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The UK and ‘genocide’ in Biafra

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 2-3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14623528.2014.936703

1469-9494

Karen E. Smith,

International Law and Human Rights

AbstractIn late August 1968, following a British proposal, Nigeria announced that it would allow an international observer team into the country to show that it was not pursuing a campaign of genocide in Biafra. This article analyses why the United Kingdom pushed for the creation of the observer team, and shows how the team's work was incorporated into the British government's justifications for its support of the Nigerian government. The experience of the observer team illustrates the difficulties of providing an ‘objective’ view regarding whether or not genocide is taking place. Notes on contributorKaren E. Smith is professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is the author of Genocide and the Europeans (2010), and has recently served as the Co-Chair of the Task Force on EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities.Notes1 The Igbos are an ethnic group originating in south-eastern Nigeria. In the past they were often (incorrectly) referred to as ‘Ibos’, as the sources cited in this article demonstrate.2 It is not mentioned in Chinua Achebe, There was a country: a personal history of Biafra (London: Allen Lane, 2012) or Chima J. Korieh (ed.), The Nigeria-Biafra war: genocide and the politics of memory (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2012) or Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra story: the making of an African legend (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 1969, reprinted in 2001). John Stremlau discusses it briefly in The international politics of the Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 265–268. Of course, the fact that the observer team operated only on the Nigerian side of the frontline meant that those inside Biafra would not have encountered it.3 Suzanne Cronje, The world and Nigeria: the diplomatic history of the Biafran war 1967–1970 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972).4 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Norms, identity, and culture in national security’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 54.5 See Nicholas Wheeler's work on how norms constrain and enable actors. Nicholas Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).6 Martha Finnemore, ‘Are legal norms distinctive?’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2000, pp. 699–705.7 Karen E. Smith, Genocide and the Europeans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 6–7.8 A. W. Brian Simpson, ‘Britain and the genocide convention’, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 73, 2003, pp. 14–35. The concern about the asylum law is that the convention states that genocide cannot be considered a political crime, and thus laws that protect individuals fleeing political persecution cannot extend to those accused of genocide.9 The convention was opened for signature until 31 December 1949; 41 states signed the convention and could then ‘ratify’ it. After 1 January 1950, any state that had not signed it could ‘accede’ to it.10 Smith, Genocide and the Europeans, pp. 48–51.11 Note from A. J. Collins (3 February 1969) on genocide and Nigeria, in UK National Archives file FCO 61/520.12 Auberon Waugh—a journalist and trenchant critic of the UK's support for the FMG— suggested in December 1968 that British ministers could be answerable in the courts to charges of genocide in Nigeria after the UK acceded to the convention. Auberon Waugh, ‘Within the meaning of the act’, The Spectator, 6 December 1968, pp. 791–792.13 Lene Hansen, Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 140.14 While some interventions during the Cold War might be classified as ‘humanitarian’ (Vietnam's overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, for example), these were not justified principally in those terms. See Wheeler, Saving strangers.15 The number of dead was initially given as 30,000 by the Eastern Region after the names of dead and missing were listed. In 1969, the British government stated that 7,000 had died; in later stages of the war, the Biafran government claimed that 50,000 had been killed. Cronje, The world and Nigeria, p. 18.16 Cited in Stremlau, The international politics, p. 60. It should be noted that there were other complex reasons for the declaration of secession. See, for example, Chibuike Uche, ‘Oil, British interests, and the Nigerian civil war’, Journal of African History, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2008, pp. 114–121; or Laurie Wiseberg's review of several early histories of the