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Welfare State Restructuring without Grand Coalitions: The Role of Informal Cooperation in Blame Avoidance

2008; Routledge; Volume: 17; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09644000802075757

1743-8993

Martin Hering,

Social Policy and Reform Studies

Abstract This article argues that welfare state restructuring, which is highly unpopular among voters, is politically feasible if government and opposition parties cooperate informally with one another. Contrary to what key arguments made in the literature assert, restructuring does not require the formation of a grand coalition to diffuse blame from voters. Informal cooperation between parties is a distinctive blame-avoiding strategy, which differs not only from other party-oriented strategies such as building a grand coalition, but also from voter-oriented ones, such as obfuscation and exemption. By analysing the politics of pension reform in Germany, this article shows that informal cooperation enables political parties to restructure the welfare state without running the risk of electoral failure. Notes The author wishes to thank Christopher Hood, Alina Gildiner, Peter Graefe, Moshe Maor, Charles D. Raab, R. 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