Historical representation of the wartime accounts of the activities of the OUN–UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Ukrainian Insurgent Army)
2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13501670600983008
ISSN1743-971X
Autores Tópico(s)Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements The author is indebted to David Marples, John‐Paul Himka and Karyn Ball at the University of Alberta for their support, suggestions and constructive criticism. Notes 1. Gerner and Karlsson, Folkmordens historia, 60, citing Semler, “Das Elend linker Immunisierungsversuche,” 188. 2. See for instance Serbyn and Krawchenko, Famine in Ukraine; Danylenko et al., Stalinizm na Ukraïni. 3. Gross, Revolution, 228–29. 4. Snyder, Sketches, 177. 5. Gross, Revolution, 227. 6. Snyder, Sketches, 177. 7. According to a 1943 report by the Polish Red Cross, cited by Jan T. Gross, “52 percent of the Polish citizens sent to Russia were ethnic Poles, 30 percent were Jewish and 18 percent were Ukrainian and Belorussian.” Gross, Revolution, 199. 8. See Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente”, 262–69; also see the review by Dieter Pohl in H‐Soz‐u‐Kult, 30 April 2001, 〈http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/546.pdf〉 (accessed 6 May 2006) and Rudling, “Bodgan Musial and the Question of Jewish Responsibility for the Pogroms in Western Ukraine.” 9. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 45. 10. Bihl, “Ukrainians in the Armed Forces of the Reich,” 139. 11. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 47. 12. Kosyk, The Third Reich, 63. 13. However, the Bandera faction themselves preferred to call themselves OUN(SD), Orhanizatsyia Ukraïns’kikh Natsionalistiv (Samostiynykiv‐Derzhavnykiv) (The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [Supporters of Statehood and Independence]): Kentiy, Narysy istoriï Orhanizatsiï Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv, 5. 14. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 47. 15. Pirie, Unravelling the Banner, 82. 16. Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews,” 175; also: 〈http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje16/text11.htm〉. 17. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 291. 18. Marples, Stalinism, 73–74. 19. Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 8. 20. Motyl, The Turn to the Right, 142–43. Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, 143. See also Marples, Stalinism, 74. 21. Subtelny, Ukraine, 442. 22. Snyder, Reconstruction, 155. 23. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 83. 24. Koval’, Ukraïna, 153–54; Piotrowski, Genocide, 229–30. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 289, 298; Weiss, “Jewish–Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine,” 411. 25. Piotrowski, Genocide, 231. 26. Stets’ko, “Akt pro vidnovlennia Ukraïnskoï Derzhavy, 30 chervnia 1941 roku,” 239. 27. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews,” 162. 28. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 260, quoting TsDAVOVU, f. 3833, op. 3, d. 7. 1.6. 29. Hunczak, “OUN–German Relations,” 179. Snyder, Reconstruction, 165, cites Balei, Fronda Stepana Bandery, 141. 30. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 291. 31. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 252, quoting Ereignismeldung UdSSR (Operational Situational Report by the Einsatzgruppen in the USSR), no. 56 (1941): 3. 32. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 242–43, quotes TsDAHOU, f. 57, op. 4, d. 369, 1.63. 33. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 294. 34. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 286. 35. Matla, Pivdenna pohidna hrupa, 17. 36. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 250. 37. Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought, 331–53. 38. Kentiy, Narysy istoriï, 119. 39. Snyder, Sketches, 5. For Dontsov, see Sosnovskii, Dmytro Dontsov. 40. Pirie, Unravelling the Banner, 79. 41. Snyder, Sketches, 144, 42. Koval’, Ukraïna, 154, 304. 43. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 297. 44. Koval’, Ukraïna, 154. 45. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 298. 46. Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought, 343 47. Kosyk, The Third Reich, 367, cites OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, konferensiy ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby, 107–13; Prokop, “Iak narodzhuvalasia prohrama ta diial’nist’,” 20. 48. Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought, 343. 49. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism,129. 50. Marples, Stalinism, 76. 51. The OUN had a long tradition of assassination of opponents and enemies. Stepan Bandera personally ordered the death of Poles and Russians, as well as West Ukrainian “collaborators,” as regional leader of the OUN in Western Ukraine in the 1930s; Pirie, Unravelling the Banner, 86. However, while the victims of the OUN prior to 1939 could be counted in dozens, the victims from its war against the Ukrainian Poles alone could be counted in tens of thousands. In addition, there were Ukrainian victims killed by the OUN(b) for putative links to OUN(m) and Bul’ba‐Borovets. They can be counted in the tens of thousands. Snyder thinks it quite likely that UPA killed as many Ukrainians as they killed Poles in 1943; Snyder, Reconstruction, 155, 164. For a detailed account of the UPA mass murder of Poles in Ukraine during 1943, see Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 35–60. 52. Terles’s background is that of an activist for Poles of the former eastern borderlands of Poland. Nevertheless, in terms of numbers and hard facts, I have found few reasons to doubt his accounts of the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia of 1943. Terles’s numbers are largely consistent with those of non‐Polish accounts by “non‐ethnic” outsiders such as Berkhoff, Snyder and Burds. The former OUN leader, Mykola Lebed’, the nationalist perhaps most responsible for the Volhynian mass murders, resigned and left for the West under a shady deal with US intelligence. He brought with him the OUN(b) archives, and found employment with the CIA. Snyder, Reconstruction, 201; Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 21. 53. Himka, “War Criminality,” citing Bahriany, “Tak trymaty!!” 84, and “Natsional’na ideia i ‘natsionalizm’ [1946],” in Bahriany, Publitsystyka, 63. 54. UPA‐North had an Uzbek platoon; Sodol, UPA. The UPA also invited Russians to create Russian national units under their command to fight both “Hitlerite and Bolshevik imperialism;” Weiner, Making Sense of War, 247. Marples, Stalinism, 58, quoting Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic, 121, states that within the ranks of UPA there were Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Jews. Kosyk adds Georgians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Lithuanians and even individual Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and Belgians; Kosyk, The Third Reich, 373–74. 55. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 297, 291. 56. Spector, Holocaust, 271; also Weiner, Making Sense of War, 263, Snyder, Reconstruction, 170. 57. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 270. 58. Weiss, “Jewish–Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine,” 409–20. Yet, even though the murder rate of Western Ukrainian Jews was 98%, Taras Hunczak argues that “had OUN–UPA pursued an Antisemitic ideology, as Berkhoff and Carynnyk suggest, perhaps thousands of Jews would not have survived;” Hunczak, “Commentary,” 136. 59. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 264. 60. Spector, Holocaust, 270, Koval’, Ukraïna, 154. 61. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 287. 62. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 264. 63. Snyder, Reconstruction, 164. 64. Ibid., 165–66, 204–5. 65. Ibid., 169. 66. Ibid., 167. Polish sources estimate the number of Poles killed as much higher; Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 61, claims that 60,000–70,000 Poles were killed in Volhynia alone. He considers the total number of murdered Poles must be in excess of 100,000, perhaps around 200,000. Turowski and Siemaszko, who headed a 1990 commission to investigate these mass murders, estimate the total number of Polish victims to be as high as 300,000–400,000; see Turowski and Siemaszko, Zbrodnie nacjonalistów ukrainskich dokonane na ludnosci polskiej na Wolyniu. A number that often surfaces in media reports, around which there seems to be a growing consensus, is 60,000 civilian Poles killed in Volhynia and up to 20,000 Ukrainians killed by AK in Volhynia. See for instance Maksymiuk “Ukraine, Poland Seek Reconciliation Over Grisly History.” AK, the Armia Krajowa, or Home Army was the most importat Polish nationalist underground partisan movement during World War II. Its aim was to restore the Polish Republic within its pre‐1939 borders. It was supported by the Western Allies. For an account of its wartime activities in Volhynia, see Romanowski, ZWZ‐AK na Wolyniu 1939–1944. 67. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 286; Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation, 195. 68. Kuzio, “OUN v Ukraïne,” 34. 69. Dontsov, Dukh nashei stariny, 245. 70. Kubijovych, The Ukrainians in the General‐Gouvernement, 422–23. 71. Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente”, 262–69. 72. Snyder, Reconstruction, 169. 73. Ibid., 170. 74. Terles, Ethnic Cleansing, 19–20, 69. 75. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 287. 76. Snyder, Sketches, 176. 77. Snyder, Reconstruction, 169–70; idem, Sketches, 177. 78. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 68, cites Confidential Agent Report of W. Yarosh, Special Agent of the 66th Detachment of the CIC in Region XII, “RE: SB (Intelligence Section of the OUN/B),” 10 November 1950, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 144–46 79. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 68, cites memorandum from Daniel Barna, Special Agent for the CIC, 19 April 1948, INSOM Dossier C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed’. 80. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 68, cites “Personality Report,” prepared by Randolph F. Caroll, CIC, Region IV, 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, US Army, 29 December 1947, INSCOM Dossier C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed’. 81. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 13, cites secret report of CIC Special Agent Vadja V. Kolombatovic to Commanding Officer, CIC Region III, 6 May 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1906–9. 82. However, Lebed’ fled Munich, and was sheltered in the Vatican for a while. His full cooperation with American authorities delivered him asylum in the US. He died in Pittsburgh on 19 July 1998, age 88; see Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 16, 55–56. 83. To make things even more confusing, the Bandera wing of OUN called themselves OUN(sd), samostiinyki‐derazhavnyky, and OUN(r), revolutsiinyi. Robert F. Kelley, “Survey of Russian Emigration,” 96, in Lebed’ archives, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, box 1, file 12. This document was declassified on 30 October 1992. Kyrychuk, Ukraïns’kyi natsional’nyi rukh, 342. 84. Ibid., 343. 85. See Himka, “First Escape.” 86. Piotrowski, Ukrainian Integral Nationalism, 253; Kyrychuk, Ukraïns’kyi natsional’nyi rukh, 359–360. 87. Ibid., 356. 88. Kas’ianov, Do pytannia pro ideolohiiu orhanizatsiï ukraïns’kykh natsionalistiv, 32. 89. Poliszczuk, Bitter Truth, 287, citing Vidmova (Munich), no. 5 (1986): 297. 90. Kyrychuk, Ukraïns’kyi natsional’nyi rukh, 356. In Ukrainian, there are two words for “Jew.” In Polish, the word zyd is a neutral word, describing somebody of Jewish faith or ethnicity. In Russian, the word zhid can be roughly translated as “yid” or “kike,” while ievrei, meaning “Hebrew,” is a neutral word. In Ukrainian, both words can be used, but the Western Ukrainian zhyd was perceived as having clear Antisemitic undertones by people in Soviet Ukraine, something the OUN was well aware of already before the Holocaust. “True, in the formerly Polish‐controlled territory, zhyd was the common word for a Jew. But nationalist propagandists made it clear that they were fully aware of the derogatory context of the word;” Weiner, Making Sense of War, 259. In fact, the use of the word zhyd had been banned by the Soviet authorities. The return of the word in 1941 shocked many Soviet Ukrainians. Berkhoft, Harvest of Despair, 60. 91. Himka, “War Criminality,” 6, 8, 9. 92. OPC, or the Office of Policy Coordination was a US government agency, coordinating paramilitary operations, created in 1948 as a part of the National Security Council. It was merged with the CIA in 1951. 93. Burds, “The Early Cold War,” 17, cites Secret Memorandum of CIC Special Agent S. M. Clemens for the Officer in Charge, Region IV, dated 30 September 1948, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ. 94. Himka, “War Criminality,” 11. 