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Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud over Brazil, 1975–7

2012; Routledge; Volume: 34; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/07075332.2012.675221

1949-6540

William Glenn Gray,

Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies

Abstract In June 1975, Helmut Schmidt's government in West Germany sanctioned the sale of a complete nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology. US observers in Congress, government, and the media reacted with alarm to this apparent setback to global non-proliferation efforts as spearheaded by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Using material from US, British, and German archives, this article examines how structural disparities in the US-German relationship augmented mutual suspicions and led both parties to behave uncooperatively. Focused narrowly on commercial rivalry with the US, politicians and industry representatives in Bonn brushed aside the concerns of non-proliferation experts, who had a weak institutional base. Jimmy Carter came to office in 1977 determined to block the consummation of the Brazil deal; he also pressed the G-7 to discontinue nuclear fuel reprocessing. Carter's abrupt unilateralism offended US allies, but together the US and France put pressure on West Germany to renounce sensitive nuclear exports. Schmidt grudgingly agreed to show more caution, but few lessons were learned; many Germans came away feeling that US-led export restrictions were overbearing, hypocritical and self-serving. While cooperative within NATO and European frameworks, West Germans remained ambivalent on global problems of proliferation until the 1990s. Keywords: Non-Proliferation TreatyNuclear Suppliers GroupWest GermanyBrazilCarter, JimmyFord, GeraldKissinger, HenrySchmidt, Helmuturaniumplutoniumenrichmentreprocessing Notes 1. 'Bonn's Atomic Sale …' N[ew] Y[ork] T[imes], 29 June 1975. 2. For a German-language account of the Brazil treaty controversy, see K. Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis. Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin, 2005), 75–98. 3. H. Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Stabilität. Außenbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik zwischen Ölkrise und NATO-Doppelbeschluß (Munich, 1986), 67–70; W. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1989), 105–6; C.Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Weltmacht wider Willen? (Berlin, 1997), 217–20; H. Soell, Helmut Schmidt. Macht und Verantwortung, 1969 bis heute (Munich, 2008), 637–8; G. Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York, 1986), 60–1; S. Kaufmann, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb, 2008), 103–5. 4. T. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1995). 5. On the recurrent phenomenon of 'nuclear alarmism', see F. Gavin, 'Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War', International Security, xxxiv(2009/10), 7–37. For complaints that Carter's tightening did no good, see S.Cooke, InMortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age (New York, 2009), 258–60. 6. H. Müller, 'Germany and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' in H. W. Maull (ed), Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, (Houndmills, 2006), 49–65. 7. M. Küntzel, Bonn und die Bombe. Deutsche Atomwaffenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt (Frankfurt, 1992). 