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The Madhyamaka Concept of Svabhāva : Ontological and Cognitive Aspects

2007; Routledge; Volume: 17; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09552360701201122

1469-2961

Jan Westerhoff,

Classical Philosophy and Thought

Abstract This paper considers the philosophical interpretation of the concept of svabhāva, sometimes translated as 'inherent existence' or 'own-being', in the Madyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. It is argued that svabhāva must be understood as having two different conceptual dimensions, an ontological and a cognitive one. The ontological dimension of svabhāva shows it to play a particular part in theories investigating the most fundamental constituents of the world. Three different understandings of svabhāva are discussed under this heading: svabhāva understood as essence, as substance, and as the true nature of phenomena (absolute svabhāva). The cognitive dimension shows svabhāva as playing an important rôle in our everyday conceptualization of phenomena. Svabhāva is here seen as a superimposition (samāropa) which the mind projects onto the world. Notes Notes [1] See Robinson (1972 Robinson, R. 1972. Did Nagarjuna really refute all philosophical views?. Philosophy East and West, 22: 325–331. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 326). [2] Garfield (1995 Garfield, J. 1995. The fundamental wisdom of the Middle Way. Translation and commentary of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 89), Komito (1987 Komito, DR. 1987. Nāgārjuna's seventy stanzas: a Buddhist psychology of emptiness, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar], p. 69). [3] Napper (1989 Napper, E. 1989. Dependent-arising and emptiness, London: Wisdom. [Google Scholar], p. 65). [4] Lopez (1987 Lopez, D. 1987. A study of Svātantrika, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar], pp. 445–446). [5] Ruegg (1981 Ruegg, DS. 1981. The literature of the Madhyamika school of philosophy in India, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. [Google Scholar], p. 9). [6] This distinction is still alive in contemporary dGe lugs commentarial textbook literature. See the annotated translation of dKon mchogs 'jigs med dbang po's Grup pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba given in Sopa & Hopkins (1976 Sopa, GL and Hopkins, J. 1976. Practice and theory of Tibetan Buddhism, New York: Grove. [Google Scholar], p. 122). [7] Sopa & Hopkins (1976 Sopa, GL and Hopkins, J. 1976. Practice and theory of Tibetan Buddhism, New York: Grove. [Google Scholar], p. 122) refer to these as phenomena's 'conventionally existent nature', their 'true or independent existence', and their 'real and final nature'. Further attempts at differentiating the different usages of svabhāva in Candrakīrti can be found in Schayer (1931 Schayer, S. 1931. Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā, Krakow: Nakladem Polskiej Akademji Umietjetności. [Google Scholar], xix, p. 55, note 41), who distinguishes four different senses, as well as in de Jong (1972 de Jong, JW. 1972. The problem of the absolute in the Madhyamika school. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2: 1–6. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 3) and May (1959 May, J. 1959. Prasannapadā Madhyamakavrtti: Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain, Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve. [Google Scholar], p. 124, note 328), who distinguish two. Although there are obvious connections with the senses distinguished here the relations between the different senses discussed by the three authors and, in Schayer's case, the distinctness of the four senses given by him are too unclear to make an attempt at comparison worthwhile. [8] maraṇan ti kho mahārāja etaṃ adiṭṭhasaccānaṃ tāsaniyaṃ ṭhānaṃ … maraṇass' eso mahārāja sarasabhāvatejo tassa sarasabhāvatejena sakilesā sattā maranassa tasanti bhāyanti (Trenckner, 1928 Trenckner, V. 1928. The Milindapañho, London: Royal Asiatic Society. [Google Scholar], p. 149). For a translation see Davids (1890, p. 211). [9] svabhāva evaiṣạṃ svalakṣaṇam | sāmāyalakṣaṇam tu anityatā saṃskṛtānām. Bhāṣya on Vasubandhu (1970–1973 Vasubandhu. 1970–1973. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with the Sphutārthā commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati. [Google Scholar], 6:14). For further references see Williams (1981 Williams, P. 1981. On the Abhidharma ontology. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9: 227–257. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 243). [10] svabhāvena parabhāvaviyogataḥ (Vasubandhu, 1970–1973 Vasubandhu. 1970–1973. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with the Sphutārthā commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati. [Google Scholar], 1:18). [11] According to the Buddhist interpretation these characteristics are being impermanent, unsatisfactory, and devoid of self (Ronkin, 2005 Ronkin, N. 2005. Early Buddist metaphysics: The making of a philosophical Tradition, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], pp. 114–115). [12] Note that this sense of svabhāva is not to be equated with that of haecceity or quiddity. An haecceity or 'individual essence' is a property only a single individual can have (the socratesness of Socrates is a stock example). But svabhāva in the sense discussed here is shareable. The svabhāva of fire is heat, a characteristic which cannot just be instantiated by fire, but also for example by water (even though heat does not constitute the svabhāva of water). [13] agnerauṣṇyam hi loke tadavyabhicāritvātsvabhāva ityucyate tadevauṣṇyamapsūpalabhyamānaṃ parapratyayasaṃbūtatvātkṛtrimatvānna svabhāva iti (La Vallée Poussin, 1903–1913 La Vallée Poussin, Lde. 1903–1913. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Google Scholar], p. 241, lines 8–9). A similar characterization of solidity (khara) as the invariable specific quality and thus svabhāva of earth is given in the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā (Williams, 1981 Williams, P. 1981. On the Abhidharma ontology. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9: 227–257. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], pp. 242–243). [14] Ames (1982 Ames, W. 1982. The notion of svabhāva in the thought of Candrakīrti. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 10: 161–177. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 170). [15] Buddhapālita, however, clearly has the notion of essence-svabhāva in mind when claims that the aim of Nāgārjuna was to teach the svabhāva (ngo bo nyid) of dependent origination (P 180a:3–4; Walleser, 1913–1914 Walleser, M. 1913–1914. Buddhapālita's Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti, vol. 16, St Petersburg: Bibliotheca Buddhica. [Google Scholar], 4:16–17). As dependent origination identified with emptiness is the exact opposite of svabhāva this expression would constitute a contradictio in adiecto unless we realize that Buddapālita wants to say that Nāgārjuna teaches the specific quality of dependent origination. [16] Iyengar (1927 Iyengar, HHR. 1927. The Ekaślokaśastra of Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva. Journal of Mysore University, 1: 158–162. [Google Scholar], p. 160). Another translation of this passage of the śastra can be found in Edkins (1893 Edkins, J. 1893. Chinese Buddhism. A volume of sketches, historical, descriptive, and critical, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner. [Google Scholar], pp. 307–307). We might want to note, however, that Lindtner (1982 Lindtner, C. 1982. Nagarjuniana. Studies in the writings and philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag. [Google Scholar], p. 16) classifies this text as 'most probably not genuine'. [17] Some information on the conceptual relationship between svabhāva and svalakṣaṇa can be found in Ronkin (2005 Ronkin, N. 2005. Early Buddist metaphysics: The making of a philosophical Tradition, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 110). [18] Nāgārjuna might here have the Vaiśeṣika conception of the five elements (bhūta) in mind, all of which are substances (dravya) and are taken to have peculiar qualities which distinguish them from the other elements. See Sharma (1960 Sharma, C. 1960. A critical survey of Indian philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Google Scholar], p. 177). [19] Williams (1981 Williams, P. 1981. On the Abhidharma ontology. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9: 227–257. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], pp. 236–237). [20] Ronkin (2005 Ronkin, N. 2005. Early Buddist metaphysics: The making of a philosophical Tradition, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ch. 3) argues that there was a gradual move away from a basically epistemological understanding of svabhāva as a characteristic mark to individuate different aspects of experience to an ontological understanding, where svabhāva subsumes objects with a particular ontological status. [21] In the contemporary commentarial literature we find occasional reference to the notion of an intrinsic property to spell out the notion of svabhāva (Tillemans, 2001 Tillemans, T. 2001. "Trying to be fair to Madhyamika Buddhism.". In The Numata Yehan Lecture in Buddhism, Canada: University of Calgary. [Google Scholar], p. 14, note 24; Siderits, 2004 Siderits, M. 2004. Causation and emptiness in early Madhyamika. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32: 393–419. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 117). Intrinsic properties are those which 'things have in virtue of the way they themselves are', while extrinsic properties are had 'in virtue of their relations or lack of relations to other things' (Lewis, 1986 Lewis, DK. 1986. On the plurality of worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar], p. 61). While it is clear that all properties constitutive of a primary existent must be intrinsic not all intrinsic properties characterize a primary existent. For example the property of being the tallest man in the room is extrinsic (since a man can only have it in relation to the other men in the room), while that of being a man is intrinsic. However, a man is not a primary existent because he is causally, mereologically, and conceptually dependent on a variety of factors. [22] Hayes (1994 Hayes, RP. 1994. Nāgārjuna's appeal. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 22: 299–378. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 311) distinguishes two senses of svabhāva, svabhāva in the sense of identity and svabhāva in the sense of independence. The former expresses it's understanding as svalakṣaṇa, the latter as dravya. Hayes then goes on to argue that Nāgārjuna equivocates between these different readings, thereby rendering his arguments invalid (p. 316). For some comments on this see Taber (1998 Taber, JA. 1998. On Nāgārjuna's so-called fallacies: a comparative approach. Indo-Iranian Journal, 41: 213–244. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Tillemans (2001 Tillemans, T. 2001. "Trying to be fair to Madhyamika Buddhism.". In The Numata Yehan Lecture in Buddhism, Canada: University of Calgary. [Google Scholar]), Siderits (2004 Siderits, M. 2004. Causation and emptiness in early Madhyamika. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32: 393–419. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 135, note i). [23] na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ | hetupratyaya saṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvo kṛtako bhavet || svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ kathaṃ | akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca (La Vallée Poussin, 1903–1913 La Vallée Poussin, Lde. 1903–1913. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Google Scholar], pp. 259–262). [24] tasya cedaṃ lakśaṇaṃ akṛtrimaḥ svabhāva hi nirapekśaḥ paratra ca (La Vallée Pousin, 1903–1913 La Vallée Poussin, Lde. 1903–1913. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Google Scholar], p. 265, lines 5–6). See also Candrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's Catuḥsátaka 12:13 de la bdag ces bya ba ni gang zhig dngos po rnams kyi gzhan la rag ma las pa'i ngo bo rang bzhin te med pa ni bdgag med pa'o 'Here "self" is a self-existent object which does not depend on other objects. The non-existence [of such an object] is selflessness.' P5266, 98, 265.17. See also Tillemans (1990 Tillemans, TJF. 1990. Materials for the study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti, Wien: Universität Wien. [Google Scholar], p. 126). [25] See Tillemans (2001 Tillemans, T. 2001. "Trying to be fair to Madhyamika Buddhism.". In The Numata Yehan Lecture in Buddhism, Canada: University of Calgary. [Google Scholar], pp. 5–6). [26] … avicārataśca laukikapadārthānāmastitvāt | yathaiva hi rūpādivyatirekeṇa vicāyamāṇa ātmā na saṃbhavati (La Vallée Poussin, 1903–1913 La Vallée Poussin, Lde. 1903–1913. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 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[31] In his (1964, 154:6–155:1) (which constitutes a commentary on the Grub mtha' chen mo of 'Jams dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721)) Ngag dbang dpal ldan (1797–?) refers to these three kinds of dependence as 'phrad ba (prāpya), ltos ba (apekṣya) and brten pa (pratītya), respectively. See Magee (1999 Magee, W. 1999. The nature of things. Emptiness and essence in the Geluk world, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar], pp. 56–57); Hopkins (1983 Hopkins, J. 1983. Meditation on emptiness, London: Wisdom. [Google Scholar], pp. 166–177); Komito (1987 Komito, DR. 1987. Nāgārjuna's seventy stanzas: a Buddhist psychology of emptiness, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar], p. 1190), Gyatso (2005 Gyasto, L. 2005. The harmony of emptiness and dependent-arising , (2nd rev. ed.), Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. [Google Scholar], pp. 20–21). [32] Ngag dbang dpal ldan (1964 Ngag dbang dpal ldan. 1964. 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[79] Some of the synonyms for absolute svabhāva Candrakīrti gives include 'objecthood of objects' (dharmānām dharmatā), 'intrinsic nature' (tatsvarūpam), 'original nature' (prakṛti), 'emptiness' (śūnyatā), 'lack of svabhāva' (naiḥsvābhāvyam), 'thusness' (tathatā), 'complete non-origination' (sarvaśa anutpāda), and 'being thus, changelessness, ever-abidingness' (tathābhāvo 'vikaritvam sadaiva sthāyitā) (La Vallée Poussin, 1903–1913 La Vallée Poussin, Lde. 1903–1913. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Google Scholar], pp. 264–265). [80] La Vallée Poussin (1903–1913 La Vallée Poussin, Lde. 1903–1913. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Google Scholar], p. 265). [81] khyad par gsum dang ldan pa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1985 Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa. 1985. Lam Rim Chen Mo, Qinghai: Tso Ngön (Qinghai) People's Press. 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[83] gnas skabs gzhan du mi 'gyur ba (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1985 Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa. 1985. Lam Rim Chen Mo, Qinghai: Tso Ngön (Qinghai) People's Press. [Google Scholar], 643:13), (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 2000–2004 Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa. 2000–2004. The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar], 3:194). [84] rnam 'jog gzhan la mi ltos pa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1985 Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa. 1985. Lam Rim Chen Mo, Qinghai: Tso Ngön (Qinghai) People's Press. [Google Scholar], 643:13), (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 2000–2004 Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa. 2000–2004. The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar], 3:194). [85] This is the reason why Tsong kha pa does not regard the three characteristics as sufficient for identifying the object of negation (dgag bya). 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