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Beyond liberal and conservative: Two-dimensional conceptions of ideology and the structure of political attitudes and values

2008; Routledge; Volume: 13; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13569310802075969

1469-9613

Brendon Swedlow,

Social and Cultural Dynamics

Abstract This article analyzes conceptual similarities and differences in selected prior work on ideological multi-dimensionality and finds substantial conceptual convergence accompanied by some provocative divergence. The article also finds that evidence from a recent survey of the American public largely validates areas of conceptual convergence. Respondents' political attitudes vary in two dimensions that are associated with different value structures—specifically, with different rankings of liberty, order, and 'caring for those who need help'. As a result, liberals, conservatives, and libertarians are identified more fully than previously possible. But the evidence does not allow the validation of one conception over another in the area where they diverge most markedly. Does the fourth ideological type value order and equality, making them 'communitarians', or are these respondents better understood as a humanitarian, paternalistic, hierarchical subtype, the 'inclusive social hierarch', since they value order as well as 'caring for those who need help'? Although politicians, philosophers, and social scientists often discuss politics as if it were organized on a single left-right dimension, 50 years of research on public opinion shows that a unidimensional model of ideology is a poor description of political attitudes for the overwhelming proportion of people virtually everywhere.Footnote1 Notes 1. Stanley Feldman, 'Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes', in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (Eds) Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 477. 2. I would like to thank Fred Smith at the Competitive Enterprise Institute and Alex Castellanos and Will Feltus at National Media, Inc. for soliciting my input on development of the survey used in this article and for permission to analyze its results. I would also like to thank Brenda Wigger at Voter/Consumer Research for providing information regarding survey administration and the Earhart Foundation for supporting analysis of the survey data. Thanks as well to Mikel Wyckoff, my co-author on a companion piece (cited in Ref. 18), whose collaboration on that work and critical comments on this one have made this article possible. Our analysis benefited from initial studies of this data undertaken by Alex Castellanos, Don Devine and Will Feltus, and we would like to express our appreciation for that. Thanks too to Larry Arnhart and Art Ward for their valuable feedback. Precursors of the empirical work summarized in this article were helpfully reviewed by Barbara Burrell, Ben Highton, Bill Jacoby, Ken Janda, Randy Piper, Laura Stoker and Matt Streb. James Bagaka provided valuable research and editorial assistance and Paula Propst and Ken Erickson essential technological services. Michael Freeden's guidance, the comments of his anonymous assessors, and the editorial assistance of Chandra Hunter Swedlow were also very important to the final shaping of this article. Any remaining errors are of course my responsibility. 3. See, e.g. Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine and Thad A. Brown, 'A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election', American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), pp. 753–778. 4. Kathleen Knight, 'Liberalism and Conservatism', in J.P. Robinson, P.R. Shaver and L.S. Wrightsman (Eds) Measures of Political Attitudes (New York: Academic Press, 1999), p. 681. 5. Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, 'Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States', American Political Science Review, 97 (2003), pp. 245–260; Norman Schofield, Gary Miller and Andrew Martin, 'Critical Elections and Political Realignments in the U.S.: 1860–2000', Political Studies, 51 (2003), pp. 217–240; and Norman Schofield and Gary Miller, 'Elections and Activist Coalitions in the United States', American Journal of Political Science, 51 (2007), pp. 518–531. For related analysis also extending back to 1860 using Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's political cultural types (discussed in text below), see Sun-Ki Chai and Aaron Wildavsky, 'Cultural Change, Party Ideology, and Electoral Outcomes', in Aaron Wildavsky, Culture and Social Theory, Sun-Ki Chai and Brendon Swedlow (Eds) (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998). 6. Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M. Carsey, 'Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension" in the American Electorate', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (2002), pp. 786–802. 7. William S. Maddox and Stuart A. Lilie, Beyond Liberal and Conservative: Reassessing the Political Spectrum (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1984). 8. Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, 'Patterns of Support for Democratic and Capitalist Values in the United States', British Journal of Political Science, 13 (1983), pp. 401–440; Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 9. Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (New York: Free Press, 1973). 10. Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy (7th edition) (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002). 11. Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Richard J. Ellis and Fred Thompson, 'Culture and the Environment in the Pacific Northwest', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), pp. 885–897; Wildavsky, Culture and Social Theory, op. cit., Ref. 5; and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis: Politics, Public Law, and Administration, in Brendon Swedlow (Ed.) (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006). 12. See, e.g. William G. Jacoby, 'Core Values and Political Attitudes', in Barbara G. Norrander and Clyde Wilcox (Eds) Understanding Public Opinion (2nd edition) (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002); William G. Jacoby, 'Value Choices and American Public Opinion', American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2006), pp. 706–723; William G. Jacoby, 'Testing for Hierarchical Structure and Priming Effects among Individual Value Choices' (2006), unpublished paper, available at http://polisci.msu.edu/jacoby/; and William G. Jacoby and Paul M. Sniderman, 'The Structure of Value Choices in the American Public', presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 2006. 13. For reviews and citations, see Stanley Feldman, 'Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), pp. 416–440; Feldman, op. cit., Ref. 1, pp. 477–508; and Jacoby, 'Value Choices and American Public Opinion', ibid. 14. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7. 15. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10. 16. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, op. cit., Ref. 11; Wildavsky, Culture and Social Theory, op. cit., Ref. 11; and Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11. 17. See, e.g. Jacoby, 'Value Choices and American Public Opinion', op. cit., Ref. 12; and Jacoby and Sniderman, op. cit., Ref. 12. 18. This evidence is developed in Brendon Swedlow and Mikel Wyckoff, 'Value Preferences and Ideological Structuring of Attitudes in American Public Opinion', (forthcoming). 19. Rokeach, op. cit., Ref. 9. 20. This is also the approach taken by Stanley Feldman, whose observations on ideological conceptualization head this piece. 21. Shalom Schwartz, 'Universals in the Content and Structure of Values', in M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Academic Press, 1992), p. 4; as quoted in Feldman, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 480. 22. Schwartz, 'Universals in the Content and Structure of Values', in M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Academic Press, 1992)., p. 1; as quoted in Feldman, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 479. 23. Jacoby, 'Value Choices and American Public Opinion', op. cit., Ref. 12, p. 706. 24. Feldman, op. cit., Ref. 1. The importance of value structure in organizing public opinion is also emphasized and demonstrated by Jacoby, 'Value Choices and American Public Opinion', op. cit., Ref. 12.; and Jacoby and Sniderman, op. cit., Ref. 12. 25. Feldman, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 479. 26. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7, pp. 33–34. 27. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7., p. 5. 28. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7., pp. 5–6. 29. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7., p. 18. 30. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7., p. 4. 31. In the 1960s, a question regarding school prayer is used in addition to the questions on civil rights; in 1980 the school prayer question is substituted for the question regarding the legalization of marijuana, which was no longer asked in that year. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7., pp. 60–61. 32. David Boaz and David Kirby, 'The Libertarian Vote', Cato Institute Policy Analysis, 580 (2006), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa580.pdf 33. Boaz and Kirby, 'The Libertarian Vote', Cato Institute Policy Analysis., pp. 8–11. As the Pew Center does in its own analysis, Boaz and Kirby used the Pew survey's attitudinal measures as well as value measures to attempt to tap the economic and personal freedom dimensions of Maddox and Lilie's conception of ideology, dimensions they call economic conservatism and social liberalism. For the ANES data and Gallup Poll data, Boaz and Kirby rely on value measures alone for this purpose. 34. Boaz and Kirby, 'The Libertarian Vote', Cato Institute Policy Analysis., pp. 10–11. 35. Boaz and Kirby, 'The Libertarian Vote', Cato Institute Policy Analysis., p. 10. 36. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10; and Rokeach, op. cit., Ref. 9. After using Maddox and Lilie's term 'populists' in the first four editions of their book, Janda and colleagues have re-labeled populists as communitarians because they believe 'communitarian is more descriptive of the category' and because populism has been used recently to describe the political style of candidates that exploit mass resentment of those in power, adding further confusion to its contested historical meaning. Janda, Berry and Goldman, ibid., p. A35, Ref. 28. 37. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10., pp. 27–28. 38. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10., pp. 25–26. The studies are found in Alexander Koryushkin and Gerd Meyer (Eds) Communitarianism, Liberalism, and the Quest for Democracy in Post-Communist Societies (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 1999). It should be noted that with this definition of socialism, Janda and colleagues part company with Rokeach, for whom a socialist is someone who highly values both liberty and equality, a value combination not possible in Janda and colleagues' reworking of Rokeach. These scholars, in turn, are at odds with Douglas, Wildavsky and other scholars' claims that liberty, equality, and order have to be traded off against each other. It should also be noted that Rokeach's scheme does not allow for the communitarian combination of values. Meanwhile, stoking the fires of conceptual confusion, Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller claim that positive attitudes toward capitalism and democracy, and more generally toward liberty and equality, define an ideological type they call a 'classical 19th century liberal', a 'socialist' in Rokeach's scheme! Chong, McClosky and Zaller, op. cit., Ref. 8; McClosky and Zaller, op. cit., Ref. 8. 39. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10., p. 25. 40. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10., pp. 140–142. 41. Janda and Goldman's IDEAlog test, question sources, results, and a tutorial in Janda and colleagues' two-dimensional conceptualization of ideology can be found at http://www.ideolog.org 42. Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1981). 43. Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11, p. 13. 44. See, for example, Mary Douglas, 'Cultural Bias', In the Active Voice (London: Routledge, 1982) and Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982). 45. Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11, p. 17. 46. See Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11, p. 17., for a bibliography of applications, reviews, and critiques of cultural theory. 47. See Dennis J. Coyle, '"This Land is my Land, this Land is your Land": Cultural Conflict in Environmental and Land-Use Regulation', in Dennis J. Coyle and Richard J. Ellis (Eds) Politics, Policy, and Culture (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 35, Table 2.1; and Michiel Schwarz and Michael Thompson, Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology and Social Choice (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 66–67, Table 5.1, for quick overviews of these elements of cultural theory and Schwarz and Thompson, ibid., and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, op. cit., Ref. 11, for exposition of the theory. 48. This description of Douglas and Wildavsky's cultural theory tracks that found in Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, ibid., fairly closely. However, the dimensions have been relabeled to make their theory 'translate' better into terms that political scientists already understand. Thus, the extent of collective action in social relations corresponds to the extent of 'group' in their formulation, while the extent of individual autonomy corresponds (inversely) to the extent of 'grid'. The extent of collective action means the extent to which a relational pattern is defined by an external group boundary. The extent of individual autonomy means the extent to which individuals are free from coercion and free to act as they please in their social relationships; individual autonomy implies some personal power or efficacy. 49. This and the previous paragraph adapted from Brendon Swedlow, 'Postscript: Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, and budgeting', in Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting and Governing, Brendon Swedlow (Ed.) (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001, 2006), pp. 335–357. 50. See bibliography in Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, Budgeting and Governing, Brendon Swedlow (Ed.) (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001, 2006), pp. 335–357.; see also Wildavsky and Sun-Ki Chai, op. cit., Ref. 5. 