Conflict Resolution through Democracy Promotion? The Role of the OSCE in Georgia
2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13510340801972288
ISSN1743-890X
Autores Tópico(s)Security, Politics, and Digital Transformation
ResumoAbstract This article qualitatively and empirically analyses the OSCE's efforts to promote democracy after intra-state war in Georgia. This regional organization is rooted in a comprehensive approach to security that directly links security to democratic values. Therefore, the OSCE is a particularly appropriate subject for studying the issue of democracy promotion in the context of conflict-resolution processes. Georgia provides a difficult environment for such a goal. Given that its two secession conflicts are ‘frozen’, democracy can, especially in this context, be considered a well-suited means to indirectly contribute to conflict resolution. By contrasting the democratic development in Georgia with OSCE activities since 1992, this article will assess OSCE democracy promotion efforts. When these efforts are measured with regard to progress in peace and democratic quality, the effectiveness of external democracy promotion by the OSCE has to be called into question. However, the article argues that democratization is a long-term process in which internal factors play a decisive role. The OSCE, like other international organizations, can only reach its normative goals to the degree of the reform orientation and political will of the target state's government. The potential for impact is limited, but can be increased by commitment and context sensitivity. Keywords: GeorgiaOSCEpromotion of democracyconflict resolution ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Julia Leininger and the editors of this special issue, Sonja Grimm and Wolfgang Merkel, for valuable comments as well as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for financial support within the framework of the Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder Scholarship for Anticipatory Peace Politics. Notes 1. Warren Christopher, ‘America's Leadership, America's Opportunity’, Foreign Policy, No. 98 (1995), pp. 6–27; Jon C. Pevehouse, ‘Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3 (2002), pp. 515–49, p. 515. 2. Although the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed OSCE only in 1995, this article will consistently use OSCE. 3. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki 1975, p. 4–8, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 4. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 19–21 November 1990, p. 3, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/4045_en.pdf.html (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 5. Thomas Ohlson and Mimmi Söderberg, From Intra-State War To Democratic Peace in Weak States, Uppsala Peace Research Papers, No. 5, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2002, p. 2. However, most of the few large-N, longitudinal, data-based studies that focus specifically on civil wars argue in favour of a conflict-dampening impact of democracy, which is consistent with a domestic variant of the democratic peace thesis 6. ‘Democratic peace theory’ operates on the assumption that democracy is, by definition, a method of resolving societal conflicts in a non-violent manner. Democracies are resistant to intra-state wars because they provide legitimate channels for dispute resolution that are absent from non-democracies. For a good overview on the democratic peace theory see, for example, Michael E. Brown, et al. (ed.), Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Anna Geis, ‘Diagnose: Doppelbefund – Ursache: ungeklärt? Die Kontroversen um den “demokratischen Frieden”’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2001), pp. 282–97; Harald Müller, ‘The Antinomy of the Democratic Peace’, International Politics, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2004), pp. 494–520. With regard to the view that democracies are even less prone to internal violent conflict than autocracies, see, for example, Matthew Krain and Marissa E. Myers, ‘Democracy and Civil War: A Note on the Democratic Peace Proposition’, International Interactions, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997), pp. 109–18; Rudolph J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy As a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, ‘War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 4, (2000), pp. 1–29 7. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ‘Democratization and the Danger of War’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 5–38; Nils P. Gleditsch and Havard Hegre, ‘Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of Analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1997), pp. 283–310; Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, ‘Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946–92’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2000), pp. 275–99 8. Pamela Jawad, Diversity, Conflict, and State Failure: Chances and Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the ‘Rose Revolution’, Cornell Occasional Paper, No. 30–3, Cornell Peace Studies Program, 2006, p. 1 9. This section contains excerpts from Pamela Jawad, Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the ‘Rose Revolution’?, PRIF (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt) Reports, No. 73, PRIF, 2005; Pamela Jawad, Europe's New Neighborhood on the Verge of War: What Role for the EU in Georgia?, PRIF Reports, No. 74, PRIF, 2006; Jawad, Diversity, Conflict, and State Failure (note 8) 10. For the general role of Soviet nationality policy in the recurrence of national movements in the late 1980s or its effect on the relationships between different communities see particularly R. Dehdashti, Internationale Organisationen als Vermittler in innerstaatlichen Konflikten. Die OSZE und der Berg Karabach-Konflikt [International Organizations as Mediator in Intrastate Conflicts. The OSCE and the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict] (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000), pp. 26–36 11. Darell Slider, ‘Democratization in Georgia’, in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 156–200, p. 169 12. The region's name – South Ossetia – is the term most frequently used in official documents and diplomatic discourse, as in this contribution. Georgians, however, often refer to the region as ‘Shida Kartli’, as ‘Tskhinvali Region’, or – in the case of hard-line nationalists – as ‘Samachablo’ (the land of the aristocratic Georgian Machabeli family); see International Criss Group (ICG), Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report No. 159 (26 Nov. 2004), p. 2. South Ossetia, bordering the Russian province of North Ossetia, represents the smallest among the secessionist entities in the post-Soviet space. It was granted the status of an autonomous region in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923 13. Autonomous regions (oblast) possessed the smallest degree of autonomy in the Soviet system, especially compared to autonomous republics, e.g., North Ossetia, which was given the status of autonomous republic in the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR), and Abkhazia, which was given status of autonomous republic in the Georgian SSR 14. According to UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimations as of 1998, 30,000 Ossetians from Georgia and 10,000 from South Ossetia registered as refugees in North Ossetia. Additionally, some 10,000 Georgians and persons of mixed ethnicity were displaced from South Ossetia to Georgia proper, and 5,000 internally displaced in South Ossetia. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, 10,000 Georgian from South Ossetia became refugees and 80,000 Ossetians took refuge in the Russian north, see International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Georgia: New IDP Strategy Awaits Implementation – A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, Geneva, 11 Oct. 2007, pp. 37–9, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/66916B7C0F146FF4C125737100 2B8044/$file/Georgia + -October + 2007.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 15. According to the 1989 census, Ossetians in South Ossetia numbered 65,000 (66.6 per cent of an overall population of approximately 99,700, including some 26,000 ethnic Georgians), with 98,000 in the rest of Georgia. Today, South Ossetia has approximately 70,000 to 80,000 inhabitants 16. UNHCR, ‘Population Movements as a Consequence of the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict’, updated 1 September 2004, cited in ICG (note 12), p. 6. 17. For a description of the atrocities committed by both sides in the 1990 to 1992 violent conflict, see Human Rights Watch, Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Violations of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Georgia–South Ossetia Conflict (New York: HRW, 1992) 18. For an evaluation of OSCE long-term missions see Pamela Jawad, ‘Krisenprävention – Zehn Jahre Langzeitmissionen der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE), 1992 bis 2001’ [‘Crisis Prevention – Ten Years of OSCE Long-term Missions, 1992 to 2001’] (Heidelberg: unpublished manuscript, 2003) 19. Protocol No. 3 of the Sochi Agreement defined a circle with a 15 km radius from the centre of Tskhinvali as the zone of conflict as well as a security corridor consisting of a 14 km band divided evenly on both sides of the former oblast's administrative borders. Protocol No. 3, 12 July 1994, signed in Vladikavkaz. See ICG, Georgia-South Ossetia: Refuguee Return the Path to Peace. Europe Briefing No. 38 (19 April 2005), p. 1 20. See note 13 21. Oksana Antonenko, ‘Frozen Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia’, in Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold (ed.), Statehood and Security – Georgia after the ‘Rose Revolution’ (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), pp. 205–70, p. 206 22. According to the 1989 census, Abkhazia had a population of 525,000 people, of which 239,000 (45 per cent) were ethnic Georgians. Almost all the Georgians fled Abkhazia by October 1993. See Gocha Khundadze, Georgia's Refugee Recount, Tbilisi, 28 April 2004, available at www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64D87Q?OpenDocument (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). However, with regard to demographic developments in a long-term perspective see Eva-Maria Auch, ‘Der Konflikt in Abchasien in historischer Perspektive’, in Institut für Friendensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik Hanborg (ISFH) (ed.), OSZE-Jahrbuch 