A Casualty of Kinetic Warfare: Military Research, Development, and Acquisition for Biodefense
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 20; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09636412.2011.625780
ISSN1556-1852
Autores Tópico(s)Global Security and Public Health
ResumoAbstract The US military is responsible for protecting its forces from biological weapons. However, the Department of Defense has neglected biodefense—most of the funding for which now comes from civilian organizations rather than traditional military sponsors. Why? I argue that organizational frames explain military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense. Because the military's frame of reference is defined by kinetic warfare involving projectile weapons and explosives, it neglects non-kinetic capabilities like biodefense. In contrast, the civilian Department of Health and Human Services has a different organizational frame and thus is more amenable to supporting biodefense. I test this theory against realism and bureaucratic interests. I find that research, development, and acquisition for biodefense support the ideational theory of organizational frames, which has important implications regarding the influence of specific ideas on national security policy. Acknowledgments In addition to the interview respondents who contributed to this research, the author would like to thank Bruce Bennett, Jonathan Caverley, Lynn Eden, James Evans, Charles Glaser, Anne Holthoefer, Jenna Jordan, Gregory Koblentz, John Mearsheimer, Michelle Murray, Takayuki Nishi, John Padgett, Keven Ruby, John Schuessler, Jason Sharman, Rebecca Slayton, and participants at the Spring 2008 Center for International Security and Cooperation Social Science Seminar, along with the editors and anonymous reviewers of Security Studies. Notes See Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968); Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Lanham: University Press of America, 1975); Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Theo Farrell, Weapons Without a Cause: The Politics of Weapons Acquisition in the United States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). There is no single theory of bureaucratic politics or organizational behavior, just as there is no single theory of state behavior in the literature about international relations. For instance, Allison and Posen refer to different models as “organizational theory,” but neither claims that there is a single theory of organizations. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 71; and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 34. The same is true for bureaucratic politics, which is not described by a single theory but rather a “long list of theories about some aspect of bureaucracy.” James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do it (New York: Basic Books, 1989), xix. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); and Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). Even literature that pays considerable attention to other factors still privileges threat-based explanations, at least during the Cold War. See Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000); and Eugene Gholz, “The Curtiss-Wright Corporation and Cold War-Era Defense Procurement: A Challenge to Military-Industrial Complex Theory,” Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 1 (Winter 2000). In contrast, for a critique of realism applied to weapon development, see Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Given this anticipated response (namely internal balancing), explanations based on external threats are associated with “action-reaction” and “anticipation-reaction” arms races, as discussed in Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 16–18, 62; Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, 10, 223; and Brown, Flying Blind, 5. See George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10: Biodefense for the 21st Century, 28 April 2004, 6; also Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, Susan B. Martin ed., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Although the 1991 Gulf War is cited to suggest that nuclear threats prevent the use of BW, the evidence is weak. Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks,” International Security 24 no. 4 (Spring 2000). Likewise, if deterrence failed, the marginal utility of a nuclear response is debatable given current US conventional superiority. Allison, Essence of Decision, 164. This perspective is similar to theories that “view the organization as a coalition.” Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 27. This aphorism is known as Miles’ law. This narrow definition is justified by Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973): 473; and David A. Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect,” International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 121. For a broad definition, see Edward Rhodes, “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy,” World Politics 47, no. 1 (October 1994). The focus here is on “the external aspect of autonomy,” namely independence or jurisdiction. In contrast, the internal aspect refers to how this independence is used, which Wilson argues is a function of identity or culture—ideational variables he uses to criticize the claim that bureaucrats only try to maximize their budget or size. These are related but distinct strands of argument. See Wilson, Bureaucracy, xviii, 181–82. Conversely, Posen and Snyder make virtually no mention of identity or culture. Even prestige, which might be considered an ideational variable, is for Posen merely a means for maintaining independence. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 45, 58; and Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 24. For a critique, see Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 14. Allison, Essence of Decision, 144–45, 168. Gholz, “The Curtiss-Wright Corporation and Cold War-Era Defense Procurement,” 37, 45, 74–75. Sapolsky argues that competition had costs but its net effect was missile innovation. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development. Also see Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation; Owen R. Cote Jr., The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 1996). On the benefits of “sequential” and thus competitive bomber development, see Brown, Flying Blind. However, the benefit of demand-side competition between services does not mean that supply-side competition between commercial defense firms is also beneficial. Gholz and Sapolsky, “Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry.” Likewise, on the pros and cons of conflict between the civilian and military leadership inside DoD, see Art, The TFX Decision; and Thomas L. McNaugher, The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition (New York: Praeger, 1984). Causal ambiguity is a common problem with references to “bureaucratic politics,” which describes a collage of different factors and outcomes rather than a coherent or causal theory. Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, “Rethinking Allison's Models,” The American Political Science Review 86, no. 2 (June 1992); and Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy.” Brown, Flying Blind, 311. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 101. Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974); and Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). For an application, see Theo Farrell, Weapons Without a Cause, chap. 3. I am sympathetic to arguments made by Kier and others about the dangers of artificially dividing ideas from interests, but not distinguishing between them has an opportunity cost as well—namely, missed opportunities to identify the independent influence of ideas that are endogenous to a particular organization. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War, 38. For distinctions similar to my own, see Jeffrey W. Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994), 114–15; and to a lesser extent, Rhodes, “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?” The officials charged with biodefense should have some power since “the sources of bargaining advantages include formal authority and responsibility,” as well as “expertise and control over information.” Allison, Essence of Decision, 169. In addition, their special or concentrated interests provide collective action advantages over diffuse opposition. For other applications of sociological institutionalism and social constructivism to international security, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). On scientific paradigms and technological frames, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); and Wiebe E. Bijker, “The Social Construction of Bakelite: Towards a Theory of Invention,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems, eds., Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). Similar definitions are provided by Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (December 1993); and Paul Shrivastava and Susan Schneider, “Organizational Frames of Reference,” Human Relations 37, no. 10 (October 1984). Knowledge-laden routines differ from “dumb” standard operating procedures. Eden, Whole World on Fire, 313. They are interpretive, not merely procedural. Unlike simple “if-then” rules, knowledge-laden routines incorporate assumptions about “why.” This difference is consequential. It is hard to explain the survival of an “if-then” rule without referring to environmental stimuli or selective pressures on the response. However, adding the “why” behind a routine permits another explanation—namely that it persists because the rationale is comprehensible within a given organization. William H. Sewell, “The Concept(s) of Culture,” in Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, eds., Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). For related definitions of organizational culture, see Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II”; Kier, Imagining War; and Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). As described by Halperin, for example, it is not clear whether the air force's initial resistance to ballistic missiles was due to the idea of sitting in silos rather than flying, or alternatively, because it had to pay for these missiles out of its existing budget. Likewise, it is unclear whether the navy resisted Polaris because the idea of destroying Soviet cities had little to do with control of the seas or because it meant paying for more submarines with the same funding. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 30, 57 and 33–34. Legro, “Military Culture,” 117. Also Eden, Whole World on Fire, 56; and Barbara Levitt and James G. March, “Organizational Learning,” Annual Review of Sociology 14 (1988). Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risk, Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996): 62. Frames of reference are multidimensional, so this inside/outside distinction is a matter of degree. Bijker, “Social Construction of Bakelite,” 174. See Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998); and John S. Duffield, Richard Price, and Theo Farrell, “Isms and Schisms: Culturalism Versus Realism in Security Studies,” International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999). Organizational frame theory describes a circular process whereby frames shape actions, which shape capabilities, which shape frames. Eden, Whole World on Fire, 56; and Bijker, “Social Construction of Bakelite,” 173. However, this process occurs over time, so the circle can be broken into distinct (or sequential) causal arcs that can be tested and falsified. For a similar definition, see Karl E. Wingenbach and Donald G. Lisenbee, “‘Deconfusing’ Lethal and Kinetic Terms,” Joint Force Quarterly 46 (3rd Quarter, 2007). Many pathogens could be used for biological warfare or bioterrorism. The most threatening are thought to include anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers like Ebola. Although I focus on pathogens that cause disease in humans, there are biological weapons that target crops and livestock as well. See “reload” in Richard Danzig, Catastrophic Bioterrorism: What Is To Be Done? (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2003). Brian G. Chow et al., Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1998), viii; and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, August 1993, 53–54. Victor A. Utgoff, Nuclear Weapons and the Deterrence of Biological and Chemical Warfare (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1997), 6–7. See Amy L. Stuart and Dean A. Wilkening, “Degradation of Biological Weapons Agents in the Environment: Implications for Terrorism Response,” Environmental Science and Technology 39, no. 8 (2005). US Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents, Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 58, November 1969, 24. Also, remarks by William Patrick in Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement: Biological Defense Research Program, US Army Medical Research and Development Command, Fort Detrick MD, 1989, A14–154b. W. Seth Carus, “The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb?” Biological Weapons in the Middle East, Policy Papers No. 23 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991); Randall J. Larsen and Robert P. Kadlec, Biological Warfare: A Post Cold War Threat to America's Strategic Mobility Forces (Pittsburgh: Ridgeway Viewpoints, 1995); Brad Roberts, “Between Panic and Complacency: Calibrating the Chemical and Biological Warfare Problem,” in The Niche Threat: Deterring the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Stuart E. Johnson (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997); and Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/04). The risk of secondary exposure and difficulty of decontamination make even a single attack a continuous rather than discrete event, so BW can adversely affect military operations for days, weeks, or longer. On the strategic utility of BW, see Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons”; and Susan B. Martin, “The Role of Biological Weapons in International Politics: The Real Military Revolution,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (March 2002). For similar logic applied to different weapons, see Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999); and Richard Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,” International Organization 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995). On the rare use of BW, see Milton Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005). Among others, see Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Dell Publishing, 1999); Igor V. Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2003); and David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009). Walter Hirsch, Soviet BW and CW Preparations and Capabilities, (Washington, DC: US Army Chemical Intelligence Branch, May 1951); The Soviet BW Program, Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 24 April 1961, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000250910/DOC_0000250910.pdf; National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities, CIA, 13 November 1969, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/niecbw1969.pdf; and Soviet Biological Warfare Threat, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 1986, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB61/Sverd26.pdf. Nevertheless, the United States underestimated the size, scope, and sophistication of the Soviet BW program—in part because the frame of reference within US intelligence agencies mirrored the kinetic frame at DoD. See Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 145–69, 196. Iraq's Biological Weapons Program, CIA, 1990, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/cia/19960517/cia_65171_65171_01.html. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, US State Department, August 2005, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf. W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (working paper, National Defense University, 2001), 49; and Amy Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2000), 78. Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton et al., The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, 151, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. On BACUS (Biotechnology Activity Characterization by Unconventional Signatures), see Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 297–98. General Colin Powell, statement made during Hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, HR 2401, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 30 March 1993. General Anthony Zinni, statement made during Hearings on the Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 30 September 1999. See Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). Eden, Whole World on Fire. Organizational frames can be described at different levels of abstraction, like the problem solving they entail. Eden, Whole World on Fire, 53. On ballistics and the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), see Herman H. Goldstine, The Computer: from Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). Walter H. MacWilliams, “A Transistor Gating Matrix for a Simulated Warfare Computer,” Bell Laboratories Record 35 (March 1957): 94. M. M. Irvine, “Early Digital Computers at Bell Telephone Laboratories,” Annals of the History of Computing, IEEE Issue, 23, no. 3 (July-September 2001): 30, 34. On limited organizational change in response to this technology, see Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, and Brendan R. Green, ed., U.S. Military Innovation Since the Cold War: Creation Without Destruction (New York: Routledge, 2009). I do not argue that all military problems involving information technology are kinetic. When discussing the differences, however, proponents of cyber security often refer to kinetic warfare, positioning their arguments relative to what they implicitly recognize as the military's dominant frame of reference. US Army, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 2006), 1.27, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). See Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 7, 21, 104. Similarly, Deborah D. Avant and James H. Lebovic, “U.S. Military Responses to Post-Cold War Missions,” in The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, eds., Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). I refer to the US military and DoD interchangeably, even though this terminology simplifies a complex organizational structure and history. George W. Merck, “Activities of the United States in the Field of Biological Warfare: A Report to the Secretary of War,” undated draft, RG 165, Box 182, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA), 8. Secretary of War, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Subject: Biological Warfare,” 13 January 1944, RG 165, Box 182, NARA, 2. Leo P. Brophy, “Origins of the Chemical Corps,” Military Affairs 20, no. 4 (Winter 1956). See A. M. Pappenheimer, “The Story of a Toxic Protein, 1888–1992,” Protein Science 2 (February 1993). Committee on Biological Warfare, Program Guidance Report, Department of Defense, Research and Development Board, ASM Archive, 1950; and Ira L. Baldwin, Proceedings from a Meeting of The Committee of Biological Warfare (1951), ASM Archives, 13-II, Folder 2, 15–17. Ross T. McIntire, “Memorandum for Commander William B. Sarles,” 29 September 1945, RG 165, Box 186, NARA. Also see Norman T. Kirk, “Letter to Commanding General, Army Service Forces,” 19 October 1945, RG 165, Box 186, NARA. This dispute with the CWS is consistent with bureaucratic interests, but stereotypes help explain why the CWS retained jurisdiction. U.S. Army Activities in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs, US Department of the Army, February 1977, 30. Dorothy L. Miller, History of Air Force Participation in the Biological Warfare Program: 1951–1954, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, January 1957, 182. Conrad C. Crane, “‘No Practical Capabilities’—American Biological and Chemical Warfare