8. Text of the NPT available at < http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml> 9. W. G. Gray, 'Abstinence and Ostpolitik: Brandt's Government and the Nuclear Question' in C. Fink and B. Schaefer (eds), Ostpolitik 1969–1974: The European and Global Response (New York, 2008), 244–68; here 256–7. 10. Conversation Brandt/Tito, 19 Apr. 1973, geheim, A[kten zur] A[uswärtigen] P[olitik der Bundesrepublik] D[eutschland] 1973 (Munich, 2004), 559–60; Egon Bahr notes on a conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador, 27 Nov. 1973, A[rchiv] d[er] s[ozialen] D[emokratie – Bonn], Depositum Bahr, Bd. 438; US Belgrade (Johnson) 14, 3 Jan. 1974, N[ational] A[rchives and] R[ecord] A[dministration], RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1976, S[tate] D[epartment] C[ables]. This is a series of hundreds ofthousands of electronic cables available at < http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-description.jsp?s=4073>. 11. Meeting of the 'Arbeitsgruppe ASPV' of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, 13 Sept. 1973, p. 14: Archiv für christlich-demokratische Politik – St. Augustin, Nachlass Birrenbach, I-433-198/1. 12. US Bonn (Hillenbrand) 8226, 23 May 1974, secret, priority, SDC. On the explosion itself, see G. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, 1999), 170–87. 13. AA-Abt. 2 (Günter van Well), Memo, Auswirkungen des indischen Atomtests, 25 June 1974, P[olitisches] A[rchiv] des A[uswärtigen] A[mts – Berlin], B 43, Bd. 107359. On the sale to India, which German officials defended at the time, see Gray, 'Abstinence and Ostpolitik', 260–1. 14. AA-Abt. 4 (Hermes), Memo, Zündung eines nuklearen Sprengsatzes durch Indien; hier: mögliche Folgen für die internationale Zusammenarbeit bei der friedlichen Verwendung der Kernenergie, 31 July 1974, AAPD 1974 (Munich, 2005), 1001–4. 15. Cooke, In Mortal Hands, 249–51. 16. Study in response to NSSM 202, 1 Oct. 1974, secret, NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC, H-205. 17. On the convening of the Suppliers Group, see J. Samuel Walker, 'Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980', Diplomatic History, xxv (2001), 215–49; here 223–5. See also DepSta (Ingersoll) to US Paris etc. 241799, 2 Nov. 1974, secret/exdis, priority, SDC. 18. J.C.E. Hymans suggests that the Bonn Republic had so thoroughly internalised its status as a 'non-nuclear weapons state' that it could not divine the motives of bomb-hungry countries such as Brazil. Hymans, 'Non-Nuclear Weapons States and Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of West Germany during the Ostpolitik Era', conference paper for the Mershon Center/German Historical Institute Conference on Ostpolitik, June 2006. Cited with permission. See also Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York, 2006). 19. Hermes, Memo, Zusammenarbeit mit Brasilien auf dem Gebiet der friedlichen Verwendung der Kernenergie, 8 Aug. 1974, [PA/AA], B 1, Bd. 178599, handwritten note on p. 5. Carlo Patti, a doctoral student at the University of Florence, is currently writing a dissertation on Brazil and the NPT that will shed further light on the motives of the Brazilian leadership. 20. Hermes, Memo, Zusammenarbeit mit dritten Staaten auf dem Gebiet der Urananreicherung; hier: Brasilien, 4 July 1974, [PA/AA], Ref. 413, Bd. 114140. On the gascentrifuge process, see S. Schrafstetter and S. Twigge, 'Spinning into Europe: Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands – Uranium Enrichment and the Development of the Gas Centrifuge 1964–1970', Contemporary European History, xi (2002), 253–72. 