The Prospects and Pitfalls of the Religious Nationalist Movement in Turkey: The Case of the Gülen Movement
2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 46; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00263200902800760
ISSN1743-7881
Autores Tópico(s)Religious Education and Schools
ResumoAbstract This article examines the interplay of religion and nationalism in Turkey in the post-1990 period and discusses the prospects and pitfalls of religious nationalist movement by focusing on Gülen's Turkish Muslimhood. It is believed that the instrumental relationship between Islam and nationalism in Turkey as exemplified in the modernist religious nationalism of Gülen will help reveal that Islam has always been an indispensable element of the discourse of nationalism in Turkey and will force us to rethink the role or religion in Turkish society and politics. Notes I am grateful to Prof. Ayşe Kadıoğlu and Prof. Fuat Keyman for their valuable suggestions and comments. 1. S. Mihelj, 'Faith in Nation comes in Different Guises: Modernist Versions of Religious Nationalism', Nations and Nationalism, Vol.13 (2007), pp.265–84. B. Rieffer, 'Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship', Ethnicities, Vol.3 (2003), pp.215–42. 2. The Hearth was established on 14 May 1970 by right-wing Turkish intellectuals as a reaction against the 1960s ideological conflicts between the left and right, which, the Hearth members argued, had resulted in a crisis in the national culture. It was preceded by the Intellectuals' Club which was established in 1962 to serve as a platform for the conservative and nationalist intellectuals to discuss a wide range of social and political issues. 3. M. Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992); G. Çetinsaya, 'Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" in Modern Turkish Political Thought', The Muslim World, Vol.LXXXIX, No.3–4 (1999), pp.350–76 ; S. Öğün, Mukayeseli Sosyal Teori ve Tarih Bağlamında Milliyetçilik (İstanbul: Alfa, 2000); H. Yavuz, 'Nationalism and Islam: Yusuf Akçura and Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset', Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol.4, No.2 (1993), pp.175–207. 4. E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 5. H. Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent (London: Hurst & Company, 1997); T. Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali. Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1999). 6. Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p.98; S. Zubaida, 'Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions', Nations and Nationalism, Vol.10, No.4 (2004), pp.407–20, at p.413. 7. S. Öğün, Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1995); Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent; Zubaida, 'Islam and Nationalism'. 8. Çetinsaya, 'Rethinking Nationalism and Islam', p.368. 9. M. Ergin, Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri[Current Issues in Turkey] (İstanbul: Güryay, 1975), pp.179–88. 10. The Intellectuals' Hearth Regulation, 1970. 11. Ergin, Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri. 12. E. Özdalga, 'The Hidden Arab: A Critical Reading of the Notion of 'Turkish Islam'', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.42, No.4 (2006), pp.551–70, at p.556. 13. Ergin, Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri, p.29. 14. İ. Kafesoğlu, Türk-İslam Sentezi[The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis] (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1999), pp.49–51. 15. Ergin, Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri; Kafesoğlu, Türk-İslam Sentezi. 16. Ergin Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri, pp.209, 211, 219. 17. Ergin, Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri, pp.6, 12–13; G. Şaylan, İ. Tekeli and Ş. Turan, Türk-İslam Sentezi[The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis] (İstanbul: Sarmal, 1994), p.134. 18. This articulation of religion and nationalism formulated under the name 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' was believed to exert considerable influence on the culture and education policies of governments of the time. For the Intellectuals' Hearth's influence on culture and education policies, see T. Bora and K. Can, '12 Eylül'ün Resmi İdeolojisi, faşist entelijansiya ve "Türk-İslam Sentezi"', Birikim, No.18 (1990), pp.24–39, at pp.32–3); Şaylan et al. Türk-İslam Sentezi, p.34; Ü. Bilir, 'Turkey-Islam. Recipe for Success or Hindrance to the Integration of the Turkish Diaspora Community in Germany?', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.24, No.2 (2004), pp.259–75, at p.263. 