STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS IN TAIWAN
2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/10736700.2010.485436
ISSN1746-1766
Autores Tópico(s)Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies
ResumoAbstract Because it is a producer and supplier of high-tech dual-use goods as well as a major transit point for WMD-related and military items, Taiwan represents an important case study of national export control systems. Taiwan is not an official member of the major multilateral export control regimes, yet it remains committed to nonproliferation goals. The article explores the strategic trade controls of Taiwan within the context of its nonproliferation policies and commitments. The author discusses the strong and weak aspects of Taiwan's strategic trade controls by looking in detail at key components of the country's export-import control system: legal basis, licensing system, enforcement and compliance mechanism, government-industry outreach, and adherence to nonproliferation treaties and multilateral export control regimes. Keywords: Taiwanexport controlsstrategic trade controldual-use goods and technology ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to Richard Young of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia for his invaluable comments on an early draft of this article; Zlati Petrov, Rikki Simmons, and Kristjan Kornmayer of the University of Georgia for research assistance; and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. All opinions and any errors are the responsibility of the author. Notes 1. For studies exploring different aspects of the relationship between dual-use trade and WMD proliferation, see Matthew Fuhrmann, "Exporting Mass Destruction? The Determinants of Dual-Use Trade," Journal of Peace Research 45 (2008), pp. 633–52; Matthew Fuhrmann, "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 181–208; Matthew Kroenig, "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance," American Political Science Review 103 (February 2009); Matthew Kroenig, "Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 161–80. 2. For an excellent overview of Taiwan's export control system as of 2005, see Mark Wuebbels, "Is Taiwan Getting Serious About Export Controls?" Nonproliferation Review 12 (July 2005), pp. 391–404. 3. "The 1540 Matrix," UNSCR 1540 Committee, . 4. For details on the methodology, see Michael Beck and Seema Gahlaut, "Introduction to Nonproliferation Export Controls," in Michael Beck, Richard Cupitt, Seema Gahlaut, and Scott Jones, eds., To Supply or to Deny: Comparing Nonproliferation Export Controls in Five Key Countries (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp. 16–21. 5. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, April 28, 2004; "Towards an Arms Trade Treaty," UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, . 6. Among recent examples of illicit trade and transnational crime, in February 2009 Taiwan busted a smuggling ring that moved banned or restricted fertilizers from mainland China to outlying Taiwanese islands and then transferred them to the Taiwanese mainland; see Flor Wang, "Police Nab Smugglers of Illegal Pesticides," Central News Agency, February 12, 2009. Human trafficking is also a problem in the region; see Flor Wang, "Taiwan Smashes 'Largest-Ever' Human Smuggling Ring," Central News Agency, June 18, 2009. 7. BOFT, Taiwan, . 8. "Annual Statistical Report," Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau, May 20, 2009, ; Dave Friedlos, "Taiwan Customs Officials Adopt RFID-Enabled Container Seals," RFID Journal, March 25, 2009. 9. "Container Operation," Keelung Customs Office, . 10. Cindy Sui, "Taiwan Seeks to Grow Beyond High-Tech Contractor Status," New York Times, March 20, 2008. 11. "Company Overview," Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited, . 12. "Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. Annual Report 2008," p. 11, . All dollar figures refer to U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted. 13. Mark Wuebbels and Patrick Heiman, "Growing Pains—An Overview of Taiwan's Export Control System," Asia Export Control Observer No. 6 (February/March 2005), p. 14, ; Michael Chase, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and James C. Mulvenon, "Shanghaied? The Economic and Political Implications of the Flow of Information Technology and Investment across the Taiwan Strait," RAND National Defense Research Institute, TR-133, July 2004. 14. Mark Wuebbels and Patrick Heiman, "Growing Pains—An Overview of Taiwan's Export Control System," Asia Export Control Observer No. 6 (February/March 2005), p. 14, ; Michael Chase, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and James C. Mulvenon, "Shanghaied? The Economic and Political Implications of the Flow of Information Technology and Investment across the Taiwan Strait," RAND National Defense Research Institute, TR-133, July 2004. "Chinese Semiconductor Company Declares Technology Advances Homegrown; Questions Raised about Efficacy of U.S., Taiwan Controls," Asia Export Control Observer No. 6 (February/March 2005), pp. 4-5. 15. "Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2008," Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2008, pp. 124, 230, . 