Descartes's Diagonal Deduction
1983; Oxford University Press; Volume: 34; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1093/bjps/34.1.13
ISSN1464-3537
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and History of Science
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessArticlesDescartes's Diagonal Deduction*PETER SLEZAKPETER SLEZAKThe University of New South Wales Search for more articles by this author * I am grateful to Charles Hamblin, Dan Hausman, John Forge, Karen Neander and Frank Vlach for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am especially indebted to the two anonymous referees of this Journal for their detailed criticisms.PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 34, Number 1March 1983 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/34.1.13 Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref © 1983 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:PETER SLEZAK Was Descartes a Liar? Diagonal Doubt Defended, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no.33 (Dec 2020): 379–388.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/39.3.379
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