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Island Exceptionalism and International Maritime Conflicts

2012; Routledge; Volume: 65; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00330124.2012.660456

1467-9272

Elizabeth Nyman,

Economic Zones and Regional Development

Abstract Scholars have argued that due to their special geographical circumstances, island states develop a different relationship with maritime space than their continental counterparts. This is generally attributed both to island residents' greater access to and benefit from oceanic resources and also to the metaphysical qualities of life that uniquely develop on islands. This article investigates deeper into the phenomenon of geographically determined island exceptionality by considering whether island states and mainland states truly behave differently when it comes to their treatment of and behavior in maritime spaces. Through an analysis of disputed areas in the International Correlates of War maritime data, I consider whether island states are more likely to try and confirm sovereignty over disputed maritime waters than mainland states. My examination of disputed maritime areas in the Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900 to 2001 shows that indeed island states are both more likely to try and settle a disputed maritime area, whether by force or by negotiated resolution. This finding is then used to raise new questions about the geographic differences that characterize island states in the world political system. En opinión de los estudiosos, debido a sus circunstancias geográficas especiales, los estados insulares desarrollan una diferente relación con su espacio marítimo que sus contrapartes continentales. Esto generalmente se atribuye a un mejor acceso a los recursos oceánicos y a su beneficio por los residentes insulares y también a las cualidades metafísicas de la vida que se desarrollan de manera única en las islas. En este artículo se ahonda más en la investigación del fenómeno de la excepcionalidad insular determinada geográficamente al considerar si en verdad los estados insulares y los estados de tierra firme se comportan diferentemente cuando se trata de la manera de ver y comportarse en los espacios marítimos. Mediante un análisis de datos marítimos de la Internacional de Correlatos de Guerra de áreas en disputa, me pregunto si los estados insulares son más propensos a tratar de ejercer y confirmar soberanía sobre aguas marítimas disputadas que los estados continentales. Mi examen de áreas marítimas en disputa en el Hemisferio Occidental y en Europa de 1900 a 2001 muestra que ciertamente los estados insulares están más inclinados a controlar y poblar un área marítima disputada, bien por la fuerza o mediante resolución negociada. Posteriormente, este hallazgo se utilizó como base para formular nuevas preguntas sobre las diferencias geográficas que caracterizan los estados insulares en el sistema político del mundo. Key Words: islandsmaritime conflictoceans关键词: 岛屿海上冲突海洋。Palabras clave: islasconflicto marítimoocéanos Notes The author would like to thank Philip E. Steinberg and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on this article. 1In 2006, fish accounted for over half of all Icelandic merchandise exports (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). 2 These options are not exclusive; states can simultaneously pursue more than one settlement option at a time. In this article, in fact, I assume that they do. 3 The ICOW data set is currently in the process of cataloging global maritime claims for the past century. For now, however, data on maritime conflicts is restricted to Europe and the Western Hemisphere. 4 According to Watts (Citation2000), the following are island states: Barbados, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauritius, St. Lucia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Watts names these as archipelagic states: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Cape Verde Islands, Comoros, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Zealand, Palau, Philippines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and Vanuatu. Watts incorrectly names Malta as an island instead of an archipelago and leaves out the island state of Nauru and the archipelagic states of Bahrain, Kiribati, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Not all of these will be included in my analyses, as they only cover the Western Hemisphere and Europe. Furthermore, although one might expect differences in the ways in which single-island and archipelagic states relate to their adjacent maritime areas, for this study, no distinction is made between islands and archipelagos because there are only six archipelagic states in the study region. 5 The use of force is defined from the Militarized Interstate Dispute project as the "threat, display, or use of force" (Jones, Bremer, and Singer Citation1996, 169). Bilateral negotiation describes an attempt between the claimant states without input from third parties. Nonbinding meditation describes efforts undertaken by a third party to settle the claim that do not hold the claimant states legally liable. Arbitration describes efforts undertaken by a third party, usually a court, to settle the dispute, and claimant states are bound to the results. 6 For more information on the Polity IV data, see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 7 For example, the United States is not a party to UNCLOS but regards the convention as customary international law. 8 The democracy, relative capabilities, and prior settlement attempts variables perform as in Table 1. UNCLOS is positive and significant not just for bilateral negotiations but also for nonbinding mediation. Claim salience is positive and significant for all but binding arbitration.