Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

AKP’s Move to “Conquer” the Center‐Right: Its Prospects and Possible Impacts on the Democratization Process

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14683840701814000

1743-9663

Yüksel Taşkın,

Populism, Right-Wing Movements

Abstract The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is moving to fill the void on the center‐right by claiming the legacy of the Democratic Party. In this essay, the center‐right legacy of conservative modernization and its influential political strategy of conservative populism will be introduced, since the AKP is also trying to reproduce them under novel conditions. Then, five interrelated sociological processes will be highlighted in order to assess the prospects of the AKP realizing its strategy. The subsequent section will deal with the problematic legacies of both the center‐right and political Islam that could hinder full‐fledged democratization of Turkey. Finally, some moderate predictions will be proposed by reconsidering the precedent set by the Justice Party in the 1960s and 1970s. Notes 1. In fact, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has frequently emphasized this point. For instance, he asserted in May 2003 that: "We have taken off 'the shirt of National View.'" He also defined the AKP as "a conservative and democratic mass party" and claimed that "the people gave us the mission of realizing the democracy for the first time since Menderes. Ours is the Second Menderes era." From these words, it is clear that the AKP is trying to claim the legacy of the center‐right. See Recep Tayip Erdoğan, "Milli Görüş'ün değil Demokrat Parti'nin Devamıyız" [We Are Not the Heir of "Milli Görüş" but of the Democratic Party], Daily Zaman, May 17, 2003. 2. While these new "centrist" names were priviliged on the party lists to gurantee their election, those deputies of the party identified with the Milli Görüş tradition were significantly purged. See Nazif Oflazoğlu, "Erdoğan 156 Milletvekilini Çizdi" [Erdoğan Purged 156 Deputies], Daily Radikal, June 5, 2007. 3. Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p.206. Similarly, Martin Blinkhorn pays attention to the conservatives' flexibility, as compared to the fascists, to introduce gradual reform. See Martin Blinkhorn, "Introduction," in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p.3. 4. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Opening Speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan," the International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy, January 10–11, 2004 (Ankara: Ak Parti Yayınları, 2004), pp.7–17. 5. To assess the historical legacy of conservative modernization in Turkey, see Yüksel Taşkın, "Türkiye Sağı'nı Anlamak: Soğuk Savaş ve Sonrası için bir Izah Denemesi" [Understanding the Turkish Right: An Attempt of Account for the Cold War and Its Aftermath], in Burak Ülman and İsmet Akça (eds.), İktisat, Siyaset, Devlet Üzerine Yazılar: Kemali Saybaşılı'ya Armağan [Writings on Economics, Politics and State: In Memory of Kemali Saybaşılı] (Bağlam Yayınları: Mart 2006), pp.337–53. 6. After March 14, 2006, controversies over the "lifestyles of the wives" of prospective heads of the Central Bank sparked a clash of identities, while their differences in terms of economic visions or policy matters did not seem to create serious concern among the same circles. Finally, Durmuş Yılmaz was appointed to the post on April 18, 2006. 7. Ecevit deliberately attempted to counter the essentials of conservative populism by introducing new binary oppositions between the elite/intellectuals and the people or between the producers and the unproductive usurpers. In the first form of antagonism, he admitted "the alienated elite" thesis of the center‐right but avoided identifying people with conservative or Islamist features. Accordingly, the people were not reactionary or traditionalist as the elite mistakenly judged them. In addition to this interpretation, he also criticized the center‐right for integrating Turkey into the novel hierarchies of capitalism. For a critical elaboration of Ecevit's left populism, see also Necmi Erdoğan, "Demokratik Soldan Devrimci Yol'a: 1970'lerde Sol Popülizm Üzerine Notlar" [From Democratic Left to the Revolutionary Path: Notes on the Left Populism in the 1970s], Toplum ve Bilim, Vol.78 (Autumn 1998), pp.22–37. 8. For a convincing analysis of the significance of international factors, see Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar [Sacred Verse and Slogan: Islamic Circles in Turkey] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990). 