Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13533312.2010.500149

1743-906X

Marianne Jago,

International Law and Human Rights

Abstract The obligations of the 'international community' in the face of humanitarian catastrophe are deeply vexed. In such cases, 'global public opinion' sometimes looks favourably on the use of force to save strangers, also articulated as a global 'responsibility to protect'. For better or worse this view is rarely reflected in decisions of the Security Council. The argument in this article is that the deployment of InterFET in East Timor in September 1999, and events preceding it, showed that humanitarian intervention is a doctrine unlikely to be employed without the consent of the 'target' state. It shows that while decision-makers are influenced by normative concerns, such as the imperative of saving lives, respect for national sovereignty continues to take primacy in an anarchical global society. The processes surrounding coerced consent, such as coalesced in the East Timor case, bear close examination for their potential to influence state behaviour, and thereby assist UN member states to avoid war and save strangers. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Jennifer Welsh, Helen Jago McCosker, Michael Naughton, June Naughton, David Malone, Marianne Hanson, William T. Tow, Peter Carey, the British Council, the Harold Hyam Wingate Foundation and the International Peace Institute for invaluable support in the completion of the Oxford MPhil thesis from which this article is drawn. I thank my sisters Jacq, Hellie and Cath for very many kindnesses. I also acknowledge the tactful and penetrating comments of the reviewers, and Michael Pugh, James Cotton and my colleagues at AusAID, especially Beth Delaney, for their encouragement. The article is written in a private capacity and does not represent the views of AusAID. Notes See Hedley Bull, 'Conclusion', in Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.193. I adopt here Bull's definition of 'order', as set out in the seminal The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, pp.4–5. As Bull pointed out, we should not assume that order is prior to other values; it is nonetheless the primary concern of the society of states (pp.6–8). See also John G. Taylor, The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, 1974–1989: A Chronology, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1990, p.1; Jose Ramos Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987; John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, London: Zed Books, 1999, pp.29ff. The definitive account of human rights violations committed in East Timor from 1975 to 1999 is Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), Díli: CAVR, 2005. The Commission found that up to 180,000 East Timorese had died 'as a direct result of Indonesian … occupation' (p.146). Cited in Ian Martin (Head of UNAMET), 'Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot and International Intervention', unpublished monograph in the author's possession, July 2001, p.67. UN SC/Res/1264/1999, 15 Sept. 1999. Italics added. UNAMET was established in June 1999 pursuant to the 5 May (1999) Agreements, and oversaw the Autonomy Vote of 30 August 1999. UN SC/Res/1264/1999, 15 Sept. 1999. The United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) replaced InterFET in February 2000. For an account of the economic crisis in Indonesia see Sri Mulyani and Ali Winoto, 'Indonesian Economic Reconstruction', in New Zealand Asia Institute, Indonesia after Suharto, Auckland, 1999. See M. Anne Brown, Human Rights and the Borders of Suffering, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002, p.152, UN doc., S/1999/513, Annexes I, II, III (at: www.un.org/peace/etimor99/sres1236.pdf). Indonesia preferred a UN mission to help ascertain the wishes of the East Timorese. The UN Secretariat and key nations such as Portugal, Australia and the US resisted this approach because it had the 'smell of the Irian Jaya formula of the 1960s', in which Indonesian military intimidation ensured a pro-integration finding. Interview with Francesc Vendrell, UN Assistant Secretary-General, New York, 22 Sept. 2000. It also signalled the intention of the UN to establish a presence