16. "Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2008," Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2008, pp. 124, 230, . p. 234. 17. Larry Shyu, "Chemical Weapons Convention and Taiwan's Issues," presentation, Taipei, Taiwan, 2009. 18. CWC, April 29, 1997, Article II, para. 1, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, . 19. The author is grateful to John Hart of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Paul Walker of Global Green USA, and Jonathan Tucker of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies for sharing their expertise related to provisions of the CWC. 20. CWC, Verification Annex, Part VI, para. 3; Part VII, paras. 31–32. 21. "Sensitive Commodity List," BOFT, . 22. Shyu, "Chemical Weapons Convention and Taiwan's Issues." 23. "The Chemical Weapons Convention," August 10, 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, . 24. Author's interview with Paul Walker, Global Green USA, Washington, DC, February 2010. 25. Shyu, "Chemical Weapons Convention and Taiwan's Issues." 26. Author's interview with John Hart, SIPRI, communication by e-mail, February 2010. 27. CWC, Verification Annex, Part VIII, para. 26. 28. Shyu, "Chemical Weapons Convention and Taiwan's Issues." 29. CWC, Verification Annex, Part VIII, para. 27. 30. "Taiwan National Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management," Atomic Energy Council, Taiwan's Executive Yuan, June 2007, ; "Nuclear Power in Taiwan," World Nuclear Association (WNA), January 2010, . 31. "Nuclear Power in Taiwan," WNA. 32. Uranium enrichment technology is sensitive because apart from being used in peaceful nuclear energy programs, it can also be employed to enrich uranium for military purposes. Spent fuel presents a proliferation risk because plutonium can be recovered from it during reprocessing and then used in a nuclear weapon. 33. "International Cooperation-Multilateral Cooperation," Atomic Energy Council, . 34. "International Cooperation-Multilateral Cooperation," Atomic Energy Council, . 35. See William Burr, ed., "U.S. Opposed Taiwanese Bomb During 1970s," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 221, June 15, 2007, The Nuclear Vault, National Security Archive, George Washington University, . 36. David Albright and Corey Gay, "Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1998, p. 55. 37. David Albright and Corey Gay, "Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1998, p. 55. 38. The events that unfolded between the 1950s and mid-1970s in Taiwan suggest that there were conflicting views within the Taiwanese elite regarding the utility of developing a nuclear military program, and opinions among outside observers differ as to the real intentions of Taiwan's leaders. Etel Solingen, in her detailed exploration of Taiwan's nuclear quest, provides an account of various opinions that emerged in the United States. See discussion in "Taiwan (Republic of China)," in Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 100–17. [0] 39. Mimi Dougherty, "Taiwanese Legislator Accuses President Chen of Nuclear Weapons Development," WMD Insights, February 2008, . 40. "Taiwan's New President Ma Says Chinese Diplomatic Pressure Bad for Relations," China Post, May 21, 2008, . 41. Dennis Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), p. 43. 42. Wuebbels, "Is Taiwan Getting Serious About Export Controls?" p. 392. 43. Wuebbels, "Is Taiwan Getting Serious About Export Controls?" p. 392. 44. "Public Notice Announcing a Revision of the Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export," BOFT, December 26, 2008; Act Governing the Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, Mainland Affairs Council, July 31, 1992, . 45. Tim Colebatch, "Stunning Policy Switch in Taiwan Plan to Open Manufacturing Sector to China," Age, August 14, 2008. 46. Tim Colebatch, "Stunning Policy Switch in Taiwan Plan to Open Manufacturing Sector to China," Age, August 14, 2008. 47. Moming Zhou, "Taiwan President: China Deal to Exclude Some Techs," Market Watch, October 29, 2009; "Taiwan Conditionally Broadens High-Tech Investment in China," Taiwan News, February 10, 2010. 48. "Taiwan Economic Ministry to Review Restrictions on China Investment," China Post, June 6, 2009; "Taiwan's President-Elect to Review Bans on Tech Exports to China," Asia Pulse, April 7, 2008. Taiwanese producers of an earlier generation of the technology (8-inch semiconductors) are allowed to invest in China. 49. Zhou, "Taiwan President: China Deal to Exclude Some Techs." 50. Michael Roberge and Youkyung Lee, "China-Taiwan Relations," backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, August 11, 2009, . 51. "Trade Statistics," BOFT, ; "Top Ten Trading Partners (2008/10)," Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, . 52. Taiwan's MND contributed about 45 percent of Taiwan Goal's initial capital start-up costs, which were more than $6 million. In addition, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Chunghwa Telecom contributed 15 percent each, and China Steel acquired the remaining 25 percent stake. "Firm Set Up to Handle Arms Purchases, MOEA," China Post, February 15, 2008; Flora Wang and Rich Chang, "Scrap Taiwan Goal Immediately: KMT," Taipei Times, February 19, 2008, ; Shih Hsiu-Chuan, "Ministry Disciplined Over Taiwan Goal Affair," Taipei Times, January 23, 2009, . 