9. In the mid‐1980s, those intellectuals close to the Intellectuals' Hearth were alarmed by the increasing impact of the so‐called "Green Communism" of Iran on the radical Islamists in Turkey. In their preference for employing this term, one can see a strange combination of the deep‐rooted fear of communism and their traditional dislike of the Shi'a interpretation of Islam. In the second half of 1980s, one could see many warnings in the conservative daily Tercüman against the increasing influence of the Islamic Revolution in Turkey. For instance, one of their their headlines in 1989 stated that: "The Students Are in Danger of Marxist and Pro‐Sharia Organizations" ["Öğrenciler Marksist ve Şeriatçı Örgütlerin Kıskacında"], Tercüman, December 13, 1989. 10. Among the new radical Islamists, there was a new trend of refusing political strugle via the parties since they believed that it was against the premises of Islam. Abdüllatif Şener, the state minister without portfolio from the AKP government, is only one of the many people who held anti‐party positions during the late 1980s. See the memoirs of Mehmet Metiner, Yemyeşil Şeriat, Bembeyaz Demokrasi [Green Sharia, White Democracy] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), pp.349–50. 11. See Yalçın Akdoğan, "İslamcı Basın" [Islamic Press], in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of Republican Era of Turkey), Vol.11 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları,1995), pp.150–4. See also Ferhat Kentel, "1990'ların İslami Düşünce Dergileri ve Yeni Müslüman Entelektüeller" [The New Muslim Intellectuals and 1990s Islamic Journals], in Yasin Aktay (ed.), Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık, Cilt.6 [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism, Vol.6] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), pp.721–81. 12. Çakır (1990), pp.77–140 in particular. 13. Işıkçılar were followers of a community founded by a retired colonel, Hüseyin Hilmi Işık. They are now led by Enver Ercan, who had very close ties with Özal when his newspaper, Türkiye, made an important advance in late 1980s. See Oral Çalışlar and Tolga Çelik, İslamcılığın Üç Kolu [The Three Branches of Islamism] (Istanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2007), pp.89–99 in particular. The Fethullah Gülen Community represents a new interpretation of the Nurcu Movement started by Said‐i Nursi. This community is now the most powerful and infleuntial Islamic community, whose advances are also significantly due to Özal. 14. The daily Türkiye steadily increased its national circulation from the late 1980s and reached its peak of 750,000 in 1995. The daily Zaman started with a moderate circulation of 30,000 in 1986 and reached 350,000 in 1995. At the beginning of 2007, Zaman exceeded 600,000, while the Türkiye had a circulation of 200,000. These newspapers were distinguished by the active support that they had given to Özal's economic policies, in line with the globalization process. 15. Ali Bulaç, "'Örgütlü Din' Gençleri Ihtiyarlatıyor!" ["Organized Religion" is Turning the Youth into Old People], Girişim, No.58 (July 1990), p.58. 16. The RP's votes gradually increased from 1987 onwards. In the general elections of 1987, 1991, and 1995, the respective votes for the party were 7.2, 16.9, and 21.3 percent. For the local elections of 1984, 1989, and 1994, the votes for the RP were 4.4, 9.8, and 22.4 percent. 17. See the memoirs of Mehmet Metiner, who presents the story of his past "green" radicalism and gradual invention of "the white color of democracy" and political liberalism. His book is also significant in terms of highlighting the past radicalism of many prominent figures who contributed to the foundation of the AKP. 18. See the political memoirs of Mehmet Bekaroğlu, an important deputy of the Virtue Party distinguished by his concern for human rights. He provides interesting facts and events as evidence of the pragmatic nature of the reformism of the Erdoğan circle that, he believes, is lacking the internalization of the democratic mentality. Mehmet Bekaroğlu, "Adil Düzen"den "Dünya Gerçekleri"ne: Siyasetin Sonu [From "The Just Order" to "The World Realities": The End of the Politics] (Ankara: Elips Yayınları, 2007). See also Yavuz Selim, Milli Görüş Hareketindeki Ayrışmanın Perde Arkası: Yol Ayrımı [Behind the Curtains of the Split within the Milli Görüş Movement: At the Crossroads] (Ankara: Hiler Yayınları, 2002). This book is a significant and timely record of the perceptions of the well‐known political actors on the true reasons of the split within the movement that led to the creation of the AKP and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). 19. The Nurcu Movement in general and the Gülen branch in particular have always distanced themselves from the Islamist parties' monopolistic claims of representing Islam. This attitude, they believe, could endanger the above‐party standing of Islam by making it a contested object of partisan politics. This is the underlying reason of their sympathy with Erdoğan's denial of the adjective "Islamist" for the AKP. 20. Abdullah Muradoğlu, "Bakanların Bilinmeyen Yönleri‐Yazı Dizisi" [The Unknown Features of the Ministers], Daily Yeni Şafak, December 9–15, 2002. 