21. For the contents of the 'guidelines' agreement initialed by Haunschild on 3 October, see the attachment of Hans Mertes' letter to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 3 Dec. 1974, B 1, Bd. 178599. 22. Mertes to Genscher, 3 Dec. 1974, as above. Mertes was writing in his capacity as a board member of the Deutsches Atomforum. 23. AA-Abt. 4 (Lautenschlager) to DG Brasilia 5150 Plurex, 5 Dec. 1974, vertraulich, cito, AAPD 1974, 1584–87. 24. Hermes, Memo, Langfristige technisch-industrielle Zusammenarbeit mit Brasilien auf dem Gebiet der friedlichen Verwendung der Kernenergie, 14 Feb. 1975, AAPD 1975 (Munich, 2006), 143–46. 25. For a list of Brazilian concessions, see Hermes to DG Washington, 19 Feb. 1975, NfD, citissime, B 1, Bd. 178599; also US Bonn (Hillenbrand) 2897, 20 Feb. 1975, confidential, SDC. 26. AA-Abt. 2 (Roth), Memo, Unterichtung des Ministers über derzeitigen Stand der deutsch-brasilianischen Verhandlungen, 12 Feb. 1975, AAPD 1975, 140–42. 27. Hermes to Genscher, 10 Mar. 1975, AAPD 1975, 237–41. 28. DG Washington (Staden) 566, 4 Mar. 1975, vertraulich, citissime, [PA/AA], B 150, Bd. 324. 29. DG Brasilia (Roeding) 102, 4 Apr. 1975, vertraulich, citissime nachts, B 150, Bd. 326. See also DepSta (Kissinger) to US Brasilia 87906, 17 Apr. 1975, secret, immediate, SDC, which stated explicitly that 'for the present and near future, no connection between sales of US reactors and the availability to foreign entities of US enrichment technology is possible'. 30. Hermes to DG Washington 320, 24 Mar. 1975, vertraulich, citissime nachts, B 150, Bd. 325. On 'below the belt', see US Bonn (Cash) 19502, 19 Dec. 1974, confidential/limdis, SDC. 31. DepSta (Kissinger) to US Bonn 71069, 28 Mar. 1975, confidential, SDC. 32. For records of the 7 Apr. conversations, see Hermes, Memo, 8 Apr. 1975, B 1, Bd. 178599; also US Bonn (Cash) 5604, 7 Apr. 1975, secret/exdis, SDC. 33. Record of Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, drafted 8 May 1975, confidential, [United Kingdom – National Archives] FCO 66/752; Hermes remarks on p. 3. 34. One British observer reported that: 'The Germans gave the poorest performance. Theytended to shelter behind the French and were probably suffering from a guilty conscience about their current enrichment deal with Brazil – although this was never openly mentioned.' FCO (J. C. Edmonds) to W.J.A. Wilberforce (UK Washington), 9May 1975, FCO 66/762. 35. For the contents of a conversation with Hermes in London on the evening of 23 Apr., see DepSta to US Bonn 106059, 6 May 1975, secret, priority, SDC. 36. Schmidt later complained that the Foreign Ministry had kept him in the dark aboutAmerican concerns. See Schmidt's remarks in the cabinet meeting of 8 Oct. 1975,as conveyed in a note by AA-Abt. 4 (Lautenschlager) of 10 Oct. 1975, B 1, Bd. 178599. 37. Declassified German documentation of Kissinger's swing through Bonn and Berlinfrom 20–22 May 1975 provides no indication that Kissinger raised the subjectof Brazil; see various notes published in AAPD 1975, 564–69, 577–84. The same goes for a conversation between President Ford and Schmidt (with Kissinger in attendance) during the course of the NATO summit in Brussels on 29 May 1975, ibid., 627–32. 38. 'Chancen in Brasilien', FAZ, 3 May 1975. 39. Editorial in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 May 1975, translated informally in US Bonn (Hillenbrand) 7423, 7 May 1975, SDC. 40. R. Gillette, 'Nuclear Proliferation: India, Germany May Accelerate the Process', Science, New Series Vol. 188, No. 4191 (30 May 1975), 911–14. 41. L.H. Diuguid, 'Brazil Nuclear Deal Raises US Concern', W[ashington] P[ost], 1 June 1975, A1. 