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The North Korean factor in the improvement of Japanese intelligence capability

2004; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/0551274042000261506

1470-1332

Sung-Jae Choi,

Intelligence, Security, War Strategy

Abstract When considered against the background of its economic and technological strength, Japan had maintained an anomalously moderate national intelligence capability throughout the Cold War period. However, Japan has been progressively getting out of this low-key stance in the area of national intelligence. This article argues that, among various international developments, the most obvious and immediate momentum for the improvement in Japan's national intelligence has come from a series of security events caused by North Korea, such as: the first and second nuclear crisis respectively in 1993–94 and 2002–present; the test-firing of the Nodong-1 ballistic missile in 1993 and the launching of the Taepodong-1 rocket in 1998; alleged spy ship incidents in 1999 and 2001; and the long suspected North Korean kidnapping of Japanese citizens and Pyongyang's admission to it in 2002. The article goes on to answer the following questions: how has Japan's national intelligence responded and what efforts has Japan made to upgrade intelligence capability in the face of North Korea-related security concerns? And what are the next steps Japan could take for progressive improvement of intelligence capability? Keywords: NorthKorean factorJapan's national intelligenceinternal security measuresorganizational reformintelligence machinery Acknowledgements I am grateful to Richard Schofield and Richard Edmonds for their academic encouragement and supervision. I would also like to thank Ono Tatsuya for obtaining Japanese material and two anonymous reviewers for their detailed comments. Notes 1 For a call for Japan's enhanced anti-terror intelligence capability, see Ogawa (2004: 107). 2 There was initial confusion over whether Taepodong-1 was a medium-range missile or an artificial satellite. South Korea and the US admitted ultimately that a civilian satellite was attached to that projectile of Taepodong-1, but also acknowledging it represented a threat since North Korea's delivery capability was confirmed (Kyodo News International, 12 September 1998). 3 For the opinion poll results in which a majority of respondents named North Korea and the Korean Peninsula as the top security threat, see Cooney (2002: 108). 4 For this and other cases involving CIRO's works, see Hayao (1993: 175–6). 5 Japan is also one of the ten ‘Third Signatories’ to the UKUSA Agreement of 1947 (CitationRichelson and Ball 1985: 142). 6 The PSIA homepage, available at http://www.e-gov.go.jp/index.html. 7 For the limit of PSIA's legal authority, also see Shiono (1996: 1303–4). 8 According to 1998 data, there were about 1,330 police boxes in Tokyo, including 237 residential kōbans (CitationParker 2001: 57). 9 It is also alleged that the Chinese have assisted Pyongyang's missile development programme in violation of the MTCR (CitationNoland 2002: 102). 10 For the list of the PSIA-identified dual-use items of illegal exports to North Korea in recent years and their use, also see CitationKōanchōsachō (2004). 11 For various estimations of the annual sum of Chongryon's fund flowing to the North varies, see Lind (1997: 395–401); Sato (1993: 68). For the PSIA estimation, see Eberstadt (1996: 523). 12 The Japanese combined testimony hearing team was comprised of officials from the Foreign Ministry, NPA, CIRO and PSIA. 13 The hypothetical law targeting North Korean vessels is also designed to restrict the calls at Japanese ports of any third country's vessels that entered North Korean ports (Asahi Shimbun, 20 January 2004, morning edition, p. 3). 14 See http://www.jda.go.jp/join/dih/gaiyou.html. When the DIH was inaugurated in 1997, there were five directorates. The Emergency Response Division was set up in 2000; the Imagery Division was reorganized into the Imagery/Geography Division in 2003. 15 To be exact, Chobetsu was merged into the DIH, presumably accounting for three-quarters of the DIH staffing. See Oros (2002: 9). 16 JDA (1999: 202). 17 For the US official acknowledgement of this, see CitationUS Department of State (1999). Additional informationNotes on contributorsSung-jae Choi Sung-jae Choi is a Doctoral Candidate in the Faculty of Law and Social Science, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He is currently completing his PhD thesis on domestic and international political dynamics surrounding the island sovereignty dispute between Korea and Japan. His research interests also include security and foreign relations of Northeast Asia, focusing on Japan and the Korean Peninsula.