21. AKP Seçim İşleri Başkanlığı [AKP's Department of Electoral Affairs], 2007, available at http://www.akparti.org.tr/secimisleri/istatistik/istatistik1.html. 22. Ibid. 23. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Önümüzdeki yıl 4 Milyon Genç ilk Kez Oy Kullanacak" [Four Million Young Electors Will Vote for the First Time in the Next Year's Election], Daily Vatan, March 13, 2006. 24. See Bekir Ağırdır, "Seçmenin Röntgeni I, II, II, IV" [The Rontgen of the Voters], Daily Radikal, July 25–28, 2007. For a more detailed analysis, see www.konda.com. 25. Ibid. 26. This group traditionally defines its nationalism as Ulusalcılık, for which some circles also prefer the term Atatürk Milliyetçiliği (Atatürk nationalism). These terms have been employed to privilege their nationalism's secular content, which they also deliberately distance from the Ottoman past and any Islamist interpretation. The term Ulusalcı was also preferred to discredit any Turanist and Turkist implication of the Republican ideology. 27. Ümiz Özdağ, "Yeniden Türk Milliyetçiliği, Daima Türk Milliyetçiliği" [Turkish Nationalism Again, Turkish Nationalism Forever], Türk Yurdu, No.179 (July 2003), pp.5–22. Italics are the author's emphasis. 28. For those attempts of formulating the AKP's ideology, conservative democracy, see Yalçın Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi [Conservative Democracy] (Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları, 2003). In the book, it is asserted that " the party is trying to reproduce conservatism—an idelogy that has been tested so far at the world level—under the social and cultural conditions peculiar to Turkey" (p.6). 29. For an assesment of the disproportional weight of the Kurdish people in the party rank‐and‐file as well as among the deputies sent to the National Assembly, see Fehmi Çalmuk, Erbakan'ın Kürtleri: Milli Görüş'ün Güneydoğu Politikası [The Kurds of Erbakan: The Milli Görüş Policy for Southeastern Anatolia] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001). 30. For the results of the 2002 general elections and 2004 local elections, see Ahmet Demirel, "28 Mart'ta ne oldu?" [What Happened on March 28?], Birikim, 181 (May 2004), pp.61–71. The author compiled the results of the 2007 general elections from the data introduced by the official website of the Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (the Higher Board of Elections), available at http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/index.html. 31. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Group Speech at the National Assembly," Zaman, November 22, 2005. 32. "Fatih Altaylı's Interview with Erdoğan on the ATV Channel," Hürriyet, September 3, 2003. Erdoğan also asserted that: "Racism, skull‐measuring is exclusionary, discriminatory, and divisive. Hence, it is negative nationalism … the love for the nation could only be proven by serving her." R.T. Erdoğan, "Derin Devlete Çomağı Soktuk, Rahatsız Olanlar Sesini Yükseltiyor" [We Drove into the Deep State: Those Who Felt Disturbed Are Reacting], Zaman, February 6, 2007. 33. For more on these conservative business organizations and their rivalry with the established business groups such as TÜSİAD, see Ayşe Buğra, "Class, Culture and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.30, No.4 (November 1998), pp.521–39; "Labor, Capital and Religion: Harmony and Conflict among the Constituency of Political Islam in Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.38, No.2 (April 2002), pp.187–204; and Ömer Demir, Mustafa Acar and Metin Toprak, "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40, No.6 (November 2004), pp.166–88. 34. This knowledge was given by the ex‐deputy of the FP, Ramazan Yenidede, in his effort to explain the split that led to the foundation of the AKP. See Selim (2002), p.35. 35. Both Erdoğan and Erbakan were already banned from politics during the congress. 36. In fact, significant conservative names of the ANAP, such as Cemil Çiçek (the minister of justice in 2007), Abdülkadir Aksu (the minister of interior affairs), and Ali Coşkun (the minister of industry and trade), had already joined the RP, then the FP. These figures were also very influential in the final decision that led to the foundation of the AKP. 37. See Burhaneddin Duran ve Engin Yıldırım, "Islamism, Trade Unionism and Civil Society: The Case of Hak‐İş Labor Confederation in Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.41, No.2 (March 2005), pp.227–47. 38. Taha Akyol was an active member of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in the 1970s. He is now working at the daily Milliyet, distinguished by its Westernist and secular orientation. 39. Taha Akyol, "Seçim Göstergeleri Açısından Türkiye'de Sağın Sorunları–II," Türkiye Günlüğü, No.17 (Winter 1991), pp.4–10. 