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Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model

1985; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 93; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/261318

1537-534X

Nirvikar Singh,

Islamic Finance and Banking Studies

Previous articleNext article No AccessMonitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent ModelNirvikar SinghNirvikar SinghPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 93, Number 3Jun., 1985 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/261318 Views: 20Total views on this site Citations: 33Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:PIERRE CHAIGNEAUAND, NICOLAS SAHUGUET The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring, Journal of Accounting Research (Aug 2022).https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12459Olga Fullana, Alba M. Priego, David Toscano The role of financial performance of Eurostoxx listed hotel companies in determining CEO compensation, International Journal of Hospitality Management 104 (Jul 2022): 103242.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhm.2022.103242Aaron Finkle, Dongsoo Shin Obstructive monitoring, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 29, no.44 (Jul 2020): 873–891.https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12386Kyung-Hye Kim, Seung-Weon Yoo, Kyong-Soo Choi Information Asymmetry among Multiple Principals and Inefficiency within the Organization, Sustainability 11, no.2424 (Dec 2019): 6920.https://doi.org/10.3390/su11246920Mariachiara Restuccia, Renaud Legoux B2B relationships on the fast track: An empirical investigation into the outcomes of solution provision, Industrial Marketing Management 76 (Jan 2019): 203–213.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2018.08.012Antoine Prévet Révélation de l'information par un principal au budget limité, Revue économique Vol. 69, no.55 (Sep 2018): 709–722.https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.695.0709Margaret M. Cullen, Niamh M. Brennan Differentiating control, monitoring and oversight, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 30, no.88 (Oct 2017): 1867–1894.https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-12-2015-2345Jan Starmans Optimal Agents, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2017).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3067223Pieter de Jong, Lakshmi Goel The influence of security analysts on CEO pay cuts, International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 13, no.11 (Aug 2015): 26–52.https://doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2015.9R. Lynn Hannan, Frederick W. Rankin, Kristy L. Towry Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness, Review of Accounting Studies 15, no.33 (May 2010): 503–536.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-010-9132-5Henry L. Tosi Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate governance research, Journal of Management & Governance 12, no.22 (Jun 2008): 153–169.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-008-9054-9Uday Bhanu Sinha International joint venture: Buy-out and subsidiary, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65, no.3-43-4 (Mar 2008): 734–756.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.10.004G. E. Rodriguez On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard, Review of Economic Design 10, no.44 (Feb 2007): 341–361.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0021-8R. Lynn Hannan, Frederick W. Rankin, Kristy L. Towry Flattening the Organization: The Effect of Organizational Reporting Structure on Budgeting Effectiveness, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2006).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.734723Hector Chade, Edward Schlee Another Look at the Radner–Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information, Journal of Economic Theory 107, no.22 (Dec 2002): 421–452.https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2960Janice S. Miller, Robert M. Wiseman, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia The Fit Between CEO Compensation Design and Firm Risk, Academy of Management Journal 45, no.44 (Aug 2002): 745–756.https://doi.org/10.5465/3069308Milton Harris, Artur Raviv Organization Design, Management Science 48, no.77 (Jul 2002): 852–865.https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.7.852.2821Ralph A. Winter Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard, (Jan 2000): 155–183.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_6Hector Chade, Edward E. Schlee Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2000).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237642Milton Harris, Artur Raviv Organization Design, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.174666Hagen Lindst�dt Qualit�t von Gruppenentscheidungen, OR Spektrum 20, no.33 (Sep 1998): 165–177.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01539765Vida Scarpello, Foard F. Jones Why justice matters in compensation decision making, Journal of Organizational Behavior 17, no.33 (Mar 1996): 285–299.https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1379(199605)17:3 3.0.CO;2-0Yoon K. Choi, Larry J. Merville Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts, Economics Letters 47, no.11 (Jan 1995): 27–33.https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00520-CRalph A. Winter Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts, (Jan 1992): 61–96.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1168-5_3 References, Industrial Relations 29, no.22 (Mar 1990): 341–359.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.1990.tb00758.xSTANLEY BAIMAN, JERROLD H. MAY, ARIJIT MUKHERJI Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal-agent context, Contemporary Accounting Research 6, no.22 (Mar 1990): 761–799.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1990.tb00785.xBALA V. BALACHANDRAN Discussion of "Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal-agent context", Contemporary Accounting Research 6, no.22 (Mar 1990): 800–803.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1990.tb00786.xStanley Baiman Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look, Accounting, Organizations and Society 15, no.44 (Jan 1990): 341–371.https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(90)90023-NJean B. McGuire AGENCY THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, Managerial Finance 14, no.44 (Apr 1988): 6–9.https://doi.org/10.1108/eb013601Henning Bohn Monitoring multiple agents, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 8, no.22 (Jun 1987): 279–305.https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(87)90009-6Klaus Spremann Agent and Principal, (Jan 1987): 3–37.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_2Volker Firchau Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems, (Jan 1987): 81–92.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_5Marina Blickle Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts, (Jan 1987): 93–103.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_6