in East Timor, to assist in the implementation of the agreements, and to conduct the popular vote (see n.13 above). The May Agreements are available at: www.undemocracy.com/S-1999-513.pdf. Foreign Minister Ali Alitas, however, who had visited the province himself, had commented in late May that he thought it unlikely that the East Timorese would seek integration with Indonesia. Television interview, SBS TV Australia, Jakarta 27 May 1999, cited in Grayson J. Lloyd, 'The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations and the International Community', in James J. Fox and Dioniso Babo Soares (eds), Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, Adelaide: Crawford House, 2000, p.99. Lloyd (see n.15 above), p.98. Interview with Peter Carey, Trinity College, Oxford, 13 July 2001. See Hidayat Djajamihardja, 'A Reporter's View', in Damien Kingsbury (ed.), Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence, Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2000, pp.99–115. Interview with Francesc Vendrell (see n.12 above). Predictably, martial law had little effect in stemming the torching of Díli and every major population centre in East Timor. See Human Rights Watch, 'East Timor: Martial Law Will Make Things Worse', press release, 7 Sept. 1999; Jeremy Wagstaff, 'Indonesia Imposes Martial Law in Timor, Releases a Pro-independence Leader', Wall Street Journal, 8 Sept. 1999; Conor O'Clery, 'East Timor Crisis Shows Indonesia's Authority Structure', Irish Times, 9 Sept. 1999, p.11. Gen. Wiranto told a visiting UN delegation on 10 September that the Indonesians 'do not reject a United Nations Peacekeeping force, but it is not really the appropriate time'. Cited in Conor O'Clery, 'Soldiers Join in Militia Attack on UNAMET', Irish Times, 11 Sept. 1999; Lloyd (see n.16 above), Sukarno had withdrawn Indonesia from the UN in January 1965 in protest at the accession of Malaysia to the UN and to the Security Council as a non-permanent member. The wording of Article 99 of the UN Charter, and indeed all of the provisions relating to the secretary-general's political and administrative functions, is deliberately non-specific. The role is evaluative, discretionary and independent, and therefore provides scope for innovation and leadership, as well as inaction. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in response to a question from the floor by Geoffrey Gunn, public lecture, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, 9 Sept. 1993, cited in Gunn, East Timor and the UN: The Case for Intervention, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997, p.43. Ramos-Horta, (see n.3 above), ch.16. UN Commission on Human Rights: 53rd session, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor', 10 April 1997, part I. An independent report would later find that the Security Council's 'failure to uphold Timor Leste's right to self-determination was the responsibility of the Permanent Members of the Security Council each of whom, with the exception of China, was dismissive of the Timor question and chose to shield Indonesia from international reaction at Timor's expense'. CAVR (see n.3 above), pp.50–1. For a scathing assessment of the role of the UN during these crises see 'Chairman of Independent Inquiry into UN Actions during 1994 Rwanda Genocide Presents Report to the Security Council', press release, UN doc. SC/6843, 14 April 2000. Astri Suhrke, 'Annan Showed What One Leader Can Achieve', International Herald Tribune, 31 Aug. 2000. Interview with Francesc Vendrell (see n.12 above). Habibie insisted that Indonesia would only allow the ballot to go ahead in the absence of a UN-imposed peacekeeping force. See Paul Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Stuggle for Modern Australia, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2009, pp.496–8. The TNI continued to orchestrate a campaign of intimidation and murder. Militia massacres in Liquica and Dili on 6 and 16 April 1999, respectively, were carried out in full view of, and without intervention from, the TNI. See, e.g., David Usborne, 'Save My People, Gusmao Tells UN', The Independent, 10 Sept. 1999, p.12, an account of a meeting in the British Embassy in Jakarta between Gusmao and Security Council Mission members. Bishop Belo also called for intervention; see Paul Kelso, 'Send Troops Now, Bishop Begs', The Guardian, 11 Sept. 1999. Afsané Bassir Pour, 'Kofi Annan's Lonely Struggle', trans. Bruno Kahn, Le Monde, 31 Oct. to 1 Nov. 1999. Ibid. (emphasis added). Kelly (see n.30 above), citing interview with John Howard, p.505. Ibid., pp.505–6. For a chronology of events see Taylor, East Timor (n.3 above), pp.200ff. 