42. Congressional Record – Senate, 3 June 1975, 16581–89. 43. Ibid., 16590–96. 44. On a more speculative note, it is worth noting that high-tech collaboration between Germany and South America provoked a certain lurid fascination in the English-speaking world during this period. Consider, for example, Frederick Forsyth's 1972 novel The Odessa File and Ira Levin's 1976 bestseller The Boys From Brazil. The latter featured a diabolical plot by Dr Josef Mengele to clone Adolf Hitler. J. Sutherland, Bestsellers: Popular Fiction of the 1970s (Routledge, 1981), 179–85. 45. Hermes, Hintergrundgespräch, 3 June 1975, B 1, Bd. 178599. This document includes both a five-page opening statement by Hermes and a fifteen-page record of questions and answers. 46. U. Bergdoll, 'Kampf um das Brasilien-Geschäft/Die Lieferung kerntechnischer Anlagen verstößt nicht gegen den Atomsperrvertrag', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 June 1975; 'Bonn hat genügend Sicherungen im Atom-Vertrag mit Brasilien eingebaut/Bedingungen sindsogar schärfer als im Atomsperrvertrag', Handelsblatt, 5 June 1975; E. Hauser, '"Brasilien-Vertrag unbedenklich"/Brief der EG-Kommission an die Bundesregierung/Freude über Natur-Uran', Frankfurter Rundschau, 6 June 1975. 47. 'Atomkraftwerke/Fix und fertig', Der Spiegel, 9 June 1975, 34. See also H. Michaels, 'Wie die amerikanische Konkurrenz den deutschen Reaktorexport zu behindern versucht', Die Zeit, 20 June 1975. 48. Deutscher Bundestag, 7. Wahlperiode, 178. Sitzung, 12 June 1975, Stenographische Berichte, Bd. 94, 12471. 49. 'Nuclear Power: The High-Priced Spread', WP, 8 June 1975, C6; 'Nuclear Peril … and its Preventives', NYT, 9 June 1975; 'Nuclear Madness', NYT, 13 June 1975, 36. 50. 'A Message for President Scheel', WP, 16 June 1975, A22. 51. For Kissinger's instructions and a description of the demarche, see DepSta (Kissinger) 133585, 7 June 1975, secret/exdis, immediate; US Bonn (Hillenbrand) 9407, 11 June 1975, secret/exdis, both SDC. For a detailed German account of the conversation, seeHermes to DG Washington 641, 12 June 1975, vertraulich, citissime, AAPD 1975, 739–44. 52. Conversation Ford/Kissinger, drafted by Brent Scowcroft, 13 June 1975, secret/nodis, p. 3, [Ann Arbor] G[erald] F[ord] L[ibrary], NSA, Memcons, box 12. 53. USUN to DepSta Secto 3001, 14 June 1975, secret/nodis, SDC. 54. On the Genscher/Kissinger conversations, see DG Washington (von Staden) 1753, 17June 1975, vertraulich, cito, AAPD 1975, 766–72; for the press statements, DepSta (Kissinger) 142762, 17 June 1975, SDC. For the Ford/Scheel conversation, 16 June 1975, see GFL, NSA, Memcons, box 12. 55. Schmidt quoted in the Jornal do Brasil, reported in US Brasilia (Crimmins) 5275, 27 June 1975, limited official use, SDC. Schmidt's remarks during this June 25 interview were based on a highly tendentious question-and-answer sheet prepared by lower levels of the Chancellor's Office; see Oldenkott's memo of 24 June 1975, in AdsD, H[elmut] S[chmidt] A[rchiv], Bd. 9362. 56. See also Kissinger's letter to the Brazilian Foreign Minister in DepSta 146237, 20 June 1975, confidential/exdis, SDC. Kissinger wrote that although 'we are concerned' about the German-Brazilian treaty 'from the proliferation point of view', public discussion ofit 'must not be allowed to affect the present cordial and constructive relationship between our two countries'. 57. See, for example, 'Atomkraftwerke/Neid der Multis', Der Spiegel, 23 June 1975, 62, and J. Schwelien, 'Heiße Geschäft mit dem Atomstrom/Hinter Washingtons Bedenken: Die Interessen der Konkurrenz?', Die Zeit, 27 June 1975. On the softening of media outrage, see US Bonn (Hillenbrand) 10796, 2 July 1975, SDC. 58. DG Washington (von Staden) 1701, 12 June 1975, Ref. 413, Bd. 114243. 