40. For the general elections results of the 2002, see Türkiye Seçimleri, http://www.belgenet.net. 41. For the results of the 2004 local elections, see Yerel Seçim Sonuçları, http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/. 42. For the results of the 2007 general elections, see the official website of the Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (the Higher Board of Elections), available at http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/index.html. 43. After these talks turned to be abortive, the ANAP withdrew from the 2007 elections while the DYP entered them with the new name of the Democratic Party (DP). 44. For a brilliant sociological analysis of the Gülen Community and its ability to respond to the needs of the newly ascending Muslim groups in the urban environments, see Can Kozanoğlu, İnternet, Dolunay, Cemaat [Internet, Fullmoon, Community] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997, 3rd edn). To understand the methods used by the community in its educational activities in the Central Asia in particular, see Bayram Balcı, Orta Asya'da İslam Misyonerleri: Fethullah Gülen Okulları [Islam's Missonaries in Central Asia: The Schools of Fethulah Gülen] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005). 45. For a recent example contrasting the Ottoman millet system with "narrow‐minded" nationalisms, see Mümtaz'er Türköne, "Türk Kanı ve Kangal" [The Turkish Blood and the Kangal Dog], Zaman, June 6, 2006. 46. See Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, Euro‐Türkler, Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği Arasinda Köprü mü, Engel mi? (The Euro‐Turks: Are They a Bridge or an Obstacle between Turkey and the EU?] (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), pp.72, 73. 47. Ruşen Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk suggest this term in their biographical work on Erdoğan. See R. Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: A Story of Transformation] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınevi, 2001), p.137. 48. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Speech at the Opening of the Union of European Turkish Democrats (EUTB)," Zaman, October 6, 2006. 49. The result was the most crowded meetings against Erdoğan's rule, mainly led by secular and Western‐oriented women. The three consecutive meetings were held in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, for which the number of participants exceeded the half‐million threshold and reached about one million in the Istanbul and Izmir meetings. 50. See R.T. Erdoğan, "Liderlik Sultası Yok" [There is No Dictatorial Leadership], Zaman, August 15, 2001. Nevertheless, with the changes in the party statute, he became the only power in deciding the party rulers. It was forbidden to submit alternative lists during the general party congress. The authority to elect the members of the Central Executive Commitee (CEC)—the highest body of the party—was taken from the Central Decision Making and Administrative Comittee (CDAC) and given to Erdoğan himself. See "Ak Parti'de tüm Yetkiler Tayyip Erdoğan'da Toplandı" [All Powers Gathered in Erdoğan in the AKP], Zaman, February 2, 2003. 51. M. Hakan Yavuz, "Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek" [Milli Görüş Movement: An Opposing and Modernist Tradition], in Yasin Aktay (ed.), Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık, Cilt.6 [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism, Vol.6] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), pp.591–604. 52. These names were Reha Çamuroğlu, İbrahim Yiğit from Istanbul and Hüseyin Tuğcu from Kütahya province. 53. For the 1999 general elections, the Virtue Party nominated a veiled women, Merve Kavakçı, who was able to be elected from Istanbul. Nevertheless, the Ecevit‐led Democratic Left Party and the Republican establishment displayed serious reactions to Kavakçı, and her election was banned by a court decision. The AKP is not willing to create similar tensions by nominating a veiled women. 54. Ertuğrul Günay, Haluk Özdalga, Zafer Üskül and Erdal Kalkan are distinguished by their social democratic identities. 55. Such names as Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, Ersönmez Yarbay, Cavit Torun and Mehmet Elkatmış, who were bold enough to criticize the one‐man rule in the party, were all excluded from the party lists. See Radikal, June 5, 2007. 56. Süleyman Demirel was elected as the leader of the AP in November 1964. He remained as the leader of the party until the 1980 military intervention. 57. One wing of the AP wanted to see Başgil as their presidential candidate. However, the military made it very clear that such a decision would have serious costs for the AP. This is why the party gave a reluctant consent to the new president, Cemal Gürsel.