'Book Says Habibie Close to Declaring War', Jakarta Post, 30 Oct. 1999. Feisal Tanjung, Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security (ret.) gave this account. Interview with Falintil Commander Matan Ruak, 'The UN Has Left Us to Be Killed', BBC Worldwide Monitoring, transcript of Radio Renascenca, Lisbon, 10 Sept. A group of UNAMET volunteers remained behind, a decision warmly welcomed by the Secretary-General. Pour (see n.33 above); see also Suhrke (n.28 above). Televised statement of Habibie, 12 Sept. 1999, cited in Sander Thoenes, 'Habibie Bows to Pressure for Peace Force', Financial Times, 13 Sept. 1999. UN Press Release HR/4434, 17 Sept.1999, p.2 (emphasis added). For a comprehensive account of international criminal processes and proceedings vis-à-vis East Timor, see Annemarie Devereux, 'Accountability for Human Rights Abuses in East Timor', in Damien Kingsbury (ed.), Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence, Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2000, pp.135–55. Interview with Danilo Turk, Security Council mission member, UN DPA, New York, 27 Sept. 2000. Ibid. Usborne (see n.32 above). Email interview with Ian Martin, July 2001. Interview with Danilo Turk (see n.44 above). Pour (see n.33 above). Interview with Danilo Turk (see n.44 above). Interview with Amb. António Monteiro, Portuguese Mission, New York, 20 Sept. 2000. UN Press Release SG/SM/7127, SC/6725, 11 Sept. 1999. At no stage did the UK contemplate intervening without Indonesian consent. Interview with Amb. Eldon, UK Mission, New York, 28 Sept. 2000. UN Press Release SC/6724, 11 Sept. 1999 (emphasis added). Penny Wensley, 'East Timor and the United Nations', speech at Glover Cottages, Sydney, 23 Feb. 2000. Bruno Kahn, 'US Rejects Peacekeepers', posted at reg.easttimor (Association for Progressive Communications), 3 Sept. 1999. Cited in Noam Chomsky, 'Comments on the Occasion of the Forthcoming APEC Summit: Friday 10 September 1999', posted at: www.reg.easttimor (Association for Progressive Communications). Joanne Gray, 'Australia Responsible for East Timor, Says US', Australian Financial Review, 4 Sept. 1999. Ibid. David Watts and Michael Binyon, 'Calls Grow for Timor Intervention', The Times, 7 Sept. 1999. Interview with Peter Carey (see n.17 above). Neil King, Jr. and Jay Solomon, 'Diplomatic Gambles at the Highest Levels Failed Voters in East Timor', Wall Street Journal, 21 Oct. 1999. Lynn Fredriksson, 'To Resist Is to Win: How Washington Succumbed to Public Pressure on East Timor', ESTAFETA [Journal of ETAN], Vol.5, No.3, 1999 (at: www.etan.org/estafeta/99/autumn/toresist.htm). David Watts, 'Clinton Says Attacks Unacceptable', The Times, 11 Sept.1999. John Gittings, 'UN Chief's Ultimatum to Jakarta', The Guardian, 11 Sept. 1999; Kelso (see n.34 above); Richard Owen, 'Targeting of Clergy Denounced by Pope', The Times, 11 Sept. 1999. The Vatican had reacted strongly to the murder of Church personnel in East Timor by the TNI and militias, especially the murders in Suai on 6 September of three priests, along with 200 other East Timorese sheltering in the local cathedral. See Sidney Jones, 'On the Trail of Destruction', Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2000, p.13. See Congressional Statement of Sen. Feingold, 9 Sept. 1999, calling for suspension of US military and economic benefits to Indonesia, and accounts of other Congressional efforts (at: etan.org/legislation/statement1.htm). Kelly (see n.30 above), citing interviews with Howard, April 2006, and the Record of Conversation (DFAT cable), Downer and Albright, 7 Sept. 1999, pp.507–8. Defence meetings between Australian and US military planners had taken place before August. US protests after the ballot that Australian intelligence had not kept the US informed of the developing catastrophe in East Timor are therefore not credible. Wensley (see n.55 above). Scott