2004 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), pp. 237–52 23. Eduard Shevardnadze was the former Secretary General of the Georgian Communist Party and former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. He returned to Georgia in March 1992 24. Slider (note 11), p. 157 25. Martina Bielawski and Uwe Halbach, Der georgische Knoten – Die Südossetien-Krise im Kontext georgisch-russischer Beziehungen [The Georgian knot – The South Ossetian crisis in the context of Georgian-Russian relations] (Berlin: SWP, 2004), p. 7 26. Approximately 100 ethnic groups inhabit the country that has an officially estimated population of 4.6 million people (2002) and – keeping in mind emigration – a realistically estimated population of about four million. In the context of potential conflicts, not only the numerical strength of the ethnic groups is relevant, but also the compactness of their settlement areas and the fact that in many cases they speak their own languages. The main ethnic groups are Georgians (70 per cent), Armenians (8 per cent), Azerbaijanians (6 per cent), Russians (4 per cent), Ossetians (3 per cent), and Abkhazians (2 per cent) 27. Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 196. Holsti used the term of ‘frozen conflicts’ to describe the result of a philosophical dilemma: ‘you cannot force communities to live together – particularly communities that believe their physical survival is at stake – but you cannot separate them either. The conflict becomes frozen rather than settled. This is not conflict resolution; it is conflict perpetuation’ 28. The term ‘consolidation’ refers to the process of a democratic regime becoming stabilized and deeply rooted. A democracy is considered to be consolidated once democratic rules are accepted by all important groups as the only valid rules, once the governing political elites abstain from manipulating them, once the democracy is based on a political culture that represents a civic culture, and once anti-regime opposition has been weakened 29. As a result of Georgia's unsatisfactory macro-economic performance and progress on structural reforms, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not release a second tranche of another $30 million in 2003. The same year, the European Commission revised its policy towards Georgia outside the regular cycle of programming reviews due to the deterioration of the situation. European Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2003–2006 Georgia, 23 Sept. 2003, pp. 3, 11, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/csp/03_ 06_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007) 30. Cited in ICG (note 12), p. 7 31. In an address to the UN General Assembly on 22 Sept. 2006, Saakashvili said that ‘the painful, but factual truth is that these regions [Abkhazia and South Ossetia] are being annexed by our neighbour to the north – the Russian Federation’. United Nations Association of Georgia, Georgia: Saakashvili Unveils ‘Fresh’ Roadmap in UN Speech, 22 Sept. 2006, available at www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EKOI-6TY49H?OpenDocument, (accessed 7 Dec. 2007) 32. Russia has distributed large numbers of Russian passports in Georgia's two breakaway regions; e.g., South Ossetia's de facto foreign minister claims that close to 90 per cent of all Ossetians in South Ossetia have become Russian citizens, cited in ICG (note 12), p. 7 33. Uwe Halbach, ‘Die Krise in Georgien: Das Ende der “‘Rosenrevolution”?' [The Crisis in Georgia: The End of the ‘Rose Revolution’?] SWP–Aktuell, No. 61, SWP, Nov. 2007 34. United Nations Association of Georgia, Timeline of Political Standoff in Georgia, Tbilisi, 3 Nov. 2007, available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id = 16180 (accessed 30 Nov. 2007) 35. United Nations Association of Georgia, Saakashvili's Address on Snap Presidential Elections, Tbilisi, 8 Nov. 2007, available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id = 16264 (accessed 30 Nov. 2007) 36. CSCE, Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council, Helsinki, 24 March 1992, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/03/4150_en.pdf (accessed Oct. 2007). 37. OSCE, Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other Field Activities, No.SEC.INF/48/06/Corr.1, OSCE Secretariat, 2006, p. 12f 38. Hansjörg Eiff, ‘Die OSZE-Mission für Georgien’, in IFSH (ed.), OSZE–Jahrbuch 1995 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), p. 180f 39. OSCE, (note 37), p. 12f 40. OSCE, Annual Report 1996 on OSCE Activities, Vienna, 15 Jan. 1997, p. 5, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/cio/1997/01/14117_285_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 41. Ibid 42. Ibid 43. Ibid 44. OSCE, Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities – 1 November 1999-31 October 2000, Vienna, 24 Nov. 2000, p. 45, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2005/05/14111_280_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007) 45. Sometimes regular election observation is considered the most important role the OSCE can play in the spread of democracy. See Peter Schlotter, ‘The OSCE's Contribution to “Democratic Peace” – 30 Years of the Helsinki Final Act’, in IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2005 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), pp. 61–8, here: p. 68 46. BTI, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003: Georgia, available at http://bti2003.