Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna) and René Descartes on the Faculty of Imagination

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09608780902761679

1469-3526

Hülya Yaldır,

Islamic Thought and Society Studies

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1See D. W. Hamlyn's translation in Aristotle's 'De Anima', Bks II, III, 14. 2Ibid., III, 7, 431a 15–16, 431b 2; III, 8, 432a 3–14. 3See also Soheil M. Afnan, Avicenna: His life and Works, 141–2; E. Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits, 43–7; Harry A. Wolfson, 'The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts', Harvard Theological Review, 69–133; Rowson, A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and Its Fate; Phillip Merlan, 'Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness: Problem of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition', International Archives of the History of Ideas 2; and The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, edited by Armstrong. 4In the Mi'râj Nama, the faculty of common sense is described as 'the form-recipient of all things'; see abbreviation 'MN', 114. 5On the faculty of estimation, see also Knudsen, 'Intentions and Impositions', 480; Harvey, The Inward Wits, 45–6; Gyekye, 'The Terms', 32–8; Wolfson, 'The Internal Senses', 90; Black, 'Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimentions', 219–58. 6Druart, 'Imagination and the Soul–Body Problem in Arabic Philosophy', 331; on Ibn Sina's concept of imagination (or imaginative faculties), see further, Robert E. Hall, 'A Decisive Example of the Influence of Psychological Doctrines in Islamic Science and Culture: Some Relationship between Ibn Sînâ's Psychology and other Branches of his Thought and Islamic Teachings', 63–6. 7Druart, 'Imagination and the Soul–Body Problem in Arabic Philosophy', 331. 8Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna, 82. 9See Wolfson, 'The Internal Senses', in his Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 276–82. 10Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, 95. 11Druart, 'Imagination and the Soul–Body Problem in Arabic philosophy', 332. 12Ibn Sînâ, al-Mubâhathât, 231–2; Ahwâl an-nafs, 62; Wolfson, 'The Internal Senses', 281; Davidson., Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, 96. 13Druart, 'Imagination and the Soul–Body Problem in Arabic Philosophy', 332–3; Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna, 83. 14Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, 98. 15Ibid., 96, 98. 16Druart, 'Imagination and the Soul–Body Problem in Arabic philosophy', 333; Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, 89, 98–9. 17Soheil M. Afnan, Avicenna: His life and Works, 148. 18For the Flying Man argument, see also (1) Commentary and (2) English translation of I, 1, by Lenn Evan Goodman, 'A Note on Avicenna's Theory of the Substantiality of the Soul', Philosophical Forum 1, 547–5, and 'Text On the Soul', ibid, 555–62. Through scholastic uses of the 'Flying Man' argument, one might establish or see a historical connection between eastern and western thought. For this, see E. Gilson 'Les sources gréce-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant', Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, vol. 4. H. Yaldir, 'Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna) and Rene Descartes on the Mind and Body Problem', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 74–5. 19Druart, 'Imagination and the Soul–Body Problem in Arabic philosophy', 334. 20Zedler, 'The Prince of Physicians on the Nature of Man', 172–3. 21Al-Ghazâlî, The Alchemy of Happiness, translated by Claud Field, 43–4. 22Many commentators claim that Descartes' anthropology take a 'Cartesian Dualistic' form. Anthony Kenny, Bernard Williams, Margaret Wilson, and Marjorie Grene would generally agree with Gilbert Ryle's account of Descartes' doctrine as 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 17. See Bernard Williams, Descartes; Margaret Wilson, Descartes; Marjorie Grene, Descartes; Anthony Kenny, Descartes. 23For Descartes, the terms 'mind' and 'soul' are virtually interchangeable. Thus they are used as synonymous. 'Thought' in a narrowly intellectualistic sense, is the defining attribute of a mind, soul or 'thinking substance'. But in some passages, Descartes prefers to use the term 'soul' (l'âme) rather than the word 'mind' (Cf. letter to Elizabeth of 28 June 1643 (AT III 692; CSMK 226–9); letter to Elizabeth of 21 May 1643 (AT III 665; CSMK 218), John Cottingham, 'Descartes on "Thought"', Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1978) 208–14; repr. in René Descartes: Critical Assessments, vol. II, edited by G. J. D. Moyal. 24Descartes, in somewhat loose language, used the term 'intellectual' not only for volitions but also for mental perceptions (cf. AT VII 438; CSM II 295). But the philosopher strongly emphasized the fact that only pure mental perception or pure cognition can be ascribed to the intellect, while judgement is attributed to the will (cf. Fourth Meditation). In this regard, see also the Principles of Philosophy, Part I, art. 34; A. Kenny, 'Descartes on the Will' in Butler; J. Cottingham, 'The Intellect, the Will and the Passions: Spinoza's Critique of Descartes'Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1988; D. M. Rosenthal, 'Will and the Theory of Judgement', in Essays on Descartes' Meditations. 25'When someone says "I am thinking, therefore I exist", he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind' (AT VII 140; CSM II 100). See also Conversation with Burman: AT V. 147; CB 4). 26 Passions of the Soul (AT XI 361; CSM I 344) and Conversation with Burman (AT V 162–3; CSMK 344–5). 28Cf. J. Cottingham, Descartes' Conversation with Burman, 27 and 74ff. 27Sixth Meditation (AT VII 78; CSM II 54), n4. 29See H. Wolfson, 'The Internal Senses' reprinted in his Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 277ff. Although the Aristotelian philosophers talked of the term 'common' sensorium as the organ of sensation and imagination, they were not fully clear about its location and structure. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III 3. 30See also Rahman's valuable remarks (RAP, 116–20); Peter Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna, 85–6; Herbert A. Davidson, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, 89–90. 31Discourse, Part IV (AT VI 33; CSM I 127). 32See J. Cottingham, 'Cartesian Trialism', Mind, 94 (1985) 218–30; repr. in Essays on Early Modern Philosophers, vol. I, pt 1, edited by V. Chappell; repr. in René Descartes: Critical Assessments, vol. III, edited by G. J. D. Moyal. 33Passions of the Soul I 43 (AT XI 361; CSM I 340), Sixth Meditation (AT VII 71–2; CSM II 50), Descartes' Conversation with Burman, 27 and 74ff. See also, John Cottingham, A Descartes Dictionary, 84–5. 34The mind–body union results in a third substance, a substance over and above the mental and material substances that make it up. This view, that is, the union-as-substance view, is supported in L. J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes, 271–4; Janet Broughton and Ruth Mattern, 'Reinterpreting Descartes on the Notion of the Union of Mind and Body', 27; Paul Hoffman, 'The Unity of Descartes' Man', 346; R. C. Richardson, 'The 'Scandal' of Cartesian Interactionism, 35; John Cottingham, 'Cartesian Trialism', 127–32 and his Descartes, 127. For the impossibility of the primitiveness of the Cartesian concept of mind-body union, see Daisie Radner's article, 'Descartes' Notion of the Union of Mind and Body', 163–4 and 168. 35Letter to Elizabeth of 28 June 1643 (AT III 692; CSMK 227). 36Rules for the Direction of the Mind (AT X 438–53; CSM I 57–65). 37Letter to Mersenne of July 1641. 38Compare Principles (AT VIIIA 5; CSM II 13); Meditations (AT VII 17–18; CSM I 12).