Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The Unravelling of Pakistan

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 51; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00396330903011453

1468-2699

John R. Schmidt,

South Asian Studies and Conflicts

Abstract Self-absorbed and disposed to muddle through even as their world is crumbling about them, the feudal elites who govern Pakistan are poorly equipped to resist the growing threat from radical Islamic forces. Having played the key role in the emergence of radical Islam in Pakistan by using jihadist groups to advance Pakistani foreign-policy interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir, Pakistani authorities have long since lost their ability to control them. The desultory Army performance against Pakistani Taliban forces in the tribal areas and the recent concessions made in Swat suggest they lack the will to decisively meet the radical Islamic threat. The consequence of their persistent failure to act may be the eventual collapse of the state Notes The best analysis of Pakistani feudal culture and its manifestation at the political level can be found in an anthropological field study conducted by Stephen M. Lyon, currently senior lecturer in anthropology at Durham University, for his PhD thesis at the University of Kent, published in 2002. Entitled ‘Power and Patronage in Pakistan’, it is available at http://sapir.ukc.ac.uk/SLyon/Lyon.pdf. See, in particular, chapter 9 on ‘State Power’. The thesis is also available in book form as An Anthropological Analysis of Local Politics and Patronage in a Pakistani Village (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004). Former President Musharraf complained that only 1% of Pakistanis paid income tax in remarks quoted in the New York Times (Barry Bearak, ‘Pakistan Battles its Tax Scofflaws’, 27 May 2000), but subsequently did nothing about it. In an editorial in the 18 November 2008 edition of the Karachibased English-language newspaper Dawn (‘A Strategy in the Making’), former Pakistani Finance Minister and World Bank Senior Economist Shahid Javed Burki argues that the problem actually worsened under Musharraf, with the tax-to-GDP ratio declining to the lowest level in Pakistani history. See Ahmed Rashid's account of the rise of the Pakistani Taliban and its early encounters with the Pakistan Army in Descent Into Chaos (New York: Viking, 2008), pp. 265–82. Descent Into Chaos also chronicles the movement of the Afghan Taliban into Quetta, Baluchistan and FATA and the support it received from ISI out of concern over the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Ibid., pp. 248–51. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, ‘Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say’, New York Times, 1 August 2008. Michael Scheuer discusses the Indian penetration of Afghanistan and the Pakistani reaction in ‘India's Strategic Challenge in Pakistan's Afghan Hinterland’, Terrorism Focus, vol. 5, no. 30, 12 August 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnewstt_news=5118&tx_ttnewsbackPid=246&no_cache=1. For an excellent discussion of Lashkare- Tayiba, its origin, ideology and goals, see Oliver Roy and Mariam Abou Zahab, Islamist Networks (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 32–44. The book is also an excellent resource for information on JeM, HUM and other jihadist and sectarian groups present in Pakistan. Bill Roggio, ‘Taliban Has “Lost” in Bajaur, Mohmand: Pakistan Military’, Long War Journal, 1 March 2009. Rashid notes that in 2004, the Pakistani Taliban, under Army pressure in South Waziristan, decamped to North Waziristan, from which it later returned. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 274–5. ‘Pakistan Hunting Swat Militants’, BBC News, 8 December 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7134089.stm. This alleged Army success in Swat was widely reported in the press at the time. For a concise history of the fighting in Swat see Muhktar E. Khan, ‘The Return of Shari'a Law to Pakistan's Swat Region’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 7, no. 4, 3 March 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34576&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=39f144 cf02. It remains to be explained how Swat Taliban forces could have been near defeat in December 2007 yet manage to come back to defeat the Army little more than one year later. One possibility, for which there is no direct evidence, is that they were reinforced by Pakistani Taliban forces from Bajaur, whose leader, Fakir Mohammed, enjoys close ties to Swat