59. Rede Helmut Schmidts zur Konjunkturpolitik, 27 June 1975, AdsD, SPD-Parteivorstand, Bd. 625. 60. See, for example, the German 'non-paper' conveyed from DG London (Lorenzen) to G.C. Edmonds of the FCO, 7 Oct. 1975, FCO 66/757. AA-Abt. 4 (Lautenschlager), Memo, Deutsch-iranische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie, 24 July 1975, B 1, Bd. 178599. See also DepSta (Ingersoll) 166532, 15 July 1975, secret/exdis, SDC. 61. Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, 5 Nov. 1975, confidential, FCO 66/845. 62. Henderson to Callaghan, 13 Aug. 1975, confidential, FCO 66/761; UK Paris (Tomkins) to FCO 1048, 28 Oct. 1975, confidential, priority, FCO 66/758. 63. US Paris (Gammon) 33474, 23 Dec. 1975, secret, SDC. 64. AA (Balken), Memo, Deutsch-brasilianische Gespräche über ein trilaterales Abkommen über Sicherungsmaßnahmen vom 20. bis 25. November 1975, 1 Dec. 1975, B 1, Bd. 178599. 65. DepSta (Ingersoll) to US IAEA-Vienna 41782, 21 Feb. 1976, confidential, immediate, SDC. For a lengthy narrative of the discussion on the treaty at the IAEA, see US IAEA-Vienna (Stone) 1878, 10 Mar. 1976, confidential, in ibid. 66. Not surprisingly, papers originating with the BMFT contain much more detail about the precise facilities being sold. See, for example, Schmidt-Küster's memo of 15 May 1975, found in Ref. 413, Bd. 114243. 67. A. Ribicoff, 'A Marked-Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales Problem', Foreign Affairs 54, July 1976, 763–87. 68. Carter's 11‐point programme on non-proliferation, 25 Sept. 1976, excerpted in FCO 66/845. The candidate's basic views on reprocessing had been articulated as early as May; see 'Carter's Nuclear Blast', NYT, 21 May 1976. 69. For Kissinger's remarks, see DG UN (Wolff) 2430, 7 Oct. 1976, geheim, citissime, AAPD 1976 (Munich, 2007), 1367–72. 70. Statement on Nuclear Policy, 28 Oct. 1976, in Public Papers of the Presidents, 1976, Vol.III (Washington, 1977), Doc. 987. 71. Remarks by Xavier de Nazelle, the French science director at the Quai d'Orsay, reported in UK Paris (Renwick) to J. A. Thomson of the FCO, 7 July 1975, secret, FCO 66/754. 72. Compare US Paris (Rush) 23390, 11 Sept. 1975, secret/exdis, immediate, with US Paris (Gammon) 33448, 23 Dec. 1975, secret/exdis, both SDC. 73. US Seoul (Sneider) 9929, 27 Dec. 1975, secret/exdis, SDC. 74. Conversation Ford/Guiringaud (as recorded by Brent Scowcroft), 1 Oct. 1976, secret/exdis, p. 4, GFL, NSA, memcons, box 21. 75. DG Paris (Herbst) 3618, 17 Dec. 1976, NfD, citissime nachts, B 1, Bd. 178700. 76. AA-Abt. 4 (Lautenschlager), memo, Niederländische Beteiligung am gemeinsamen Urananreicherungsprogramm der Troika (Gasultrazentrifuge), 8 Oct. 1976, AAPD 1976, 1376–81. 77. On van der Stoel's various initiatives, see the ample documentation in B 1, Bd. 178701. 78. Hermann Bößenecker, 'Von Biblis nach Bushir/Mit den Milliarden-Aufträgen aus Brasilien und jetzt aus dem Iran hat die deutsche Atomwirtschaft nun den Durchbruch auf dem Weltmarkt geschafft', Die Zeit, 9 July 1976; 'Atomgeschäft/Kunde Carlos', DerSpiegel, 25 Apr. 1977, 34. 79. Bundeskanzleramt (Sanne), 'Wiederaufbereitungsanlage Brasilien', 25 Nov. 1976, geheim, AAPD 1976, 1545–6. 80. Ibid. See also the candid admission by Loeck, a Kanzleramt official, that 'many in the FRG' considered the Brazil treaty in its current form to be a 'foolish decision', particularly 'the inclusion of enrichment and reprocessing provisions'. US Bonn (Stoessel) 21262, 17 Dec. 1976, confidential/nodis, GFL, NSA, Country Files – Europe, box 7. 