Dutch Flood Policy Innovations for California
2009; Wiley; Volume: 141; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1936-704x.2009.00036.x
ISSN1936-704X
Autores Tópico(s)demographic modeling and climate adaptation
ResumoFlood risk management is an important part of life in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is formed by the deltas of three rivers- the Scheldt (rain-fed, originating in southern Belgium), the Meuse (rain-fed, originating in northern France), and the Rhine (glacier and rain-fed, originating in Switzerland). The country also borders the North Sea, with the Scheldt River connecting the sea to Antwerp Harbor. The Rhine is the largest of the three rivers, splitting into three branches (the Ijssel, the Lek, and the Waal) as it crosses the border into the Netherlands (Tol et al. 2003). Two-thirds of the country lies below mean sea level (Voortman 2003). The Dutch have a long history of attempting to control floods. As early as the ninth century, the Dutch started building dikes to protect reclaimed bog land (Kaijser 2002). These dikes started as local, individually-owned structures, but communities soon realized that closed dike rings were necessary to protect all sides of the region. These dike rings eventually became waterschaps or "waterships," regional districts charged with water management including drainage and dike building. These districts are still the administrative body for flood defense (Linsten 2002, Voortman 2003). The 14th century saw the first major recorded floods in 1313 and 1315, leading to the famine from 1314-1317 that killed 5-10 percent of the population. Periodic flooding continued through much of the Netherlands' history. As sediment settled between the dikes, dikes grew taller. During the 19th century, reorganization of the water districts occurred and a national body was formed. Military engineers took over the construction and maintenance of the dike system (Tol and Langen 2000). During the 20th century, as trained engineers and the central government took over flood control efforts, the analysis of appropriate techniques and construction increased (Disco and van dev Ende 2003). Prior to 1953 dikes were built to the height of the previously known high-water level plus a margin of safety (Jonkman et al. 2004). Following the catastrophic flood of 1953, the Delta Committee was formed to advise the government regarding flood control (Voortman 2003). One recommendation of the Committee was to establish an optimal exceedance frequency of the design water level based on risk of flooding and cost of protection. Van Dantzig's 1956 paper described this risk-based calculation. He proposed that flood management required integration of three areas with noted problems: statistics, hydrology, and economics. In the past 50 years, significant effort has been devoted to expanding on van Dantzig's work and working on solutions to the problems he noted and the assumptions he made. Increased computing power, additional rainfall and hydrologic data, and watershed models have all added to the understanding of flooding while increased emergency preparedness and response have enhanced protection of land, homes, farms, businesses, and lives. Northern California also has a history of devastating floods, although the history of floods and water management is much shorter than in the Netherlands. Throughout the past century and a half, winter rains and snowmelt have resulted in flood events that have caused billions of dollars in damage and multiple deaths. One of the largest floods in California history occurred in January, 1862 following four weeks of rain. No quantitative flows are known, but the banks of the Sacramento were breached and the water was, at minimum, three feet deep from Sutter's Fort to Davis (Harding 1960). This flood also brought significant mining debris, covering the land near Marysville with one to six feet of sediment. During the second half of the 19th century, mining techniques had developed from ditch and flume operations to high powered hydraulic techniques that discharged up to a million gallons an hour from a single nozzle (Kelley 1989, Larson 1996). Over 1.5 billion cubic yards of sediment was discharged into the Feather, Yuba, Bear and American River basins from hydraulic mines (Larson 1996). However, the litigation between Woodruff and North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company (1884) effectively stopped hydraulic mining by requiring complete containment of debris. Early in the settlement of California, flood control was typically very local, with levees built by individuals or local governments. Following this major flood in 1862 and the resulting litigation, hydraulic mining ended and levee management moved to larger regional agencies and the state government. The largest recorded flows in the Sacramento River were reached during the flood of March 1907. Although some tributaries have since exceeded their 1907 flows, the Sacramento River has not exceeded its peak flow of