war, ‘An emerging literature: studies of the Nigerian civil war’, African Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1975, pp. 117–126; or the works cited in endnotes 2 and 3.17 John W. Young, The Labour governments 1964–70, Vol. 2: International policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 200; Stremlau, The international politics, p. 65.18 Young, The Labour governments, p. 198; Stremlau, The international politics, p. 76.19 Young, The Labour governments, p. 201.20 ‘Confidential (not for public use), Nigeria: a background note on British interests and the government's approach to the civil war’ (no date, in file from November 1968 to March 1969), in UKNA file FCO 65/179. Such reasons were actually frequently cited by the government, as in debates in the Houses of Parliament.21 Young, The Labour governments, p. 199.22 Young, The Labour governments, p. 199.23 House of Commons, Sitting of 27 August 1968, Hansard, vol. 769, col. 1447.24 Young, The Labour governments, p. 203; Cronje, The world and Nigeria, pp. 38-65.25 Cronje, The world and Nigeria, pp. 38–65.26 ‘Information Memorandum from the Western Africa Country Director, Bureau of African Affairs (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Affairs (Palmer)’, 18 April 1968, Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA-US, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, vol. XXIV, document 396.27 See Young, The Labour governments, p. 204; Stremlau, The international politics, pp. 228 and 297.28 Republic of Biafra, ‘Address by Ojukwu to the OAU in Addis Ababa, 5 August 1968′, in file MS321463, Vol. 65, of the Nigerian Civil War Collection archives (donated by Suzanne Cronje), School of Oriental and African Studies. Emphasis in original.29 Stremlau, The international politics, p. 113.30 ‘Pressure on Lagos to accept cease-fire’, The Times, 10 April 1968. In 1968, the ‘International Committee for the Study of the Crimes of Genocide’, a Paris-based unofficial organization of lawyers from several countries, determined that genocide was occurring in Nigeria. Cronje, The world and Nigeria, pp. 277–278.31 Cronje, The world and Nigeria, p. 75.32 As reported in ‘Let's finish it off’, The Economist, 24 August 1968.33 ‘Too partisan to mediate’, The Guardian, 28 August 1968.34 Note to Mr Williams from E. G. Norris, 24 November 1967, in UKNA file FCO 38/293.35 Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, Peacekeeping Force for Nigeria, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 18 March 1968, in UKNA file FCO 38/293; Briefing note on Nigeria by the West and General Africa Department, Commonwealth Office, 29 May 1968, in UKNA file FCO 38/294.36 Record of meeting between the Commonwealth Secretary and Chief Enahoro on Monday, 26 August 1968, in UKNA file FCO 25/243.37 Dennis Barker, ‘Save Biafra movement gets a fillip’, The Guardian, 4 June 1968; ‘Archbishop urges arms ban’, The Guardian, 16 July 1968.38 Robert Brown, ‘Government blamed for allowing export of arms to Nigeria’, The Guardian, 24 May 1968.39 ‘Stop the arms’, The Times, 28 May 1968.40 ‘A final solution for Biafra?’, The Guardian, 15 July 1968.41 Quotes in order: David Winnick MP (Commons sitting of 11 June 1968, Hansard, vol. 766, col. 35); Reginald Maudling MP (Commons sitting of 11 June 1968, Hansard, vol. 766, col. 36); Sir John Eden MP (Commons sitting of 12 June 1968, Hansard, vol. 766, col. 247); and Frank Allaun MP (Commons sitting of 12 June 1968, Hansard, vol. 766, col. 263). Winnick and Allaun were Labour MPs, Maudling and Eden Conservative MPs.42 Barker, ‘Save Biafra movement gets a fillip’.43 ‘Demand for peace and equality’, The Guardian, 1 October 1969.44 Michael Stewart, Life and Labour: an autobiography (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), p. 241.45 Young, The Labour governments, p. 193.46 Harold Wilson, The Labour government 1964–1970: a personal record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael Joseph Ltd, 1971), pp. 558–589.47 Commons sitting of 12 June 1968, Hansard, vol. 766, col. 293.48 Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Federal Nigerian Commissioner for Information and Labour, in the Prime Minister's Room at the House of Commons on Wednesday 12 June at 7 pm, in UKNA file FCO 25/242.49 First quotation: Hugh Fraser, House of Commons, Sitting of 27 August 1968, Hansard, vol. 769, col. 1456; second quotation: Bernard Braine, col. 1513; third quotation: Frank Allaun, col. 1469.50 Hugh Noyes, ‘Protests by MPs over arms for Nigeria’, The Times, 28 August 1968.51 Stremlau, The international politics, p. 265.52 Record of meeting between the Commonwealth Secretary and Chief Enahoro at 8 pm on Tuesday, 27th August 1968, in UKNA file FCO 25/243.53 ‘Observers’, in UKNA file FCO 38/225.54 Letter from George Thomson to