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Guatemala's Genocide Determination and the Spatial Politics of Justice

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13562570902780910

1470-1235

Elizabeth Oglesby, Amy Ross,

Anthropological Studies and Insights

Abstract This paper focuses on the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification's (CEH) determination that state violence in Guatemala between 1981 and 1983 constituted acts of genocide. The construction of the CEH's argument is analysed, together with its implications for political dynamics within post-war Guatemala. The potential new 'geographies of justice' that flow from the CEH's genocide argument are explored in terms of new venues and avenues for prosecution of Guatemalan genocide cases. It is shown how the CEH made nuanced connections between territory, political practice, ethnic identity and violence, and it is argued that these connections were key to its genocide argument. Finally, the relationship is interrogated between the CEH's genocide determination and the figure of the 'neutral Maya' as the post-war representation of an indigenous subject inhabiting a space untainted by the stain of a (failed) revolutionary past. Notes Other studies explore how the labelling of violence as genocide is significant. For example, Morus (2007) Morus, C. 2007. The SANU Memorandum: intellectual authority and the constitution of the exclusive Serbian 'people'. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 4(2): 142–165. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar] demonstrates how the gravesites around Srebrenica remain an intense site of social struggle, with Bosnian and Serbian communities seeking to claim that the violence inflicted on their own communities was the most egregious. For additional studies of the aftermath of counter-insurgency in Guatemala, see AVANCSO (1990 Avancso. 1990. Política Institutional Hacia los Desplazados en Guatemala, Guatemala City: Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala. [Google Scholar], 1992 Avancso. 1992. Donde está el Futuro? 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The instruction of great catastrophe: truth commissions, national history, and state formation in Argentina, Chile and Guatemala. The American Historical Review, 110(1): 46–67. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] and Hays-Mitchell (2007) Hays-Mitchell, M. 2007. "Who are the victims, where is the violence: the spatial dialectics of Andean violence as revealed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru". In War, Citizenship, Territory, Edited by: Cowen, D. and Gilbert, E. 199–218. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar] for other examples of Truth Commissions in Latin America and Nevins (2003) Nevins, J. 2003. Restitution over coffee: truth, reconciliation and environmental violence in East Timor. Political Geography, 22(6): 677–701. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] for the case of East Timor. Human rights abuses in the context of Guatemala's CEH report refer to crimes committed by agents of the state, and 'acts of violence' refers to irregular forces such as the insurgency or private death squads. This exclusion occurred in part because of opposition from Soviet delegates during the deliberations leading up to the elaboration of the Genocide Convention. Legal scholars at the time agreed that the inclusion of political genocide could water down the impact of the Genocide Convention, enabling any group to claim victimisation by genocide. In the past two decades, however, international legal scholars have attempted to address this lacuna (van Schaack, 1997 Schaack, B. van. 1997. The crime of political genocide: repairing the Genocide Convention's blind spot. The Yale Law Journal, 106(7): 2259–2291. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). On the relationship between diverse indigenous movements and the armed revolutionary movement, see CEH (1999, ch. 1, paras 291–358); Gonzalez (2002) Gonzalez, M. 2002. Se Cambio el Tiempo: Conflict y Poder en Territorio K'iche' 1880–1996, Guatemala: Asociacion para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala (AVANCSO). [Google Scholar]; Manz (2004) Manz, B. 2004. Paradise in Ashes: A Guatemalan Journey of Courage, Terror and Hope, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Hale (2006) Hale, C. R. 2006. Mas Que un Indio: Racial Ambivalence and Multiculturalism in Guatemala, Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press. [Google Scholar]; AVANCSO (2008) Avancso. 2008. Memorias Rebeldes Contra el Olvido/Paasantzila Txumb'al Ti' Sotzeb'al K'u'l, Guatemala City: Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala. [Google Scholar] and McAllister (forthcoming) McAllister, C. forthcoming. "An Indian dawn". In The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, Politics, Edited by: Grandin, G., Levenson-Estrada, D., Oglesby, E. and Solano, L. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. [Google Scholar]. Guatemalans were aware of the experiences of several other 'truth commissions' in the region, particularly Chile and El Salvador. In Chile, the eight commissioners were all nationals; in El Salvador three foreigners were selected. Guatemala's was a 'hybrid' approach, reflecting the compromises made by both parties. Marcie Mersky, co-ordinator of the CEH's final report, Memoria del Silencio, "Guatemala: unanswered questions on truth and transition", public presentation, University of Arizona, 2 April 2003. Three per cent were attributed to the rebel forces and 4 per cent were unknown (CEH, 1999). English-language summary of Memoria del Silencio (CEH, 1999). Available at: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english; last accessed 27 November 2008. The section on genocide of the CEH report can be found in ch. 1, vol. 3, paras 849–1257 (full CEH report available at: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report; last accessed 1 December 2008. Certain other crimes were also excluded from the 1996 National Reconciliation Law, a topic discussed in greater detail later. For the text of the Genocide Convention, see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm; accessed 27 November 2008. CEH, 1999, ch. 2, vol. 3, para. 854. The CEH based it analysis on the following case: International Criminal Tribunal for the ex-Yugoslavia IT-95-5-R61/IT-95-18-R61, Karadzic and Mladic, 11 July, 1996, para. 94. For an explanation of military strategy in Guatemala, see Gramajo Morales (1995) Gramajo Morales, H. A. 1995. De la Guerra–a la Guerra: La Difícil Transición Política en Guatemala, Guatemala City: Fondo de Cultura Editorial. [Google Scholar] and Schirmer (1998) Schirmer, J. 1998. The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. [Google Scholar]. For comparative analysis on the National Security Doctrine in other Latin American countries, see the electronic briefing books of the National Security Archives: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/; last accessed 28 November 2008. According to census data, the population of these four regions in the early 1980s ranged from 82 per cent Mayan to well over 90 per cent Mayan. Charles R. Hale, expert testimony for the Guatemala Genocide Case, Audencia Nacional, Spain, 27 May 2008. Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/guatemala/genocide/index.htm; last accessed 2 December 2008. For example, the CEH cites de facto head of state General Efraín Rios Montt: Naturally, if a subversive operation exists in which the Indians are involved with the guerrillas, the Indians are also going to die. However, the army's philosophy is not to kill the Indians, bun to win them back, to help them (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central America, Ríos Montt Views on Peasant Killings, Communism, 2 June 1982). Even more succinctly, in explaining the military's 'beans and bullets' counter-insurgency programme in 1982, an army officer in El Quiché said that the army's message to indigenous populations was "If you're with us, we'll feed you. If not, we'll kill you") (Bonner, 1982 Bonner, R. 1982. Guatemala enlists religion in battle. The New York Times, 18 July [Google Scholar]). Interviewed by Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack, April 1988 (cited in CEH, 1999, ch. 2, vol. 3, footnote 150). For more on the resettlement of the displaced populations in the 1980s, see AVANCSO (1990 Avancso. 1990. Política Institutional Hacia los Desplazados en Guatemala, Guatemala City: Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala. [Google Scholar], 1992 Avancso. 1992. Donde está el Futuro? Procesos de Reintegración en Comunidades de Retornados, Guatemala City: Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala. [Google Scholar]); Manz (1988) Manz, B. 1988. Refugees of a Hidden War: The Aftermath of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala, Buffalo: SUNY Press. [Google Scholar]; and Stepputat (2001) Stepputat, F. 2001. "Urbanizing the countryside: armed conflict, state formation and the politics of place in contemporary Guatemala". In States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Post-colonial State, Edited by: Hansen, T. B. and Stepputat, F. 284–312. Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press. [Google Scholar]. The militarisation of rural villages in the conflict zones began to ease by the late 1980s and the civil patrols were disbanded in the early 1990s, as the peace process neared conclusion. Guatemala is a signatory to the Genocide Convention and the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Rare human cases have been prosecuted in Guatemala. One example is the prosecution of a general and two colonels for the assassination of Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack. That paradigmatic case illustrates the difficulties and dangers of the pursuit of justice within Guatemala (Hale et al., 2002 Hale, C., Ball, P.Oglesby, E. 2002. Democracy as subterfuge: researchers under siege in Guatemala. Latin American Studies Association Forum, 33(3): 6–10. [Google Scholar]). One witness was killed, several more went into exile and the case was shuttled from judge to judge for 12 years. Almudena Bernabeu, personal communication with Amy Ross, January 2008. Almudena Bernabeu is a lawyer with the Center for Justice and Accountability (San Francisco, California) and lead attorney for the victims of genocide in Guatemala in a case brought before the Spanish National Court (see later). Ms Bernabeu related one instance in which a genocide case had been met with 35 separate appeals, stalling the process in the Guatemalan judiciary for nearly a decade. The genocide of 1981–83 falls outside the temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which can only prosecute crimes committed after 1 July 2002. The doctrine of universal jurisdiction holds that certain crimes are so heinous as to be of international concern. In its broadest interpretation, universal jurisdiction means that any court, anywhere, can prosecute the perpetrators of crimes such as torture, even if the accused is from a nation other than where the suit is brought (see Sriram, 2005 Sriram, C. L. 2005. Globalizing Justice for Mass Atrocities: A Revolution in Accountability, New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar]). Universal jurisdiction received little attention until it ensnared Chile's General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in October 1998; since that time, scholars have noted an acceleration in activities (Roht-Arriaza, 2005 Roht-Arriaza, N. 2005. The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Other senior Guatemalan officials charged are: ex-Minister of Defence Ángel Anibal Guevara Rodríguez, former Minister of Interior Donaldo Álvarez Ruiz, ex-Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff Manuel Benedicto Lucas García, former Director of National Police Germán Chupina Barahona and head of the police unit Comando Seis, Pedro García Arredondo. Chupina Barahona died in February 2008 after eluding a Guatemalan arrest warrant due to illness. For documents related to the case in English, see The National Security Archive, Guatemala project (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/guatemala/genocide/index.htm). See also the Center for Justice and Accountability (http://www.cja.org/cases/guatemala.shtml), The Rigoberta Menchú Foundation (http://www.frmt.org/es/) and the Centre for Legal Action and Human Rights (http://www.caldh.org/); last accessed 2 December 2008. Spain has a particular interest in the history of political violence in Guatemala. In January 1980, Guatemalan security forces set fire to the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City after it was occupied by peasant protestors. As a result of that incident, Spain broke diplomatic relations with Guatemala for four years. Several Spanish clergy were assassinated in Guatemala. For English or Spanish versions of the 'Spanish Constitutional Court Decision Accepting Jurisdiction' (SCCD 237/September 26, 2005, Guatemala Genocide Case 331/1999-10) see: http://www.cja.org/cases/guatemaladocs.shtml; last accessed 2 December 2008. Almudena Bernabeu, personal communication with Amy Ross, January 2008. Although in the latest round of appeals, the Guatemalans won in that the Spanish courts accepted that they had jurisdiction and that the Guatemalan plaintiffs did not have to show lack of progress at home. Frank LaRue, former director of the Center for Human Rights and Legal Action (CALDH), personal communication with Amy Ross, September 2002. After returning home to Chile from London, Pinochet faced hundreds of suits in Chilean courts (Roht-Arriaza, 2005 Roht-Arriaza, N. 2005. The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). In Guatemala, after international arrest warrants were issued in Spain against the Guatemalan genocide defendants, Guatemalan courts accepted the warrants and two of the defendants were arrested. In 2007, however, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court ruled that Spain did not have jurisdiction and the two were released. Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment of April 29, 2004. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, judgment of April 29, 2004, separate opinion of Judge Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, p. 13, para. 40. We have written elsewhere on debates over historical memory and tensions in the narrative framing of Mayans as protagonists and/or victims (Oglesby, 2007 Oglesby, E. 2007. Educating citizens in postwar Guatemala: historical memory, genocide, and the 'culture of peace'. Radical History Review, 97(January): 76–98. [Google Scholar]). See also Hale (2006 Hale, C. R. 2006. Mas Que un Indio: Racial Ambivalence and Multiculturalism in Guatemala, Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 83–110) for an excellent discussion.