about 600,000 cubic feet per second (16,990 m3/s) (Harding 1960). Thirty to forty inches of precipitation across Northern California during the week before Christmas in 1955 led to severe damages and levee failures. Seventy-four lives were lost and over $200 million in economic losses were attributed to the flood (Harding 1960). Record rainfalls led to major flooding in 1986. Levee breaks in the Sacramento River Basin led to 13 deaths and over $400 million in damages. Two of the most expensive floods in California's history (1995 and 1997) occurred within two years of each other and together caused nearly $4 billion in damages (Department of Water Resources website). Early in California's history, no state or federal agencies managed flood control; flood control projects were managed locally. As settlement increased, however, state and federal funding and regional management became necessary. First, state and county agencies began acting to prevent flooding and then in 1917, federal authority for flood management was granted by Congress. Since then, there has been a fluctuating balance of power between regional and district, state, and federal flood control planning, funding, and management (Kelley 1989). Six types of actions can be considered for flood management (Hoojier et al. 2004): Actions to prevent flood generation: land use management in the upstream basin, Actions to modify flood flows and elevations: flood storage, levees, by-passes, and channel improvements, Flood damage reduction actions: floodplain zoning, building codes, awareness raising, Preparatory actions: flood forecasting, warning and emergency plans, Flood event actions: crisis management, evacuation, and Post-flooding actions: aftercare, financial compensation, insurance. The Dutch concentrated mostly on preventive flood control measures, and many of the measures implemented in California were first tested by the Dutch in their attempt to control flood waters. Some more recent Dutch innovations might increase California's ability to reduce flood damage. This paper is organized into three subjects. First is a review of Dutch flood control innovations. Next, implementation of each measure is discussed in California's context. The final section wraps up the discussion with a summary of key points and conclusions. Dutch flood defenses have three components: dunes, dikes, and special structures. Natural sea dunes protect coastal areas from tides and storm surges. The dunes are planted with helm grasses to hinder erosion. Where there are no dunes, the Dutch built dikes. The dikes, initially constructed along the river, have become dike rings to provide protection on all sides. The 1500 mile dike system in the Netherlands includes some massive engineering and construction accomplishments. The Afsluitdijk dike, for example, prevents North Sea intrusion into the Zuiderzee and has created the IJsselmeer freshwater lake. The dike is over 90 m wide and 32 km long. Cross dikes are used to protect against upstream dike bursts. An early example was constructed between the Lek and Linge rivers in 1284. Although this crossdike offered protection to those downstream, it increased the damage upstream (Tol and Langen 2000). Special structures include the Maeslankering storm surge barrier that closes to protect Rotterdam and surrounding towns from flooding from abnormally large storm surges. Each of the two barrier "arms" is as tall as the Eiffel Tower if placed upright (Sayler 2006). Other special structures include cofferdams, gates, and retaining walls. In general, these special structures are in place as temporary solutions in response to a flood event or storm surge. Flood management policies and system designs are established to reduce flood damages. Engineers today use two strategies to evaluate flood management solutions: risk-based and reliability-based design. These design strategies are described below (Hoes and Schuurmans 2006, Vrijling et al. 1997, 2005, Yanmaz 2000). Risk-based design focuses on minimizing the future costs of flooding by taking preventative measures today. Risk has two components - the chance an event will occur and the consequences of that event (Sayers et al. 2002). A subset of cost-benefit analysis, the optimal risk-based design results in the minimum total cost, from summing all costs multiplied by their probabilities for each alternative, and choosing the least expensive alternative. Risk-based design requires having a pre-established flood probability distribution, as well as reliable estimation of the damages from different flood levels. A discount rate is applied to future costs to give a net present value for evaluating different protection levels. A benefit of the risk-based approach is that it allows choices based on comparison of expected outcomes and costs of solution alternatives (Sayers et al. 2002, Hall et al. 2003, Vis et al. 2003). Reliability-based design is based on a pre-established "acceptable" failure probability target. Legislation, insurance policies, or