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The ISI and the War on Terrorism

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 30; Issue: 12 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10576100701670862

1521-0731

Shaun Gregory,

Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

Abstract Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence [ISI] plays an ambiguous role in the War on Terrorism. An important ally for Western intelligence with whom it has very close links, the ISI also has a long history of involvement in supporting and promoting terrorism in the name of Pakistan's geostrategic interests. This article explores the nature of the ISI and its aims and objectives in the post-9/11 era. It argues that the focus of the ISI's actions are to shore up Pakistan's ruling elite and to destabilize Pakistan's enemies by the promotion of Sunni Islamism at home and of pan-Islamist jihad abroad. The ISI's strategy, however, deeply conflicts with that of the West, a point underlined by the resurgence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban almost six years after the War on Terrorism began. With grave new trends evident in Pakistan, reliance on the ISI is failing and a Western rethink of its intelligence strategy toward Pakistan is now imperative. [T]he ISI is a disciplined force, for 27 years they have been doing what the government [of Pakistan] has been telling them. —President Pervez Musharraf, interview, London Times, 28 September 2006 The author thanks James Revill for research support and Gordon Corera, Christine Fair, and Julian Richards for help with various aspects of the article. Responsibility for any errors is entirely the author's. Notes 1. Major General William Cawthorne had been the Pakistan Army's first Director of Military Intelligence. See Sir Morrice James (Lord Saint Brides), Pakistan Chronicle (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 25. The author is indebted to Brian Cloughley and Ian Talbot for help with this history. 2. Intelligence Resource Program, "Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence," Federation of American Scientists, 1 May 2002. Available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi). 3. A helpful overview history of the ISI, from which this is taken, is: Sean P. Witchell, "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government," International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence 16(1) (Spring 2003), pp. 374–388. 4. The military had been de facto in control of Pakistan since the swearing in of Major General Iskander Mirza as Acting Governor General of Pakistan on 7 August 1955. 5. For useful context see Irm Haleem, "Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity Towards Praetorianism in Pakistan," Third World Quarterly 24(3) (Autumn 2003), pp. 463–477. 6. The politics of Bengali nationalism, the complexities of the struggle between East and West Pakistan, and the intricacies of the 1971 war are outside the scope of this article. For insight see: Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War of Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Abdul Rehman Siddiqi, East Pakistan: The Endgame 1969–71 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996). 7. It is worth recalling that Pakistan was a member of both the CENTO [1955] and SEATO [1954] alliances during this period and India, although non-aligned, had close relations with the Soviet Union. Pakistan thus found a ready ally in the CIA for ISI activities it could explain to the United States as part of the struggle against communism or against Soviet-inclined India. 8. Zulfakir Ali Bhutto, If I am Assassinated (New Delhi: Vikas Press, 1979). 9. The FSF was disbanded and many of its operatives arrested when Zia ul-Haq assumed power by military coup in 1977. 10. Hypocritically, given the ends to which he subsequently turned the ISI, General Zia ul-Haq castigated Bhutto for politicizing the ISI during his term of office, calling it the "political arm of the PPP." See Yashwant Deva Avsm, "ISI and its Chicanery in Exporting Terrorism," The India Defence Review, available at (http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/3328/idr00006.htm). 11. See Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the AQ Khan Network (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2006), pp. 12–14 and Witchell, "Pakistan's ISI," p. 378. 12. See James Ring Adams and Douglas Frantz, A Full Service Bank: How BCCI Stole Billions Around the World (New York: Simon and Schuster,1993); Jonathan Beaty and S. C. Gwyne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI (Maryland: Beard Books, 1993); Abid Ullah Jan, From BCCI to ISI: The Saga of Entrapment Continues (New York: Booksurge Press, 2006); and Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, BCCI: The Inside Story of the World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire (New York: Bloomsbury, 1992). 13. There are a number of excellent histories of this period; among the most insightful are: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947–1997 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), pp. 208–267 and Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism (New Haven: M. E. Sharpe Press, 2005), pp. 89–132. 