Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Gulf of Interest: Why Oil Still Dominates Middle Eastern Climate Politics

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 1; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/21534764.2011.628499

2153-4780

Mari Luomi,

Global Energy and Sustainability Research

Abstract This article aims to demonstrate why a handful of countries, most prominently Saudi Arabia, together with Kuwait and Qatar, continue to greatly influence other Middle Eastern Arab states' external climate change policies. The article explores three questions: why do Arab states continue to disregard climate change as a significant instability factor; why do most oil-exporting states of the Arabian Peninsula still oppose ambitious mitigation; and why do their policies continue to determine the positions of other Arab states? In order to answer these questions, the article uses an analytical approach that takes into account both sides of the ‘black box’. The article confirms the contention that the constancy of the dominating states' policies stems from the interests of local, status quo-favouring rentier elites. These rentier governments, it is argued, choose to ignore the need to act against the potentially destabilising longer-term consequences of climate change, instead emphasising the safeguarding of short and near-term economic and political stability. In the other Arab states, natural resource scarcities and traditional security problems narrow the scope of attention and resources available for active responses and participation in international climate negotiations. This has led to weak position-formation and a disposition to follow the stronger voices in the region, despite often apparently misaligned interests. However, with the recent rise in regional awareness of the negative physical impacts of climate change, particularly in the area of water security, there is increasing pressure for the resource-scarcer Arab states of the Mashriq (and also Maghrib) to form independent policies. This could potentially further complicate the prospects of a region-wide response to this major transboundary challenge. Keywords: climate changeclimate politicsoilOPECrentierismGCCGulfSaudi ArabiaKuwaitQatarUnited Arab EmiratesArab statesMiddle EastUNFCCC Notes 1 North African Arab states, Israel and Iran are not discussed in this article. Although the first are members of the League of Arab States and, hence, implicitly included in the article's scope, and although some participate in the O(A)PEC co-ordination, in the UN Climate Convention these states are part of the Africa group and largely co-ordinate their positions within that group. As of 2011, Israel was not known to have had any climate policy-related co-operation with other states in the region. Iran, in turn, is an interesting case: a rising regional power with a relatively accommodating participation style, which certainly is a topic for further research. Aarts and Janssen have examined Iran's role in the pre-Ahmadinejad era in: “Shades of Opinion: The Oil Exporting Countries and International Climate Politics”, in Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe, ed. Nonneman (2005), pp. 223–42. 2 Tolba and Saab (eds.), Arab Environment: Climate Change. Impact of Climate Change on Arab Countries (2009), executive summary. 3 On Yemen, see Ulrichsen, Gulf Security: Changing Internal and External Dynamics (2009), pp. 29–30. 4 See e.g. Met Office, Climate Change, Middle East (2009). 5 The only clear exception has been Abu Dhabi, which has announced a measured 7% target for renewables by 2020. Saudi Arabia and Dubai and have also signalled a serious intent in incorporating renewables in their domestic energy mixes. 6 The following capacity targets have been recorded by the author: Abu Dhabi: 7% by 2020; Bahrain: 5% by 2030; Dubai: 1% by 2020; Egypt: 20% by 2020; Jordan: 10% by 2020; Kuwait: 5% by 2020; Lebanon: 12% by 2020; Palestinian territories: 20%; and Yemen: 15% by 2025. 7 Brown and Crawford, Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East (2009). See also: Tolba and Saab (eds.), Arab Environment. 8 CNA, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (2007), p. 44. Some researchers have labelled the Darfur conflict as the first “climate war”. 9 Brown and Crawford, Rising Temperatures. 10 Figures for 1998–2001. Cruz et al., “Asia”, in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Parry et al. (2007), p. 474; Brown and Crawford, Rising Temperatures, p. 11. 