other parties may determine an acceptable failure probability based on different preferences regarding loss of life, infrastructure investment, or economic loss. Acceptable failure levels may be based on the previously discussed risk-based design using the failure rate with the best net present value for the flood protection system and probable damage during flood events. Reliability-based design allows engineers and planners to develop a solution set of alternatives that provide the target level of protection and then choose the lowest-cost alternative. Flood protection systems can incorporate both methods. For example, risk-based design requires substantial data for a given floodplain. By evaluating just one section of that region with risk-based design, a target failure probability can be established and applied in a reliability-based approach to the entire region, provided other parts of the region have similar flood hydrologies, costs, flood damages, and benefits. Currently the Dutch use a minimum acceptable flooding probability for flood protection. The reliability-based design standard is based on an economic optimal value, or risk-based evaluation. The safety standard for a dike ring protecting a heavily populated city and its suburbs is higher than the standard for a dike ring protecting agricultural land. This integrated method results in the reliability design standards summarized in Figure 1. Dike Ring Reliability Standards (Staatsblad 1995). Evaluation of risk- and reliability-based designs considers the two factors of flood risk: the frequency of flooding and the consequences of flooding. Resistance strategies are designed to reduce flood risk by reducing the frequency and magnitude of flood events. Historically, these are the most common and include dike or levee systems, and reservoirs and dams. Vis et al. 2003, list the following disadvantages to resistance strategies: design discharge is constant, resulting in the assumption that all areas and land use types have equal probability of flooding, inaccurate projections of economic development occur when a resistance strategy was designed decades ago, and continual maintenance and improvements reduce environmental habitat and spoil landscape qualities. Resilience strategies focus on minimizing the consequences of a flood. These strategies include allocating land as floodplains, developing better emergency response systems, and expediting flood clean-up and recovery. Often resilience strategies are described as ways of "living with the flood" instead of "fighting floods" (Vis et al. 2003). One disadvantage of resilience strategies is de-valuation of land due to rezoning for uses compatible with flooding. In the 1950s, van Dantzig (1956) and the Delta Committee focused on three areas of flood management: statistics, hydrology and hydraulics, and economics. Van Dantzig's approach involved risk-based design for a (mostly) resistance strategy. He was the first to approach flood defense design using probability-based quantitative cost-benefit analysis (Voortman 2003). In evaluating the economic decision, van Dantzig made several assumptions: Critical dike height refers to the height at which the dike may break, but only describes the relationship between this height (H) and crown height (Hc) as H < = Hc, Dikes only fail by overtopping, Dike breaks are repaired immediately, Value of goods is stable in time relative to estimated national growth, Probability distribution of reaching critical dike height is stable in time once corrected for sinking dikes (no climate change), Value of ecological habitat (and other non-economic entities) is neglected, and Emergency response and evacuation capabilities are perfect with regards to human life. Figure 2 illustrates van Dantzig's basic approach. The horizontal axis is the project size, or level of protection, and the vertical axis is the annualized cost of the project. The dotted line is the annualized installation cost which is the sum of annualized construction and maintenance costs; as the level of protection increases, so do these costs. The dashed line is the annual expected damage cost – as the level of protection increases, these costs decrease. The solid line is the total cost line and which is the sum of the two types of costs. The optimal risk-based design is the level of protection corresponding to the least total cost, or the lowest point on the curve. Example of Risk-Based Design. Within the Dutch river districts, the importance of preserving natural and cultural lands has historically received varying attention. In 1993, however, landscape, natural, and cultural-historical values were incorporated into national Dutch policy on dike improvements (Walker et al. 1994, Lenders et al. 1999). Since then, each river district has varyingly integrated these values into their dike reinforcement plans. Environmental Impact Assessments are compulsory for projects that are not classified as immediate and urgent (Lenders et al. 1999). Participation by local