19. Ergin, Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri, pp.393, 396. 20. Ibid., pp.207–9; Kafesoğlu, Türk-İslam Sentezi, pp.93, 144–5. 21. Öğün, Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye, p.183. 22. In 27 African countries alone, there are approximately 15,000 students in 38 Gülen schools, and 40,000 students in the Central Asian Gülen schools. For detailed information on Gülen schools, see A. Bayar, 'Fethullah Hocacıların Orta Asya Hicreti: Kolonici Dervişler', Hürriyet, 1–3 Nov. 1996; H. Turgut, 'Fethullah Gülen ve Okulları', Yeni Yüzyıl, 15–17 Jan. 1998. 23. About the headscarf issue which has polarized Turkey, Gülen claimed that it was an issue of secondary methods of jurisprudence in Islam, not one of the basic principles of belief in God. He added that the style of beard and clothes are details of the religion and that nobody had the right to strain religion through focusing on such details (E. Özkök, 'Danışmaya Evet, Fetvaya Hayır', Hürriyet, 14 Dec. 1994; N. Akman, 'Fethullah Gülen Konuşuyor', Sabah, 23–30 Jan. 1995; N. Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti[An Interview with Fethullah Gülen in New York] (İstanbul: Sabah, 1997). In fact Gülen believes that at heart every Muslim should be free to fulfil their religious duties, even in the detailed requirements of Islam. If this is not possible, he advises girls to continue their education by taking their headscarves off. See M. Gündem, '11 Days With Fethullah Gülen', Milliyet, 25 Jan. 2005. 24. F. Çekirge, 'Fethullah Gülen Olayı', Sabah, 14 Dec. 1994; A. Bayramoğlu and H. Cemal, 'Refah Zihniyeti Karşısında Değişik Bir Ses: Fethullah Hocaefendi', Sabah, 14 Feb. 1995. 25. By defining Islam as a religion based on the enlightenment of the mind and illumination of the heart, Gülen comes out against the politicization of Islam (H. Turgut, 'Bediüzzaman Said Nursi'den Fethullah Gülen Hoca'ya Nur Hareketi', Sabah, 15–25 Jan. 1997). For this reason, he criticized the Welfare Party for politicizing Islam and accelerating the polarization between Islamists and secularists, which constituted the biggest problem for Turkey's stability (Milliyet, 18 April 1997). For a detailed comparison between Erbakan, then leader of the Welfare Party, and Fethullah Gülen, see B. Koyuncu, Fethullah Gülen's Views on Islam and Democracy (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1997). At this point, it is important to note what Ali Yaşar Sarıbay underlined, that Gülen and his community represent elitist Islam, which can be an alternative to populist/radical Islam (Milliyet, 18 Oct. 1995). 26. To emphasize the need for tolerance and interfaith dialogue, in 1995 Gülen met with the leaders of political parties and some Eastern Orthodox, Western Christian and Jewish religious leaders. The Journalists' and Writers' Foundation established by the Gülen community in 1994 has been a very important platform for Gülen to underline his call for interfaith dialogue and tolerance. For detailed information about the activities of the foundation, ranging from organizing Ramadan dinners to an interfaith dialogue conference , see M. Bilici, 'The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey', The Muslim World, Vol.96, No.1–20 (2006), pp.15–16. 27. See N. Akman, Gurbette Fethullah Gülen (İstanbul: Zaman Kitap, 2004); Gündem, '11 Days With Fethullah Gülen'; Fethullah Gülen, The Muslim World, Vol.95, No.3 (special issue, July 2005), pp.325–471. 28. See Zaman, 25 Sept. 2001; Hürriyet, 14 April 2002; Zaman, 16 Nov. 2003; Hürriyet, 23 March 2004; Aksiyon, 13 Sept. 2004; Akman, Gurbette Fethullah Gülen. 29. A book was recently published by B. Jill Caroll which tries to show how Gülen conveys messages of dialogue and other human ideals by comparing his views with those of Confucius, Plato, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Jean-Paul Sartre. See B. Caroll, A Dialogue of Civilizations: Gülen's Islamic Ideals and Humanist Discourse (Somerset, NJ: The Light Inc, 2007). 30. Hakan Yavuz also calls the Gülen movement a movement since it has a collective goal and an intent to achieve collective engagement, based on networks. It is a movement based on the re-imagining of Islam under the guidance of Fethullah Gülen. See H. Yavuz, 'The Gülen Movement: A Modern Expression of Turkish Islam', Religioscope, 21 July 2004. 31. E. Can, 'Fethullah Gülen ile Ufuk Turu'[A Wide-Ranging Interview with Fethullah Gülen], Zaman, 13–23 Aug. 1995; Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti; Gündem, 19 and 24 Jan. 2005. 32. Turgut, 25 Jan. 1997; Gündem, 21 Jan. 2005. 