11 Figure for 2005 [Dawoud, Water Scarcity in GCC Countries: Challenges and Opportunities (2007)]. 12 Anon., “Abu Dhabi Faces Water Crisis”, The National, 22 March 2009. Household per capita water use for England and Wales in 2007–8: 148 litres. UK Environment Agency, Water Resources in England and Wales: Current State and Future Pressures (2008), p. 11. 13 Production decreased by 47% and 67%, respectively. IRIN, “Syria: Drought Driving Farmers to the Cities”, 2 September 2009. 14 Darem, “Cultivation of Qat behind Yemen Water Crisis”, Yemen Observer, 13 February 2010; Macleod and Vidal, “Yemen Threatens to Chew Itself to Death over Thirst for Narcotic Qat Plant”, Guardian, 26 February 2010. 15 Antelava, “Jordan Faces up to Water Crisis”, BBC, 6 October 2009. 16 Bahrain, Bahrain's Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC 1: Main Summary Report (2005), p. 18. 17 The UAE study accounts for possible accelerated ice cap melting [UAE Ministry of Energy, The United Arab Emirates Second National Communications to the COP of the UNFCCC (2010), p. 27]. 18 IRIN, “Egypt: Disaster Looms for Delta Region”, 7 October 2009. 19 El-Atrache, “160 Syrian Villages Deserted Due to Climate Change”, AFP, 2 June 2009. 20 Stern, The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (2007). 21 Conversation with Anna Savolainen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland), Siuntio, January 2010. 22 Iraq does not clearly fit in either group. 23 Luomi (ed.), Managing Blue Gold: New Perspectives on Water Security in the Levantine Middle East (2010). 24 Conversation with Anna Savolainen, Siuntio, January 2010. 25 Iraq acceded the UN climate convention and ratified the Kyoto Protocol only in 2009. The other OPEC member states are: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela. 26 The OAPEC member states are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and the UAE. 27 Al-Mulla, Chapter 4: Climate Change and Human Development in Qatar: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities (2009), p. 17. 28 Barnett; Dessai; and Webber, “Will OPEC Lose? From the Kyoto Protocol”, Energy Policy 32 (2004), pp. 2084–7; Persson et al., “Major Oil Exporters May Profit Rather than Lose in a Carbon-Constrained World”, Energy Policy 32 (2007), pp. 6346–7, 6352. 29 Ambitious generally refers to aiming at limiting global temperature increase at 2°C. 30 See e.g. Depledge, “Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change Regime”, Global Environmental Politics 8 (2008), pp. 9–35; Luomi, Bargaining in the Saudi Bazaar: Common Ground for a Post-2012 Climate Agreement? (2009). 31 For example, the OECD/IEA's World Energy Outlook 2009 predicts that global oil demand will under a reference scenario rise by 1%, from 85 million barrels/day (m b/d) in 2008 to 105 m b/d in 2030. In a scenario, in which the CO2 concentration of the atmosphere is limited at 450 ppm levels — which is when avoiding dangerous climate change becomes rather likely — oil demand grows only by 0.2% per annum, to 89 b/d in 2030. However, the emission targets pledged in the framework of the UNFCCC for the post-2012 period by mid-2011 were far from this level. The OECD has recently made a comparison between OPEC states' export revenues arguing that the revenues of the coming 20 years will still be many times higher than those during the past 20 years. 32 E.g. Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (2003); Nonneman, “Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa: A Conceptual Framework” in Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe, ed. Nonneman (2005). Nonneman calls his foreign policy-analysis framework as a theoretically pluralistic, complex model of international politics, while arguing that all foreign policy analysis explanations must be multi-layered, multi-causal and contextual, and should better integrate the national level. 33 Nonneman, “Analyzing”, p. 10; Hinnebusch, International Politics, pp. 91–4. 34 See e.g. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics 43 (1991), pp. 233–56. 35 For more on legitimacy resources, see Davidson, The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival (2005). 36 Israel: US$29,500. IMF, World Economic Outlook (2011). GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita. 37 IndyACT, Analysis of CAMRE Position to the Copenhagen Summit (2009). 