citizens and environmental groups is also encouraged. Van Dantzig ignored the value of human life in his calculations for economic optimization. Nathwani et al. (1997) developed the Life Quality Index as a measure of the economic benefits of life expectancy. Voortman et al. (2002) used this to create the Extended Life Quality Index for evaluating flood protection decisions and for allowing human life to be included in mathematical and economic calculations for flood defense systems. However, the Extended Life Quality Index may be less important to total flood damage estimates when emergency alert and evacuation systems are included in flood defense measures. Currently, flood forecasting along the Rhine allows 2 to 3 days for evacuation and along the Muese forecasting is between 12 to 36 hours ahead of flooding (Hooijer et al. 2004). Uncertainty can contribute to flood management calculations in two ways – estimation of flood probability and estimating flood damages. Flood frequency estimates require knowing the probability and associated uncertainty of 1) hydraulic and hydrologic conditions, 2) failure modes of flood defense infrastructure, and 3) infrastructure failure and flood wave propagation (Kortenhaus and Oumeraci 2001). Expected damage is a function of economic development and hazard warning and preparedness (Sayers et al. 2002). Hydrologic uncertainty is often due to lack of sufficient data for estimating flood frequency curves (Yue et al. 2002, Van Noortwijk 2004). Five statistical distributions are commonly used for flood frequency analysis: Generalized Extreme Value, Gumbel, Lognormal, Weibull, and the Pearson-III (Singh and Strupczewski 2002, Apel et al. 2004). Using 35 years of data from the Rhine and Cologne Rivers, Apel et al. showed that the selection of distribution led to large variability (25 percent of maximum flood flow) in the estimate of the 150-year flood. Failure of the dike system can be estimated based on failure mode. Voortman et al. (2002) list failure modes as internal erosion, breaching through inner slope via wave overtopping, overflowing, or uplifting inner revetment, and breaching through outer slope via failure of pitched block revetment. Each failure mode can be assigned a probability of failure. The combination of all failure modes can be used to estimate the overall probability of failure (Voortman 2003). Once the defense system fails, flood wave propagation is important for estimating the extent of flood damage. Flood wave propagation can be a factor of the failure mechanism, the extent or length of original dike failure, and the characteristics of the flood hydrograph (Kortenhaus and Oumeraci 2001). Uncertainty can be reduced as better models for flood wave propagation are developed and the interactions of these factors are better understood. As these different types of uncertainty are reduced through better models, more data, or further study, flood risk and damage calculations will improve. This will enable engineers and planners to more precisely evaluate flood protection systems and design alternatives. Cost-benefit analysis requires economic quanti-fication of all costs and consequences for a flood defense design (Schmandt et al. 1988, USWRC 1962). Because not all costs are easily defined in monetary terms, the bias of the decision-maker can be reflected in the analysis. Risk-prone decision making results in reported costs being lower than actual costs and benefits being valued more in the analysis. Risk-averse decision makers report higher costs and lower benefits than the flood defense system actually provides (Voortman 2003). Such bias is often unintentional. An interesting aspect of flood management and risk assessment is how the public perceives risk and the importance of flood protection. Public perception of flood risk can affect budget, construction and maintenance of flood defense systems, and other aspects of flood risk management policy. There are three bases for public risk perception: dormant flood risk, immediate flood threat, and accidental/uncontrolled flooding (Baan and Klijn 2004). Dormant flood risk has two components- crisis effect and levee effect. Crisis effect occurs immediately after a disaster and causes people to overestimate future flood risk. Levee effect starts once protection measures have been taken and causes people to rely too heavily of the protection of the system and then grossly underestimate future flood risk (White 1945). Immediate flood threat occurs during a flood event. As water height increases and comes close to the top of the dike, people feel emotions ranging from fear to inconvenience to solidarity (Baan and Klijn 2004). The degree of fear typically is inversely correlated to experience with flood events. People that live with frequent flooding typically experience less fear than those new to an area or living in an area that has not experienced flooding in several years. Past experience may be the single most important factor affecting people during high water levels. Those