and the TNSM. This could be one reason why Taliban forces seem to have vanished from parts of Bajaur. Pakistani economist Meekal Aziz Ahmed describes the methods used by Pakistani governments to avoid implementing IMF-mandated reforms in an op-ed in the English-language Pakistani newspaper, The News, 1 December 2008, available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=149919. Hassan Abbas describes the spread of Taliban forces into other areas of the NWFP in ‘From FATA to the NWFP: The Taliban Spread Their Grip in Pakistan’, CTC Journal, vol. 1, no. 10, 17 September 2008, pp. 3–5, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss10.pdf. Jane Perlez, ‘Pakistan's Military Chief Criticizes U.S. Over a Raid’, New York Times, 10 September 2008, p. A8. Anatol Lieven, ‘How Pakistan Works’, lecture, Chatham House, London, 5 December 2007, pp. 10–11, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/10669_051207lieven.pdf. Lieven makes the same assertion in ‘A Memo for President Obama’, National Interest Online, 18 November 2008, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20244. For an account of this incident and the reaction to it see Hassan Abbas, ‘The Road to Lal Masjid and its Aftermath’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 5, no. 14, 19 July 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnewstt_news=4322&tx_ttnewsbackPid=182&no_cache=1. See Salman Masood, ‘Fear of Taliban Reaches Lahore’, International Herald Tribune, 3 November 2008. Lawyer and columnist Ahmad Rafay Alam describes Taliban threats to shopkeepers and their frightened response in ‘The Beginning of the Talibanization of Lahore?’, Let Us Build Pakistan, 14 October 2008, http://letusbuildpakistan.blogspot.com/2008/10/beginning-of-talibanization-of-lahore.html. See also Patrick Coburn and Issam Ahmed, ‘The Dancing Girls of Lahore Strike Over Taliban Law’, Independent, 12 December 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/dancing-girls-of-lahore-strikeover-taliban-law-1062907.html. Aoun Abbas Sahi notes similar incidents reported in the Seraiki belt in southern Punjab. See ‘The Punjab Connection’, Newsline, October 2008, http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsOct2008/cover3oct2008.htm. Zahid Hussain, ‘Death Threat for Editor Najem Sethi Over Islamic Cartoon’, The Times, 26 July 2008. ‘Militants Kill 7 Police In Pakistan Attack’, Reuters, 7 February 2008. A Taliban spokesman commenting on the attack stated that ‘our leaders have formally allowed our volunteers to carry out attacks in Punjab, which they have been planning for two years’. Aoun Abbas Sahi also discusses the rise of radical Islam in the Seraiki area of Punjab in ‘The Punjab Connection’. Randeep Ramesh, ‘Sri Lanka Cricket Team Attack Echoes Deadly MumbaiOffensive’, Guardian, 3 March 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/03/sri-lanka-cricketpakistan-mumbai. See comments by former CIA director Michael Hayden in a Fox News interview, ‘CIA Director: Al Qaeda is Job 1 of Top 10 Security Challenges in 2009’, 2 February 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/02/02/cia-directoral-qaeda-job-security-challenges/. Stephen Coll, ‘The Back Channel’, New Yorker, 2 March 2009, p. 38. The number of madrassas in Pakistan is a matter of some dispute. Auon Abass Sahi (‘The Punjab Connection’) uses the Pakistan government number of 13,000 registered madrassas and asserts there are about 20,000 altogether, a commonly cited figure. Most of the government-registered madrassas are in Punjab. The numbers cited appear to represent a steep increase over the past decade. Ian Talbot quotes a figure of 2,521 registered madrassas as of 1997 in Pakistan: A Modern History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 388. It is unclear what percentage of madrassas can be considered radical. One figure commonly seen is 10–15%, used by Stephen Cohen in his book The Idea of Pakistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 182. Triangulating what evidence does exist suggests that radical madrassas in Punjab probably number in the hundreds and have proliferated significantly over time. Most importantly, no barrier exists to their establishment. The mullahs are pushing against an open door. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJohn R. Schmidt John R. Schmidt is a former senior officer in the US Foreign Service who was Political Counselor at the US Embassy in Islamabad from 1998 to 2001. He currently teaches a graduate seminar on ‘Pakistan and the Radical Islamic Threat’ at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington DC.