14. Two key documents are Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq's addresses to the nation: "Introduction of Islamic Law," 10 February 1979 and "Islamic Order; Our Goal," 3 June 1980, both published by the Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. For analysis see: Craig Baxter, Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) and Surendra Naih Kaushik, Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: A Study of the Zia Regime (New Delhi: South Asia Publications, 1998). 15. Kathy Gannon, I is For Infidel (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 2005), pp. 127–149. 16. Islamism is used throughout this article to refer to an Islamic revivalism usually characterized by literalism, moral conservatism, and an attempt to implement increasingly radical Islamic values in all spheres of life, particularly in the law and politics. 17. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10 (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 63–64. 18. One source indicates that the ISI built up a store of at least three million small arms during this period. See Peter Chalk, "Light Arms Trading in South East Asia," Janes Intelligence Review, 1 March 2001, available at (http://www.rand.org/commentary/030101JIR.html). 19. An extremely helpful backgrounder is Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977–88: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). 20. The seven mujahidin leaders became known as the seven dwarfs. See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda's Road to 9/11 (London: Penguin/Allen Lane 2006), pp. 99–100. 21. George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History (New York: Grove/Atlantic Monthly, 2003), pp. 491–492. 22. Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism, p. 114. 23. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven; Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 129–130. 24. Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 251. 25. Two of the best studies of Al Qaeda remain, Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New Haven: Phoenix Press, 2002) and Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin Press, 2004). 26. Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zed Books, 1998). 27. Antoine Sfeir, Al Qaida Menace La France (Parfis: La Cherche-Midi, 2007). 28. John Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al Qaeda and the Rise of Global Jihad (London: Motorbooks International, 2007). 29. James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (Philapdelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 30. Sean O'Neil and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006). 31. Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 165. 32. Perhaps the best analysis of the crash, characterized as an assassination by some authors, is by Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism, pp. 124–132. 33. Witchell, Pakistan's ISI, pp. 380–381. 34. The political strength of the Pakistan presidency is shaped by the extent to which elite powers in Pakistan are willing to support it. A prime minister cannot retain office against the president's will if the president has the support of the Army, particularly where the Army is supported by other significant political forces in the country. 35. A useful insight is Phil Rees, Dining with Terrorists: Meetings with the World's Most Wanted Militants (London: Pan Books, 2006), pp. 275–276. 36. It was important to both the ISI and CIA that these weapons not include traceable U.S. hardware that could then expose Pakistan to claims of supporting the separatist violence and the United States to charges of wittingly or unwittingly supporting terrorist violence. 37. For an useful introduction see Charles Allen, God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Historical Roots of Modern Jihad (New York: Abacus Press, 2007). 38. The defining moment arguably was the Taliban taking over on 12 October 1994 the huge ISI weapons dump at Spin Boldak, originally earmarked for Hekmatyar. It is disputed whether this arms transfer was organized by the ISI or whether the Taliban made a payment to local Afghan commanders, but either way the symbolism was the same: a clear ISI shift from Hekmatyar to the Taliban. 39. For excellent analyses of this rise see Nematollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Press, 2002) and William Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2001). 40. Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 333. 41. The others, perhaps not surprisingly, were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 42. See: Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 121–144; see also Rohan Guranatna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2002). 43. Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 212. The ISI Director at this time, Lt. General Hamid Gul, held deeply Islamist and profoundly anti-Western views and was, and remains, an admirer of bin Laden and the Taliban. Gul is contentedly on record as blaming the United States and Mossad for the 9/11 attacks. See among many examples: Rediff Interview with Hamid Gul, 12 February 2004, available at (http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/12inter.htm). 44. Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 327. 45. Ibid., pp. 410–411. 46. For an expert development of these ideas see Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Reseaux Islamiques: La Connexion Afghano-Pakistanaise (Paris: Hachette, 2002). 47. See C. Christine Fair, "Pakistan: An Uncertain Partner in the Fight Against Terrorism," Chapter 2, The Counterterror Coalitions: Co-operation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica: Rand Report, 2004). 