who have experienced minor flooding with little or no damage will underestimate the risk of damage. Those who have experienced loss of life or extensive property damage in the past are most likely to experience helplessness and fear (Burn 1999). Evacuation is often perceived as more troublesome and threatening than the high water level (Baan and Klijn 2004). Those that require assistance from others to evacuate (elderly, children, disabled) are the most susceptible to negative feelings during high water events. Interestingly, even the forecast of a high water event may be enough to trigger these feelings. Not all feelings are negative. Feelings of solidarity or togetherness can occur among people who band together during a high water event. The third base for risk perception is uncontrolled flooding. A flood event is linked to several negative effects ranging from premature death to feelings of ill-health and mental distress. These feelings typically fade as time passes after the flood event (Baan and Klijn 2004). Public risk perception has been integrated into the Netherlands' flood strategy with specific regard to incorporating public involvement in decision-making. When the public is more involved and more educated in actual flood risk, negative feelings are reduced (Baan and Klijn 2004). Recent research indicates that people in the Netherlands no longer perceive flooding as a natural disaster, but instead as a failure of the flood management system (Baan and Klijn 2004). This has increased the likelihood that people overestimate the level of protection and place disproportionate trust in the man-made systems. In the earliest days of dike building, landowners were responsible for protecting their property and making dike repairs. As cities formed, coordination among landowners was necessary, regional water authorities started to form. Maintenance costs were still distributed among land owners protected by the dikes and cities were mostly exempt from regular maintenance costs, but the waterschappen had authority to manage the construction, maintenance, and operation of dams, sluices, dikes and drainage canals (Tol and Langen 2000, Kaijser 2002). "Dike counts,"dijkgraaf, were executives assigned to inspect dikes three times a year (spring, summer, and fall). The spring inspection identified repairs to be made; the summer inspection made sure that the work had been completed; the fall inspection was a final opportunity to identify problems before the winter. If a land owner was unable to fund repair costs, the dike count would loan the money at interest rates in excess of 100 - 200 percent (Tol and Langen 2000). For extensive repairs or following flood damage, the dike count could raise money by imposing a tax on cities. However, most of the financial burden fell on landowners and frequently these repair costs led to bankruptcy. Often dike counts abused this privilege and were able to amass large amounts of land (Tol and Langen 2000). In 1798, a new constitution and more stable central government led to reorganization of a national budget and the formation of a national water authority (Tol and Langen 2000). The funding for flood protection comes from a combination of inhabitant and property taxes at state, provincial, and municipal levels of government. Provincial governments are responsible for implementing state water policies. Costs for flood protection may be covered by the national general budget, as long as they fit within the following activities: "Formulation of the national, strategic policy on flood protection and water management, supervision of its realization and enforcement, The realization of the operational tasks concerning the infrastructure, The flood protection works lacking hinterland or financial capacity; the Main Dike separating the Wadden Sea from the Lake IJssel, dams and barriers in the estuaries, dunes and dikes on the Wadden islands, The preservation of the coast by fighting the structural erosion, The operational management of the state waters. These waters concern the Rhine with its branches, the Meuse, the Scheldt, the Lake Ijssel, the estuaries, the principal canals and the territorial and international sea, and The promotion of the (inter)national shipping routes." (Huisman 2002: 4). In 1998 (the most recent year with published information), The Netherlands spent 1 percent of its national income (US $ 3.14 billion) on water management - 15 percent of which was for flood protection (US $ 444 million). In the next ten years, the Dutch anticipate spending $2.9 billion on flood protection (Woorden 2006). The Water Board Bank (Nederlandse Waterschapsbank) was formed in 1954 when funding for the substantial repair work caused by the 1953 floods was difficult. The local water boards were too small on their own and formed the collaborative to allow long-term borrowing at favorable rates (Huisman 2002). The Water Board Bank is the fifth largest Dutch bank and is owned by public authorities (81 percent is held by the water boards with