53. The MND was charged with violating laws and regulations governing the separation of powers; the MND's 45 percent stake in Taiwan Goal exceeded the 35 percent threshold permitted under Taiwanese law. "Firm Set Up to Handle Arms Purchases, MOEA"; Wang and Chang, "Scrap Taiwan Goal Immediately: KMT"; Hsiu-Chuan, "Ministry Disciplined Over Taiwan Goal Affair." 54. "President Ma Ying-jeou's Inaugural Address," Central News Agency, May 20, 2008. 55. "CSI: Container Security Initiative," U.S. Customs and Border Protection, . 56. "Megaports Initiative," National Nuclear Security Administration, . 57. "Taiwan: Suspected Chemical Taken from North Korean Freighter," New York Times, August 12, 2003, p. A6. 58. Derek Mitchell, "Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment, and Honor," in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 301. 59. For a discussion on the role of the United States, see Wuebbels, "Is Taiwan Getting Serious about Export Controls?" pp. 392–93. 60. "Public Notice Announcing a Revision of the Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export." 61. "Deemed export" is the transfer of sensitive information, technology, or software to a foreign national that takes place within the country. 62. FTA, Article 13. Taiwan refers to all controlled items—dual-use items, munitions, sensitive chemicals, bio-substances, and nuclear material, as well as related equipment—as "Strategic High-Tech Commodities." 63. "Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export," BOFT. 64. "Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export," BOFT. 65. "Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export," BOFT. 66. Previously Taiwan maintained five control lists, four of which correlated to control lists of the multilateral export control regimes (the NSG, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime), and the fifth list was the Sensitive Commodity List. 67. Regulations Governing Export and Import of Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC Regulations), March 31, 1994 (last amended July 19, 2000), Articles 5, 14, BOFT, . SHTC Regulations is the document detailing regulations on export and import of strategic items. 68. Regulations Governing Export and Import of Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC Regulations), March 31, 1994 (last amended July 19, 2000), Articles 5, 14, BOFT, . SHTC Regulations is the document detailing regulations on export and import of strategic items. 69. "Public Notice Announcing a Revision of the Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export," BOFT. 70. Regulations of Products Selling [sic] by National Defense Technology Institutions (Amended), December 28, 1990, MND, ; Bylaw of Armaments Bureau, Ministry of National Defense (Amended), November 16, 1993, . 71. Act for Establishment and Administration of Science Parks, last amended January 20, 2004, National Science Council, . 72. Operational Regulations Governing Nuclear Safeguards, August 23, 1995, Atomic Energy Council, ; Administrative Regulations for Radioactive Material and Equipment Capable of Producing Ionizing Radiation and Associated Practice, last amended 11 July, 2008, Atomic Energy Council, ; Ionizing Radiation Protection Act, January 30, 2002, Atomic Energy Council, . 73. "Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export," BOFT. 74. Act Governing the Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, Mainland Affairs Council, Article 35. 75. NDTI Regulations, Article 5. 76. Bylaw of Armaments Bureau. 77. Wuebbels and Heiman, "Growing Pains—An Overview of Taiwan's Export Control System," p. 14. 78. SHTC Regulations, Article 20. 79. "Public Notice Announcing a Revision of the Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, Specific Categories of Strategic High-Tech Commodities, and Restricted Areas for Export," BOFT. Libya was dropped from the list following normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations. 80. Statute for the Establishment and Administration of Export Processing Zone, Article 5(16), January 30, 1965 (last amended May 30, 2006), EPZA, . 81. Act for Establishment and Administration of Science Parks, Articles 6(10) and 19. 82. NDTI Regulations, Article 5. 83. BOFT officials, personal interviews with author, Taipei, November 2008. 84. "APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan," submitted by Chinese Taipei, February 2009, draft, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, , p. 1. 85. BOFT officials, personal interview with author, Taipei, November 2008. 86. FTA, Article 13, BOFT, . 87. SHTC Regulations, Article 19. 88. This list includes items such as graphite materials, chemicals, certain types of equipment (for example, hydraulics, pneumatic cylinders, and filtering and purifying machines), devices for semiconductor production, and other categories. For a full List please refer to "Sensitive Commodity List," BOFT, . 89. FTA, Article 27. 90. BOFT officials, personal interview with author, Taipei, November 2008. 