81. AA-Abt. 4 (Lautenschlager) to Ministerbüro, Aktuelle Fragen der deutschen nuklearen Exportpolitik, 7 Jan. 1977, B 1, Bd. 178700. 82. Ministerial conversation under Schmidt's leadership, 12 Jan. 1977, B 1, Bd. 178700. On Hermes' conversations in Washington, see DG Wton (Staden) 158 and 159, 16 Jan. 1977, vertraulich, citissime nachts, B 150, Bd. 360. 83. See, for example, the Mondale press conference of 2 Feb. 1977, in Presidential Papers 1977/I, 59–61. For records of the Mondale/Schmidt conversation, 25 Jan. 1977, see AAPD 1977 (Munich, 2008), 82–87; also Mondale to Brzezinski, 25 Jan. 1977, secret/eyes only, [Atlanta], J[immy] C[arter] L[ibrary], NLC-133-120-5-8-7. 84. The German record of these conversations appears in five telegrams published in AAPD 1977, dated 11–13 Feb. For a more upbeat (and, it turned out, overly optimistic) assessment, see Vance to Carter, 11 Feb. 1977, secret, JCL, NLC-128-12-5-19-1. 85. Skidmore, Politics of Military Rule, 196–7. 86. Schmidt to Carter, 23 Feb. 1977, geheim, pp. 4–5, JCL, NSA, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence, box 6. In passing this letter along to Carter on 25 February, Brzezinski snapped that Schmidt's argument 'ignores the fact that the "fundamental concept" of the NPT is to prevent proliferation'. 87. Schmidt to Carter, 23 Feb. 1977 (as above), p. 3. 88. Conversation Hermes/Stoessel, 18 Feb. 1977, B 1, Bd. 178700. 89. Conversation between Dohnanyi and British Foreign Secretary David Owen, reported in DG London (von Hase) 454, 23 Feb. 1977, vertraulich, AAPD 1977, 229–31. 90. AA-Abt. 2 (Blech), Memo, Deutsch-französische Planungsstabsgespräche, 3 May 1977, vertraulich, AAPD 1977, 539–40. 91. Conversation Hermes/Soutou, reported in DG Paris (Lahusen) 718, 8 Mar. 1977, vertraulich, citissime, AAPD 1977, 291–301. 92. Conversation Schmidt/Giscard, 3 Feb. 1977, geheim, AAPD 1977, 108–10. 93. S. Keeny et al., Nuclear Power – Issues and Choices: Report of the Nuclear Energy Study Group (Cambridge, 1977), 377–88. 94. Presidential Directive/NSC-8, 24 Mar. 1977, accessed at the Jimmy Carter Library web site: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd08.pdf 95. For the text of Carter's 29 Mar. letter to Schmidt, see AA (Dohmes) to Izmir (for Hermes), 30 Mar. 1977, geheim, citissime nachts, B 150, Bd. 364. Brzezinski's memoirs indicate that Carter was originally planning to announce the new policy publicly on 24 Mar.; see Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York, 1983), 130–1. 96. Schmidt, telephone conversation with Carter, 31 Mar. 1977, vertraulich, B 150, Bd. 364. Giscard's response to Carter included similar observations, according to the French ambassador; see Kanzleramt (Zeller), Vermerk: Abschiedsbesuch des französischen Botschafters, 31 Mar. 1977, vertraulich, in ibid. 97. See, for example, the letter from Hanns Martin Schleyer, president of the German Employers' Association, to Genscher on 10 Mar. 1977, B 1, Bd. 178701. 98. For a summary record of the meeting, see AA (Rouget) to DG Brasilia 80, 25 Mar. 1977, vertraulich, citissime, B 150, Bd. 364. 99. Conversation Schmidt/Vance, 31 Mar. 1977, geheim, AAPD 1977, 413–31; here 427, 431. 100. Conversation Carter/Genscher, 14 Mar. 1977, geheim, AAPD 1977, 306–13, here esp. 309. 101. For the text of the 'non-paper', and a series of detailed appendices outlining the specific contractual terms agreed to by the German firms vis-à-vis Brazil, see AA (Rouget) to DG Washington 361, 30 Mar. 1977, vertraulich, citissime nachts, B 150, Bd. 364. 