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Being-on-the-Bench: An Existential Analysis of the Substitute in Sport

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 2; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/17511320801896158

1751-1321

Emily Ryall,

Free Will and Agency

Abstract Being a substitute in sport appears to contradict the rationale behind being involved in that sport, especially in those sports where substitutes frequently remain unused or are brought on to the field of play for the final moments of that game. For the coach or manager, substitutes function as a way to improve the team achieving a particular end, namely to win the game; whether to replace an injured or tired player, to change a team's structure or tactics, to complete a specialised manoeuvre (such as goal kicking in American football or a short corner in hockey), or to run down the clock. Whether a substitute is afforded an opportunity of playing the game appears to be directed by others; arguably if one had a choice in the matter one would chose to be on the field of play rather than off it. Nevertheless, the Existentialist position is that our situation is always inexorably one that is freely chosen. To argue that one has not freely chosen one's position is to be 'inauthentic'. Furthermore, to conceptualise one's manifestation and to be treated by others as a thing 'in-itself'–such as a substitute – is to fall into 'bad faith'. Culbertson (2005 Culbertson, L. 2005. The paradox of bad faith and elite competitive sport. Journal of Philosophy of Sport, 32: 65–86. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) has already argued that elite competitive sport is an arena that promotes rather than avoids bad faith due to its constituent factors. Culbertson's frame of reference primarily applied to sporting events that involve individuals competing in co-active, parallel competition – such as athletics, swimming or weightlifting – where bad faith is generated via a tacit acceptance of ever-improving and quantifiable performance. The purpose of this paper is a continuation of such an enquiry but with a redirection of focus away from parallel competition by individuals towards team competitions which are, by nature, less concerned with an unremitting contest against time, distance or some other measurable concept. This paper sets out to examine the nature of the substitute in sport, who appears to be equally liable to find herself being 'inauthentic' and/or in 'bad faith'. It attempts to consider the nature of these concepts and offer direction as to how substitutes can attempt to realise the Existential ideal. Resumen Ser un suplente en el deporte parece contradecir el fundamento mismo de estar involucrado con tal deporte, especialmente en aquellos deportes donde los suplentes se quedan en el banquillo a menudo o son sacados al campo de juego durante los momentos finales del partido. Para el entrenador o mánager, los suplentes funcionan como un medio para mejorar el rendimiento del equipo a la hora de conseguir un objetivo determinado, esto es ganar el partido; bien sea sustituyendo a un jugador lesionado o cansado, para cambiar la estructura o la táctica, para completar una maniobra especializada (por ejemplo marcar un gol punteando en fútbol americano o un saque de esquina corto en hockey), o para dejar pasar el tiempo en los momentos finales. Parece ser que si se le da a un suplente la oportunidad de jugar en un partido, esto depende de otros. Podría decirse que si uno tuviera elección en el asunto, preferiría estar en el campo de juego en vez de afuera. Sin embargo, la posición existencialista es que nuestra situación siempre es inexorablemente una que ha sido elegida libremente. Sostener que uno no ha escogido libremente su situación es ser "inauténtico". Además, el conceptualizar la manifestación de uno mismo y el ser tratado por los demás como una "cosa-en-sí-misma"—tal como es un suplente—es el pecar de "mala fe". Culbertson (1) ya ha sostenido que el deporte competitivo de élite es una área que promueve más que evita la mala fe debido a sus elementos constituyentes propios. El esquema de referencia de Culbertson se refería mayormente a eventos deportivos que involucran individuos que compiten en competiciones paralelas y coactivas, tales como el atletismo, la natación, o la halterofilia, donde la mala fe se genera por medio de una aprobación tácita del siempre mejorable y cuantificable rendimiento deportivo. El propósito de este artículo es continuar tal cuestión, mas dirigiendo el enfoque en vez de hacia la competición paralela de individuos, hacia la competición por equipos, al estar éstos, por naturaleza, menos preocupados por la incesante competición contra el reloj, la distancia, o algún otro concepto medible. Este artículo quiere examinar la naturaleza de la suplente en el deporte, quien parece ser puede encontrarse tan fácilemente siendo "inauténtica" como culpable de "mala fe". Intenta considerar la naturaleza de estos conceptos y ofrecer una dirección de cómo los suplentes pueden intentar realizar el ideal existencial. Zusammenfassung Ein Auswechselspieler zu sein scheint der Idee des Sports zu widersprechen, insbesondere in Sportarten, in denen Auswechselspieler gar nicht oder erst zum Ende hin ins Spiel kommen. Aus Sicht des Trainers oder des Managers erfüllen Auswechselspieler den Zweck, die Mannschaft zu verbessern, um bestimmte Ziele zu erreichen, das heißt, ein Spiel zu gewinnen; sei es einen verletzten oder müden Spieler zu ersetzen, sei es um die Aufstellung zu verändern oder aus taktischen Gründen, um einen speziellen Spielzug auszuführen (wie beispielsweise der Torschuss im American Football oder die kurze Ecke im Hockey), oder um auf Zeit zu spielen. Ob dem Auswechselspieler die Gelegenheit gegeben wird zu spielen, scheint von anderen entschieden zu werden; hätte ein Spieler die Wahl, würde er sich wohl dafür entscheiden zu spielen, anstatt auf der Bank zu sitzen. Wie dem auch sei, aus