33. F. Gülen, DirilişÇağrısı (İstanbul: Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı Yayınları, 2007). 34. See Can, 'Fethullah Gülen ile Ufuk Turu'. 35. Particularly in his writings in the monthly Sızıntı (Fountain), a journal that promoted a synthesis of scientific knowledge and Islam, he reflected on religious truths, such as the existence of God, while using scientific explanations. 36. Said-i Nursi (1876–1960), whose aim was to transform society by raising the consciousness of Muslims and to revise the collective memory by reinterpreting Islam through the lens of contemporary developments, was the founder of the Nurcu movement (H. Yavuz, 'Islam in the Public Sphere', in H. Yavuz and J. Esposito (eds.), Turkish Islam and the Secular State (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003). While basing his movement on Sufi tradition, his goal was to show the compatibility of science and religion, modernity and tradition. 37. B. Balcı, 'Fethullah Gülen's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam', Religion, State & Society, Vol.31, No.2 (2003), pp.151–77. 38. Zaman, 18 Dec. 1996 39. B. Agai, 'The Gülen Movement's Islamic Ethic of Education', in H. Yavuz and J. Esposito (eds.), Turkish Islam and the Secular State (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), p.48. 40. Ibid., p.49; B. Turam, 'National Loyalties and International Undertakings: The Case of the Gülen Community in Kazakhstan', in H. Yavuz and J. Esposito (ed.), Turkish Islam and the Secular State (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003). 41. Agai, 'The Gülen Movement's Islamic Ethic of Education', p.48 42. Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 43. Turam, 'National Loyalties and International Undertakings', p.188. 44. Gündem, 21 Jan. 2005 45. Turgut, 17 Jan. 1997; Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 46. Gündem, 14 Jan. 2005; Turgut, 17 Jan. 1997; E. Uğur, 'Intellectual Roots of "Turkish Islam" and Approaches to the "Turkish Model"', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.24, No.2 (2004), pp.327–45, at p.336. 47. Yeniyüzyıl, 11 Nov. 1996. 48. Gündem, 13 Jan. 2005. 49. Sabah, 23 Nov. 1997; Turgut, 24 Jan. 1997. 50. Turgut, 24 Jan. 1997. 51. Sevindi, 23 July 1997. 52. Gündem, 14 Jan. 2005. 53. Ibid. 54. S. Memioğlu, 'Din ve Devler Arasında Fethullah Gülen', Selam, 2–12 Sept. 1997. 55. Turam, 'National Loyalties and International Undertakings', p.190. 56. Yeniyüzyıl, 11 Nov. 1996. 57. Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 58. Narlı defines neo-Ottomanism as a re-evaluation of the Ottoman past with a deep respect and feeling of nostalgia to see whether the Ottoman model may provide any solution to present problems and neo-nationalism as a new sense of ethnicity that emerged in line with the rise of Turkish communities in the Balkans and Central Asia due to the growth of outspoken Kurdish nationalism. See N. Narlı, 'Tarikats and Cemaats in Turkey', Turkish Daily News, 24 Jan. 1997. 59. Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 60. Turgut, 17 Jan. 1997. 61. Narlı, 'Tarikats and Cemaats in Turkey'. 62. Turgut, 18 Jan. 1997. 63. Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti; Gündem, 26 Jan. 2005. 64. Gündem, 26 Jan. 2005. 65. Gündem, 13 Jan. 2005. 66. Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti. 67. Zaman, 4 Dec. 2004. 68. Gündem, 9, 14 Jan. 2005. 69. Zaman, 20 Aug. 1995; Cumhuriyet, 27 Aug. 1995. 70. Agai, 'The Gülen Movement's Islamic Ethic of Education', p.63. 71. Yavuz, 3 Aug. 1996. 72. Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 4 Dec. 2004; Yeni Şafak, 4 Dec. 2004. 73. I employed the term 'instrumental pious nationalism' from B. Rieffer, 'Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship', Ethnicities, Vol.3 (2003), pp.215–42. 74. H. Gülalp, 'Whatever Happened to Secularization the Multiple Islams in Turkey', The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2–3 (2003), pp.381–95, at p.382. 75. E.F. Keyman, 'Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey', Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 24, No.2 (2007), pp.215–34. 76. H. Gülalp, 'Whatever Happened to Secularization the Multiple Islams in Turkey', The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2–3 (2003), pp.381–95. 77. See E.F. Keyman, 'Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey', Theory, Culture & Society, Vol.24, No.2 (2007), pp.215–17. 78. H. Gülalp, 'Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy in Turkey', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.41, No.3 (2007), pp.351–72.
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