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An Intifada in Europe? A Comparative Analysis of Radicalization Processes Among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza versus Muslim Immigrants in Europe

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2011.582629

1521-0731

Boaz Ganor,

Middle East Politics and Society

Abstract Groups of second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe are increasingly undergoing radicalization processes that can lead to violent activity. These immigrants find relief for their frustrations in global jihadi ideology and radical Islam. In seeking to understand these radicalization processes within the European context, the author draws lessons from the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza on the eve of the “First Intifada” (popular uprising) in 1987. While these cases have different root causes and implications, the author's comparative analysis demonstrates that the social processes and generational clashes that lead to radicalization are shared by the two arenas. Notes 1. In his study on homegrown terrorism and radicalization in Europe, Tomas Precht defines homegrown terrorism as “acts of violence against targets primarily, but not always, in Western countries in which the terrorists themselves have been born or raised” (Tomas Precht, Homegrown Terrorism and Islamic Radicalization in Europe. Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice (2007). Available at http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors_2_.pdf). Homegrown terrorism is generally understood to be carried out by individuals who have undergone a radicalization process in the Western world, with some limited level of contact, exposure, or visit to foreign countries or organizations for ideological inspiration or training. The United States has similarly defined the term in its Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act as “the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (The Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act (H.R. 1955). 24 October 2007. 110th Congress, 1st Session. Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/h1955_rfs.xml). 2. “Timeline: French riots,” BBC News, November 14, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4413964.stm 3. The term “radicalization” describes the changes in attitude that lead toward sanctioning and eventually taking part in violent or terrorist activity. The Islamic radicalization process often starts off with individuals who are frustrated with society, their lives, or certain policies of their countries or foreign countries. Generally, these individuals join with other like-minded individuals, increasingly identify with radical Islamic ideologies, and may eventually participate in violent acts of terrorism. The pattern of radicalization has various phases, including conversion and identification with radical Islamic ideologies, indoctrination and group bonding, and finally actual acts of terrorism or plots (Precht, Homegrown Terrorism and Islamic Radicalization in Europe, p. 5). 4. Tim Niblock and Bogdan Szajkowski, Muslim Communities in the New Europe (London: Ithaca Press, 1996), p. 223. 5. There are also ethnic and religious antagonisms within the Palestinian community—between Christians and Muslims, Bedouins and urban residents, a variety of clan affinities but, as a rule, the Palestinian community can be perceived as one ethnic group. 6. Some of the Palestinians contend that the occupation began with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and that it also exists in the State of Israel. These Palestinians oppose settling the conflict with the solution of two states—a Palestinian state and the State of Israel, and they are striving to obliterate the State of Israel and establish one bi-national state in its place. Such a state, sooner or later, due to immigration and natural growth dissimilar between the two societies—Jewish and Muslim—would have a Palestinian majority. 7. As part of Arafat's attempted “second launch” of an armed struggle following the 1967 war, hundreds of recruits and volunteers joined the newly dubbed “popular liberation war,” coming from student networks in Europe, training camps in Syria, and including “hundreds” of new recruits from the West Bank. While attacks did take place in the months following the war out of the territories, “in number and impact, these incidents were extremely modest” (Yezid Sayigh, “Turning Defeat into Opportunity: The Palestinian Guerillas after the June 1967 War.” Middle East Journal 46(2) (1992), p. 250). 8. Helena Cobban, “The Dilemma of the PLO.” MERIP Reports no. 119 (1983). The Middle East Research and Information Project., p. 4. 9. Ehud Yaari, Fatach (Tel Aviv: Lving Epstein, 1970), p. 98; In his book on Fatah, Ehud Yaari explains that militant groups that entered the West Bank and Gaza were disappointed by the fact that residents of the territories did not support calls for an armed struggle. They did not seek to develop terrorist networks nor did they provide a safe base for operations for militant operations. The number of Fatah members operating out of the territories declined until January 1968, with the number of arrests peaking in that period (pp. 98–99). 10. Cobban, “The Dilemma of the PLO,” p. 4. 11. Sayigh, “Turning Defeat into Opportunity,” p. 253. 12. Cobban, “The Dilemma of the PLO,” p. 4. 13. Instead of using solely hard power and military force, some scholars recognize that the Israeli army and the security establishment understood that “economic prosperity was required… to prevent civil unrest.” As such, the army and security agencies favored allowing Palestinian workers to enter Israel (David V. Bartram, “Foreign Workers in Israel: History and Theory.” International Migration Review 32(2) (1998), p. 305). 14. At the peak of the Palestinian labor trend in Israel, Palestinians held 25 percent of Israeli agricultural jobs and 45 percent of construction jobs (Bartram, “Foreign Workers in Israel,” p. 307). 15. Juval Portugali, “Nomad Labour: Theory and Practice in the Israeli-Palestinian Case.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 14(2) (1989), p. 211. 16. In the years following the 1967 war, the Palestinian population experienced a rise in the standard of living, as demonstrated by increases in food intake, ownership of private cars and household durable goods, as well as improvements in housing conditions. Private consumption per capita also rose at an overall 5 percent per annum from 1969–86 (Hisham Awartani, “Israel's Economic Policies in the Occupied Territories: A Case for International Supervision.” In Emma Playfair, ed., International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 401). 