existenzialistischer Sicht beruht unsere Situation immer auf einer freien und unumgänglichen Entscheidung. Zu behaupten, jemand habe seine eigene Situation nicht frei gewählt, ist gleichbedeutend mit der Aussage, jemand sei ,nicht authentisch'. Des Weiteren ist es ein Rückfall in die Unwahrhaftigkeit, den eigenen Willen sprachlich zu fassen, sich jedoch von anderen als Ding ,an sich' – als Auswechselspieler – behandeln zu lassen. Culbertson (1) hat bereits argumentiert, dass Wettkampfsport auf Hochleistungsniveau aufgrund seiner ihn konstituierenden Faktoren ein Feld ist, das derartige Unwahrhaftigkeiten eher befördert denn vermeidet. Culbertsons primärer Bezugspunkt sind Sportereignisse mit Individuen in co-agierenden, parallelen Wettkämpfen – wie zum Beispiel Leichtathletik, Schwimmen oder Gewichtheben – wo die Unwahrhaftigkeit durch die stillschweigende Akzeptanz des konstanten Verbesserungsimperativs und der Quantifizierbarkeit der Leistungen entsteht. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist eine Fortführung der Fragerichtung, allerdings mit einer Neuausrichtung des Fokus weg von Parallel-Wettkämpfen von Individuen hin zu Mannschafts-Wettkämpfen. Letztere sind von Natur aus weniger interessiert an einem unablässigen Wettlauf gegen die Zeit, Distanzen oder anderen messbaren Konzepten. Dieser Artikel beabsichtigt, die Natur des Auswechselspielers im Sport zu beleuchten, der scheinbar gleichermaßen für sein uneigentliches und/oder unwahrhaftiges Sein verantwortlich gemacht wird. Dieser Text versucht, den Kern dieser Konzepte zu erschließen und zeigt gleichzeitig einen Weg auf, wie Auswechselspieler das existenzialistische Ideal verwirklichen können. Keywords: existentialismauthenticitybad faithsubstitutesport Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Notes 1. Heidegger (1977) uses the term 'Bestand' to describe the human tendency to view the world as something to be divided into representations of objects to be used and consumed for human purpose. It is this 'technological attitude' that conceals from humans their own being and prevents them from being authentic. 2. The term 'team' sport corresponds to sports that involve more than two players. Doubles events in racquet sports, for example, do not allow for the substitution of an individual in a pair either before or during a competition. 3. Indeed, there were complaints by the Australians during the 2005 Ashes Test that England's use of their substitute ran against the 'spirit' of the game. See Martin Gough, 'Substitute row mars Ashes series', BBC Sport website, 28 Aug. 2005, available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/cricket/england/4192306.stm, accessed 26 Dec. 2006. 4. Being authentic is holding the attitude that I engage in my projects as my own. One is inauthentic if one acts in such a way from a sense of duty (because it is what 'good' people or 'upstanding' citizens do), whereas, acknowledging that one freely chooses to act in a particular way (not because it is what one is expected to do) is to be authentic. Authenticity involves a transparency, in an acceptance that we, as humans, are beings who are wholly responsible for ourselves. In this, it could be argued that authenticity is a moral category, in promoting integrity and a recognition of the human condition. 5. As indicated earlier, this is the only thing one can say about a human essence or nature. 6. In this then, falling into bad faith and being authentic are not necessarily dependently related concepts. We may be in good faith while being authentic and we may be in good faith while being inauthentic, and contrary, we may be in bad faith while being inauthentic or in bad faith while being authentic. One does not necessarily presuppose the other. However, in certain situations there may be a relationship between the two, in that being inauthentic implicitly encourages falling into bad faith brought about by a pre-reflective attempt to be an 'in-itself'. 7. As given by Sartre in Existentialism and Humanism (1973). 8. As given by Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1958). 9. This idea is explored most fully in Sartre's play No Exit or Huis Clos (1944) and is exemplified in his famous phrase 'ell is other people'. 10. Heidegger expressed this 'Être-pour-autrui' or being-for-others. 11. There are occasions when these emotions are different – when being named in the squad is a source of pride and confidence (for example, if it is the first time one wears one's national shirt). Yet this merely emphasises Sartre's claim that one is in bad faith in sincerely playing the role of a substitute as an object in-itself. 12. In this mantra, Sartre emphasises that in being free, we carry the weight of the world on our shoulders. It is only as a result of our existence that there is a world for us to be confronted with and through this confrontation we are left with a freedom whereby we create ourselves; it therefore makes no sense to complain that the world is the way it is. 13. This could be her most skilful, mentally tenacious or physically dominant players; depending on what the coach believed to be important attributes or characteristics that would lead to the desired state of affairs in the game (i.e. winning). 14. Indeed, Sartre argued that it is with one's death that one's facticity – or one's purpose – becomes ultimately determined by others and not by oneself. 15. As noted by Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus. 16. This suggests a similarity to Wittgenstein's notion of 'attitude' in ethics. In a sense, the facts are irrelevant; one could always argue that our behaviour is highly influenced, determined even, by our genes or other physical or social causes but the point is that we hold the 'attitude' that we are free. This gives us credibility in being human: it is to take responsibility for one's being. To be authentic involves a sense of autonomy: to be resolute in committing to a course of action, rather than to merely occupy a role or place.