95. Prokop, “The Journal ‘Ideya i Chyn’,” 34–35. In addition, some other volumes make reference in passing to the decision to ethnically cleanse Volhynia; see Omelesiuk, “UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotsi;” idem, “Za shcho boret’sia UPA;” Voloshyn, “Na shliakakh zbroinoï borot’by;” Makar, “Pivnichno‐zakhidni ukraïns’ki zemli.” 96. Misilo, Litopys UPA. 97. 〈http://www.litopysupa.com/〉 (accessed 19 August 2006). 98. Poliszczuk, Bitter Truth, 350–52; Panchenko, Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns’ Kykh Natsionalistiv, 244–45. 99. Serhiichuk, Nasha Krov, 3, 7, 48–49, 64. 100. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 286. 101. Kosyk, The Third Reich , 377–82. 102. Tsaruk, Trahediia Volyns’kikh sil 1943–1944 rr. 103. Aster, “Reflections on the Work of Peter J. Potichnyj,” 226–227. 104. Hunczak, “Commentary,” 132. Other high‐profile writers, have used a technicality to show that there cannot have been any Ukrainian Nazis. Kuropas, for instance, denies “that any Ukrainian could have been a Nazi, because he or she would not have gained entry to the Nazi Party.” Rickert, “Kuropas Maintains He Is Not an Antisemite.” 105. See, for instance, Potichnyj and Shtendera, Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground. 106. Bilinsky, “Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues,” 375. 107. Around the same time, a bloody campaign of terror enacted by Poles against Ukrainians was carried out in areas that today are located in Poland. These campaigns are outside the scope of this paper, but see Serhiichuk, Trahediia ukraïntsiv Pol’shchi; Koval’, Ukraïna v drugii svitovyi. 108. For Kuropas’s reaction to Berkhoff, see Kuropas, “Ukraine under Nazi Rule.” For the actual number of Jews in the NKVD, the Soviet secret police, the most complete data available exist for 1939; see Petrov and Sorokin, Kto rukovodil NKVD, 495. 109. Hunczak, “Commentary,” 129–42. 110. Kartunov, Yellow‐Blue Antisemitism. 111. In 2000, Kuropas wrote, “Big money drives the Holocaust industry … To survive, the Holocaust industry is always searching for its next mark. Ukraine’s turn is just around the corner.” Kuropas, “Holocaust Exploitation.” Democratic Congressmen Rahm Emanuel of Illinois and Henry Waxman of California sent a letter to the Chancellor of the University of Northern Illinois, calling on the university to renounce some of Kuropas’s past comments. The result of this controversy was a high‐profile call to the Bush administration to exclude Kuropas from an official US delegation sent to the swearing‐in of Ukraine’s third president Viktor Yushchenko (January 2005), following the Orange Revolution. After Kuropas’s return from Ukraine, the Bush administration publicly distanced itself from Kuropas, stating that it would not have included Kuropas in the delegation had it been aware of his allegedly Antisemitic writings; see Rickert, “Congressman Wants Peters to Renounce Kuropas Remarks;” idem, “Kuropas Maintains He Is Not an Antisemite.” In 2004, Kuropas wrote that “Jews were the tools of the Polish king; during Soviet times, they began as loyal members of the Soviet ruling elite. Later, Jews were especially well represented in the Soviet secret police … The age‐old Jewish strategy of clinging to those who rule … They [the Jews] will simply do what their predecessors have always done: quickly join the power structure”: Kuropas, “Jews for Yanukovych.” See also Rudling, “Organized Anti‐Semitism in Contemporary Ukraine,” 81–119. 112. Hunczak, “Commentary,” 129–42. On the Einsatzgruppen mass murder of August 1941 see, for instance, Streit, “Wehrmacht, Einsatzgruppen, Soviet POWs and Anti‐Bolshevism,” 103–9. On the summer 1941 murder of Volhynian Jews, see Snyder, Sketches, 181. 113. Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration;” “War Criminality,” 9–24. 114. Pirie, Unravelling the Banner, 77, 82. Additional informationNotes on contributorsPer Anders Rudling Per Anders Rudling is a doctoral candidate in history at the University of Alberta. His dissertation focuses on the construction of a Belarusian national identity. Research interests include nationalism, Antisemitism, diaspora, identity and migration. He has published on ethnic minorities in Ukraine and Canadian immigration. Educated in Uppsala, St Petersburg and San Diego, he teaches Russian history and is the editor of Past Imperfect at the University of Alberta.
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