Programs During the Korean War,” Perspective in Biology and Medicine 45, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 244; NSC 5602/1, 15 March 1956, discussed by John Ellis van Courtland Moon, “The US Biological Weapons Program,” in Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, eds., Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa, and Malcolm Dando (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 12, 35. U.S. Army Activities in the US Biological Warfare Programs, 39–41. See “Project 112,” described in U.S. Army Activities in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs, 45–47. Confidential interviews with former Detrick officials by author, Vienna, VA and Frederick, MD, June 2007. Also see David I. Goldman, “The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership's Response to Nixon's Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Politics in 1996,” Journal of Military History 73, no. 2 (April 2009); Jonathan B. Tucker, “A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969–70,” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002); and Forrest Russel Frank, U.S. Arms Control Policymaking: The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention Case (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1974). Goldman, “The Generals and the Germs,” 561–68. Melvin R. Laird, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research—Terminology (December 1969), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 58, emphasis added. EAI Corporation, Final Report on Review of CBW Defense Research Information System Needs of the Navy Program Element Manager, Bethesda, MD, January 1983, 1. Albert J. Mauroni, Chemical-Biological Defense: U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 1. Mauroni, Chemical-Biological Defense, 213; and Jeffery K. Smart, History of Chemical and Biological Detectors, Alarms, and Warning Systems (Aberdeen Proving Ground: US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, 2000), 26. Work on stand-off detection effectively ended in 1986. Louis J. Del Rosso, Biological Threat, October 1990, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassimages/otsg/19961108/110596_sep96_decls12_0005.html. For example, see U.S. Army Operational Concept for Individual and Collective Measures for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense, Training and Doctrine Command, 1982. Lee Clarke, Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Brown, Flying Blind, 26. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 384; and Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, 44. On the irrational imbalance of spending on missile defense versus biodefense, see Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 218; Loise M. Jollenbeck, Jane S. Durch, Leslie Z. Benet, ed., Giving Full Measure to Countermeasures: Addressing Problems in the DoD Program to Develop Medical Countermeasures Against Biological Warfare Agents (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004), 34. Confidential interview with a former USAMRIID official by author, Frederick, MD, June 2007; Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 84. This procurement decision was not the result of a comprehensive threat assessment by senior staff but rather the “fortuitous” initiative of an army major and civilian employee. Interview with Anna Johnson-Winegar by author, July 2007; Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 85–86. On Soviet spending, see Alibek and Handelman, Biohazard, 118; and Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 333. Koblentz, Living Weapons, 22. Also Alibek and Handelman, Biohazard, 281. US Central Command, After Action Report: Medical Defense Against Biological Warfare, 1991, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/bw_ii/bw_refs/n23en070/960315_doc04_05_0000004.htm. Interview with Jack Berndt by author, June 2007. Mauroni, Chemical-Biological Defense, 71; and Joint Staff, Chronology of Key Events, 1992, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassimages/otsg/19961211/120396_sep96_decls1_0001.html. Bernard Rostker, Information Paper: The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, 1997, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/fox_vehicle_ii_s03.htm#B.%20%20Detection%20Equipment. Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 103, 106. Interview with Anna Johnson-Winegar by author, July 2007. Also, Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 107–8. IOM, Health Consequences of Service During the Persian Gulf War: Recommendations for Research and Information Systems (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), 51; and Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 116. Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 139. See Public Law 103–160, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994,” November 30, 1993. Jollenbeck, Durch, and Benet, ed., Giving Full Measure to Countermeasures, 29. Also Al Mauroni, Where are the WMDs? The Reality of Chem-Bio Threats on the Home Front and the Battlefront (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006): chaps. 2 and 3. See Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems, Government Accounting Office (GAO), Washington, DC., 1996, 7; and Martin Enserink, “On Biowarfare's Frontline,” Science 296, no. 5575 (June 2002); in contrast to an overall decline of about 20 percent in DoD RDT&E Programs (R-1 tables, 1993, 1995, 1997), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA247271&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA277105&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada320886.pdf. Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 196, 201. IOM, Giving Full Measure to Countermeasures, 29. Jon Cohen and Eliot Marshall, “Vaccines for Biodefense: A System in Distress,” Science 294, no. 5542 (October 2001): 498; and Franklin H. Top et al., DoD Acquisition of Vaccine Production: Report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by the Independent Panel of Experts (December 2000), 16, http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada423373.pdf. Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 133. Interview with Richard J. Danzig by author, June 2007. Also Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, chap. 8, 244–45. The process behind this policy change supports organizational frame theory over bureaucratic interests. Rather than competitive bargaining or “horse trading,” Danzig and Lederberg reportedly persuaded the military leadership through an educational campaign targeting their underlying assumptions. Elaine Sciolino, “Anthrax Vaccination Program is Failing, Pentagon Admits,” New York Times, 12 J
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