Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Peacekeepers Fighting a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment of the African Union Mission in Somalia

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 37; Issue: 11 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2014.952260

1521-0731

Noel Anderson,

Political Conflict and Governance

AbstractIn response to Somalia's decades-long political and humanitarian crises, the African Union has deployed a peace support operation known as the African Union Mission in Somalia. Tasked to help eliminate an ongoing insurgency, the mission has seen heavy combat as it fights to reclaim territory held by the al-Shabaab militant organization. This article applies the techniques of open source campaign analysis to assess the mission's prospects for long-term success. The prognosis is not good. Analysis reveals a range of vulnerabilities that threaten the deployment's core security objectives, suggesting that the optimism many have expressed for the mission is misplaced. AcknowledgmentsMy thanks to Barry Posen, Paul Williams, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article. All errors remain my own.Given the dynamic nature of the ongoing conflict in Somalia, this article should be regarded accurate as of 4 August 2014.Notes1AMISOM's mandate was first stipulated in Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX) (January 2007), paragraph 8 and UN Security Council, Resolution 1744, S/RES/1744 (2007), paragraph 4.2Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2012/74 (January 2012), para-graph 40.3A transcript of Johnnie Carson's remarks is available on the United States Africa Command website: http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Transcript/9997/transcript-ambassador-johnnie-carson-on-the-situat (accessed 13 October 2013).4Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Al-Shabaab is Fighting for its Survival," CNN (27 September 2013). Available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/27/opinion/mesquita-al-shabaab/ (accessed 27 September 2013).5Al-Shabaab frequently carries out attacks in Kenya and has also successfully attacked targets in Djibouti and Uganda.6For examples of the former, see: John Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security 7(1) (1982); Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). For examples of the latter, see: Kelly Greenhill, "Mission Impossible? Preventing Deadly Conflict in the African Great Lakes Region," Security Studies 11(1) (2001); Sameer Lalwani, Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2009).7S/RES/1744 (2007), paragraph 4.8As late as the fall of 2008, AMISOM force levels remained at a measly 3,000 troops. See: Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia: They Created a Desert and Called it Peace(building)," Review of African Political Economy 36(120) (2009), p. 226 note 5.9Ibid., p. 224. For a detailed account of the causes and consequences of the Ethiopian invasion, see: Ken Menkhaus, "The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts," African Affairs 106(424) (2007).10By December 2008, over 80 percent of the TFG's soldiers and police had deserted, some taking weapons, uniforms, and vehicles. See: "'Thousands' Desert Somalia Forces," BBC News (12 December 2008). Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7779525.stm (accessed 13 September 2013).11It remains unclear what the motivations behind al-Shabaab's retreat were, but analysts have speculated that the group's mishandling of the 2011 summer famine—and the popular discontent that sowed in the capital—was likely the cause. Al-Shabaab forbid international aid agencies access to the country, accusing them of engaging in activities "hostile" to Islam. These restrictions severely impacted humanitarian assistance operations, rightly leading many Somalis to blame al-Shabaab for the humanitarian crisis in south-central Somalia.12UN Security Council, Resolution 2036, S/RES/2036 (2012), paragraph 1.13These data are compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) project, which was first introduced in Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 47(5) (2010). Figure 1 plots the 26 July 2014 release of the dataset for the dates 1 August 2013–25 July 2014. Note that individual attacks were collected over 5 kilometer distances and then combined to create weighted point data to represent their relative frequency geographically.14Note that the AU differentiates between peacekeeping and peace support operations (PSOs). The latter term is more encompassing, spanning the spectrum from conflict prevention through to peace enforcement. Specifically, the AU defines PSOs as "multifunctional operations in which impartial activities of diplomatic, military and civilian (which among others include police, rule of law and civilian administration) components, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, work to restore or maintain peace in a mandated area of operations. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations." See: Headquarters of the African Union, African Standby Force Peace Support Operations Doctrine (November 2006), p. 3–1.15UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), p. 31.16Ibid., p. 97.17Barry Posen, "Urban Operations: Tactical Realities and Strategic Ambiguities," in Michael Desch, ed., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), p. 159.18Ibid.19U.S. Department of State, US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (January 2009), p. 12.20Ibid.21On COIN strategy, see: U.S. Department of the Army, The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3–24 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), henceforth FM 3–24; David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).22For a detailed overview of the origins and ideology of al-Shabaab, see: Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).23At present, it appears the al-Qaeda/al-Shabaab alliance has been more institutional than operational. See: Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2013/413 (July 2013), paragraph 13.24Bueno de Mesquita, "Al-Shabaab is Fighting for its Survival"; Robert Rotberg, "A Wounded Leopard: Why Somalia's al-Shabaab Attacked a Nairobi Mall," Globe and Mail (23 September 2013). Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/a-wounded-leopard-why-somalias-al-shabaab-attacked-a-nairobi-shopping-mall/article14460642/ (accessed 30 September 2013); Simon Tisdall, "Al-Shabaab Shows Weakness, Not Strength In Somalia Theatre Bombing," The Guardian (4 April 2012). Available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/04/al-shabaab-somalia-theatre-bombing (accessed 30 September 2013).25Figure 2 and death estimates compiled using the 26 July 2014 release of the ACLED dataset for the dates 1 January 2011–25 July 2014.26S/2013/413, p. 7; Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Joint AU-UN Benchmarking Exercise and the Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia, PSC/PR/2(CCCXCIX) (October 2013), paragraph 13.27Rob Wise, Al-Shabaab (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), p. 6.28S/2013/413, annex 1.4, paragraph 1. On Eritrean training of al-Shabaab, see: Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2011/433 (July 2011), annex 8.5. On Eritrea's wider spoiler efforts, see: Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2013/440 (July 2013), paragraphs 34–54.29International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Non-State Groups and Affiliates," The Military Balance 112(1) (2012), p. 484. Fiat Type 6614 armored personnel carriers identified by the author.30For example, until August 2011 Mogadishu was essentially cut in two by a clearly demarcated front line that extended across the city.31On al-Shabaab's tactics, techniques, and procedures, see: S/2011/433, paragraphs 18–29; S/2013/413, annex 1.5.32For a detailed breakdown of al-Shabaab's structure, see: S/2013/413, annex 1.2.33International Crisis Group, Somalia's Divided Islamists, Africa Briefing, no. 74 (May 2010); Matt Bryden, The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2014).34S/2013/413, p. 7; International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing, no. 99 (June 2014), pp. 4–5.35S/2011/433, paragraph 60.36Ibid., paragraphs 63–68 and annex 3.37PSC/PR/2(CCCXCIX), paragraph 13.38S/2013/413, annex 9.1.39International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report, no. 147 (December 2008), p. 12.40One recent example includes al-Shabaab's cooperation with Lower Shabelle community members to build irrigation canals. See: Tres Thomas, "Al-Shabaab Bombs Symbolic Restaurant, Builds Symbolic Canal," Somalia Newsroom (7 September 2013). Available at http://somalianewsroom.com/2013/09/07/al-shabaab-bombs-symbolic-restaurant-builds-symbolic-canal/ (accessed 8 September 2013).41Wise, Al-Shabaab, pp. 5–6.42Human Rights Watch, Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), p. 2.43S/2011/433, p. 12.44For example, in a tweet posted on 16 September 2013, al-Shabaab dismissed the recent Brussels Conference for a New Deal for Somalia as little more than "Belgian waffle."45Michael Desch, "Why MOUT Now?" in Soldiers in Cities, pp. 5–6.46On the Russian capture of Grozny during the First Chechen War, see: Anatol Lieven, "Lessons of the War in Chechnya, 1994–1996," in Soldiers in Cities.47Posen, "Urban Operations," p. 162.48Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2014/140 (March 2014), paragraph 58.49Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 23. A more recent advocate is Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 171.50FM 3-24, paragraph 1-67.51On force-to-space ratios, see: Stephen Biddle, David Gray, Stuart Kaufman, Dennis DeRiggi, and D. Sean Barnett, Defense at Low Force Levels: The Effect of Force to Space Ratios on Conventional Combat Dynamics (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991). For an application to COIN, see: James Kiras, "Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency," in John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin Gray (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World, 4th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 178–179.52R. Royce Kneece Jr., David Adesnik, Jason Dechant, Michael Fitzsimmons, Arthur Fries, and Mark Tillman, Force Sizing for Stability Operations (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010), p. 5; FM 3-24, paragraph 1-67; James Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," Rand Review 27(2) (2003), pp. 28–29.53Peter Krause, "Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don't Know," MIT Center for International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, 07-02 (February 2007).54Steven Goode, "A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency," Parameters 39(4) (2009).55John McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).56Seaports are located in Kismayo and Mogadishu; there is a jetty located in Merca; and there are minor ports in Barawa and Hobyo.57International airports are located in Kismayo and Mogadishu. Major domestic airports are located in Baidoa, Bardera, Beledweyne, Galkayo, and Hudur.58Goode, "Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency," p. 49; Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p. 267; James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2006).59Lieven, "Lessons of the War in Chechnya," p. 69.60Ibid.61Posen, "Urban Operations," p. 163.62David Pearson, "Low-Intensity Operations in Northern Ireland," in Soldiers in Cities, p. 116.63Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," International Organization 63(1) (2009).64Matthew Kocher, Thomas Pepinsky, and Stathis Kalyvas, "Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War," American Journal of Political Science 55(2) (2011).65Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).66Thomas Dempsey, "The Transformation of African Militaries," in Amy Krakowka and Laurel Hummel, eds., Understanding Africa: A Geographic Approach (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2009), p. 393.67The ratio includes contractors and varies as a function of whether one includes the large Army logistical base located in Kuwait as support elements. See: John McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), pp. 50–54.68UN Security Council, Resolution 2124, S/RES/2124 (2013), paragraph 5.69David Smith, "US-Trained Somali Soldiers Defect to Al-Qaida," The Guardian (28 April 2010). Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/28/somalia-soldiers-defect-alqaida (accessed 13 June 2013).70S/2013/413, annex 8.2, paragraph 7.71PSC/PR/2(CCCXCIX), paragraph 13.72Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Implementation of the Mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, S/2013/371 (June 2013), paragraph 26.73Paul Williams, "After Westgate: Opportunities and Challenges in the War against Al-Shabaab," International Affairs 90(4) (2014), pp. 918–920.74Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, Letter from the Coordinator Addressed to the Chair of the Committee, S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.8 (February 2014), p. 6.75Ibid., pp. 4–6.76"Uganda Suspends Officers Sent to Somalia on AU Mission," BBC News (16 September 2013). Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24116606 (accessed 16 September 2013).77Nicholas Kulish, "African Union and Somalia to Investigate Rape Accusation," The New York Times (15 August 2013). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/world/africa/african-union-and-somalia-to-investigate-rape-allegations.html?_r=0 (accessed 1 September 2013); Human Rights Watch, Hostages of the Gatekeepers: Abuses against Internally Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia (2013), p. 30.78S/2013/413, paragraph 132.79Ibid., paragraph 134. Notably, AMISOM did not adopt a mission-wide protection-of-civilians (PoC) strategy until May 2013. For an overview and analysis of AMISOM's struggle with PoC issues, see: Paul Williams, "The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(2) (2013).80PSC/PR/2(CCCXCIX), paragraphs 7, 13, and 21.81S/2013/371, paragraph 26.82S/RES/2124 (2013), paragraphs 6 and 13.83Williams, "After Westgate," p. 921.84S/RES/2036, annex. Recent reports and briefings confirm that AMISOM does not possess any helicopters. See: S/2014/140, paragraph 82; Briefing by Nicholas Kay, UN Special Representative for Somalia, to the 7181st meeting of the UN Security Council, S/PV.7181 (May 2014), p. 4.85Available evidence suggests the UN operates three Mi-8 helicopters and one Dash-7 fixed wing aircraft in Somalia. See: UN Procurement Division, "Air Transportation Acquisition Plan for Financial Year 2013/2014." Available at http://www.un.org/depts/ptd/pdf/AirTransport-AllMissionsConsolidated.xls (accessed 15 April 2014); Progress Report on the Implementation of the Mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, S/2014/100, paragraph 29.86On Kenyan airstrikes, see: S/2013/413, paragraphs 93–94. On American UAVs, see: Craig Whitlock, "US Drone Base in Ethiopia is Operational," The Washington Post (27 October 2011). Available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-27/world/35276956_1_drone-flights-drone-operations-reaper-drones (accessed 1 September 2013).87Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2012/544 (July 2012), annex 5.2, paragraph 2.88Al-Shabaab has been quick to propagandize civilian casualties in the past. For example, following air strikes that killed 12 civilians and wounded 52 others, the group urged followers to attack Kenya with "huge blasts" in retaliation. See: ABC News, "At Least 12 Killed as Kenyan Jets Bomb Somali Town" (31 October 2011). Available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-10-31/kenyan-jets-bomb-somali-town/3609458 (accessed 12 April 2014).89Dempsey, "Transformation of African Militaries," p. 394.90Abdi Farah Shirdon, "A Bright Future for Somalia is Within Touching Distance," Al Jazeera (7 May 2013). Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/201356104956136289.html (accessed 1 September 2013).91Mogadishu's population is reported in the CIA World Factbook (2014).92Population estimates for these cities vary widely; crude estimates are as follows: Kismayo, 130,000; Beledweyne, 150,000; Merca, 200,000; Baidoa, 250,000.93Elias Biryabarema, "Uganda Says to Pull Out Troops from Somalia over Congo Charges," Reuters (2 November 2012). Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/03/us-uganda-congo-un-idUSBRE8A111U20121103 (accessed 15 August 2013). On the question of Uganda's decision to intervene in Somalia and how it relates to managing Uganda's relationship with the West, see: Jonathan Fisher, "Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda's 2007 Intervention in Somalia," African Affairs, 111(444) (2012).94AMISOM troops are paid an allowance of US$1,028 per month, but the Ugandan government deducts US$200 for "administration costs." See: Moses Walubiri and Paul Kiwuwa, "Uganda: MPs Query Deployment of Police to Somalia," All Africa (13 March 2013). Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201303131218.html (accessed 31 July 2014). The estimate for the lowest paid Ugandan soldier's salary is from Dan Damon, "Why is Uganda Fighting in 'Hellish' Somalia?" BBC News (15 March 2012). Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16853499 (accessed 30 August 2013).95Menkhaus, "Somalia," p. 224. Note that Menkhaus is characterizing the situation in Somalia circa 2007–2008. Nonetheless, I find his description fitting for contemporary conditions inside the country.