17. Portugali, “Nomad Labour,” p. 212; Less than half of these had legal work permits, and they constituted 6–7 percent of the Israeli labor force. Of the entire West Bank labor force, about one-third worked in Israel and about one-half of Gaza's labor force worked in Israeli territory (Bartram, “Foreign Workers in Israel,” p. 307). 18. Leila Farsakh. “Palestinian Labor Flows to the Israeli Economy: A Finished Story?” Journal of Palestine Studies 32(1) (2002), p. 13. 19. David Maimon, 1993. The Vincible Terror (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky, 1993), pp. 68–69. 20. An estimated 50 percent of the Palestinian labor force was not registered through the government (Portugali, “Nomad Labour,” p. 208). 21. In his study on economic growth in the territories, Bregman reported an average 17 percent increase in real GNP growth in the West Bank and Gaza in 1974–75. Arie Bregman, Economic Growth in the Administered Areas 1968 – 1973 (Jerusalem: Bank of Israel Research Department, 1975). Other more conservative estimates by Van Arkadie still note considerable growth, with at least a 9 percent increase. Van Arkadie further notes that employment of Palestinians in the Israeli economy was the major factor behind this growth, with over “one-third of the increase … accounted for directly by the increase in wage earnings…” The economies of the territories experienced “considerable growth during the period 1968–1975… well in excess of anything experienced while these territories in the possession of Jordan and Egypt” (Brian van Arkadie, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1967 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1977). As discussed in Delwin A. Roy, “Occupied Economies.” Journal of Palestine Studies 7(3) (1978), p. 129. See also Haim Barkai, “Twenty Years: The Israeli Market since the Six Day War.” In Yosef Gabai, ed., Sourcebook for Israel's Economy Course (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Minhal, 1991). 22. Open Society Institute, Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities. At Home in Europe Project (December 2009). Available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215; according to the European Union's June 2009 strategy report on immigration, there is a total of 18.5 million registered non-EU nationals and an estimated 8 million illegal immigrants living in the European Union (Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels (2009). Available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/jun/eu-com-stockholm-prog.pdf). Exact statistics regarding how many of these immigrants are Muslim are unavailable, since census data rarely asks respondents questions regarding their religious affiliation. However, scholars and experts often cite the 15 to 20 million estimate, with Muslims constituting the majority of immigrants in most Western European countries. Leading with numbers of Muslims is France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Italy (Robert S. Leiken, “Europe's Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs 84(4) (July/August 2005). 23. Ibid. 24. W. R. Bohning, “Integration and Immigration Pressures in Western Europe.” International Labor Review 130(4) (1991), p. 453. 25. Higher education in the West Bank and Gaza expanded following the 1967 War, with nearly half a dozen colleges and universities springing up in Gaza and the West Bank in the first 10 years following Israeli occupation, supported by the financial contributions of individuals and states. Post-secondary education was “virtually non-existent in Palestine during the Mandate years,” and only limited numbers went abroad to study due to financial constraints (Samir N. Anabtawi, Palestinian Higher Education in the West Bank and Gaza: A Critical Assessment (London: Routledge, 1986), pp. 2–9). 26. Don Peretz, “Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising.” Foreign Affairs 66(5) (1987–1988), p. 66. 27. G. Gilber, “Economic and Demographic Developments as Causes of the Intifida.” In Gad Gilber and Asher Saser, eds., In the Eye of Conflict: The Intifada (Tel Aviv: The United Kibbutz, 1991), p. 35. 28. Anabtawi, Palestinian Higher Education in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 9. 29. Emile F. Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 4. 30. Gilber, “Economic and Demographic Developments as Causes of the Intifida,” pp. 21, 32, 35. 31. Zeev Sheef and Ehud Yaari, Intifada (Tel Aviv: Schocken Publishing House Limited, 1990), p. 76. 32. Leiken, “Europe's Angry Muslims.” 33. Maurice Crul and Hans Vermeulen, “The Second Generation in Europe,” International Migration Review 37(4) (2003; The Future of the Second Generation: The Integration of Migrant Youth in Six European Countries). New York: The Center for Migration Studies, p. 966. 34. Ibid., p. 972; see H. Gans, “Second Generation in Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of Post-1965 American Immigrants.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 15 (1992), pp. 173–192. 35. M. T. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing.” The Washington Quarterly 27(3) (2004), p. 30. 36. Ibid., p. 31. 37. Ibid., p. 43. 38. Francis Fukuyama, “Identity and Migration.” Prospect Magazine 131 (2007). 39. Bohning, “Integration and Immigration Pressures in Western Europe,” p. 454. 40. Fukuyama, “Identity and Migration,” p. 3. 41. Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 625. 42. Alan Hart, Arafat, A Political Biography (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 518. 43. Savage, “Europe and Islam,” p. 31. 44. It should be noted that many of the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks and plots were European Muslims, often second- or third-generation immigrants, who underwent a radicalization process in Europe. For example, Mohammed Atta and other organizers of 9/11 attacks; the bombers of the 11 March Madrid attack; Mohammed Bouyeri, responsible for the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004; the bombers of the 7 July 2005 London attacks; and British Muslims implicated in plots to blow up aircraft using liquid explosives in the summer of 2006. 45. See Steven Plocker, “Paris Intifada.” Yedhiot Ahronot (6 November 2005). Available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3164664,00.html and The New York Sun, “France's Permanent Intifada” (27 October 2006). Available at http://www.nysun.com/editorials/frances-permanent-intifada/42376/