51. These measures are taken from Ellis and Thompson, op. cit., Ref. 11, Table B-3, p. 895. These measures were initially used to operationalize cultural theory for the study of risk perception, and have been used in many other surveys for this purpose (see bibliography in Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, ibid., for citations). For attempts to operationalize cultural theory for survey research using NORC General Social Survey (GSS) data, see Richard P. Boyle and Richard M. Coughlin, 'Conceptualizing and operationalizing cultural theory', in Coyle and Ellis, op. cit., Ref. 47; and Charles Lockhart and Richard M. Coughlin, 'Grid-group theory and political ideology: a consideration of their relative strengths and weaknesses for explaining the structure of mass belief systems', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (1998), pp. 33–58. 52. See Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11; Aaron Wildavsky, The Rise of Radical Egalitarianism (Washington, DC: The American University Press, 1991), pp. 133–150; and Richard J. Ellis, The Dark Side of the Left: Illiberal Egalitarianism in America (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1998). 53. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10, p. 22. 54. 'Conservatives want smaller government budgets and fewer government programs. They support free enterprise and argue against government job programs, regulation of business, and legislation of working conditions and wage rates'. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10., p. 24. 55. See Dennis J. Coyle's foreword to Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11; and Dennis J. Coyle, 'The Theory that Would be King', in Coyle and Ellis, op. cit., Ref. 47 for a discussion of this problem. 56. Maddox and Lilie, op. cit., Ref. 7, pp. 18–20. 57. The egalitarian element makes populism a political cultural coalition similar to that supporting European social democracies, where egalitarians enlist the coercive power of the hierarchical, bureaucratic state in redistribution to help the less fortunate. See Gary Lee Malecha, 'A Cultural Analysis of Populism in Late-Nineteenth Century America', in Coyle and Ellis (Eds) op. cit., Ref. 47, pp. 93–116; Ellis, op. cit., Ref. 52; Wildavsky, op. cit., Ref. 51; and Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11. But the socially conservative elements pursuing this leveling for their own benefit make populists more resemble nationalistic, racist, and xenophobic European right wing parties than European social democracies. 58. As Wildavsky puts it, 'Inclusive hierarchies (my father's house has many mansions and there is room for all—rich and poor, gay and straight, black and white) differ from exclusive hierarchies (there is no room at the inn for anyone who does not conform)'. Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11, p. 236. 59. Fatalism could be a useful concept for public opinion researchers because the dynamics of fatalistic political culture might help account for the values and political attitudes of apathetic, disaffected, disengaged, distrustful, non-voting or otherwise non-participating members of the public. Chong, McClosky and Zaller's 'anti-regime' types seem to have fatalistic political attitudes. Chong, McClosky and Zaller, op. cit., Ref. 8; and McClosky and Zaller, op. cit., Ref. 8. 60. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10, p. 13. Emphases in original. 61. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10., Ref. 10, p. 16. Emphases in original. 62. Janda, Berry and Goldman, op. cit., Ref. 10., Ref. 10, p. 14. 63. Coyle, op. cit., Ref. 47, p. 33. 64. Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11, p. 12. 65. See, e.g. the analysis in Brendon Swedlow, 'Cultural Influences on Policies Concerning Mental Illness', in Coyle and Ellis, op. cit., Ref. 47, pp. 71–89. 66. Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11, p. 12. 67. Swedlow and Wyckoff, op. cit., Ref. 18. 68. See Fred L. Smith, Jr and Alex Castellanos (Eds) Field Guide for Effective Communication (Washington, DC and Alexandria, VA: Competitive Enterprise Institute and National Media, Inc., 2004), for a copy of the full questionnaire and preliminary analysis of results. 69. See Swedlow and Wyckoff, op. cit., Ref. 18, for justification and explanation of how these measures were constructed. 70. See Swedlow and Wyckoff, op. cit., Ref. 18., for evidence and analysis of these relationships. 71. See Swedlow and Wyckoff, op. cit., Ref. 18., or Smith and Castellanos, op. cit., Ref. 61, for copies of these questions as they appeared on the questionnaire. 72. See, e.g. Jacoby, 'Value Choices and American Public Opinion', op. cit., Ref. 12; and Jacoby and Sniderman, op. cit., Ref. 12. 73. Jacoby, 'Value Choices and American Public Opinion', op. cit., Ref. 12.; as further discussed in Swedlow and Wyckoff, op. cit., Ref. 18. 74. Wildavsky, Culture and Social Theory, op. cit., Ref. 11; and Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11; and, Wildavsky, Budgeting and Governing, op. cit., Ref. 49. 75. See Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, The Scar of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) for the subtleties of white attitudes toward blacks. 76. Ellis, op. cit., Ref. 52; Wildavsky, op. cit., Ref. 51; and Wildavsky, Cultural Analysis, op. cit., Ref. 11.