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Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 32; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09700160801886330

1754-0054

Ashok K. Behuria,

Eurasian Exchange Networks

Abstract The Sunni Muslims of South Asia are divided into two major sub-sects, i.e. Deobandi and Barelvi, named after their places of origin in India in the 19th century. Because of abiding differences between them, these two sub-sects have built up walls of hatred and mistrust between them over time. The faultline between them has erupted violently in Pakistan since the late 1970s. While there are some pioneering works available on their separate worldviews, no study has yet been attempted to critically analyse the nature of their interaction at the political level. This article discusses the pattern of interaction between the sub-sects since the colonial days, during the movement for Partition, and later in Pakistani politics. Ashok K. Behuria is a Research Fellow at IDSA. Notes 1 As per the statistics provided in the 1998 Census of Pakistan. See http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/other_tables/pop_by_religion.pdf (Accessed November 11, 2007). 2 Ibn Khaldun was born in present-day Tunisia. He is well known for his work, Muqaddimah (translated into Latin as Prolegomenon), which is regarded as the first-ever work on the philosophy of history. He is also considered as the first philosopher in the medieval period who dealt with a wide variety of subjects like historiography, mathematics, economics, sociology, theology and cultural studies. 3 As per the estimates of CIA World Factbook, 2005, at http://www.cia.gov (Accessed October 1, 2007). 4 As per the estimates of globalsecurity.org based in Alexandria, Virginia, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm (Accessed October 1, 2007). 5 I have deliberately introduced this jargon to differentiate it from its variant 'militarisation' and would suggest that there is an ideological drive/orientation guiding militancy, which could be an important point of difference between the two. 6 See Dawn (Karachi), April 12, 2007. 7 In his letter to the Abdali, he wrote, '… All control of power is with the Hindus because they are the only people who are industrious and adaptable. Riches and prosperity are theirs, while Muslims have nothing but poverty and misery. At this juncture you are the only person, who has the initiative, the foresight, the power and capability to defeat the enemy and free the Muslims from the clutches of the infidels. God forbid if their domination continues, Muslims will even forget Islam and become undistinguishable from the non-Muslims'. Translation from his original letter in Sayed Riaz Ahmad, Maulana Maududi and Islamic State, People's Publishing House, Lahore, 1976, p. 15. 8 Prominent among them were his son Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1823), Shah Waliullah Rafi-uddin (1749–1818), Shah Abdul Qadir (1751–1816) and Abdul Ghani, whose son was the famous alim Shah Ismail Shaheed. 9 For details, see Francis Robinson, The Ulema of Firangi Mahal and Islamic Culture in South Asia, Permanent Black, Delhi, 2001. 10 The argument here is influenced by the position taken by Mumtaz Ahamad in his article 'Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia,' in Martin E. Marty and R. Scot Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalism Observed, The Fundamentalism Project, I, paperback edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1994, pp. 457–529. 11 For details regarding the Deoband madrassa and Deobandi world view, see Barbara D. Metcalf, Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002. 12 For details about Barelvi interpretation of Islam, see Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India. Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870–1920, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1996. 13 For a detailed discussion of the formation of the JUI and its participation in Pakistani politics, see Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan 1971–1977, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2000. 14 Quoted in Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam'iyyat 'Ulama-i-Pakistan 1948–1979, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1993, p. xxi. 15 See Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Years: 1857–1948, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1968, p. 19. 16 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of Muslim League in North–West and North–East India (1937–1947), Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1988, pp. 23–24. 17 This is not to suggest, however, that there was absolutely no opposition to the idea of Pakistan from the Barelvi ranks. There were some Barelvi Sunni leaders like Maulana Qari Muhammad Tayyib, Pir Muhammad Sirajul Huda Qadiri, Maulana Hashmat Ali Khan and Shah Aulad-i-Rasul Muhammad Mian Marahrawi (1892–1052), who formed their own branch of Jamaat-i-Ahle Sunnat in 1935, and many others who adopted a line close to the central leadership of the Deobandis and argued that if support for the Congress was kufr then support for League led by apostates, hypocrites and Shias like Jinnah was haram. 18 For a detailed discussion on the way the popular support for Pakistan was generated, see Ian Talbot, Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in Northwest India, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1996, and David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 1988. 19 Report of the Court of Enquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Government Printing Press, Lahore, Punjab, 1954, p. 75. 20 I have used this word, for want of a better alternative, to connote the onset of militancy during this period when the society was radicalised at both the ideological and operational levels. There were many groups in Pakistan who thought they could impose their brand of Islam through militant means. 21 As per the report of the International Crisis Group, titled 'Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military' of July 29, 2002 (Islamabad, Brussels): "In the first years of Zia's Islamisation (1979–82), only 151 new seminaries were established. During the next six years, as the Afghan jihad gained momentum, 1,000 more opened. According to the last (1995) official update, 2,010 new madrasas had been registered since 1979, raising the total number registered to 3,906." 22 India Abroad News Service, July 25, 2006. 23 Data taken from Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) website, http://www.hrcpelectoralwatch.org/partyprofiles.cfm (Accessed November 11, 2007). 24 Khaled Ahmad, 'The Grand Deobandi Consensus,' The Friday Times, Lahore, February 4–10, 2000, p. 4. 25 See for a detailed discussion, 'The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,' Asia Report No. 95, Report of the International Crisis Group, Islamabad, Brussels, April 18, 2005. 26 For details on Barelvi and Deobandi organisations, see Muhammad Amir Rana, Gateway to Terrorism, New Millennium Publication, London, 2003. 27 Khaled Ahmed, 'Re-assertion of the Barelvis in Pakistan,' The Friday Times, Lahore, September 8, 2000, p. 3.