Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The nature of the social agent*

1994; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 19; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/0022250x.1994.9990145

1545-5874

Kathleen M. Carley, Allen Newell,

AI-based Problem Solving and Planning

We pose the question, What is necessary to build an artificial social agent? Current theories of cognition provide an analytical tool for peeling away what is understood about individual cognition so as to reveal wherein lies the social. We fractionate a set of agent characteristics to describe a Model Social Agent. The fractionation matrix is, itself, a set of increasingly inclusive models, each one a more adequate description of the social agent required by the social sciences. The fractionation reflects limits to the agent's information‐processing capabilities and enrichment of the mental models used by the agent. Together, limited capabilities and enriched models, enable the agent to be social. The resulting fractionation matrix can be used for analytic purposes. We use it to examine two social theories—Festinger's Social Comparison Theory and Turner's Social Interaction Theory—to determine how social such theories are and from where they derive their social action. Notes This research was supported by the defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DOD), and monitored by the Avionics Laboratory, Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories, Aeronautical Systems Division (AFSC), Wright‐Patterson AFB, OH 45433–6543 under Contract F33615–87‐C‐1499, ARPA Order No. 4976, Amendment 20. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. government. The authors would like to thank Sara Kiesler and Randy Collins for their comments.