Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

La matanza del Seguro Obrero (5 de septiembre de 1938)

2010; Duke University Press; Volume: 90; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1215/00182168-2010-032

1527-1900

Claudio Robles Ortiz,

Cultural and Social Studies in Latin America

This brief yet informative book analyzes the critical conjuncture that led to the historic triumph of the Frente Popular in Chile in 1938. Marcus Klein focuses on the coup orchestrated by Jorge González von Marées, the jefe of the Movimiento Nacional Socialista (MNS), and then examines the impact of the subsequent massacre of the young nacistas, a small group of Chilean nazis that failed to provoke a military uprising to overthrow Arturo Alessandri. The author explains why those tragic events had a decisive impact in Chilean politics. They exposed the repressive character of the Alessandri administration, left former dictator Carlos Ibáñez out of the presidential race, and, more importantly, facilitated the political compromises that allowed Pedro Aguirre Cerda to defeat right-wing candidate Gustavo Ross in one of the most contested elections in Chile. Although this interpretation is certainly not new, Klein’s well-researched work provides a vivid picture of the political forces and characters in conflict, tracing their changing strategies to reach La Moneda.Correcting previous treatments by other authors that characterized the MNS as one of the new voices of Chilean nationalism, Klein shows that, just like latter-day nacionalistas in Chile, the jefe’s followers were fascists who easily traded their ideology for immediate political benefits. Thus they soon directed their rhetoric toward the popular sectors in search of votes. Moreover, the author argues that while the communists and socialists vehemently rejected the MNS’s efforts to attract working-class voters, Chilean nacistas enjoyed considerable freedom to maneuver because of President Arturo Alessandri’s obsession with fighting the threat of communism. Yet this fear was totally unfounded, as the Communist Party had already adopted the Popular Front strategy, a “marriage of convenience that ultimately Alessandri hoped to destroy” (p. 52).Klein also examines the presidential candidates’ profiles and actions with a keen eye, showing their merits and, especially, their limitations. The author leaves no doubt that Gustavo Ross needed little effort to disappoint voters with his brusque personality, “contempt for other classes except his own” (p. 64), and certainly his policies as a cabinet member, which granted him the unflattering moniker “minister of hunger.” No less a problematic alternative, the “wealthy landowner and veteran politician” Pedro Aguirre Cerda was the only candidate who would give frentistas a real chance to win the election, in spite of his “lack of magnetism and personal charisma” (pp. 70 – 72). For his part, Carlos Ibáñez, who upon returning from exile stated that he had no ambitions other than living peacefully with his family, would not hesitate to reject the rather embarrassing nacistas. Instead, he hoped to garner the support of the Frente Popular; in the end, however, Ibáñez was incapable of securing the backing of the political forces that really mattered. In short, Klein suggests, Chilean voters would have trouble deciding which candidate was less unappealing.The study of the massacre’s immediate consequences is one of the book’s most sig nificant contributions. Klein shows the intricacies of the government’s harsh response, Alessandri’s readiness to take advantage of the situation to request extraordinary powers, and, as customary in Chile, the distorting role of right-wing newspapers El Diario Ilus-trado and El Mercurio, which were both “ready to disseminate lies and misinformation” about the massacre (p. 93). The author also establishes that, although the young nacistas posed no real threat to the government, an upset Alessandri was not only determined to humiliate and execute them but also lied “with an amazing lack of shame” (p. 89) when he affirmed that some had been murdered by their own comrades. Klein explains this determination as motivated by Alessandri’s resolve to avoid by all means being ousted again, which is a plausible argument, since the coup took place on the anniversary of the military intervention that forced him to resign in 1925. However, it would also be necessary to consider Alessandri’s growing authoritarianism and his infamous record at repressing the labor movement, which included the massacres in San Gregorio and La Coruña.Finally, another strength of this book is its rich bibliography, which the author reads selectively and critically, based on his exhaustive research on Chilean right-wing political actors, both fascist and otherwise. Klein is also to be commended for using a variety of sources, including an extensive list of Chilean newspapers and magazines, reports by foreign diplomats, and a selection of key documents as appendixes. Last but not least, readers will enjoy Klein’s concise style and clarity. All of this makes the book an excellent resource for readers seeking an engaging discussion of Chilean politics in an era, as Enrique Lafourcade puts it, “cuando los políticos eran inteligentes.”