Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Bosnia: Dayton is Dead! Long Live Dayton!

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 3-4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13537110903372367

1557-2986

Roberto Belloni,

Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

Abstract The process of implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia has come to a halt. Particularly since 2006, nationalist rhetoric has increased, political, economic, and social reforms have stalled, and some analysts warn that the country might be sliding towards collapse. This article traces the roots of the current crisis in the 2006 failed constitutional reform attempt, which has highlighted the precarious state of the Bosnian political situation and, more broadly, in the limited impact of the international community's illiberal, top-down strategies employed in the country since almost the beginning of the peace process. It concludes by suggesting the need for a new approach, led by the European Union, and aimed at reviving the domestic political process. Roberto Belloni is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Trento, Italy. He has published extensively on issues pertaining to democratization and peacebuilding in deeply divided societies, with particular reference to the Balkans. His recent work includes the book State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia (London: Routledge, 2007). Notes 1. Paddy Ashdown and Richard Holbrooke, "A Bosnian Powder Keg," The Guardian, 22 Oct. 2008, p. 28. 2. Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western, "The Death of Dayton," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5 (2009), p. 69. 3. Kurt Bassuener, James Lyon, and Eric A. Witte, Sliding Toward the Precipice: Europe's Bosnia Policy. Democratization Policy Council, 7 Nov. 2008; www.democratizationpolicy.org (accessed 1 Sept. 2009). 4. Insightful histories of Bosnia and its peoples include Noel Malcolm, A Short History of Bosnia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Ivan Lovrenović, Bosnia: A Cultural History (London: Saqi Books, 2001); Marko Attila Hoare, The History of Bosnia from the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Saqi Books, 2007). 5. Among the many accounts of Bosnia's descent into war, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999). 6. V. P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 7. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southeastern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 21. 8. For further details on Bosnia's constitutional structure, see Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2006). 9. Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: International Intervention and Nationalist Partition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 216. 10. James Lyon, "Will Bosnia Survive Dayton?", Current History, Vol. 99, No. 635 (2000), p. 112. 11. This paragraph draws from Roberto Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 50–3. 12. Since late 2008 this situation has prevented the election of a city mayor and effectively deadlocked local governance; see International Crisis Group, Bosnia: A Test of Political Maturity in Mostar, Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 54, 27 July 2009; www.crisisweb.org [accessed 1 Sept. 2009]. 13. Ibid., p. 7. 14. Belloni, State Building, pp. 54–8. 15. For an analysis of the 2006 attempt at constitutional reform, see Sofia Sebastian, Leaving Dayton Behind: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Madrid: FRIDE, Working Paper 46, Nov. 2007; www.fride.org [accessed 10 June 2009]. 16. See, for example, Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 17. Sofia Sebastian, "The Role of the EU in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Ethnopolitics, Vol. 8, Nos. 3–4 (2009), pp. 346–7. 18. Peace Implementation Council, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-Sustaining Structures, Bonn, Germany, Peace Implementation Council, ch. 11, para. 11, 9–10 Dec. 1997; www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5183 [accessed 10 Jan 1998]. 19. David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding (London: Pluto Press, 2006). 20. Florian Bieber, "After Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace," Ethnopolitics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2006), p. 15. 21. Marcus Cox, State Building and Post-war Reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia (Geneva: Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiation, 2001), p. 14. 22. Roberto Belloni, "A Dubious Democracy by Fiat," Transitions Online, 22 Aug. 2003, www.tol.cz [accessed 22 Aug. 2003]. 23. A uniquely reflective account of the myopic attitude of international interveners can be found in Mark W. Huddleston, "Innocents Abroad: Reflections From a Public Administration Consultant in Bosnia," Public Administration Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (1999), pp. 147–60. 24. For an analysis of the international civil society building efforts see Roberto Belloni and Bruce Hemmer, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Constructing Civil Society Under a Semi-Protectorate," in Thania Paffenholz (ed.), Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Engagement (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming). 25. The Peace Implementation Council was established in Dec. 1995. Its formal composition has not changed since then; although its meetings have been attended by a fluctuating number of observers. 26. See, for example, Colin Woodward, "Debate Surrounds International Community's Role in Bosnia," Christian Science Monitor, 2 Feb. 2007, p. 7. 27. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point. 