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/laendergutachten_en/gus_mongolei/Georgia.pdf (accessed 30 Nov. 2007), p. 1. 47. Ghia Nodia, Nations in Transit 2004: Georgia, Freedom House, 2004, p. 2, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan016576.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 48. OSCE, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003, Vienna, 1 October 2004, p. 91, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/osce/2004/10/10575_26_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007) 49. OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia: Parliamentary Elections – 2 November 2003, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, Part 1, Warsaw, 28 January 2004, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/01/1992_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 50. OSCE/ODIHR, Parliamentary Elections, Georgia – 2 November 2003, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, Tbilisi, 3 November 2003, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/11/1031_en.pdf) (accessed 31 Oct. 2007) 51. All three, Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze, had been part of the Shevardnadze era. Saakashvili had been Minister of Justice until he resigned in 2002 because the cabinet refused to approve an anti-corruption law. After the foundation of the Citizen's Union of Georgia (CUG) in August 1993, Zhvania became its first Secretary General and later on Chairman of Parliament. In November 2001, he resigned from this position in protest against the attempt to crack down on the independent TV station ‘Rustawi2’. Burjanadze was Chairwoman of Parliament at the time of the ‘Rose Revolution’ and became interim president after Shevardnadze's resignation, as provided for by the constitution 52. OSCE (note 48), p. 91 53. OSCE/ODIHR, Report on Extraordinary Presidential Elections – 4 January 2004, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, Warsaw, 28 February 2004, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/02/2183_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 54. OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia: Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections – 28 March 2004, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, Part 2, Warsaw, 23 June 2004, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/06/3193_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 55. OSCE, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2004, Vienna, 28 April 2005, p. 86, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2005/04/14066_269_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 56. Jawad, (note 8), p. 8f 57. Jawad 2005, (note 9), p. 11 58. OSCE, 2005 Annual Report on OSCE Activities, Vienna, 25 April 2006, p. 20, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2006/04/18784_589_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 59. OSCE (note 55), p. 86 60. OSCE, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2006, Vienna, 23 April 2007, p. 59, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2007/04/24112_830_en.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 61. OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia: Municipal Elections – 5 October 2006, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission, Final Report, Warsaw, 20 December 2006, available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/OfficeforDemocraticGovernance/$file/odgalreport. pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 62. OSCE (note 60), p. 59 63. Ibid., p. 20 64. Ibid., p. 86 65. Ghia Nodia, Nations in Transit 2007: Georgia, Freedom House, 2007, p. 289, available at http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007final/nit-georgia-web.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2007). 66. Ibid., p. 228 67. OSCE (note 58), p. 86 68. OSCE (note 55), p. 86 69. Halbach, (note 33) ‘Die Krise in Georgien: Das Ende der ‘“Rosenrevolution”?', p. 1 70. OSCE (note 55), p. 86 71. OSCE (note 58), p. 86f 72. Nodia (note 65), p. 228 73. OSCE (note 60), p. 59 74. Nodia (note 65), p. 228 75. This argument is also made by a research project on external democracy promotion by international organizations that the author conducts at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany 76. On the OSCE's imbalance between its three dimensions of comprehensive security in Central Asia, see Alexander Warkotsch, ‘International Socialization in Difficult Environments: The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Central Asia’, Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2007), pp. 491–508 77. OECD, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, Paris, April 2007, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf (accessed 31 May 2007) Additional informationNotes on contributorsPamela Jawad Pamela Jawad is Research Associate in the Research Department of International Organization, Democratic Peace and the Rule of Law at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany. She is also chief editor of the annual Conflict Barometer published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.
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