Michael Oakeshott, for instance. 2. Cf. White 1987, 19–20. 3. See, e.g., Ankersmit 2001. For an excellent account of 'experimental history', see Munlow 2007, 103–10. See also the collection of Munslow and Rosenstone, eds, Experiments in rethinking history. On 'unconventional history', see, especially, the 2002 theme issue of History and Theory of that name, as well as the discussion surrounding it. 4. White, of course, partially allows for this appeal to historical method in introducing his idea of the ideological baggage brought by narrativizing. As he states, he does not intend 'to say that a historical discourse is not properly assessed in terms of the truth value of its factual (singular existential) statements taken individually and the logical conjunction of the whole set of such statements taken distributively. For unless a historical discourse acceded to assessment in these terms, it would lose all justification for its claim to represent and provide explanations of specifically real historical events' (White 1987, 45). 5. Almost without exception, discussions of 'postmodernism' in history revolve around the issue of epistemological scepticisim which, as I argue here, is only a preliminary one with respect to the broader political and ideological aims of 'postist' thought. This confusion is quite persistent and leads to rejections of 'postmodernism' (including post-structuralism) by thinkers who are clearly in agreement with the political and social aims involved, and really object only to the moral relativist or anti-referential views imposed on 'postist' thought in popular readings. Even some quite sophisticated readings fail to see the distinction between postmodernism and post-structuralism; see, e.g., Davies 2006, 13–18. Although Beverley Southgate has presented a more understanding reading of postmodernism, importantly noting that it is not only a philosophy but also a pragmatics for living, he too focuses largely on the epistemological: truth and aporia, incredulity toward metanarratives, undecidability; and neglects its socially committed side. See Southgate 2003, 5–6. As he writes: 'Postmodernism is not, then, simply a "philosophy", or a part of a subject that everyone knows has little or nothing to do with "real life"; it's not just a "theory" that impinges on nothing more substantial than the abstract metaphysical constructions of "intellectuals".' Hence, it is not enough to say – as an anonymous referee of this article has – that postmodernism is not necessarily apolitical. Instead, room needs to be made for this political aspect by abandoning the unnecessary dramatics surrounding the debate about epistemology and reference, at least the ever-popular question of whether history is fact or fiction. Otherwise, this kind of rhetoric will continue to define the general understanding of postmodernism and of the post-1968 more broadly. For more on this, see also Munslow 2007, Jenkins 1999, 62 ff., and Breisach 2003, 72 ff. Breisach's classification of narrative constructivism as 'post-structuralist postmodernism' partakes, to me, in this more popularizing reading and presents non-referentialism as an integral part of this position. 6. This term is put forward by Joan Scott. She claims that women's history is supplementary in the sense of being both 'superfluous and indispensable' – hence it underscores a lack in existing historiography. Scott 2001, 50–1. 7. Baudrillard 2002 (1996), 123; cited in Jenkins 2003, 9. The translation given by Jenkins differs slightly. 8. Judt 1979, 87; cited in Sharpe 2001, 34. In his latest book, Ill fares the land (2010), Judt makes a strong case for the need to return consideration of social consequences to contemporary political discourse. 9. Matti Peltonen, for example, points this out in his book Mikrohistoriasta (On microhistory), 1999. 10. Some of the exemplars that Stone mentions as representative of this 'new history' are the same that have been often referred to in the constructivism/postmodernism debate in history even up to and including recent years: the most prominent of these being Simon Schama and Natalie Zemon Davis. See, e.g., Southgate 2003, 51–2. 11. As Robert A. Rosenstone (2004, 3) notes, literary innovations allow the historian to write in experiential terms. For him, traditional realist writing: 'did not let me get close enough to my characters. Did not let me see the world through their eyes, smell it through their noses.' On the flip side, there is always the danger of forgetting the fictionality involved in this kind of imaginary identification, of course. 12. Cf. White (1978, 43) on realist history writing as 'bad art'. 13. As Stone continues: 'Another obvious danger is that the revival of narrative may lead to a return to pure antiquarianism, to story-telling for its own sake. Yet another is that it will focus attention upon the sensational and so obscure the dullness and drabness of the lives of the vast majority' (Stone 1979, 22–3). 14. Cf. Peltonen 1999, 60. For more on the incompatibility of microhistory and Whitean constructivism, see the Ginzburg–White debate; e.g. Ginzburg 1991. Similarly, microhistory, like narrative constructivism, finds inspiration in social and cultural anthropology, especially the work of Clifford Geertz and the concept of 'thick description'. 15. Feminism's interest is, of course, first in practical social criticism, not theory. Hence, these positions have been theorized on pragmatic terms. For a discussion of feminism's relation to postmodernism, see, e.g., Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson 1988. For studies of women's history, see, of course, Joan W. Scott's Gender and the politics of history (1988) and Bonnie Smith's The gender of history (1998). Also see Joan Scott's 'Feminism's History' Journal of Women's History, 16, no. 2: 10–29, reprinted in Sue Morgan, ed., The feminist history reader (Routledge, 2006). 16. Partner's call for controlled fiction also casts light on another, more recent development, namely the return to or increased interest in empiricism. See, e.g., Spiegel 2005 and 2009. While this has generally been seen as a counter-oppositional 're-turn', it should also – as long as we bracket the epistemological aspect – be examined in terms of the political. Thus, focus on empiricism in an anti-epistemological intellectual climate needs to be related to the present; it needs to be examined in terms of soliciting emotional involvement on the one hand, and in terms of gaining control over interpretations on the other. Emphasis of the empirical attachment of history does not, after all, necessarily intend 'objectivity'. 17. For more on this dynamic, see, e.g., Haber 1994 and Fraser 1995. 18. As Ann Braithwaite writes: 'This insistence on examining one's personal life, on exploring its many contradictions, desires, pleasures and fun marks one especially salient example of the overlaps and similarities between third-wave and postfeminisms. For many third-wave feminists … a defining feature of their self-identified brand of third-wave feminism is precisely its refusal of the second wave's politics of rejection of signifiers and practices of traditional femininity in favor of a politics of contradiction, incorporation and negotiation' (Braithwaite 2002, 339). 19. Cf. Imogen Tyler and her critique of this narcissistic label and its subversive effect on feminist political ambitions. Argues Tyler: 'Women's anxiety about being identified as feminist is a direct consequence of the coercive efforts of the social elite to delegitimize feminism by naming it narcissistic' (Tyler 2005, 39). 20. This avoidance of overt or at least content-specific political positions appears to be more evident in American debate. I would argue that this has much to do with the fact that the United States is more committed to and more engrossed in the 'entertainment age' than perhaps any other nation. This relates, of course, also to the more extreme interpretation given to textualism there. 21. See Munslow's Future of history (2010). 22. Of course, as Munslow and Rosenstone (2004, 14) note, experimentation and this kind of activism are challenging and carry professional risk. 23. Stone's comment brings an interesting issue to the fore: if the 1970s were indeed a period of disillusionment with regard to the efficacy of political action, how accurate is it to assume it was also a time when opinions and emphases concerning what history is for actually aimed at being politically engaged? 24. Compare this with feminism where private life was by many made into a political strategy much in the same manner as it has been used as an oppositional tool in contemporary performance art, for instance.