48. For example, U.S. economic aid to Pakistan jumped from $91 million in 2001 to $974 million in 2002. See Bessma Momani, "The IMF, the US War on Terrorism and Pakistan," Asian Affairs 31(1) (Spring 2004), p. 45. 49. See, for example, the data for Pakistan from the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys, available at (http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248). 50. Zahid Hussain, "The War Within," Newsline, 1 April 2003, available at (http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsApr2003/cover1apr2003.htm). 51. See, for example, "Pakistani Links Military to Failed Plot to Kill Him," New York Times, 28 May 2004, p. 12. 52. Tim McGirk, "Has Pakistan Tamed Its Spies?" Time Magazine, 6 May 2002, p. 34. 53. David Chazan, "Profile: Pakistan's Military Intelligence Agency," BBC News Online, available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1750265.stm). 54. Corera, Shopping for Bombs. It is clear from this study that the ISI were watching Khan and that at least two reports were delivered to the Pakistan government in 1989 and 1998–99 about Khan's activities (see pp. 96 and 145–147). Corera does not, however, directly explore the question of ISI involvement in supporting Khan. 55. This list is drawn from John Pike, "Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence [ISI]," Global Security, (26 April 2005), available at (http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/pakistan/isi.htm) and is supplemented with information from: Peter Chalk, "Pakistan's Role in the Kashmiri Insurgency," Jane's Intelligence Review (1 September 2001), reproduced at (http://www.rand.org/commentary/090101JIR.html) and B. Raman, "Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence [ISI]," SAAG Paper No. 287 (8 January 2001), available at (http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper287.html). 56. V. Belokrenitsky, "The ISI: Still Terrorism's Ally?" Terrorism Monitor 1(3) (October 2003), pp. 34–37. 57. Former ISI Director General Javed Ashraf Qazi, for example, said "no-one can make a career out the ISI … ISI people are serving military officers and after three years they are out." Quoted in Hussain, "The War Within." 58. First, if personnel really were being rotated out of the ISI every three years it would mean that the entire staff would change over each three-year period. This would be an enormous loss of institutional experience, memory, and efficiency and an enormous and unnecessary drain on resources to train people coming into the organization to replace those rotated out. It would also mean people leaving in the middle of operations and would carry the immense risk that those rotated out of the ISI would disseminate their knowledge outside the ISI. 59. In his role as Chief of the Army Staff [COAS], see Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002), p. 239. 60. This is not to imply that the Pakistan government is unaware of ISI involvement in these kinds of activities. A particularly important case is that of "gangster/terrorist" Dawood Ibrahim, whose long association with the ISI (and with Al Qaeda) and involvement in drug smuggling, crime, and money laundering risks exposing the degree of government complicity in these kinds of activities. This is one of many reasons why the Musharraf government will not allow Dawood to be handed over to the United States. See John Wilson, "Dawood's ISI Links Could Trouble Musharraf," Observer Research Foundation (2005), available at (http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A029.htm). 61. Although his statement that it had only been in the government's control since 1979 is thought provoking. 62. A recent example was the withdrawal of the British Military Attaché to Islamabad, reported in August 2005, who had allegedly been involved in a "honeytrap" operation and tricked into an inappropriate relationship with a female Pakistani "civilian defence academic" thought to be a rogue ISI operative. See: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4158958.stm) and (http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/aug-2005/18/index4.php). 63. There are many interesting features of these arrests, including that most of them have been in Pakistan's cities rather than in the wild tribal areas and that many of those arrested have been found in "safe houses" linked to Islamist political parties or Kashmiri terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed. 64. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 155–157 and 204–206 and Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistani Army Officers Arrested in Terror Swoop," The Daily Telegraph (1 September 2003). 65. Stephen Burgess, "Struggle for the Control of Pakistan: Musharraf Takes on the Islamist Radicals, US Air University Report" (2002), available at (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/know_thy_enemy/burgess.pdf). See also Douglas Jehl, "Pakistan Cutting it's Spy Unit Ties to Some Militants," The New York Times, 20 February 2002, p. 1. 66. Jaideep Saika, "The ISI Reaches East: Anatomy of a Consiracy," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25 (Spring 2002), pp. 185–197; S. Bhaumik, "Indian Rebels Sheltering in Bangladesh," BBC News (1 October 2002), available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2289916.stm); A. Jain, "Pakistan's ISI Terror Camps in Bangladesh," India Daily, 15 September 2004; H. Sekhon, "Bangladesh: A Haven for Pakistan's ISI," Strategic Trends, The Observer Research Foundation (27 September 2004). 