the Prime Minister, 29 August 1968, in UKNA file FCO 25/254.55 Stremlau, The international politics, pp. 266–267.56 Letter from J. Wilson, West and General Africa Department, to the Head of Conference Section, Protocol and Conference Department, 11 October 1968, in UKNA file FCO 38/226.57 The choice of countries/organizations involved was down to the FMG. Canada had been involved in discussions on the Commonwealth force; Sweden was considered a sympathetic country; Poland was—like the rest of the Soviet bloc—virulently anti-secessionist; the OAU was supportive of the FMG.58 Letter from A. A. Baba-Gana, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Federal Military Government of Nigeria, to Sir David Hunt, British High Commissioner, Lagos, 6 September 1968, in UKNA file FCO 38/225. Emphasis added.59 Telegram from British High Commission in Lagos to the FCO, 9 December 1968, in UKNA file FCO 65/168.60 Confidential minute dated 18 November 1968 on ‘Observers’, in UKNA file FCO 65/167.61 Poland did not favour such a move and Wilson was unenthusiastic, as the safety of the observers could not be guaranteed. Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Observers, for the Prime Minister's Visit to Nigeria, March–April 1969, PMN (69) B.3, 20 March 1969, in UKNA file FCO 65/172.62 Telegram 556 from UK High Commission in Lagos to FCO, 12 March 1969, on the question of observers visiting rebel held areas, reporting a meeting with Gowon and Arikpo (Minister for External Affairs), in UKNA file FCO 65/171.63 Report dated 2 October 1968 on International Observer Team's visit to 1st Nigerian Division, in UKNA file FCO 65/178.64 All of the reports are in the UK National Archives. See Smith, Genocide and the Europeans, pp. 77–78.65 Commons sitting of Thursday, 24th October 1968, Hansard, vol. 770, col. 1587.66 Commons sitting of Monday, 18th November 1968, Hansard, vol. 773, col. 884.67 Commons sitting of Thursday, 3rd December 1968, Hansard, vol. 774, col. 1241.68 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Diplomatic Report no. 211/70, ‘Nigeria: International Team of Observers’, The British High Commission in Nigeria to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 11 March 1970, in UKNA file FCO 65/782.69 David Hunt, On the spot: an ambassador remembers (London: Peter Davies, 1975), p. 188.70 Curiously this is the only time he refers to observers—and does not note that the observer team included observers from the UK and other countries. Stewart, Life and Labour, p. 240.71 Markpress News Feature Service, ‘“Observers” in Nigeria would be absurd, says Biafra’, in UKNA file FCO 38/225.72 In a radio broadcast on 4 October 1968; referred to in minute of 28 February 1969 by A. N. R. Millington, in UKNA file FCO 65/171.73 ‘If not “genocide”, still bloody’, The Guardian, 11 October 1968.74 ‘Genoslaughter?’, The Times, 31 December 1968.75 Uche, ‘Oil, British interests, and the Nigerian civil war’, p. 130; Cronje, The world and Nigeria, p. 93.76 John Ezard, ‘Colonel gave press briefings from confidential report’, The Guardian, 14 January 1971; ‘General says journalist a trusted friend’, The Times, 15 January 1971.77 ‘Briton withdrawn from post in Lagos’, The Times, 25 September 1969; ‘Major says, “I was asked for Nigeria plans”’, The Guardian, 2 May 1970, ‘Major's “dole” case fails’, The Times, 30 May 1970.78 Cronje, The world and Nigeria, pp. 83–92.79 For example, the ‘Directive for Major-General Alexander’ (the first British observer) repeats the terms of reference set out by the FMG, but offers no advice on what he should look for to prove there was no ‘intentional or planned systematic and wanton destruction of civilian life or civilian property in the war zone’. UKNA file FCO 38/225.80 Report on Activities during the Period 24 Sep–23 Nov 1968, in UKNA file FCO 65/168.81 Cronje, The world and Nigeria, p. 84.82 Wilson, The Labour government, p. 749.83 Alain Destexhe, ‘The third genocide’, Foreign Policy, No. 97, Winter 1994/95, p. 4.84 See, for example, Genocide Prevention Task Force, Preventing genocide: a blueprint for US policymakers (US Holocaust Memorial Museum, American Academy of Diplomacy, US Institute for Peace, 2008); Gareth Evans, The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions, 2008); David A. Hamburg, Preventing genocide: practical steps toward early detection and effective action (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010); I. William Zartman, Preventing identity conflicts leading to genocide and mass killings (New York: International Peace Institute, November 2010); Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, The EU and the prevention of mass atrocities: an assessment of strengths and weaknesses (Budapest Centre for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, 2013).