28. Police Restructuring Commission, Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Police Restructuring Commission, 2004). The rationale for police reform and the manner in which the High Representative attempted to introduce it in Bosnia is analyzed in Thomas Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems of Internationally-led Security Sector Reform," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1–22. 29. Letter to the EU Parliament from Milorad Dodic, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, 20 Sept. 2007; www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/pdf/JISB [accessed 10 Dec. 2008]. 30. A good, short account of this escalation can be found in International Crisis Group, Bosnia's Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe, Europe Report No. 198, 9 Mar. 2009, pp. 4–5; www.crisisweb.org [accessed 10 June 2009], pp. 11–14. 31. Tomas Valasek, Is Russia a Partner to the EU in Bosnia?, London: Center for European Reform, Policy Brief, 19 Mar. 2009; www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_tv_bosnia_19march09.pdf [accessed 1 July 2009]. 32. Srecko Latal, "Western Bodies in Bosnia 'Dead Horse'—Lajcak," Balkan Insight, 2 Feb. 2009; www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/16352 [accessed 10 June 2009]. 33. International Crisis Group, 9 March 2009. 34. Confidential interview with European Commission Official, Sarajevo, Sept. 2009. 35. "BiH Main Parties Announce New Decentralisation Agreement," SE Times, 29 Jan. 2009; www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2009/01/27/feature-01 [accessed 1 Sept. 2009]. 36. After a stand-off between international and Serb officials, the High Representative used his Bonn powers to abolish the declaration; see Anes Alic, "Bosnian Serbs vs Inzko," International Relations and Security Network, 23 June 2009; www.isn.ch [accessed 1 Sept. 2009]. 37. Dan Bilefsky, "Tensions Rise in Fragile Bosnia as Serbs Threaten to Seek Independence," 27 Feb. 2009, The New York Times, p. 11. 38. Interview with Kurt Bassuener, independent political analyst, Democratization Policy Council, Sarajevo, Sept. 2009. See also Kurt Bassuener, How to Pull Out of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Dead-End: A Strategy for Success, Democratization Policy Council, 19 Feb. 2009; www.democratizationpolicy.org [accessed 1 Sept 2009]. 39. Confidential interview with EU Official, Sarajevo, Sept. 2009. 40. James Lyon, "Halting the Downward Spiral," New York Times, 24 Feb. 2009; www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24iht-edlyon.1.20395827.html [accessed 1 Sept. 2009] 41. Belloni, State Building, pp. 160–66. 42. For a discussion of the current state of the constitutional debate, see Kenneth Morrison, Dayton, Divisions and Constitutional Revisions: Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads (London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Research and Assessment Branch, 2009). 43. Vanja Filipovic and Kurt Bassuener, "Mayor with a Plan," Transitions Online, 25 July 2007; www.tol.cz [accessed 1 Sept. 2009]. 44. For a discussion of institutional arrangements that protect group interests but do not entrench ethnic vetoes, see Florian Bieber, "Challenge of Democracy in Divided Societies: Lessons from Bosnia—Challenges for Kosovo," in Florian Bieber and Džemal Sokolović (eds.), Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 109–22; Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 45. Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, "Towards Ownership: From Peace Implementation to Euro-Atlantic Integration," Sarajevo: PIC, 23 June 2006; www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=37503 [accessed 1 July 2009]. 46. "Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council," available at: www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=39997 [accessed 1 July 2009]. 47. "Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council," 27 Feb. 2008; www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=41352 [accessed 1 July 2009]. 48. "Communiquè of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council", 30 June 2009; www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=43665 [accessed 1 July 2009]. 49. Summary note on the joint report by Xavier Solana, EU High Representative for the CESP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on "EU's policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Way Ahead," (10 Nov. 2008) Brussels, S367/08; www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1110_cagre_defense/EU_policy_in_bosnia_and_Herzegovina_joint_report_solana_rehn_en.pdf [accessed 1 July 2009]. 50. For an assessment of the EU's role, actual and potential, in the Western Balkans, see Roberto Belloni, "European Integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, Prospects, and Obstacles," Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp. 313–31. 51. European Stability Initiative, The Helsinki Moment: European Member-state Building in the Balkans, Berlin/Brussels/Istanbul: ESI, Feb. 2005; www.esiweb.org [accessed 3 May 2006]. 52. United Nations Development Programme, Silent Majority Speaks, Sarajevo: UNDP, May 2007; www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=3&RID=43 [accessed 13 Oct. 2008]. 53. See Edward P. Joseph and R. Bruce Hitchner, Making Bosnia Work: Why EU Accession is not Enough, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, USIP Peace Briefing, June 2008; Megan Chabalowski and Michael Dziedzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Parsing the Options, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, USIP Peace Briefing, Sept. 2009; both reports at www.usip.org [accessed 10 Sept. 2009]; International Crisis Group, 2009. 54. Judy Batt, Bosnia and Herzegovina: The International Mission at a Turning Point, FRIDE Policy Brief, p. 4, 9 Feb. 2009; www.fride.org [accessed 10 June 2009].