38 UNEP, Abu Dhabi Declaration on Environment and Energy (2003). The declaration stresses the Arabs states' rights to develop their natural resources and demands the industrialised countries to choose policies that do not have harmful impacts on the export revenues and development of oil-exporting countries. 39 CAMRE, The Arab Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change (2007). The declaration recognises the existence of climate change and promises regional and national mitigation and adaptation plans, which do not harm the countries' right to development and which increase economic growth and alleviate poverty. It demands that the interests of fossil fuel producers be taken into account in issues such as response measures, and that carbon capture and storage should be accepted in the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (a key OPEC demand). Partly from IndyACT, CAMRE. 40 This statement (only in Arabic), takes further steps towards a more constructive and comprehensive direction. It calls for the developed countries to cut their emissions by 40% compared to 1990 levels by 2020. This is a very ambitious statement given that Saudi Arabia has openly opposed the setting of any numerical targets. Interestingly, fossil fuels are not mentioned at all, although response measures are. The statement calls for assistance for economic diversification and strengthening of adaptation capacity against both climate change and its response measures. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is not mentioned either, which potentially points towards a strengthening of the resource-scarce states' positions. Partly from IndyACT, CAMRE. 41 A document outlining a work plan of the LAS/CAMRE in the post-Copenhagen negotiations is also known to have been drafted in April 2010, but not openly distributed. 42 The role of the UAE in the international climate negotiations has traditionally been accommodating vis-à-vis the OPEC and Saudi position(s). Since around 2007, Abu Dhabi has sought to brand itself as the region's ‘green energy leader’, partly managing to create an international reputation that reflects this image-building. See: Luomi, “Abu Dhabi's Alternative Energy Initiatives: Seizing Climate Change Opportunities”, Middle East Policy 16 (2009), pp. 102–17. Since 2010, the UAE has also been taking careful steps towards a more moderate direction in its international climate policy, while simultaneously seeking to avoid an open confrontation with Saudi Arabia. 43 According to the World Resource Institute [CAIT 8.0 (2010)], the ranking of these countries in 2007 was: Qatar: 1; the UAE: 2; Kuwait: 4; and Saudi Arabia: 11. 44 Revkin, “Bush's Shift Could Doom Air Pact, Some Say”, New York Times, 17 March 2001. 45 Telephone interview with Aysar Tayeb (Energy and Environment Specialist, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Saudi Arabia), November 2009. 46 It has even been suggested that the US, particularly in the 1990s, would have asked Saudi Arabia to take care of the obstructionism on its behalf in fear of the domestic political cost of doing this itself. Barnett, “The Worst of Friends: OPEC and G-77 in the Climate Regime”, Global Environmental Politics 8 (2008), p. 4; Depledge, “Striving for No”, p. 16; Dessai, An Analysis of the Role of OPEC as a G77 Member at the UNFCCC (2004), pp. 11–4. 47 Personal interviews, Poznan, December 2008; Depledge, “Striving for No”, p. 17; Barnett, “Worst of Friends”, p. 6. 48 Personal interview, Doha, October 2009. 49 Personal interviews and observation, Bonn, June 2009; Abu Dhabi, October 2009; Copenhagen, December 2009; IISD, Earth Negotiations Bulletin 12.472 (2010). 50 E.g. personal interview, Doha, October 2009. 51 Mahdi, “Saudis Say Trust in Climate Science ‘Shaken’”, The National, 8 December 2009. 52 McGray, From Copenhagen to Cancun: Adaptation (13 May 2010). 53 Black, “Copenhagen Climate Deal ‘Satisfies’ Saudi Arabia”, BBC, 4 January 2010. 54 UNFCCC, “Views on the Need for Additional Meeting Time for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol …” (2010), pp. 36–7. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMari Luomi Author's note: This article builds in part on earlier research, which found reflection in two papers published by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in 2010. An early draft of the article was prepared for the Exeter Gulf Studies Conference of 2010.