67. See, for example, N. S. Jamwal, "Counter Terrorist Strategy," Strategic Analysis, IDSA (Spring 2003), available at (http://ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_jan03jan01.html) and Jaideep Saika, "Terror Sans Frontiers: Islamic Militancy in North East India," Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, (July 2003), available at (http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu:16080/Research/Ops/ Saika/SaikaOP.pdf). 68. See "Pakistan's ISI Tried to Infilitrate Nepal," India Daily, available at (http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/14321.asp). See also (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/11/mil-061121-irna02.htm). 69. "Pakistan-based Islamic Group Eyes Eastern Sir Lanka," Tamilnet (15 June 2004), available at (http://www.tamilnet.com.art.html?catid=79&artid=12219). 70. Bronwen Maddox, "How the Road to Terror Leads Back to Pakistan," The London Times, 11 August 2006, p. 13. 71. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of Bombing in London on 7 July 2005 (London: The Stationery Office, 2006) and ISC (Intelligence and Security Committee) Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (London: The Stationery Office, 2005). For an excellent analysis of the Pakistan connection to terrorism in the United Kingdom see Julian Richards, "Contemporary Terrorist Threats in the UK: The Pakistan Dimension," Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism 2(1) (Spring 2007), pp. 11–29. 72. Several of the alleged plotters made recent visits and reportedly received money wired from Pakistan. See CNN, "Terror Plot Leaves UK on Highest Level of Alert" (11 August 2006), available at (http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/08/11/terror.plot/index.html). 73. Almost all of the leading Al Qaeda figures captured or killed in Pakistan were located by U.S. or Western intelligence, rather than by the ISI. Indeed Pakistan's formulation that they "will act on actionable intelligence" neatly passes the onus to the United States and the West to initiate operations against Al Qaeda. 74. This was the plot two weeks after 7/7 to allegedly blow up four more suicide bombs on London's transport network. The alleged leader of the plot, Muktar Said-Ibrahim, allegedly began the plot after returning from a four-month trip to Pakistan in March 2005. He was thus in Pakistan at the same time as two of the suicide bombers who undertook the 7/7 bombings. See "21/7: The Trial," The London Times, 16 January 2007, available at (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/incomingFeeds/ article1293339.ece). 75. The clearest example of this is Pakistan's refusal to extradite O mar Saeed Sheikh. See Christina Lamb, "Just Whose Side is Pakistan Really On?" Sunday Times (13 August 2006), available at (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article607597.ece). See also Tom Regan, "Report: US Rendition Threat Forced Britain to Act on Airport Terror Plot," Christian Science Monitor, 2 October 2006. See also Musharraf's rebuttal: "West Will Fail Without Pakistan," 30 September 2006, BBC World News, available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5394278.stm). 76. For a critical view of Pakistan's role in the War on Terrorism see T. G. Carpenter, "Take the War on Terrorism to Pakistan," CATO Institute Paper (28 March 2002). 77. A very helpful study is C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(6) (November/December 2004), pp. 489–504. 78. As the DG of MI5 Dame Eliza Manningham Buller noted in relation to U.K. Islamic terrorist incidents, "plots often have links back to Al-Qaida [sic] in Pakistan and through those links Al-Qaida gives guidance and training to its largely British foot soldiers here on an extensive and growing [emphasis added] scale". For the full text of the speech see MI5's website at (http://www.mi5. gov.uk/output/Page568.html). 79. International Crisis Group, "Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism," ICG Report No 73 (16 January 2004). 80. Including Jamaat-I-Islami and the even more radical Deobandi-influenced Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam. 81. For a discussion of the ISI's role in the political fortunes of the MMA see B. F. Fitzgerald, "A New Deal for Pakistan?", Terrorism Monitor 2(3) (February 2004), pp. 1–3. 82. "Opposition Parties agree on Anti-Musharraf Alliance," The Daily Times [Pakistan] (5 September 2005). 83. An extremely helpful study is Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between the Mosque and the Military (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 84. Animesh Roul, "Sipah-e-Sahaba: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan," Terrorism Monitor 3(2) (January 2005), pp. 5–7. It would be a mistake to see sectarian violence in Pakistan only in terms of the ISI. There is a long and complex history to the conflicts, particularly since the Iranian revolution. For a good introduction see Musa Khan Jalalazai, Sectarianism and Political Violence in Pakistan (Lahore: Taleeb Books, 1993). 85. Tom Burgis, "US Fuels Pakistan Bounty Market," Financial Times, 28 September 2006, available at (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/bbd820b2-4f3a-11db-b600-0000779e2340.html). 