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Toward a Coherent Theory of Human Moral Development: Beyond Sir Isaiah Berlin's Vision of Human Nature

1983; SAGE Publishing; Volume: 31; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1467-9248.1983.tb01769.x

1467-9248

Robert A. Kocis,

Political Philosophy and Ethics

Berlin's theory of human nature is criticized on two grounds. First, within his substantive account of us, there is a tension between the Kantian vision of persons as purposive (which requires that we be free) and the Herderian pluralism (which depicts liberty as equal to other values). Second, his claim that theories of self-realization are inherently prone to rationalist perversion—and political oppression —is depicted as mistaken because it is teleology, and not the regularities of human change, that perverts our ideals. To resolve the tension within Berlin's account, a non-teleological account of our moral development is suggested: once secured, we can grow in a variety of contradictory directions. Liberty—which, along with justice and privacy, fosters security—is thus not the height of a superior morality, but a part of the psychological basis of any valid morality.