102. Carter to Schmidt, 15 Apr. 1977; contents conveyed in AA (Schönfeld) to DG Washington 427, 19 Apr. 1977, geheim, cito, B 150, Bd. 366. See also remarks by Joseph Nye as reported in DG London (Noebel) 949, 27 Apr. 1977, NfD, citissime, B 1, Bd. 178701. 103. 'On the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy', 7 Apr. 1977; translation published in The Bulletin [Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany], 13 Apr. 1977, 63. 104. For roughly comparable accounts of the G7 summit meeting on the afternoon of Saturday, 7 May 1977, see the British record in PREM 16/1418, esp. 4–6; also the German record in AAPD 1977, 576–83. 105. G7 summit meeting (British record), 12–13. 106. Although France had delivered some reprocessing blueprints by this point, its contract appears to have played little to no role in Pakistan's later acquisition of bomb-making capacity, which came via uranium enrichment instead. See B. Chakra, 'Road to Chagai: Pakistan's Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations', Modern Asian Studies, xxxvi (2002), 871–912; also William Burr, 'The United States and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb', National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 333, Docs. 3–4. 107. The partners were, specifically, British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), the Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA), and Kernbrennstoff-Wiederaufarbeitung (KeWa). See Ref. 413, Memo, Deutsch-französischer Gipfel am 16/17. 6. 1977 in Bonn; hier: Deutsch-französischer Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen von United Reprocessors, 7 June 1977, vertraulich, B 150, Bd. 369. 108. Remarks of Soutou as conveyed in DG Paris (Herbst) 1724, 11 June 1977, geheim, citissime, AAPD 1977, 792–94. 109. Summary record of Schmidt-Giscard conversation, 17 June 1977, vertraulich, AAPD 1977, 829–36. 110. Schmidt-Giscard press statement, 17 June 1977, B 1, Bd. 178701. 111. 'Government Statement on Nuclear Exports Policy', The Bulletin, 22 June 1977, 94. 112. Kanzleramt, Kurzprotokoll über die 3. Sitzung des Rates für die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie am 17. Juni 1977, B 150, Bd. 370. 113. 'Brazil/Nuclear retreat', The Economist, 3 May 1986, 88; 'Brazil's nuclear plans/In search of enrichment', The Economist, 5 Mar. 1988, 86. 114. On the on-going cleanup of the Karlsruhe site, see http://www.um.baden-wuerttemberg.de/servlet/is/80801/. 115. Cooke, In Mortal Hands, 267–9. 116. E. Guizzo, 'How Brazil Spun the Atom', IEEE Spectrum, Mar. 2006; S. Squassoni and D. Fite, 'Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment', Arms Control Today, xxxv (2005). 117. SPD-Parteirat (unkorrigierte Bandabschrift), 27 Jan. 1977, 19, in AdsD, SPD-PV, Bd. 281. Additional informationNotes on contributorsWilliam Glenn GrayThanks to Jim Farr and the two anonymous reviewers for close reading; also to Frank Gavin, William Burr, and Erin Mahan for their encouragement. Mara Drogan and Sonja Schmidt, my co-panelists at the 2009 session of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), helped provide the occasion for a first airing of this material, complete with a friendly commentary from Stuart 'Bill' Leslie. Responses from Purdue colleagues and grad students at a Works in Progress talk were also much appreciated. Archivists at the Gerald Ford Library, Jimmy Carter Library, Archive for Social Democracy, and the Political Archive of the Foreign Office in Berlin have all been tremendously helpful, above all Knud Piening at the lattermost institution.