86. See Amnesty International, "Pakistan: Growing Anger at Continuing Enforced Disappearances," available at (http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGASA330522006) and "BBC in Missing Pakistani Debate," BBC New Online, available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5142700.stm). An important resource that has collated information and media reportage on these disappearances can be found at (http://icssa.org/isi_victims.php?pg=1). 87. Despite its enormous influence the ISI has had many intelligence failures, not least in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Its greatest mistake and failure, however, may yet prove to be the promotion of Islamism, internally and regionally and the unleashing of forces it can no longer control. 88. For a superb analysis of this risk see Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). For prescient earlier analyses see Brahma Chellaney, "Fighting Terrorism in South Asia," International Security 26(3) (Winter 2001/2), pp. 94–116; Anatol Lieven, "Preserving Pakistan," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002), pp. 107–118 and William Maley, "The War Against Terrorism in South Asia," Contemporary South Asia 12(2) (June 2003), particularly pp. 207–208. 89. See John Negroponte, quoted in "Al Qaeda Rebuilding in Pakistan," BBC New Online (12 January 2007), available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6254375.stm). 90. The so-called Sargodha peace deal of February 2005 agreed the disengagement of Pakistani armed forces from the region in return for the commitment of tribal groups not to attack Pakistani forces. See Ismail Khan, "Waziristan Draft Accord Approved," Dawn, 2 February 2005. 91. Pazir Gul, "Waziristan Accord Signed," Dawn, 5 September 2006, p. 1. This deal also agreed a no-combat deal with tribal groups. 92. The Waziristan accords require tribal groups to "ensure the departure" of foreign fighters and end cross-border movement for militant activity but the Taliban and pro-Taliban tribal groups have not observed these terms and by agreeing to end the use of force the Pakistan military has no means to enforce such a request. At the same time the Northern Waziristan deal was announced Pakistan Army spokesman Major General Shaukat Sultan was widely reported as stating that a "no arrest" deal had been concluded with Osama bin Laden himself by the Pakistan military "provided he lived as a peaceful citizen." The remarks were subsequently renounced as a "gross misquote" and corrected by the Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, but there is no doubt that the Waziristan deals have left Al Qaeda and bin Laden/Al-Zawahiri at greater freedom than at any point since 9/11. See CNN, "Pakistan; No Bin Laden Arrest Deal" (6 September 2006), available at (www.cnn.com/2006/world/asiapcf/09/06/pakistan.afghanistan/index.html). 93. Eben Kaplan, "The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan," Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder Briefing, CFR (30 May 2006). 94. Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, "Terror Officials See AQ Chiefs Regaining Power," New York Post, 19 February 2007. 95. "Un groupe Allie d'Al-Qaeda annonce changer de nom sur 'ordre de Ben Laden"' (26 January 2007) Cassafree, available at (www.cassafree.com/modules/news/print/php?storyid=8230). For background see Shaun Gregory, "France and the War on Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 15(1) (Spring 2003), pp. 124–147. 96. Figures for the number of Madaris vary widely with as many as 50,000 suggested by some sources. However, the more modest figure of 13–14,000 by 2005–6 is probably more accurate. See "Special Report: School for Terror: Pakistan," The Economist, 19 August 2006. 97. F. Bokhari, "Third of Madrassas in Pakistan Defy Deadline," Financial Times, 30 December 2005, p. 8. Among those registered there is strong resistance to curricula reform, partly on the grounds that the Westernization/secularization of curricula is un-Islamic and partly because most Madaris received little or no money from the Pakistan government and thus are not susceptible to financial pressure. 98. Two of the best studies of Madaris are those by C. Christine Fair, Islamic Education in Pakistan (Washington: USIP 2006) and International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military," Report No. 36 (Islamabad: ICG, 2002). 99. An embedded point is that studies of Madaris do not and cannot provide data from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] of Pakistan where Islamist influence is strongest and so may underplay the problems. See Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaya, and Tristan Zajonc, "Madrassa Metrics: The Statistics and Rhetoric of Religious Enrollment in Pakistan," available at (http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~akhwaja/papers/madrassas_beyondcrisis_final.pdf). 100. See for example the data from the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys, available at (http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248). 101. The rationale and role of Pakistan in supporting the Taliban uprising in 2007 is explored in Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Pakistan, The Taliban and Dadullah," PSRU Report No. 3 (Bradford; March 2007). 102. B. Raman, "Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Toiba," SAAG Paper, No. 678 (New Delhi, 2003). 103. One of the key concerns here is Jamaat-I-Islami, a significant player in Pakistan's National Assembly and one of the Pakistan government's partner parties under the MMA banner. JI party members have a long track record of association with Al Qaeda operatives and Kashmiri separatist/terrorist groups.