Artigo Revisado por pares

The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs

1985; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 93; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/261298

ISSN

1537-534X

Autores

J. Vernon Henderson,

Tópico(s)

Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism

Resumo

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Tiebout Model: Bring Back the EntrepreneursJ. Vernon HendersonJ. Vernon HendersonPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 93, Number 2Apr., 1985 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/261298 Views: 36Total views on this site Citations: 115Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Richard W. 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