91. BOFT officials, personal interview with author, Taipei, November 2008. 92. BOFT officials, personal interview with author, Taipei, November 2008. 93. "APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan," p. 28. 94. Customs Anti-Smuggling Act, June 1934, last amended on March 21, 2007, Articles 1, 6. 95. Customs Anti-Smuggling Act, June 1934, last amended on March 21, 2007, Articles 1, 6., Articles 9 and 17. 96. "Border Control Measures in Taiwan," National Police Authority, p. 7, . 97. "Spot Check on Container Site," Taichung Customs Office, . 98. "About Keelung Customs Office: Characteristics," Keelung Customs Office, . 99. "Government Financial Annual Report for 2008," Taxation and Tariff Committee, Ministry of Finance, July 2009, , p. 95. 100. "APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan," pp. 3–4. 101. "APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan," p. 6. 102. "Anti-Smuggling Operations," Keelung Customs Office, . 103. The Coast Guard Act, January 26, 2000, Article 4. 104. The Coast Guard Act, January 26, 2000, Articles 4–8. 105. The Coast Guard Act, January 26, 2000, Article 9. 106. Customs Anti-Smuggling Act, Article 16. 107. "Specialized Police," NPA, Ministry of Interior, . 108. "Vietnam Customs Paid a Visit to the Keelung Customs Office," Keelung Customs Office, November 10, 2008, ; "Non-Intrusive Inspection Division," Kaohsiung Customs Office; "Anti-Smuggling Operations," Keelung Customs Office. 109. "Cutters and Boats," Coast Guard Administration, Executive Yuan, . 110. "APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan," p. 12. 111. "APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan," p. 5. 112. "NNSA Megaports Initiative Expands to Four New Ports," NNSA press release, October 1, 2009. 113. When a container is chosen for "e-sealing," an e-seal locks the container, the radio-frequency identification (RFID) chip ID is recorded, and it is transferred to a secure database. The information is synchronized with a driver's ID and information on the container and the truck. This information is then printed and affixed to the vehicle and container. When the truck passes through a checkpoint, the special electronic reader detects the e-seal, the driver ID system detects the driver ID, and an optical character recognition system detects the container ID and truck ID. If any of the information does not match, police receive an alarm message that alerts them to conduct a physical inspection of the truck. For details, see Friedlos, "Taiwan Customs Officials Adopt RFID-Enabled Container Seals." 114. When a container is chosen for "e-sealing," an e-seal locks the container, the radio-frequency identification (RFID) chip ID is recorded, and it is transferred to a secure database. The information is synchronized with a driver's ID and information on the container and the truck. This information is then printed and affixed to the vehicle and container. When the truck passes through a checkpoint, the special electronic reader detects the e-seal, the driver ID system detects the driver ID, and an optical character recognition system detects the container ID and truck ID. If any of the information does not match, police receive an alarm message that alerts them to conduct a physical inspection of the truck. For details, see Friedlos, "Taiwan Customs Officials Adopt RFID-Enabled Container Seals.". 115. 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Jacobson, "Investigations in Germany and Japan Reveal Prohibited Reexports to North Korea," International Trade Law News, July 7, 2008, . 131. Masako Toki and Stephanie Lieggi, "Japan's Struggle to Limit Illegal Dual-Use Exports," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 5, 2008, . 132. "Taiwan Firm and California-Based Affiliate Settle Allegations Regarding Conspiracy to Violate the Export Administration Regulations," press release, Bureau of Industry and Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 6, 2009. 133. "Taiwan Firm and California-Based Affiliate Settle Allegations Regarding Conspiracy to Violate the Export Administration Regulations," press release, Bureau of Industry and Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 6, 2009. 134. "Taiwan and California Companies Settle Allegations of Unlawful Exports to the PRC," press release, Bureau of Industry and Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 15, 2009. 135. "Taiwan Citizen Charged With Illegal Exports to Iran," Global Security Newswire, February 9, 2010, . 136. Con Coughlin, "Iran Seeks Nuclear Parts Through Taiwan," Daily Telegraph, December 10, 2009. 137. S.Y. Lin and Flor Wang, "BOFT Clarifies Report on Company Selling Nuclear Components to Iran," Central News Agency, December 18, 2009. 138. BOFT officials, personal interview with author, Taipei, November 2008. 139. BOFT officials, personal interview with author, Taipei, November 2008.; BOFT, . 140. SHTC Regulations, Article 14. 141. Information on the pilot tests came from BOFT officials, personal interview with author, Taipei, November 2008. The BOFT's page on ICPs is available in Mandarin Chinese, . 142. Roberge and Lee, "China-Taiwan Relations."
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