Burchill interview with Karen Snowdon, ABC Television Australia, PM News, 3 Sept. 1999. Kelly (see n.30 above), citing interview with Paul Hunt, Downer's adviser, p.488. To this same faction, which emphasized above all else good Australian relations with Indonesia, has been attributed responsibility for the Australian failure (since remedied) to hand over intelligence evidence of TNI/militia atrocities at the time of the ballot, and for diluted efforts to collect evidence afterward. SBS (Australia) Dateline, 'See No Evil', 18 May 2001, interview Capt. Andrew Plunkett, senior Australian intelligence officer. James Cotton, 'Peacekeeping in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.53, No.3, 1999, p.245. Kelly (see n.30 above), p.493, citing discussions with Downer from January to June 1999. For an official account of Australia's change of policy on East Timor, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), East Timor in Transition 1998–2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, Canberra, 2001, esp. pp.16–37. Interview with John Howard, May 2006, cited in Kelly (n.30 above), p.493. Alexander Downer, 'East Timor – Looking Back on 1999', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No.1, 2000, p.8. Kelly (see n.30 above), p.481. Telephone interview with Tom Hyland, 10 Jan. 2001. Interview with John Miller, ETAN, New York, 28 Sept. 2000. Interview with Peter Carey (see n.17 above); Carey, 'Indonesian Myth', The Independent, 13 Sept. 2000, describes a corrupt Indonesian military, whose best battalions are 'little more than torturers in uniform whose commanders will one day stand trial in the Hague'. Interview with Sidney Jones and Joseph Saunders, Human Rights Watch, New York, 26 Sept. 2000. 'Suspend Aid until Militia Brought under Control', HRW press release, 1 Sept. 1999; 'Indonesian Government Must Prevent East Timorese Bloodbath', HRW press release 3 Sept. 1999; 'The World Must Act or be Complicit in the Killing', HRW press release 5 September 1999; 'East Timor: Martial Law Will Make Things Worse', HRW press release 7 Sept. 2000. Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Sept. 1999. See, e.g., 'The Violent Reaction to East Timor's Voice', The Economist, 4–10 Sept. 1999, p.27; 'Who Will Rescue East Timor?', The Economist, 11–17 Sept. 1999, p.27; Dan Murphy and John McBeth, 'Scorched Earth', Far East Economic Review, 16 Sept. 1999, pp.10–14; Sangwon Suh and Tom McCawley, 'East Timor's Agony', Asiaweek, 17 Sept. 1999, p.22; 'World Press Condemns Indonesia', BBC, 2 Sept. 1999, posted at: reg.easttimor (Association for Progressive Communications). IMF First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer, press conference IMF Annual Budget Report, 9 Sept. 1999 (transcript posted at: www.imf.org/). Ibid. UN Press Release SC/6727 15 Sept. 1999. UN doc.,S/1999/975, cited in UN Press Release SC/6727 15 Sept. 1999, p.2, Kelly (see n.30 above), p.511. 'Enter the Peace Keepers', The Guardian, 21 Sept. 1999. See Paul Chapman and Barbie Dutter, 'Australia "Was Set to Bomb Jakarta in Timor Conflict"', Daily Telegraph, 23 June 2001, which describes early and 'aggressive probing' of InterFET by Indonesian aircraft and submarines. Gen. Cosgrove, cited in Kelly (see n.30 above), p.512. Email interview with Capt. Jonathan Surbeck (InterFET), Department of Defence, Canberra, 13 July 2001. James Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention', Survival, Vol.43, No.1, 2001, p.137. Kofi Annan, 'Why Democracy Is an International Issue', Cyril Foster Lecture, The Sheldonian, Oxford, 19 June 2001 (emphasis added). This view was expressed by most UN officials interviewed in New York in September 2000. 'Australia and the United Nations: Challenges in the New Millennium', Australian National University public lecture series, Canberra, 2 March 2000. The International Crisis Group and former Chair Gareth Evans, in particular, have been leading proponents of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), which argues that 'sovereign states, and the international community as a whole, have a responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes' (see: www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521). Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.9.