state and provincial government holding the remaining 19 percent) (Huisman 2002). Flood damages place a large financial burden on the government as a result of requests for compensation. Previously, insurance policies excluded coverage for flood damages, and the government was responsible for all claims. In 2000, a special committee convened by the Netherlands' government provided recommendations on flood insurance policy (Kok et al. 2002). The committee recommended that the government work with insurance companies to designate flooding as a result of high rains (and no failure of flood defense systems) as part of property insurance. This reduced the governments' exposure to flood damage claims (Kok et al. 2002). Public-private enterprises can help finance flood system improvements. Two recent partnerships include gravel and sand production and urban planning. The Grensmaas project combined private gravel and sand extraction with floodplain lowering (van Stokkom et al. 2005). Private enterprises have also presented plans for floating villages, which allow for river dikes to be moved further inland and maximize the public's willingness to pay for riverfront property. Although these partnerships have potential, so far implementation has been difficult and inefficient (van Stokkom et al. 2005). The Dutch are increasingly incorporating resilience strategies in their flood management policies (Olsthoorn and Tol 2001, Van Steen and Pellenbarg 2004). This is increasingly important as the economic value protected by the flood management system increases faster than dike heightening can occur. The economic value protected has increased nationally by a factor of six in the past 40 years, and more in many local areas. Two strategies are receiving the most attention as potential resilience methods to minimize economic consequences of flooding: storing flood waters and increasing maximum flow capacity of channels (Vis et al. 2003, Hooijer et al. 2004, Silva et al. 2004). In the Netherlands, these two strategies are part of creating "room for rivers," an initiative led by the Dutch government to provide better flood protection and use spatial planning for long-term development (Woorden 2006). The plan includes implementation of resilience measures in the four ways, by dike or levee relocation (setbacks), flood bypasses or "green rivers", lowering floodplains between the river and the levees, and developing flood detention areas (Hooijer et al. 2004). The Dutch are currently building a flood bypass along the Ijssel branch of the Rhine to protect the towns of Veessem and Hoenwaard from flood waters. This channel is being built in a mostly agricultural area (Woorden 2006). As part of the same government measure to ensure flood protection objectives are met by 2015, the Dutch are also moving dikes along the Meuse between Geertruidenberg and Waalwik. By moving the dikes further from the river, the area known as the Overdiep Polder will be expanded and water levels in the area will drop up to 30 cm (Woorden 2006). Although both measures reduce developable land, the goal is to maintain agricultural use while protecting more populated areas. Detention of floods in compartments requires designating areas for temporary water storage and subdividing existing dike rings. The compart-mentalized sections will have different flood probabilities resulting from a pre-determined order for rerouting flood waters to the compartments (Vis et al. 2003, Silva et al. 2004). Upstream compartments are filled first to reduce the flood peak's height and duration further downstream. Typically, the compartments designated to receive flood waters first should be designated as natural or agricultural lands to minimize economic damage (Vis et al. 2003). These detention compartments also can be managed to help recharge groundwater supplies, reduce river bed erosion, and improve biodiversity (van Stokkom and Smits 2002). Silva et al. (2004) evaluated the potential for compartmental detention for Rhine flood waters. Because upstream storage is most desired, the Netherlands would have to focus on areas near the German border. To reduce flood water flow from an "average" flood hyetograph by 1000 m3/s, 150 million m3 of storage is required. This is equivalent to 3000 hectares (30 km2) flooded to 5 meters (Silva et al. 2004). An increase of 1000 m3/s from 15,000 m3/s (current maximum flow capacity) to 16,000 m3/s results in the probability of the detention area being used in a given year being approximately 1 in 500 (Silva et al. 2004). Such a low probability may lead to people forgetting the purpose of the detention area and begin development in ways that diminish its effectiveness at lessening flood damages. Green rivers or flood bypasses are one method to increase the maximum flow capacity of part of a channel. Green rivers are designated areas where water flows only during flood periods and may be used for agriculture or ecological habitat at other times
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